Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

TARP announcement,bank health,and borrowers’ credit risk

Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.     

Liquidity risk and syndicate structure

We decompose syndicated loan risk into credit, market, and liquidity risk and test how these shape syndicate structure. Commercial banks dominate relative to non-banks in loan syndicates that expose lenders to liquidity risk. This dominance is most pronounced when borrowers have high levels of credit or market risk. We then tie commercial banks’ advantage in liquidity risk to access to transactions deposits by comparing investments across banks. The results suggest that risk-management considerations matter most for participants relative to lead arrangers. Links from transactions deposits to liquidity exposure, for instance, are more than 50% larger at participants than at lead arrangers.     

How do global banks scramble for liquidity? Evidence from the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007

We investigate how banks scrambled for liquidity following the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market freeze of August 2007 and its implications for corporate borrowing. Commercial banks in the United States raised dollar deposits and took advances from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), while foreign banks had limited access to such alternative dollar funding. Relative to before the ABCP freeze and relative to their non-dollar lending, foreign banks with ABCP exposure charged higher interest rates to corporations for dollar-denominated syndicated loans. The results point to a funding risk manifesting as currency shortages for banks engaged in maturity transformation in foreign countries.     

ASSET BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER: GET WITH THE PROGRAM

Asset backed commercial paper, or ABCP for short, is commercial paper that is issued by a special purpose corporation against undivided interests in corporate receivables, including retail, trade, or export receivables. Since the inception of the market in 1983, the volume of ABCP has grown to represent about 16% of the total commercial paper market.
ABCP is a valuable source of liquidity for companies that generate a steady flow of quality receivables. Many ABCP programs restrict purchases to companies with investment grade ratings. For such companies, ABCP may help diversify funding sources and allow the firms to lower their funding costs by arbitraging different markets. But ABCP programs can also prove a low-cost source of funding for companies that either do not have access to the CP market through their own balance sheets or have used up their prime CP and bank borrowing capacity. ABCP is also an important source of funds for smaller companies requiring liquidity to support rapid growth.
ABCP programs can be viewed as "synthetic" revolving bank credit facilities in the sense that they can provide the same flow of funds as revolving credits by using a vehicle constructed specifically to refinance pools of receivables. The benefits of ABCP relative to bank lines of credit may take the form of either lower interest rates, less restrictive financial covenants, or both. Although ABCP is at best a partial substitute for bank credit, the liquidity provided by an asset backed commercial paper program can be used to hold down the costs of bank borrowing.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Credit lines as monitored liquidity insurance: Theory and evidence

We propose a theory of credit lines provided by banks to firms as a form of monitored liquidity insurance. Bank monitoring and resulting revocations help control illiquidity-seeking behavior of firms insured by credit lines. The cost of credit lines is thus greater for firms with high liquidity risk, which in turn are likely to use cash instead of credit lines. We test this implication for corporate liquidity management by identifying exogenous shocks to liquidity risk of firms in corporate bond and equity markets. Firms experiencing increases in liquidity risk move out of credit lines and into cash holdings.     

Asymmetric transmission of a bank liquidity shock

We investigate whether banks that receive a positive liquidity shock make up for the reduction in the amount of credit supplied by banks that suffer a negative liquidity shock. For identification, we use the exogenous shock to the Brazilian banking system caused by the international turmoil of 2008 that sparked a run on small and medium banks toward systemically important banks. We find that a reduction in liquidity causes banks to strongly decrease their loan supply, whereas a positive liquidity shock has a small (if any) effect on the loan supply. Our evidence shows that this asymmetric effect of liquidity on the loan supply occurs both at the intensive and the extensive margins. Our findings are consistent with the theories that predict that borrowers face switching costs and that banks tend to hold on to liquidity during periods of systemic uncertainty.     

Aggregate Risk and the Choice between Cash and Lines of Credit

Banks can create liquidity for firms by pooling their idiosyncratic risks. As a result, bank lines of credit to firms with greater aggregate risk should be costlier and such firms opt for cash in spite of the incurred liquidity premium. We find empirical support for this novel theoretical insight. Firms with higher beta have a higher ratio of cash to credit lines and face greater costs on their lines. In times of heightened aggregate volatility, banks exposed to undrawn credit lines become riskier; bank credit lines feature fewer initiations, higher spreads, and shorter maturity; and, firms’ cash reserves rise.     

