ASSET BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER: GET WITH THE PROGRAM

Asset backed commercial paper, or ABCP for short, is commercial paper that is issued by a special purpose corporation against undivided interests in corporate receivables, including retail, trade, or export receivables. Since the inception of the market in 1983, the volume of ABCP has grown to represent about 16% of the total commercial paper market.
ABCP is a valuable source of liquidity for companies that generate a steady flow of quality receivables. Many ABCP programs restrict purchases to companies with investment grade ratings. For such companies, ABCP may help diversify funding sources and allow the firms to lower their funding costs by arbitraging different markets. But ABCP programs can also prove a low-cost source of funding for companies that either do not have access to the CP market through their own balance sheets or have used up their prime CP and bank borrowing capacity. ABCP is also an important source of funds for smaller companies requiring liquidity to support rapid growth.
ABCP programs can be viewed as "synthetic" revolving bank credit facilities in the sense that they can provide the same flow of funds as revolving credits by using a vehicle constructed specifically to refinance pools of receivables. The benefits of ABCP relative to bank lines of credit may take the form of either lower interest rates, less restrictive financial covenants, or both. Although ABCP is at best a partial substitute for bank credit, the liquidity provided by an asset backed commercial paper program can be used to hold down the costs of bank borrowing.     

Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis

We use the 2007 asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) crisis as a laboratory to study the determinants of debt runs. Our model features dilution risk: maturing short-term lenders demand higher yields in compensation for being diluted by future lenders, making runs more likely. The model explains the observed tenfold increase in yield spreads leading to runs and the positive relation between yield spreads and future runs. Results from structural estimation show that runs are very sensitive to leverage, asset values, and asset liquidity, but less sensitive to the degree of maturity mismatch, the strength of guarantees, and asset volatility.     

Altering Investment Decisions to Manage Financial Reporting Outcomes: Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Conduits and FIN 46

We evaluate the manner in which sponsors of highly leveraged asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits responded to Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities an Interpretation of ARB No. 51, and its Canadian counterpart Accounting Standards Board of Accounting Guideline 15 (AcG‐15), Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities. By matching commercial paper investors with corporations seeking liquidity, ABCP sponsors facilitate a significant amount of short‐term, securitized financing in the United States. FIN 46 and AcG‐15 require sponsors to consolidate their ABCP conduits with their financial statements. We demonstrate that the volume of ABCP began to decline when FIN 46 was first proposed, and that this decline is primarily attributable to a reduction in North American banks' sponsorship of ABCP. We also demonstrate that North American banks entered into costly restructuring arrangements to avoid having to consolidate their conduits per the new accounting standards. Our results suggest that, in certain settings, accounting standards appear to have real effects on investment activity and product‐market competition.     

Bank lines of credit as contingent liquidity: Covenant violations and their implications

We examine the relation between banks’ liquidity risk and their willingness to supply capital to borrowers under previously committed credit lines. We show that during the collapse of the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the last quarter of 2007 and the first half of 2008, banks with higher exposure to ABCP conduits renegotiated significantly tougher conditions on the outstanding credit lines offered to borrowers in violation of a covenant. Specifically, we find that borrowers faced higher spreads over the prime rate and LIBOR as well as higher commitment fees on undrawn amounts. Our paper suggests that an increase in lender liquidity risk can bear financial implications for firms that use credit lines as an instrument of liquidity management.     

Banks' Liquidity and the Cost of Liquidity to Corporations

We consider the liquidity shock banks experienced following the collapse of the asset‐backed commercial paper (ABCP) market in the fall of 2007 to investigate whether banks' liquidity conditions affect their ability to provide liquidity to corporations. We find that banks that borrowed more from the Federal Home Loan Bank system or the Federal Reserve's discount window following that liquidity shock passed a larger portion of their borrowing costs onto corporations seeking access to liquidity when compared to the precrisis period. This increase is larger among banks with a bigger exposure to the ABCP market, credit lines that pose more liquidity risk to banks, and borrowers that are likely dependent on the credit‐line provider. Our findings show that the crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.     

How do global banks scramble for liquidity? Evidence from the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007

We investigate how banks scrambled for liquidity following the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market freeze of August 2007 and its implications for corporate borrowing. Commercial banks in the United States raised dollar deposits and took advances from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs), while foreign banks had limited access to such alternative dollar funding. Relative to before the ABCP freeze and relative to their non-dollar lending, foreign banks with ABCP exposure charged higher interest rates to corporations for dollar-denominated syndicated loans. The results point to a funding risk manifesting as currency shortages for banks engaged in maturity transformation in foreign countries.     

