Foreign Equity Ownership and Information Asymmetry: Evidence from Japan

Using a large sample of Japanese firms, we investigate whether the level of foreign ownership in a firm is inversely related to information asymmetry between firm (managers) and market (outside investors). Since information asymmetry is not directly observable and, thus, is difficult to measure empirically, our analysis focuses on the link between foreign shareholding and a measurable consequence of information asymmetry; that is, the timing and magnitude of intertemporal return‐earnings associations. The empirical results support our hypothesis, and subsequent tests based on residual foreign ownership show that the relation between foreign ownership and information asymmetry is robust to the addition of various control variables such as market capitalization and cross‐corporate holdings. We also show that foreign investors tend to avoid stocks with high cross‐corporate holdings. Overall, our results suggest that foreign (institutional) investors are likely to be efficient processors of public information and are attracted to Japanese firms with low information asymmetry.     

The Effects of Conservative Reporting on Investor Disagreement

We examine whether the level of a firm's conditional conservatism affects investor disagreement around earnings announcement dates. Investor disagreement is relevant for its repercussions on stock market efficiency. However, the literature related to the effect of firms’ reporting policies on disagreement is scant. Prior research suggests that conservatism, by requiring higher verifiability of profits, constrains earnings overstatements and encourages more complete revelations of losses, thus improving the information environment. In this paper, we further hypothesize that these effects of conservatism enhance news credibility and decrease information asymmetry, particularly for bad news announcements. This results in a lower disagreement and improved interpretation of earnings news. We consistently find that conservatism measures are negatively associated with proxies of announcement-time investor disagreement and that this effect is stronger when the firm is reporting bad news. Additional analyses indicate that the impact of conservatism is stronger when market surprise to the announcement is greater, while it is weaker in the presence of frequent and precise voluntary disclosure that preempts the earnings announcement. Finally, we show that a higher percentage of institutional investors’ ownership and a higher level of commitment to conservatism reinforce the impact of the latter.     

Large shareholders and firm value: Are high-tech firms different?

This paper explores the relationship between ownership structure and firm value in firms listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The results of the estimations, taking into account simultaneity and reverse causality, show that the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value differs across firms belonging to the sector of innovative technologies and more ‘mature’ firms. The results give support to the hypothesis that ‘mature’ firms with higher ownership concentration are likely to perform better than firms with more dispersed ownership. In contrast, in high-tech companies, with large share of knowledge related activities, higher ownership concentration is associated with lower firm value. This effect is robust to various alternative specifications.     

The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure: Evidence from Cross-Listings of Chinese Firms

In this paper, we investigate the impact of cross‐listings on information asymmetry risk, the cost of capital and firm value of a group of cross‐listed Chinese companies. Our paper is the first to examine the effect of cross‐listing on information asymmetry risk. Because cross‐listed firms are subject to increased disclosure requirements, increased regulatory scrutiny and increased legal liability, we propose that Chinese cross‐listed firms have lower information asymmetry risk, lower cost of capital and higher firm value than their non‐cross‐listed counterparts. We find in both univariate and multivariate tests that cross‐listed firms enjoyed lower information asymmetry risk in the domestic market compared with the non‐cross‐listed firms. We also find that cross‐listed firms have lower cost of capital in the cross‐listing market than non‐cross‐listed firms in the domestic markets. Finally, we find that cross‐listed firms are associated with higher firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. These results have implications for international investors and companies seeking cross‐listing opportunities.     

Firm Growth and Survival: Does Ownership Structure Matter?

The publication of the passive learning model of Jovanovic and subsequently the active exploration model of Ericson and Pakes led to a resurgence in research on firm growth and survival. Empirical work measuring the relationship of growth and survival relative to size and age uncovered a number of strong regularities, consistent with the new theoretical models and also with a rather broad class of models of which the above represent special cases. But recent theoretical work has shown that when the learning models are applied to the special case of the labor managed firm, most of the sharp empirical predictions derived for profit maximization are rendered indeterminate. Given the impact of ownership structure on the theoretical results of the learning models, we use a dataset of French producer cooperatives to determine whether firms of different ownership structures actually have substantially different growth and survival patterns. We find that French cooperatives survive and grow in very much the same way as has been found for U.S. firms, suggesting that the empirical regularities previously uncovered hold for a much broader class of firms. We are left to conclude that the underlying empirical growth and survival relationships continue to hold for firms with sharply differing ownership structures, and the theoretical models are attempting to explain these broad-based relationships by means of overly specific modeling.     

Do institutional investors monitor management? Evidence from the relationship between institutional ownership and capital structure

We examine the dynamic relations between institutional ownership and a firm's capital structure. We find that a firm's leverage decreases when institutional ownership increases. This result implies that a firm reduces its debt level as institutional investors substitute for the monitoring role of debt. More importantly, we find that a firm's suboptimal leverage decreases when the institutional ownership increases, and institutional ownership decreases when a firm's suboptimal leverage increases. This finding shows that institutions not only effectively monitor a firm's capital structure but they also passively sell their shares when dissatisfied with it. In addition, we find that the monitoring evidence on a firm's leverage and suboptimal leverage are more pronounced when the institutional investors are less likely to have business relationships with a firm or the information asymmetry is high in the market.     