Do Federal Home Loan Bank membership and advances increase bank risk-taking?

Since the early 1990s, commercial banks have turned to Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLBank) advances to plug the gap between loan and deposit growth. Is this trend worrisome? On the one hand, advances implicitly encourage risk by insulating borrowers from market discipline. On the other, advances give borrowers greater flexibility to managing interest rate and liquidity risk. And access to FHLBank funding encourages members to reshape their balance sheets in ways that could lower credit risk. Using quarterly financial and supervisory data for banks from 1992 to 2005, we assess the effect of FHLBank membership and advances on risk. The evidence suggests liquidity and leverage risks rose modestly, but interest-rate risk declined somewhat. Credit risk and overall failure risk were largely unaffected. Although the evidence suggest FHLBank membership and advances have had, at best, only a modest impact on bank risk, we caution that our sample period constitutes one observation and that moral hazard could be pronounced if leverage ratios revert to historical norms.     

Currency-Induced Credit Risk in a Dollarized Economy

We analyze the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on corporate credit default in a dollarized economy. The application, before an exogenous exchange rate shock, of a new regulation concerning currency-induced credit risk (CICR) in the Peruvian banking system created natural conditions for a comparison between exposed and unexposed corporate borrowers. We use firm-level data to find that CICR and debt dollarization have opposite effects on credit risk. While CICR increases default, debt dollarization reduces it. Our results suggest that banks transfer exchange risk as a hedging mechanism by lending to such borrowers in dollars only.     

货币政策对流动性风险的影响——基于银行信贷行为视角

本文基于我国现实背景和《巴塞尔协议Ⅲ》,利用2008年至2017年间194家商业银行的相关数据,对我国银行净稳定资金率进行了度量,并在此基础上,检验了货币政策对我国商业银行流动性风险的影响,探究了其影响机理和传导渠道。研究表明:扩张型货币政策会提高商业银行的流动性风险;不同经济环境下,货币政策对流动性风险的影响存在差异但不具备异质性;不同类型的商业银行中,货币政策对流动性风险的影响不具有异质性;在货币政策对流动性风险的影响中,银行信贷行为是重要的传导渠道。因此,央行可基于货币政策对流动性风险的影响差异进行相机抉择;商业银行则要加强信贷规模和质量的管理,优化资产结构,通过弱化信贷渠道作用来降低货币政策对银行流动性风险的不良影响。     

Bank Heterogeneity and Interest Rate Setting: What Lessons Have We Learned since Lehman Brothers?

A substantial literature has investigated the role of relationship lending in shielding borrowers from idiosyncratic shocks. Much less is known about how lending relationships and bank‐specific characteristics affect the functioning of the credit market in an economy‐wide crisis. We investigate how bank and bank–firm relationship characteristics have influenced interest rate setting since the collapse of Lehman Brothers. We find that interest rate spreads increased by less for those borrowers having closer lending relationships. Furthermore, firms borrowing from banks endowed with large capital and liquidity buffers and from banks engaged mainly in traditional lending were kept more insulated from the financial crisis.     

The relationship between liquidity risk and credit risk in banks

This paper investigates the relationship between the two major sources of bank default risk: liquidity risk and credit risk. We use a sample of virtually all US commercial banks during the period 1998–2010 to analyze the relationship between these two risk sources on the bank institutional-level and how this relationship influences banks’ probabilities of default (PD). Our results show that both risk categories do not have an economically meaningful reciprocal contemporaneous or time-lagged relationship. However, they do influence banks’ probability of default. This effect is twofold: whereas both risks separately increase the PD, the influence of their interaction depends on the overall level of bank risk and can either aggravate or mitigate default risk. These results provide new insights into the understanding of bank risk and serve as an underpinning for recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening banks (joint) risk management of liquidity and credit risks.     

