A Complete Characterization of Efficient Liability Rules: Comment

In a recent article, Jain and Singh (2002) prove that a condition they call negligence liability is necessary and sufficient for any liability rule to be efficient. In this note I criticize their result on two accounts: First, their result crucially depends on implicit restrictions they impose on the liability assignment function. If we drop the assumption that the liability apportionment between two non-negligent parties is constant for all combinations of non-negligent care levels, the equivalence between the condition of negligence liability and the efficiency of liability rules breaks down. Second, their attempt to drop the assumption of uniqueness for the social optimum improves the generality of the model at a substantial cost, since it must be accompanied by a new assumption that is possibly even more unrealistic. The importance of the uniqueness assumption is shown in a simple discrete care model, in which comparative negligence may lead to an inefficient outcome when the existence of two social optima leads us to interpret due care as a varying standard based on the other partys actual choice.     

Environmental Liability Law and Induced Technical Change – The Role of Discounting

We analyse the incentives of environmental liability law for inducing progress to emission abatement technology. We consider three liability rules: strict liability, a negligence rule with an emission norm as the due care standard, and a double negligence rule which combines the emission standard with an abatement technology norm. In the case of distortive discounting, i.e. where the private discount rate deviates from the social one, we show, how the level of distortion influences the ranking of liability rules, according to the criterion of generated social cost.     

Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability

We use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmentalregulations and show that, when jurisdictions compete for firms that engagein environmentally risky behaviour, strict liability implements the sociallyoptimal outcome while simple negligence does not, even if the jurisdictionsfully cooperate in setting standards of care. Consequently, we argue that,even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority, likein the European Union, this would not implement the socially optimaloutcome. We also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulationsmakes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence.     

Who do you blame in local finance? An analysis of municipal financing in Italy

We study the effect of introducing a less transparent tax tool for the financing of local governments. A political agency model suggests that politicians with stronger re-electoral incentives would raise more tax revenues and use more the less transparent tax tool to enhance their probability of re-election. This prediction is tested by studying a reform that in 1999 allowed Italian municipalities to partially substitute a more accountable source of tax revenue (the property tax) with a less transparent one (a surcharge on the personal income tax of residents). Exploiting the existence of a term limit for mayors, we use a Difference in Difference approach, to estimate how mayors facing re-electoral concerns reacted to the introduction of the less transparent tax tool compared to mayors facing term limit. We find results in line with theory. We also show that the reduction in the property tax is larger in smaller municipalities and in municipalities with lower level of social capital. The normative implications are then discussed.     

年轻高管与企业股价崩盘风险：来自“代理冲突观”的证据*

在企业纷纷实施高管年轻化战略的背景下，本文从股价崩盘风险的视角分析和检验了年轻高管风险偏好的经济后果及其作用机理。本文基于“个体认知观”和“代理冲突观”展开理论推演，采用中国沪深A股非金融上市公司的数据，检验发现，年轻高管会显著加剧企业未来的股价崩盘风险，且这种影响主要存在于民营企业，在国有企业并不显著。进一步针对具体作用机制的检验发现，年轻高管在投资决策中选择了更多能迅速提升个人收益的风险性投资项目，但在不能迅速提升个人收益的风险性投资项目上与年长高管没有显著差异。同时，年轻高管对股价崩盘风险的加剧效应仅仅存在于高管在上市公司领取薪酬的样本企业，且更高的独立董事比例能显著抑制年轻高管的股价崩盘风险加剧效应。这表明，年轻高管个体认知层面的风险偏好被其追求个人私利最大化的代理冲突所扭曲，进而为年轻高管风险偏好的“代理冲突观”提供了实证证据。     

年轻高管与企业股价崩盘风险：来自“代理冲突观”的证据*

在企业纷纷实施高管年轻化战略的背景下，本文从股价崩盘风险的视角分析和检验了年轻高管风险偏好的经济后果及其作用机理。本文基于“个体认知观”和“代理冲突观”展开理论推演，采用中国沪深A股非金融上市公司的数据，检验发现，年轻高管会显著加剧企业未来的股价崩盘风险，且这种影响主要存在于民营企业，在国有企业并不显著。进一步针对具体作用机制的检验发现，年轻高管在投资决策中选择了更多能迅速提升个人收益的风险性投资项目，但在不能迅速提升个人收益的风险性投资项目上与年长高管没有显著差异。同时，年轻高管对股价崩盘风险的加剧效应仅仅存在于高管在上市公司领取薪酬的样本企业，且更高的独立董事比例能显著抑制年轻高管的股价崩盘风险加剧效应。这表明，年轻高管个体认知层面的风险偏好被其追求个人私利最大化的代理冲突所扭曲，进而为年轻高管风险偏好的“代理冲突观”提供了实证证据。     

The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies

The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy.
The paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency, and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives. Last, the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on Government bureaucracies.     

Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

This paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology. Our analysis considers technical progress in end-of-pipe abatement and in the production technology used, thereby generalizing the approach taken by Endres et?al. (Environ Resour Econ 36:341?C366, 2007). We establish that this generalization has drastic repercussions on incentives under negligence liability, while the performance of strict liability is not compromised. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the social desirability of investment in abatement or production technology (or both) decisively determines how ex-ante and ex-post regulation fare with respect to welfare maximization in the case of negligence liability.     

Local community reaction to the ‘no-take’ policy on fishing in the Tsitsikamma National Park, South Africa

Fishing in the Tsitsikamma National Park has officially been halted since 2001. However, the desire to fish in the Marine Protected Area remains high among the local communities in Tsitsikamma. This has led to illegal fishing practices in the park. Consequently, the reaction of the local communities was measured using semi-structured questionnaires, informal interactions, personal observations, and through a key informant workshop that was organized in the Tsitsikamma National Park. It was found that responses from local communities to fishing within the park were defined by their residence status, ethnicity, gender, income, and educational level. There is a general understanding by local communities that the purpose of the Tsitsikamma National Park is to conserve nature within its boundaries. However, there is a mismatch in the understanding of the term ‘conservation’ between the local communities and conservation officials of the South African National Parks (SANParks). Local communities consider conservation to include sustainable utilization while conservation officials from the practice pursue absolute protection of the marine fisheries resources. The majority of local communities in Tsitsikamma resent this SANParks ‘no-take’ policy on fishing. They would like access to the fisheries resources in the Tsitsikamma National Park for both subsistence and recreational purposes.     

Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal elections

Recent theoretical papers develop political agency models in which voters compare tax policy with that in neighbouring jurisdictions. In these yardstick competition models voters judge incumbents by comparing their policy with policy in neighbouring jurisdictions. This paper reports an analysis of municipal elections in Flanders during the period 1982 to 2000 and finds empirical evidence for yardstick voting. Incumbents are punished for higher tax rates. Importantly, the electoral punishment also depends on tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. Higher rates in neighbouring municipalities are favourable for the incumbents.     

Led on the Wrong Track? A Note on the Direction of Technical Change under Environmental Liability Law

This note shows that polluters might opt for technical change which is inferior to other innovations from a social standpoint under environmental liability law. Polluters choose what is socially optimal under strict liability. However, we show that it is possible to have not only too little or too much technical change of a given kind but, importantly, also the wrong kind of technical change under negligence.     

On and Off the Liability Bandwagon: Explaining State Adoptions of Strict Liability in Hazardous Waste Programs

We test a model of states' adoption of the hazardous waste liability regime (negligence, strict liability) providing greater net benefits. The likelihood of adopting strict liability increases in a state's number of chemical-intensive manufacturing plants, decreases in the number of large mining establishments. Also predictive: severity of state's hazardous waste problem, effectiveness of other state environmental programs, and political climate. States may view strict liability as better for industrial than mining pollution, and may be partly motivated by "precaution targeting" and "deep pockets" mentality. Non-adopters may wish not to discourage business or have other programs that substitute for strict liability.     

