Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Cost of Transacting and Expected Returns in the Nasdaq Market

This article empirically examines the liquidity premium predicted by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model using Nasdaq data over the 1973–1990 period. The results support the model and are much stronger than for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as reported by Chen and Kan (1989) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) . I conjecture that the stronger evidence on the Nasdaq is due to the dealers' inside spreads on the Nasdaq being a better proxy for the actual cost of transacting than the quoted spreads on the NYSE, since the Nasdaq dealers do not face competition from limit orders or floor traders.     

The Post-Reform Bid-Ask Spread Disparity between Nasdaq and the NYSE

We report further evidence of the difference in execution costs between Nasdaq and the NYSE before and after the 1997 market reforms. We find that informed trading costs are consistently higher on Nasdaq both before and after the reforms. In the pre‐reform period the Nasdaq‐NYSE disparity in bid‐ask spreads cannot be completely attributed to the difference in informed trading costs. However, in the post‐reform period the spread difference between these two markets becomes insignificant with the effect of informed trading costs controlled. Our findings are consistent with the contention that the reforms have largely reduced noninformation trading costs and dealers' rents.     

Execution Costs of Institutional Equity Orders

We compare institutional execution costs across the major U.S. exchanges using a sample of institutional equity orders in firms that switch exchanges. Execution costs including commissions are essentially indistinguishable across these exchanges. We also find the fraction of trading volume from momentum traders is greater on the NYSE than on either the Nasdaq or AMEX and that orders are more likely to be worked by an institution's trading desk on the NYSE than on the Nasdaq. These results suggest that institutions actively manage execution strategies, taking into account characteristics of the markets in which they trade.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: G10, G19, G20, G23.     

Is the Adverse Selection Component Really Higher on the NYSE/Amex than on the Nasdaq?

Affleck–Graves, Hegde and Miller (1994) find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is higher for NYSE and Amex stocks than for Nasdaq stocks. Using the model of Huang and Stoll (1997), we revisit their study and find the opposite to be true – the adverse selection component is actually higher for Nasdaq stocks than for NYSE and Amex stocks. The economic magnitude of this additional adverse selection cost is very significant. Our results have important implications for the understanding of information production in dealer versus auction markets, and the costs of trading on such markets.     

Transactions Costs and Holding Periods for Common Stocks

Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Constantinides (1986) provide a theoretical basis for the proposition that assets with higher transactions costs are held by investors for longer holding periods, and vice versa. We examine average holding periods and bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq stocks from 1983 through 1991 and for New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks from 1975 through 1989 and find strong evidence that, as predicted, the length of investors' holding periods is related to bid-ask spreads. We also find that the relation between holding periods and bid-ask spreads is much stronger on Nasdaq, where spreads are larger, than on the NYSE, where spreads are smaller.     

Factors Influencing Dividend Policy Decisions of Nasdaq Firms

This study reports the results of a 1999 survey of Nasdaq‐listed firms. Respondents provided information about the importance of 22 different factors that influence their dividend policy. Our results suggest that many managers of Nasdaq firms make dividend decisions consistent with Lintner's (1956) survey results and model. The results also show significant differences between the manager responses of financial and non‐financial firms on nine of the 22 factors. This finding implies the presence of industry effects on dividend policy decisions. In general, the same factors that are important to Nasdaq firms are also important to NYSE firms.     

Information asymmetry,information dissemination and the effect of regulation FD on the cost of capital

This paper considers the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on firms’ information environments and costs of capital. For NYSE/Amex firms we find little evidence of a change in the cost of capital attributable to Regulation FD. For Nasdaq firms we find that Regulation FD increased firms’ costs of capital by 10–19 basis points per annum though the statistical significance of this change is modest for some of our models. We also show substantial cross-sectional variation in the cost of capital changes. We find that cost of capital changes were negatively related to both pre-regulation firm size and PIN. In addition to the findings regarding Regulation FD, this research contributes to a growing literature that documents links between firms’ information environments and their costs of capital.     