Monitoring costs as a basis for the dispersion of firm ownership

This paper proposes a model of endogenous shareholder dispersion. We find ownership structure causes variance in firm value, not vice versa, and contra to Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Conditions are also identified where increases in ownership dispersion maximize firm value, contra to Shleifer and Vishny (1986). The model suggests that ownership dispersion is a dynamic phenomenon that may change with interest rates or the set of alternative uses of firm resources. The conclusion is that there is not likely to be one ‘best’ structure of firm ownership, either for an individual firm over time or for all firms at a single point in time.     

Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non‐executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated‐ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia‐Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.     

How useful are signals? A micro-structure analysis

We analyze how the market processes a signaling event by studying a sample of self-tender offers, events often viewed as signals of firm value. By examining changes in the degree of informed trading, we find asymmetric information costs fall at announcement, remain low throughout the event, and increase at offer expiration. By one month following expiration, informed trading returns to a level not significantly different from that prior to the offer. Higher risk firms have significantly larger declines in information asymmetry during the offer. Increases in information asymmetry persist one month following expiration for firms with lower pre-offer informed trading. (JEL G14, G32)     

Firm efficiency: Domestic owners,coalitions, and FDI

In this paper we analyze the evolution of firm efficiency in the Czech Republic. Using a large panel of more than 190,000 Czech firm/years we study whether firms fully utilize their resources, how firm efficiency evolves over time, and how firm efficiency is determined by ownership structure. We employ a panel version of a stochastic production frontier model for the period 1996–2007 with time-varying efficiency. We differentiate among various degrees of ownership concentration and domestic or foreign origin. In a two-stage set-up we first estimate the degree of firm inefficiency and then the effect of ownership structure on the distance from the efficiency frontier. Our results support the hypothesis that concentrated ownership is positively related to efficiency. FDI has beneficial effects at the microeconomic level. However, we show that a simple majority is not necessarily the best structure to improve efficiency. We further analyze the effects of ownership coalitions and shed light on many other subtleties of how ownership and the specific industry affect firm efficiency.     

Information disclosure ratings and managerial short-termism: An empirical investigation of the Chinese stock market

Information asymmetry between managers and outside investors creates agency problems and impedes efficient capital allocation. Information disclosure is critical in alleviating information asymmetry in capital markets. This study investigates the effect of information asymmetry on managerial short-termism by examining information disclosure ratings (IDRs). Using real earnings management as a proxy for managerial short-termism, our analysis of a sample of Chinese A-share companies during 2001–2018 indicates that high IDRs mitigate managerial short-termism. The results also indicate that the effect of IDRs in reducing managerial short-termism is driven mainly by stock liquidity. This conclusion holds after consideration of endogeneity and application of two-stage least-squares and generalized method of moments methods, adjustment of the definition of IDRs, consideration of alternative proxies for managerial short-termism, and control for firm characteristics that might affect the extent of managerial short-termism. This study also examines the effects within three subsamples: companies listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board, small and medium enterprise board, and growth enterprise market board. IDRs substantially reduce managerial short-termism among firms listed on all three boards. These findings indicate that enterprises have corrected previous internal governance problems, and IDRs have helped to improve internal governance through stock liquidity. Therefore, external supervision also helps to reduce the agency problem of managerial short-termism.

     

共享审计可以提高并购绩效吗？——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据

以2004—2016年我国A股上市公司的并购事件为样本,研究并购双方共享审计师对并购绩效的影响,并考察了信息不对称程度对两者之间关系的调节作用。结果表明并购双方共享审计师能显著提高并购方及目标方的并购绩效;对于信息不对称程度更大的跨行业、跨地域并购事件,共享审计对并购绩效的正向影响更为显著。进一步检验发现共享审计可以显著降低并购双方之间的信息不对称程度,进而导致较低的并购溢价。     

经营者将要退休是否影响公司绩效——以中国A股市场为例

我们的研究从静态和动态两个角度展开,分析了经营者将要退休这一事件对公司当前盈利能力和未来发展潜力的影响。对全部样本的实证研究显示:经营者将要退休与公司的盈利指标、成长性指标显著负相关,控制权属性虚拟变量与以上指标显著负相关。进而将样本按照最终控制权是否为国有分开后发现,这种负相关性在国有控股企业中表现得尤为明显,在以民营企业为主的非国有控股企业中则不显著。59岁现象在两组企业中表现差异的原因有二:第一,退休政策在两组企业中执行的力度不同;第二,国有控股企业可能具有更高的代理成本,从而59岁现象可能更加严重。     