论共同保证中的保证人责任

经济的高速发展需要一个良好的法律秩序保证市场的运行，其中最重要的是要对市场经济中产生的债权加以保护。作为对债权有效保护的担保应被加以规范，担保中人的担保由于其设置成本低、设置灵活而被广泛运用，人的担保中最核心的问题即是保证责任，在单个保证中的保证责任相对简单，但当有两个以上的人作保证（共同保证）时，保证责任就比较复杂了。从我国目前在共同保证法律规定中的不足谈起，再结合国外的相关规定，以期能对共同保证中保证责任的完善提出个人意见。     

Newspaper Circulation and Local Government Efficiency*

In this paper, we examine the role of the newspaper market for a key aspect of political accountability: the efficient use of public funds by elected politicians. Newspapers are a major provider of the political information voters use to monitor their elected officials, especially at the local level. Thus, the incentives for politicians to reduce budgetary slack should be stronger in jurisdictions where the electorate is well informed by newspapers. Using panel data on the circulation of some 150 newspapers in Norwegian municipalities, we show that increases in local newspaper circulation are associated with higher levels of local government efficiency.     

Ambiguity and Accident Law

Environmental accidents often involve ambiguous risks, i.e., the relevant probabilities are unknown. This paper studies how liability rules are affected by ambiguity. The injurer and the victim choose a level of care, which is observable, and an unobservable action. Both actions may affect the size and/or likelihood of loss. We analyze the welfare implications of tort rules. First, we show that with ambiguity, negligence is likely to perform better than strict liability. Second, we propose a tort rule of negligence and punitive damages, which gives the efficient levels of both care and unobserved actions.     

The impact of personal bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship

I study the two competing effects of limited personal liability on entrepreneurship in a life‐cycle model: an insurance effect through debt relief in the event of business failure and a borrowing cost effect where the borrowing cost rises with default premiums. I first calibrate the model to the US economy by taking a simplified version of the US Chapter 7 bankruptcy code and then consider the effects of alternative regimes. I find that personal bankruptcy law affects entrepreneurship primarily by altering the decisions of agents with moderate entrepreneurial ability through the insurance effect rather than through the borrowing cost effect.     

On the efficiency of the negligence rule

The three versions of the negligence rule discussed in the literature differ regarding whether a negligent injurer is liable for the entire loss or only for the incremental loss; or regarding whether negligence is defined as failure to take at least due care or failure to take a cost‐justified precaution. It is shown in the paper that the incremental version with untaken precaution notion of negligence is not efficient; not even for the unilateral case. The paper also establishes, for the bilateral case, the efficiency of the incremental version with the shortfall‐from‐due‐care way of defining negligence.     

HOW TO DESIGN INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS IN A WARMING WORLD: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS*

We analyze how long‐term uncertainty, for example, regarding future climate conditions, affects the design of concession contracts and organizational forms in a principal–agent context, with dynamic moral hazard, limited liability, and irreversibility constraints. The prospect of future, uncertain productivity shocks on the returns on the firm's effort creates an option value of delaying efforts, a course that exacerbates agency costs. Contracts and organizational forms are drafted to control this cost of delegated flexibility. The possibility for the agent to delay investment in response to uncertainty and irreversibility also elicits preference for unbundling different stages of the project through short‐term contracts. Our analysis is relevant to infrastructure sectors that are sensitive to changing weather conditions and sheds a pessimistic light on the relevance of public–private partnerships in this context.     

循环农业示范市发展现状,问题及对策——基于湖北省恩施州的研究

党的十七届三中全会提出,要发展循环农业,实现农业可持续发展。农业部在全国确立了10个农业循环经济示范市,力求促进循环农业发展,实现农业节能减排,为农业可持续发展、国家节能减排战略实施做出贡献。文章试图建立农业循环经济理论框架,在此基础上,选取湖北省恩施州作为案例区,对循环农业示范市发展现状、问题进行分析,并提出相应对策建议,力求在更大范围内促进农业循环经济发展提供理论依据。     

家族控制与企业创新投入

家族企业对社会情感财富目标的追求是其区别于非家族企业的重要特性，社会情感财富目标与企业经济利益间冲突对企业R&D投入的影响不容忽视。以社会情感财富为理论基础，基于573家上市家族企业2011-2015年的面板数据，分析受市场化程度影响时，家族涉入情境下信息透明度对企业R&D投入的影响。结果显示：信息透明度可以有效缓解信息不对称和代理冲突，促进企业R&D投入；家族控制对R&D投入有消极影响；当企业信息透明度较高时，会抑制家族所有者为个人谋取私利的动机，进而增强其对企业R&D投资的积极作用。在市场化程度更高、产权保护力度较大的地区，信息透明度会缓解家族控制权对R&D投入的消极作用。