Sizing Up Repo

To understand which short‐term debt markets experienced “runs” during the financial crisis, we analyze a novel data set of repurchase agreements (repo), that is, loans between nonbank cash lenders and dealer banks collateralized with securities. Consistent with a run, repo volume backed by private asset‐backed securities falls to near zero in the crisis. However, the reduction is only $182 billion, which is small relative to the stock of private asset‐backed securities as well as the contraction in asset‐backed commercial paper. While the repo contraction is small in aggregate, it disproportionately affected a few dealer banks.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Syndicated Leveraged Loans During and After the Crisis and the Role of the Shadow Banking System

In an article published in this journal in 1998, Nobel laureate Merton Miller argued that one of the best weapons available to national economies in their defense against the macroeconomic effects of banking crises is the availability of non‐bank financial institutions and products—or what we now refer to as the “shadow banking system.” Although Miller may have exaggerated the independence of bank‐ and market‐based sources of financing, the author argues that events during and after the recent crisis have shown Miller's claims about the importance of non‐bank investors in the provision of credit to be fundamentally correct. Critics of securitization and the shadow banking system tend to focus on the subprime mortgage story in which the sudden re‐pricing of credit risk and the resulting disappearance of investment demand for ABCP, private‐label mortgage‐related ABS, and ABS CDOs created unexpected and significant downward price pressure on those asset types. But the leveraged loan market tells a very different story. In contrast to the near complete disappearance of private mortgage securitizations, the extraordinary recovery of the U.S. syndicated leveraged loan market demonstrates that the relation between commercial and shadow banking has proved to be a highly productive and resilient one—and very much a two‐way street. When leveraged loans and CLOs experienced problems from 2007 through 2009 due primarily to the widespread liquidity and credit market disruptions that affected essentially all structured credit products, institutional investors in leveraged loans disappeared and the leveraged loan primary market imploded. But when institutional participants recognized the value of the underlying asset—corporate loans—and regained confidence in shadow‐banking products, leveraged lending by banks recovered quickly and dramatically. This outcome is viewed as vindicating Professor Miller's statement about the benefits of shadow markets and securitization— namely, the role of non‐bank investors in diversifying the risk of credit creation while at the same time improving the price discovery process in different markets. The recent history of the U.S. leveraged loan market demonstrates that shadow banking system participants play a critical role in meeting the total demand for such loans, and that the ebbs and flows from institutional leveraged loan markets are strongly connected with the health and integrity of the underlying leveraged bank loan market.     

Depositor Behavior under Macroeconomic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies

Depositor behavior has been associated with bank‐specific characteristics, random runs, or contagion episodes. Using evidence on the 2000–02 bank runs in Argentina and Uruguay, this paper shows that macroeconomic risk is also important. Few macroeconomic shocks can quickly cause large runs. Macroeconomic risk affects deposits regardless of traditional bank‐specific characteristics. Furthermore, bank exposure to macroeconomic factors can explain differences in deposit withdrawals. During crises, the evolution of bank‐specific characteristics is mainly driven by macroeconomic factors, while the informational content of bank‐specific variables declines. Overall, depositors seem responsive to risk in a broader sense than that often considered by the literature.     

电子货币视角下的商业银行流动性需求

电子货币的快速发展已经给传统金融理论带来了挑战,特别是对以货币作为经营对象的商业银行经营管理产生了明显的冲击。文章以电子货币发展为视角,尝试性地引入凯恩斯的货币需求理论分析商业银行的流动性需求,旨在为商业银行的流动性管理提供有益的思路。     

The effect of IMF lending on the probability of sovereign debt crises

This paper explores empirically how the adoption of IMF programs affects sovereign risk over the medium term. We find that IMF programs significantly increase the probability of subsequent sovereign defaults by approximately 1.5–2 percentage points. These results cannot be attributed to endogeneity bias as they are supported by specifications that explain sovereign defaults and program participation simultaneously. Furthermore, IMF programs turn out to be especially detrimental to fiscal solvency when the Fund distributes its resources to countries whose economic fundamentals are already weak. Our evidence is therefore consistent with the hypothesis that debtor moral hazard is most likely to occur in these circumstances. Other explanations that point to the effects of debt dilution and the possibility of IMF triggered debt runs, however, are also possible.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

Do Bank Relationships Affect the Firm's Underwriter Choice in the Corporate‐Bond Underwriting Market?

