对建立健全公司董事会的几点建议

董事会是公司的决策机构，关系到一个企业的兴衰，因此，应完善公司董事会的构成，建立总经理负责制，对企业的经营负责，发挥董事会的战略决策功能和监督功能。     

建立和完善上市公司独立董事制度

我国上市公司治理结构中存在制约机制不够健全的问题，特别是董事会结构中存在种种缺陷，为维护公司整体利益，保证中小股东的合法权益不受损害，发挥独立董事的制衡和监督作用，健全上市公司董事会功能，有必要尽快建立和完善适合我国上市公司实际需要的独立董事制度。     

投资者关系管理与董事会秘书功能研究

董事会秘书长期从事投资者关系管理工作，了解资本市场投资者对上市公司的认可与接受程度，因此，他们在投资者关系管理工作中，越来越多地发挥着主导作用。他们作为法定的上市公司高管人员。具备提升公司价值的独特功能。在投资者关系管理工作中，他们要把握好几个重要环节，就能够发挥独特职能，实现公司价值的维护和提升。公司价值必须通过董事会秘书的投资者关系管理工作来实现，否则公司价值不会为投资者认同，也不能在市场价格上得以体现。     

董事会结构、战略决策参与程度与公司绩效

通过对中国101家上市公司的实证研究发现:独立董事的数量与董事会战略决策参与程度不相关,董事长与总经理两职分任比两职兼任更有利于提高董事会战略决策参与程度,董事会规模与战略决策参与程度负相关,董事会战略决策参与程度与公司财务业绩正相关.研究发现独立董事功能的发挥还很不明显,仍然需要加大改革的力度.     

公司控制权市场作用探讨

公司控制权市场作为一种外部机制对公司管理层发挥约束功能还是有限的，不能把公司控制权市场作为公司治理机制的唯一选择，只能从解决失灵的董事会和构建有效的公司控制权市场两个方面同时着手。     

董事会性别多样化的理论依据与功能定位

在女性主义以及委托代理等理论的支撑下，女性董事独特的优势被放大。性别多样化的董事会结构有助于提高公司的决策质量和信息披露质量，改善董事会的运行效率。同时，女性在发挥董事会监督职能优势等方面扮演着不可或缺的角色，她们在董事会中表现出更为强烈的监督意愿，能够进一步凸显董事会的职能优势。此外，多样化的董事会结构还能够积极回应各利益相关方的诉求，加强企业的社会责任承担。在当前《公司法》修订的背景下，保障女性进入董事会，有利于进一步完善公司内部监督机制，从而提升公司治理能力。     

完善上市公司治理机制

由于历史的原因，我国现有上市公司中的大部分是由原国有企业或其他政府控制的实体重组改制而成的。其公司治理存在：股权高度集中、董事会独立性不强、监事会作用未能得到有效发挥、投资决策的透明度和专业化水平低、经理服务市缺乏和激励 约束机制扭曲等共性问题。改善我国公司治理的现状可以从降低股权集中度；增强董事会的功能；完善人才、激励以及监督机制等方面努力。     

产品市场竞争、董事会结构与公司绩效——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

本文采用沪、深两市10大行业共计525个样本公司数据,对处于不同竞争度的产品市场的上市公司,就其董事会规模、独立董事比例、总经理与董事长是否两职合一与公司绩效间关系进行实证检验。结果表明:在不同竞争度的产品市场中,董事会发挥的治理功能也不相同。在产品市场竞争度低的行业中,由于外部市场监管不便或不利,客观上需要董事会发挥其应有的监管作用;而在产品市场竞争度高的行业中,市场能够起到较好的监督作用,董事会仅起到一定的辅助监管作用。从我国的实际情况来看,产品市场竞争度有待进一步提高,强化董事会的监管作用有利于完善公司治理,提高公司绩效。     

透过风险管理的滤镜看世界董事会应具有的风险智能

分析大部分公司董事会成员的结构，你会发现通常由许多不同领域专长的成员所组成。不同成员之经验、知识及智能将引领董事会所能发挥的能力。尽管成员问各持不一样的观点，但我们相信所有董事会的成员应该配戴一副能辨识风险的眼镜（risk—colored glasses）。     

董事会对英国公司治理的影响

<正>英国公司治理的成效取决于多种因素，了解英国董事会在改善管理者与股权持有人公司其他利益相关者之间发挥的作用，对国内企业的公司治理机制和董事会决策机制的健全和完善，具有现实参考意义。随着公司在发达经济体和新兴经济体内的快速崛起和扩张，公司治理在当今时代变得尤为重要。英国公司治理的成效取决于多种因素，如股权结构、股东身份或董事会的运作，人们也越来越关注治理机制和董事会决策的影响。     

略谈代表(执行)董事及其对第三人的责任

现代公司的权力由股东转移到董事会手中 ,而实际行使权力的主要是代表 (执行 )董事。其对公司有一定的控制力 ,就应当承担相应的义务。在代表 (执行 )董事造成公司损害同时也使第三人遭受损害时 ,要对第三人承担损害赔偿责任。我国公司法应该借鉴英美法系的做法 ,以完善我国的公司制度。     

The Impact of Director Reputation and Performance on the Turnover and Board Seats of Target Firm Directors

Abstract:  This study examines factors that explain the turnover and board seats held by target firm directors post-takeover. Following successful takeovers the proportion of the board replaced is lower when the target has better performance. In failed takeovers, executive directors have lower turnover and the rate of turnover is reduced after a hostile takeover. Inconsistent with ex-post settling-up, actions that advance target shareholder wealth during the takeover does not assist a director obtain an increase in future board seats. Confirming a reputation effect, directors with multiple directorships have a lower rate of turnover and a higher increase in future board seats.     

