The Price Impact and Survival of Irrational Traders

Milton Friedman argued that irrational traders will consistently lose money, will not survive, and, therefore, cannot influence long‐run asset prices. Since his work, survival and price impact have been assumed to be the same. In this paper, we demonstrate that survival and price impact are two independent concepts. The price impact of irrational traders does not rely on their long‐run survival, and they can have a significant impact on asset prices even when their wealth becomes negligible. We also show that irrational traders' portfolio policies can deviate from their limits long after the price process approaches its long‐run limit.     

Disclosure Risk and Price Drift

Disclosures play an apparently critical role in the empirical regularity of the short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal in stock returns. Motivated by this evidence, this paper integrates an analysis of disclosures within an asset pricing model to arrive at a framework in which disclosures and asset returns are jointly determined. Disclosures resolve uncertainty, but the increased information flow also raises the risks during the disclosure period. When disclosures and asset returns are modeled jointly, apparently good news is associated with the upward revision of future disclosure risks. The model generates predictions that have the outward appearance of short‐run momentum and long‐run reversal.     

Net Asset Value Discounts for Asian-Pacific Real Estate Companies: Long-Run Relationships and Short-Term Dynamics

This study investigates the time series behavior of real estate company net asset value discount/premium (NAVDISC) in eight Asian-Pacific securitized real estate markets from 1995 to 2003. We postulate that if there is a stable NAVDISC for real estate companies in the long-run, then there should be a long-run cointegrating relation between their stock prices (Ps) and net asset values (NAVs). Employing panel data cointegration econometrics that comprises three approaches; panel unit root test, heterogeneous panel cointegration test and dynamic panel error-correction modeling (ECM), we find that long run NAVDISCs persist in individual Asian-Pacific securitized real estate markets and the regional market. All the NAVDISCs exhibit mean reversion and that the respective disequilibrium errors fluctuate around the mean values. Moreover, NAV is an important factor that statistically explains the price variations in real estate stock prices regardless of their speed of mean-reversion in the NAV discount /premium.     

Innovation,Growth, and Asset Prices

We examine the asset pricing implications of a production economy whose long‐term growth prospects are endogenously determined by innovation and R&D. In equilibrium, R&D endogenously drives a small, persistent component in productivity that generates long‐run uncertainty about economic growth. With recursive preferences, households fear that persistent downturns in economic growth are accompanied by low asset valuations and command high‐risk premia in asset markets. Empirically, we find substantial evidence for innovation‐driven low‐frequency movements in aggregate growth rates and asset market valuations. In short, equilibrium growth is risky.     

Long‐Run Stockholder Consumption Risk and Asset Returns

We provide new evidence on the success of long‐run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long‐run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross‐sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross‐section of stocks.     

Nonlinearity and Flight‐to‐Safety in the Risk‐Return Trade‐Off for Stocks and Bonds

We document a highly significant, strongly nonlinear dependence of stock and bond returns on past equity market volatility as measured by the VIX. We propose a new estimator for the shape of the nonlinear forecasting relationship that exploits variation in the cross‐section of returns. The nonlinearities are mirror images for stocks and bonds, revealing flight‐to‐safety: expected returns increase for stocks when volatility increases from moderate to high levels while they decline for Treasuries. These findings provide support for dynamic asset pricing theories in which the price of risk is a nonlinear function of market volatility.     

Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution of Asset Pricing Puzzles

We model consumption and dividend growth rates as containing (1) a small long‐run predictable component, and (2) fluctuating economic uncertainty (consumption volatility). These dynamics, for which we provide empirical support, in conjunction with Epstein and Zin's (1989) preferences, can explain key asset markets phenomena. In our economy, financial markets dislike economic uncertainty and better long‐run growth prospects raise equity prices. The model can justify the equity premium, the risk‐free rate, and the volatility of the market return, risk‐free rate, and the price–dividend ratio. As in the data, dividend yields predict returns and the volatility of returns is time‐varying.     

STOCK PRICES AND INFLATION

Numerous empirical studies establish that inflation has a negative short‐run effect on stock returns but few studies report a positive, long‐run Fisher effect for stock returns. Using stock price and goods price data from six industrial countries, we show that long‐run Fisher elasticities of stock prices with respect to goods prices exceed unity and range from 1.04 to 1.65, which tends to support the Fisher effect. We also find that the time path of the response of stock prices to a shock in goods prices exhibits an initial negative response, which turns positive over longer horizons. These results help reconcile previous short‐run and long‐run empirical evidence on stock returns and inflation. Also, they reveal that stock prices have a long memory with respect to inflation shocks, such that investors should expect stocks to be a good inflation hedge over a long holding period. JEL Classification: G12     

Long‐Run Stock Performance and Its Determinants for Asset Buyers

This paper examines the long‐term stock performance of asset purchasers and the determinants of cross‐sectional differences in performance. Our findings show that buyers’ stocks, on average, underperform following purchases. Buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns of buyers acquiring related assets are significantly higher than those acquiring unrelated assets, consistent with the focus hypothesis. Asset buyers with superior prior stock performance experience poorer long‐run performance than buyers with inferior prior stock performance, consistent with the prior performance hypothesis. Asset buyers that manage earnings upward, experience poorer long‐term abnormal stock performance than acquirers with downward earnings management, consistent with the earnings management hypothesis. The long‐term return evidence is to some degree consistent with the governance hypothesis but we find little support for the free cash flow hypothesis.     

The Moving Average Ratio and Momentum

I show the ratio of the short‐term moving average to the long‐term moving average (moving average ratio, MAR) has significant predictive power for future returns. The MAR combined with nearness to the 52‐week high explains most of the intermediate‐term momentum profits. This suggests that an anchoring bias, in which investors use moving averages or the 52‐week high as reference points for estimating fundamental values, is the primary source of momentum effects. Momentum caused by the anchoring bias do not disappear in the long‐run even when there are return reversals, confirming that intermediate‐term momentum and long‐term reversals are separate phenomena.     