Factors Associated with Differences in the Magnitude of Abnormal Returns Around NYSE Versus Nasdaq Firms' Earnings Announcements

This study provides an explanation for the 'exchange effect' puzzle documented in prior accounting research. Grant (1980) finds that the magnitude of earnings announcement week abnormal returns is higher, on average, for firms traded over-the-counter than for NYSE firms. Atiase (1987) shows that this incremental 'exchange effect' persists even after controlling for firm size. We investigate potential explanations for this incremental exchange effect. We first show that even after controlling for differences in firm size, Nasdaq firms have less rich information environments and enjoy greater growth opportunities than NYSE firms. We then investigate whether differential predisclosure information environments and/or growth opportunities can explain the incremental exchange effect. The results indicate that although the absolute magnitude of the earnings announcement-related abnormal returns is inversely related to proxies for the amount of predisclosure information, the incremental exchange effect cannot be explained by differences in the predisclosure information environment. In contrast, after controlling for differences in growth opportunities across NYSE versus Nasdaq firms, and investors' heightened sensitivity to Nasdaq firms' growth opportunities in particular, there is no significant incremental exchange effect (whether or not we control for predisclosure information). These results suggest that the incremental exchange effect puzzle documented in prior research is more likely to reflect growth-related phenomena than differences in the predisclosure information environment.     

Dimensions of execution quality: Recent evidence for US equity markets

I analyze market-order execution quality using order-based data reported in accordance with Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 11Ac1-5. These data facilitate a comprehensive investigation of multiple dimensions of execution quality, including measures of costs and speed, for large samples of common stocks on Nasdaq and the NYSE. The evidence is consistent with competitive equity markets. Overall execution costs on Nasdaq exceed those on the NYSE, but orders execute faster. This relationship reverses for larger orders exceeding 1,999 shares. The apparent trade-off between costs and speed suggests that inferring execution quality from costs alone could be problematical. It also illustrates the need for models of trader behavior that can accommodate multiple dimensions of execution quality.     

The Industry-Wide Implications of Dividend Omission and Initiation Announcements and the Determinants of Information Transfer

In examining the industry-wide implications of dividend omission and initiation announcements, this study finds distinct industry responses for these two events. Specifically, dividend omission announcements have a significantly negative impact on the valuations of industry-related firms. Factors influencing this industry reaction include the Herfindahl index of the announcing firm's industry, the two-day abnormal return of the announcing firm, and its trading status (Nasdaq or NYSE/AMEX). Unlike dividend omissions, dividend initiations evoke a competitive (or negative) response from industry-related firms. The degree of homogeneity in the announcing firm's industry, the announcing firm's abnormal return and its size affect this industry response.     

Market Response to Liquidity Improvements: Evidence from Exchange Listings

The study examines a sample of 895 stocks that moved from Nasdaq to the New York Stock Exchange or to the American Stock Exchange (Amex) between 1971 and 1994. We show how various measures of liquidity such as the bid‐ask spread, trading volume, and stock price precision improve in somewhat different ways upon transfer to NYSE (Amex). We also find that reductions in trading costs (percentage spread) and in pricing error volatility (Hasbrouck's σ₅) can explain most of stock market's positive response to exchange listing. Thus, liquidity has many facets and cannot be represented by the bid‐ask spread alone.     

RECENT GROWTH IN NASDAQ TRADING VOLUME AND ITS RELATION TO MARKET VOLATILITY

We document a significant increase in Nasdaq trading volume relative to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) trading volumes. Although recent increases in the number of shares traded are reported in the financial press, we also find it present in the percentage of dollar values traded. We then examine correlations between trading volume and several measures of market volatility. Nasdaq volume appears to be more closely correlated with residual variance, while NYSE and AMEX volumes are more closely correlated with overall market variance. We conclude that the type and quantity of information driving trading are different on Nasdaq than on the two exchanges, and that the relative growth in Nasdaq volume cannot be attributed solely to differences in the methods of counting volume in the two market environments.     

Determinants of the components of bid-ask spreads on stocks

In this paper we show that George et al. (GKN, 1991) estimators of the adverse selection and order processing cost components of the bid-ask spread are biased due to intertemporal variations in the bid-ask spread. We use alternative estimators that correct this bias and that are applicable to individual securities, and estimate these cost components empirically using data on NYSE/AMEX stocks. As expected, our results indicate that on average adverse selection costs account for approximately 50% of the bid-ask spread, sharply higher than the estimates of 8-10% obtained by GKN for NASDAQ stocks and 21% that we obtain for NYSE/AMEX stocks using GKN's estimators. We then conduct cross-sectional regressions designed primarily to determine whether adverse selection costs vary across specialists after controlling for firm size and other factors. Consistent with previously established hypotheses, we find that adverse-selection costs vary across specialists, and that this variation is related to the number of securities that the specialist handles.     