建立独立董事制度 完善公司治理结构

为了规范上市公司的法人治理结构，使董事会更公正地代表股东利益尤其是中小股东的利益，借鉴国际市场经验，笔者认为，在上市公司中引入独立董事制度是完善中国上市公司治理结构的重要步骤。     

商业银行董事会治理：特征与绩效——基于美国银行业的实证研究

本文以1996—2005年间美国43家商业银行为样本,实证分析了商业银行董事会治理的特征及其对绩效的影响。研究表明:平均而言,商业银行董事会的规模略大于非金融性企业的这一指标,且外部董事的比例较高;董事会规模与银行绩效之间存在非线性的倒U型曲线关系,但外部董事的比例对银行绩效的影响不显著;董事长与总经理两职合一、董事会次级委员会的数量、外部董事拥有的董事席位数均与银行绩效显著负相关;董事会会议频率对当年度银行绩效的影响不显著,但与前一会计年度的绩效之间存在显著的负相关关系;董事持股比例与银行绩效之间存在非线性的关系,而总经理任职年限对银行绩效的影响不显著。     

Governance and Funds Allocation in United States Medical Research Charities

We examine boards of directors of medical research charities and find that medical charities spend less on program activities and more on fund-raising when the executive director of the charity serves on the board of directors, especially when the board is small. Executive salaries are also higher at charities where management is represented on the board. Management and general expenses and fund balances are, however, unrelated either to the presence of an insider on the board or to the size of the board.     

Bankruptcy outcomes: Does the board matter?

We examine the association between board composition and bankruptcy outcomes. Preliminary analyses provide no evidence that the proportion of outside directors is significantly associated with the likelihood that a Chapter 11 firm liquidates. Further analyses indicate, however, that the relation between the proportion of outside directors and bankruptcy outcomes is a function of the outside directors' ownership. More specifically, we find that the association is positive when outside director ownership is low and negative when it is high. The overall evidence supports the notion that a one-size-fits-all approach to corporate governance is likely to result in suboptimal board structures and hinder firms' strategies for dealing with poor performance.     

Bank holding company performance,risk, and “busy” board of directors

We examine the association between “busyness” of the board of directors (serving on multiple boards) and bank holding company (BHC) performance and risk. We estimate several simultaneous-equations models employing the 3SLS technique and instrumental variables to account for endogeneity. We obtain four main results. First, BHC performance measures (return on equity, Tobin’s Q and EBIT over total assets) are positively associated with busyness of directors. Second, BHC risk measures (total, market, idiosyncratic, credit and default risks) are inversely related to busyness of directors. Third, performance (risk) benefits of having busy directors strengthened (weakened) during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Fourth, busy directors are not more likely to become problem directors (fail the 75% attendance standard), and if sitting on boards of both BHC and non-financial firms, they attend more of the BHC board meetings, than those of the non-financials. Our findings partially alleviate concerns that over-boarded directors shirk their responsibilities.     

Boards,ownership structure,and involuntary delisting from the New York Stock Exchange

This study examines whether the likelihood of becoming involuntarily delisted from NYSE is associated with a firm’s board of directors and ownership characteristics. To this end we compare 161 firms that were delisted from NYSE between 1998 and 2004 to a set of industry and size-matched control firms. Consistent with our expectations, we find that the likelihood of delisting is related to a firm’s governance characteristics. Our results on the importance of the board of directors are new to this setting and add to a large body of evidence linking corporate boards and ownership characteristics to corporate performance.     

Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences.     

How do independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR)? Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment

We investigate how independent directors view corporate social responsibility (CSR). Exploiting the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock, we document that independent directors view CSR activities unfavorably. In particular, firms forced to raise board independence reduce CSR engagement significantly relative to those not required to increase board independence. Our results are consistent with the risk-mitigation view and the agency cost hypothesis where managers over-invest in CSR to mitigate their own exposure to nonsystematic risk. The over-investments in CSR are curbed in the presence of a stronger, more independent, board of directors. Several robustness checks confirm the results, including fixed-effects and random-effects regressions, dynamic panel data analysis, instrumental-variable analysis, propensity score matching, Lewbel's heteroscedastic identification, and Oster's method for coefficient stability. We also confirm the risk-mitigation hypothesis by showing that CSR activities reduce firm risk significantly. Our research design is much less vulnerable to endogeneity and is therefore likely to show a causal effect of board independence on CSR.