排序方式: 共有34条查询结果,搜索用时 46 毫秒
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We study the contribution of money to business‐cycle fluctuations in the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, and the euro area using a small‐scale structural monetary business cycle model. Constrained likelihood‐based estimates of the parameters are provided and time instabilities analyzed. Real balances are statistically important for output and inflation fluctuations. Their contribution changes over time. Models giving money no role provide a distorted representation of the sources of cyclical fluctuations, of the transmission of shocks, and of the events of the last 40 years. 相似文献
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Financial regulation was as hotly debated a political issue in the 19th century as it is today. We study the political economy of state usury laws in 19th century America. Exploiting the wide variation in regulation, enforcement, and economic conditions across states and time, we find that usury laws when binding reduce credit and economic activity, especially for smaller firms. We examine the motives of regulation and find that usury laws coincide with other economic and political policies favoring wealthy political incumbents, particularly when they have more voting power. The evidence suggests financial regulation is driven by private interests capturing rents from others rather than public interests protecting the underserved. 相似文献
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We document a highly significant, strongly nonlinear dependence of stock and bond returns on past equity market volatility as measured by the VIX. We propose a new estimator for the shape of the nonlinear forecasting relationship that exploits variation in the cross‐section of returns. The nonlinearities are mirror images for stocks and bonds, revealing flight‐to‐safety: expected returns increase for stocks when volatility increases from moderate to high levels while they decline for Treasuries. These findings provide support for dynamic asset pricing theories in which the price of risk is a nonlinear function of market volatility. 相似文献
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ZHIGANG FENG JIANJUN MIAO ADRIAN PERALTA‐ALVA MANUEL S. SANTOS 《International Economic Review》2014,55(1):83-110
In this article, we propose a recursive equilibrium algorithm for the numerical simulation of nonoptimal dynamic economies. This algorithm builds upon a convergent operator over an expanded set of state variables. The fixed point of this operator defines the set of all Markovian equilibria. We study approximation properties of the operator. We also apply our recursive equilibrium algorithm to various models with heterogeneous agents, incomplete financial markets, endogenous and exogenous borrowing constraints, taxes, and money. 相似文献
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We analyze the transmission mechanism of wages to inflation within a New Keynesian business cycle model with wage rigidities and labor market frictions. Our main focus is on the channel of real wage rigidities on inflation persistence for which we find the specification of the wage bargaining process to be of crucial importance. Under the standard efficient Nash bargaining, the feedback of wage rigidities on inflation is ambiguous and depends on other labor market variables. However, under the alternative right‐to‐manage bargaining we find that more rigid wages translate directly into more persistent movements of aggregate inflation. 相似文献
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ULF VON KALCKREUTH TOBIAS SCHMIDT HELMUT STIX 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2014,46(8):1753-1786
This paper provides one explanation why cash is still used for transactions despite a broad diffusion of noncash payment instruments. In particular, we argue that a distinctive feature of cash—a glance into one's pocket gives a signal of the remaining budget and past expenses—provides utility to some consumers. Using payment survey data, we show that consumers who need to keep control over their remaining liquidity and who have elevated costs of information processing conduct a larger percentage of payments using cash, withdraw less often, and hold larger cash balances than other consumers. 相似文献
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ADRIAN T. H. KUAH 《R&D Management》2009,39(3):305-306
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