This paper studies the effect of bank relationships on underwriter choice in the U.S. corporate‐bond underwriting market following the 1989 commercial‐bank entry. I find that bank relationships have positive and significant effects on a firm's underwriter choice, over and above their effects on fees. This result is sharply stronger for junk‐bond issuers and first‐time issuers. I also find that there is a significant fee discount when there are relationships between firms and commercial banks. Finally, I find that serving as arranger of past loan transactions has the strongest effect on underwriter choice, whereas serving merely as participant has no effect.     

人民币升值对我国银行业影响的实证分析

随着我国外汇业务的逐渐成熟,人民币升值的呼声愈来愈高,汇率的频繁波动已是无法避免。通过实证分析来具体量化汇率变动对商业银行所造成的正负面影响,进而分析人民币升值对我国银行业稳定性的影响程度。     

Reprint of: Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.     

How Does the Corporate World Cope with Mega‐Terrorism? Puzzling Evidence from Terrorism Insurance Markets

Terrorist attacks that have succeeded abroad since 2001, as well as others that were prevented, indicate that the threat of a large‐scale attack is real and will be with us for a long time. Focusing on the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, this article analyzes the role that insurance can play in providing commercial enterprises with financial protection against the economic consequences of major terrorist attacks. The article begins by explaining the design and key features of terrorism insurance programs operating today in each of the three countries (TRIA in the U.S., Pool Re in the U.K., and Extremus in Germany). The authors then provide a detailed comparative analysis of the evolution of prices and take‐up rates (based on as yet unpublished data), with particular attention to financial institutions. For those who think the U.S. is the most likely target for mega‐terrorism, the findings are somewhat puzzling. On average, for example, companies in the U.S. do not pay even half as much for comparable coverage under TRIA as companies pay in Germany under Extremus, which raises the questions: Is terrorism coverage under the U.S. insurance program now drastically underpriced? If so, what would be the likely consequences of another large‐scale attack in the U.S.? On the demand side, the authors observe a dramatic increase in take‐up rates in the U.S. since 2003, revealing increased corporate concern. By contrast, the market penetration in Germany remains remarkably low. A better understanding of these programs and of the recent evolution of terrorism insurance markets in the U.S. and Europe should help corporate and government decision makers develop more effective protection against the economic consequences of mega‐terrorism.     

Intervention with Screening in Panic-Based Runs

Policymakers frequently use guarantees to mitigate panic-based runs in the financial system. We analyze a binary-action coordination game under the global games framework and propose a novel intervention program that screens investors based on their heterogeneous beliefs about the system's stability. The program only attracts investors who are at the margin of running, and their participation boosts all investors' confidence in the financial system. Compared with government guarantee programs, our proposed program is as effective at mitigating runs but features two advantages: it costs less to implement and it is robust to moral hazard.     

Sweep programs and optimal monetary aggregation

This paper examines the admissibility of monetary aggregate groupings for the US over 1993–2001, based upon weak separability. We investigate the impact of retail and commercial demand deposit sweep programs on the separability of monetary asset groupings. Weak separability is tested using the Swofford–Whitney and Fleissig–Whitney tests. We use Varian's measurement error adjustment procedure to eliminate violations of the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). When funds from both retail and commercial demand deposit sweep programs are placed within checkable deposits, all groupings, narrow and broad, pass GARP and weak separability. For groupings based on conventional money measures, tests tend to favor broad aggregates.     

Thawing frozen capital markets and backdoor bailouts: Evidence from the Fed's liquidity programs

During the subprime crisis, the Federal Reserve introduced several emergency liquidity programs as supplements to the discount window (DW): TAF, PDCF, and TSLF. Using data on loans to large commercial banks and primary dealers, we find that the programs were used by relatively few institutions and thus provided limited relief to banks that relied on short-term debt markets. Although usage increased after Lehman's bankruptcy, most commercial banks avoided the DW and TAF. We also find that the programs were more often used by failed European banks than by healthy US banks, likely because these loans are expensive relative to private market funds. Our results also show that usage of PDCF and TSLF programs, while higher, was more often used by primary dealers in weaker financial position.