竞争力、市场微观结构与证券交易所变革

纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克实施的重大并购行动标志着全球证券交易所新一轮并购浪潮的兴起,证券交易所之间的竞争再度趋于白热化.交易所之间的竞争已演变为市场微观结构的竞争.本文对纽约证券交易所和纳斯达克的交易成本进行了比较,无论是上市成本还是交易成本,新兴的纳斯达克都比传统的纽约证交所更胜一筹.因而本文认为有效降低交易成本应是提高交易所核心竞争力的关键所在,而改进交易机制、拓展产品服务以及调整组织架构,可以作为降低交易成本、提高交易所竞争力的具体竞争策略.     

Short selling and trading abuses on Nasdaq

We examine the potential for short-selling trading abuses unique to Nasdaq during a period when there was no up-tick rule and no effective prohibitions against “naked” short selling. We find that (a) short sellers earned significant abnormal returns on Nasdaq securities, but these were smaller than on NYSE/AMEX securities; (b) they did not destabilize markets by selling into falling markets and exacerbating price drops; and (c) Nasdaq short sellers may be more susceptible than NYSE/AMEX shorts to “short squeezes”. Our results cast doubt on the appropriateness of recent regulatory reforms established for Nasdaq and public concern over Nasdaq short-selling abuses.     

The Effect of Decimalization on Trade Size and Adverse Selection Costs

Abstract:   We examine adverse selection costs around NYSE decimalization. Further, we analyze the relation between adverse selection costs and trade size. We find a significant increase in the percentage adverse selection cost and a reduction in dollar adverse selection cost (percentage adverse selection multiplied by the spread) following complete decimalization on the NYSE. On estimating the adverse selection components by trade size classes, we find a decline in dollar adverse selection costs in trades of all sizes, with the strongest evidence coming from medium size trades, followed by small and large size trades. One implication of our findings is that there appears to be less stealth trading following complete decimalization and less institutional trading overall.     

Evidence and Implications of Increases in Trading Volume Around Exchange Listings

After controlling for market volume trends and differences in volume measurement between the Nasdaq and the exchanges, we find that mean trading volumes increase significantly for Nasdaq stocks that list on the Amex or the NYSE. Furthermore, stocks with low (high) pre‐listing volume tend to realize the largest volume increases (decreases) as well as the best (worst) post‐listing performance. Our results support the hypothesis that stocks with high past trading volumes tend to experience lower future returns, and shed new light on the nature and possible causes of poor post‐listing stock performance.     

How common are common return factors across the NYSE and Nasdaq?

We entertain the possibility of pervasive factors that are not common across two (or more) groups of securities. We propose and implement a general procedure to estimate the space spanned by common and group-specific pervasive factors. In our empirical analysis, we study the factor structure of excess returns on stocks traded on the NYSE and Nasdaq using our methodology. We find that there are only two common pervasive factors that govern the returns for both NYSE and Nasdaq. At the same time, the NYSE and Nasdaq each have one more group-specific factor that is not the same across the two exchanges. Our results point to the absence of complete similarity between the factors driving the returns on these exchanges.     

Adverse selection costs for NASDAQ and NYSE after decimalization

NYSE and NASDAQ completed their decimalization on January 29, 2001 and on April 9, 2001 respectively. In this paper, we compare adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread for NASDAQ and NYSE stocks after decimalization using the data from May 2001 and July 2001. We find that the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread is significantly lower on NASDAQ than on NYSE, and these differences cannot be attributed to the differences in the characteristics of the stocks traded in the two markets. In addition, we find that the adverse selection costs increase with trade size on NYSE, however there is no monotonic pattern observed for NASDAQ stocks. Lastly, we report that although the order flows arrived in the two markets are significantly different, they can at best explain a small portion of the observed differences in adverse selection costs.