A New Model of Inflation,Trend Inflation,and Long‐Run Inflation Expectations

This paper develops a bivariate model of inflation and a survey‐based long‐run forecast of inflation that allows for the estimation of the link between trend inflation and the long‐run forecast. Thus, our model allows for the possibilities that long‐run forecasts taken from surveys can be equated with trend inflation, that the two are completely unrelated, or anything in between. Using a variety of inflation measures and survey‐based forecasts for several countries, we find that long‐run forecasts can provide substantial help in refining estimates and fitting and forecasting inflation. It is less helpful to simply equate trend inflation with the long‐run forecasts.     

Imperfect Information and Stock Market Volatility

The purpose of this paper is to (1) develop a model to show how imperfect information can create excess volatility in asset returns and (2) provide empirical evidence consistent with the model. In this framework, variations in information quality cause the market prices to fluctuate more than the corresponding economic fundamentals. Using high‐frequency data from 1988 to 2002, the empirical evidence supports the predictions of the model by showing that economic volatility, defined as squared deviations of the quarterly gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate from its long‐run trend, can explain about half of the variation in S&P 500‐stock index quarterly volatility.     

EVIDENCE ON DELTA HEDGING AND IMPLIED VOLATILITIES FOR THE BLACK‐SCHOLES,GAMMA, AND WEIBULL OPTION PRICING MODELS

Modifying the distributional assumptions of the Black‐Scholes model is one way to accommodate the skewness of underlying asset returns. Simple models based on the compensated gamma and Weibull distributions of asset prices are shown to produce some improvements in option pricing. To evaluate these assertions, I construct and compare delta hedges of all S&P 500 options traded on the Chicago Board Options Exchange between September 2001 and October 2003 for the Weibull, Black‐Scholes, and gamma models. I also compare implied volatilities and their smiles (i.e., nonlinearities) among the three models. None of the three models improves over the others as far as delta hedging is concerned. Volatilities implied by all three models exhibit statistically significant smiles.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

Stock Returns and Volatility: Pricing the Short‐Run and Long‐Run Components of Market Risk

We explore the cross‐sectional pricing of volatility risk by decomposing equity market volatility into short‐ and long‐run components. Our finding that prices of risk are negative and significant for both volatility components implies that investors pay for insurance against increases in volatility, even if those increases have little persistence. The short‐run component captures market skewness risk, which we interpret as a measure of the tightness of financial constraints. The long‐run component relates to business cycle risk. Furthermore, a three‐factor pricing model with the market return and the two volatility components compares favorably to benchmark models.     

Learning about Consumption Dynamics

This paper characterizes U.S. consumption dynamics from the perspective of a Bayesian agent who does not know the underlying model structure but learns over time from macroeconomic data. Realistic, high‐dimensional macroeconomic learning problems, which entail parameter, model, and state learning, generate substantially different subjective beliefs about consumption dynamics compared to the standard, full‐information rational expectations benchmark. Beliefs about long‐run dynamics are volatile, with counter‐cyclical conditional volatility, and drift over time. Embedding these beliefs in a standard asset pricing model significantly improves the model's ability to match the stylized facts, as well as the sample path of the market price‐dividend ratio.     

Time‐Varying Asset Volatility and the Credit Spread Puzzle

Most extant structural credit risk models underestimate credit spreads—a shortcoming known as the credit spread puzzle. We consider a model with priced stochastic asset risk that is able to fit medium‐ to long‐term spreads. The model, augmented by jumps to help explain short‐term spreads, is estimated on firm‐level data and identifies significant asset variance risk premia. An important feature of the model is the significant time variation in risk premia induced by the uncertainty about asset risk. Various extensions are considered, among them optimal leverage and endogenous default.     

The Evolution of a Financial Crisis: Collapse of the Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Market

This paper documents “runs” on asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) programs in 2007. We find that one‐third of programs experienced a run within weeks of the onset of the ABCP crisis and that runs, as well as yields and maturities for new issues, were related to program‐level and macro‐financial risks. These findings are consistent with the asymmetric information framework used to explain banking panics, have implications for commercial paper investors’ degree of risk intolerance, and inform empirical predictions of recent papers on dynamic coordination failures.     

Valuing Government Obligations When Markets Are Incomplete

We simulate a 10‐period overlapping generations model with aggregate shocks to price safe and risky government obligations using consumption‐asset pricing. Agents cannot trade with future generations to hedge the model's productivity and depreciation shocks, and can only invest in one‐period bonds and risky capital. We find that the pricing of short‐ and long‐dated riskless obligations is anchored to the prevailing risk‐free return. The prices of obligations whose values are proportional to the prevailing wage are essentially identical to those of safe obligations, notwithstanding large macro shocks. On the contrary, government obligations in the form of options entail significant risk adjustment.     

Measurement Error and Nonlinearity in the Earnings-Returns Relation

There is a long history of research which examines the relation between unexpected earnings and unexpected returns on common stock. Early literature used simple linear regression models to describe this relation. Recently, a number of authors have proposed nonlinear models. These authors find that the earnings-returns relation is approximately linear for small changes but is 'S'-shaped globally. However, unexpected earnings are generated by the sum of a measurement error and a true earnings innovation, so the apparent nonlinearity could be an artifact of nonlinearity in the measurement errors. Using a research design that minimizes the presence of measurement errors, we provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that measurement errors contribute to the nonlinearities in the earnings-returns relation. While we are not suggesting that the earnings-returns relation is linear, our evidence suggests that there is no advantage to using a nonlinear model for large firms that are widely followed by analysts.