中国公司的增长策略研究

论文根据中国所有的上市公司在2004——2008年的数据分析了中国公司的增长策略。根据研究结果,发现近75%的中国上市公司都没有足够的内部资源来保证其按照行业平均增长率来实现增长,这些公司的财务绩效(ROE和ROA)都显著地劣于其他公司;只有3%的中国上市公司的增长率落在精明增长区间(Raisch & Von Krogh,2007)内,这些公司可以凭借内部资源的支撑以高于行业平均增长率的速度来实现增长,其ROE显著地优于其他公司。论文并根据实证的结果对中国公司的增长策略提出建议。     

Ownership structure and firm performance: Some empirical evidence from Spain

The ‘managerial’ and the ‘contractual’ theories of the firm imply different causes and consequences for the relationship between ownership and performance of firms. This paper provides a test of the two conflicting theories, using ownership and performance data from a sample of Spanish family- and non-family-controlled firms. We find evidence in support of the contractual theory of the firm, according to which firms choose their ownership structure maximizing economic value, net of contractual costs.     

The Effects of a Separation of Ownership from Control on UK Listed Firms: An Empirical Analysis

There has been a wide‐ranging debate concerning the effects of the separation of management and ownership of large firms. Given recent issues concerning corporate remuneration, this debate is as relevant and possibly more so today as it has ever been. Theoretically, as the ownership of a firm becomes more diverse, the management of the firm will have more discretion and opportunity to act in accordance with their own interests at the expense of those of the shareholders. This paper considers the effect of a separation of ownership from control on 406 UK listed firms. Simultaneous equations are used to test for a relationship between the percentage of shares owned by significant outsiders and insiders and the performance of the firm. A number of authors have suggested that there may be a significant relationship between these variables. The analysis conducted in this study supports the view that there is a relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership,firm size and rent sharing in Bulgaria

Using a unique three-digit firm-level data set of all medium and large manufacturing enterprises in Bulgaria covering the years 1997–1998, we investigate how wages are affected by ownership status, firm size and rent sharing. Our pooled OLS, panel and first-difference TSLS estimates clearly point to ownership structure as an important determinant of both the wage level (for given productivity) and the degree of rent sharing. Rent sharing is very pronounced in state-owned firms but far less pronounced in private domestic and foreign firms. The results strongly confirm the existence of a multinational wage premium. In addition, we find weak evidence of a positive firm size-wage effect and a positive effect of firm size on the degree of rent sharing. If these effects exist, they are often more pronounced in private domestic firms.     

Entrepreneurial dynamics of the self-employed and of firms: a comparison of determinants using Spanish data

Entrepreneurship is viewed at either an individual level (self-employment), or a firm level (firms’ creation) phenomenon. We also observe the self-employed and firms that hire employees and grow, and others that do not. This paper theorizes occupational and firm-creation decisions and uses Spanish data on industry, region and time to compare entrepreneurial indicators based on official statistics of the number of self-employed individuals and of the number of firms, both with and without employees. The results show that there are important differences in the patterns of the determinants of growth rates in the self-employed and in firms and, within each of them, between those that hire employees and those that do not. We establish sound arguments to recommend the highest level of disaggregation possible in entrepreneurship studies.     

Ownership structure, corporate governance and productive efficiency in China

This paper investigates whether and to what extent ownership structure and corporate governance affect productive efficiency in a sample of 744 publicly listed manufacturing firms in China between 1999 and 2006. The paper finds that firm efficiency, as estimated using stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership while positively related to public and employee share ownership. In addition, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm efficiency is U-shaped, indicating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government, government-controlled legal entity to other types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. These results provide strong evidence that political interferences have reduced firm efficiency. Moreover, firms with more independent board are more efficient, supporting the argument that board of directors can be an effective internal governance mechanism. Furthermore, provincial market development, a proxy for the strength of external governance mechanism, is positively related to firm efficiency. Overall, the findings illustrate that restructuring state-owned enterprises via improvements in corporate governance has enhanced firm efficiency, but partial privatization without transfer of ownership and control from the state to the public remains a major source of inefficiency in corporate China.     

Dividend reinvestment plans and Pecking Order capital structure behavior: An empirical investigation

Due to the asymmetric information effect, corporations have been reluctant to use external sources of equity capital. The adoption of dividend reinvestment plans (DRP) by large numbers of firms may indicate an alternative way to raise external equity funds. It has been shown that many factors may explain a firm’s decision concerning the source of the shares made available to DRP participants. The hypothesis to be tested is that the nature of the DRP actually selected may be predicted by financial characteristics such as cash flow generation, investment needs, historical dividend policy, firm ownership structure and firm capital structure. Using logistic regression analysis, results of joint tests of financial variables suggested by the Pecking Order Theory of capital structure indicate significant support for the hypothesis. Specifically, ownership structure, historical dividend policy and debt ratio are found to be key determinants of the type of DRP utilized.