Bank-level stability factors and consumer confidence – A comparative study of Islamic and conventional banks’ product mix

This study examines the behaviour of key bank-level stability factors of liquidity, capital, risk-taking and consumer confidence in Islamic and conventional banks that operate in the same market. Using fixed effect for a sample of 194 banks of Gulf Cooperation Countries between 2000 and 2007, we found that liquidity is not determined by the bank's product mix but rather attributed to systematic factors. However, non-performing assets (representing loans to sub-prime borrowers) have a positive and significant relationship with liquidity, implying that during the crisis Islamic banks tend to take stringent risk strategies compared to conventional banks. Furthermore, Islamic banks generally tend to provide higher consumer confidence levels as they were more capitalized than conventional banks, although conventional banks had carried higher averages of liquidity compared to Islamic banks. Consumer confidence levels or depositors’ discipline as proxied by deposits and customer funding over liabilities generally appear to be higher in Islamic banks than conventional banks.     

What drives the cost of US dollar bond funding for banks?

This paper decomposes issue spreads on US dollar-denominated bonds issued by LIBOR panel banks into credit risk and liquidity premium components. We attribute the recent increase in issue spreads to the investor perception that banks are less creditworthy than in the past. Although the behaviour of the credit risk component is well-explained by a structural model of default, this mechanism is nullified by the introduction of government guarantees. The behaviour of the liquidity premium component is partially explained by the bid/ask spread in the secondary market and issue size. Government guarantees also reduce the liquidity component of the issue spread.     

Bank capitalization and lending behavior after the introduction of the Basle Accord

In this paper, we provide evidence that banks with a low level of capitalization have reduced their commitment with respect to lines of credit after the introduction of the Basle Accord. A bank's lending behavior reflects its level of commitment towards borrowers, which in turn affects the level of effort it exerts on screening and monitoring the activities of borrowers. We find that the post-Basle Accord market reaction to the announcement of lines of credit issued by banks with a low level of capitalization is significantly lower than the reaction to other types of bank credit announcements. We interpret this result as evidence that some banks have a low level of commitment associated with lines of credit after the Basle Accord.

The changing structure of local credit markets: Are small businesses special?

In many countries consolidation in the banking industry has reduced the number of small banks and led to significant shifts in market shares; deregulation has fostered entry in local credit markets and the expansion of branch networks, increasing competition in local markets. Small businesses are believed to be more vulnerable to these changes, since they are more dependent on credit from local banks. In this paper we investigate the consequences of consolidation and entry for these borrowers compared with those for large firms. We employ a data set for Italy, which provides information on volumes of loans and bad loans by size of borrower with a detailed geographical partition. We find that mergers are followed by a temporary reduction in outstanding credit to all sizes of borrowers and by an increase in bad loans, most likely due to the reassessment of banks portfolios. Entry has a relatively persistent negative impact on credit supply to small and medium-sized firms. Our results also show that concentration, branch density and the share of branches of small banks affect the volumes of credit and bad loans of small borrowers.     

Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

Banks have a unique ability to hedge against market‐wide liquidity shocks. Deposit inflows provide funding for loan demand shocks that follow declines in market liquidity. Consequently, banks can insure firms against systematic declines in liquidity at lower cost than other institutions. We provide evidence that when liquidity dries up and commercial paper spreads widen, banks experience funding inflows. These flows allow banks to meet loan demand from borrowers drawing funds from commercial paper backup lines without running down their holdings of liquid assets. We also provide evidence that implicit government support for banks during crises explains these funding flows.     

Information verifiability, bank organization, bank competition and bank-borrower relationships

This paper investigates whether the benefits of bank-borrower relationships differ depending on three factors identified in the theoretical literature: verifiability of information, bank size and complexity, and bank competition. We extend the current literature by analyzing how relationship lending affects loan contract terms and credit availability in an empirical model that simultaneously accounts for all three of these factors. Based on Japanese survey data we find evidence that the benefits from stronger bank-borrower relationships in terms of credit availability are limited to smaller banks. However, when the benefits are measured as improved credit terms, we find little additional benefit, and in some cases increased cost, from stronger relationships for opaque borrowers and for borrowers who get funding from small banks. These latter findings suggest the possibility that relationship borrowers may suffer from capture effects.