Assessing the Effectiveness of State Regulation and Enforcement of Hazardous Waste

This paper assesses the effectiveness of different state hazardous waste regulations and policies in promoting compliance using data for 8000 facilities across the United States. Because data on compliance is available only if a facility is inspected, the analysis uses a censored bivariate probit. Adoption of voluntary pollution prevention programs appears to decrease violations in general while adoption of strict liability and allocating a higher percentage of employees to regional offices appear to decrease Class 1 violations only. Although spending on waste programs also appears to decrease Class 1 violations, spending is positively correlated with the overall probability of violation.     

Forcing Firms to Think About the Future: Economic Incentives and the Fate of Hazardous Waste

What is the cost of off-site hazardous waste disposal? In addition to paying for disposal fees and shipments costs, generators of hazardous waste can potentially be held liable for the cost of cleanup if the waste disposal site contaminates the environment after closure or abandonment and thus falls under the federal or state Superfund legislation. This paper empirically examines the sensitivity of individual hazardous waste generators to these categories of costs, exploiting the variation across states in factors influencing disposal costs, and in the structure of the liability imposed on waste generators under certain circumstances by state laws. We fit nested logit models to predict the waste management method (incineration or landfill disposal) and the state of destination for shipments of halogenated solvent waste used for metal cleaning in manufacturing and reported in the Toxic Release Inventory in 1988–1990. Waste generators respond to transportation costs and to proxies for current disposal costs. Generators also find the concurrent presence of strict and joint-and-several liability a deterrent, but this deterrent effect does not vary with the wealth of the firm or the volume of the waste shipped.     

论跨界环境损害民事责任主体

无论是从保护弱势群体，还是从保护环境抑或“风险和收益并存”原理角度，都应科以经营者严格责任。但由于其所从事的活动的特殊性，不能由其承担所有由此带来的损失，应让其他责任主体参与进来，因此，在确定经营人为首要的责任主体后，为了平衡各方利益关系，同时需规定责任保险人、基金等责任主体，但与经营者不同。其无论在赔徭范围还是赔偿顺序上承担的都只是补充责任。     

Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability

We use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmentalregulations and show that, when jurisdictions compete for firms that engagein environmentally risky behaviour, strict liability implements the sociallyoptimal outcome while simple negligence does not, even if the jurisdictionsfully cooperate in setting standards of care. Consequently, we argue that,even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority, likein the European Union, this would not implement the socially optimaloutcome. We also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulationsmakes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence.     

A Complete Characterization of Efficient Liability Rules: Comment

In a recent article, Jain and Singh (2002) prove that a condition they call negligence liability is necessary and sufficient for any liability rule to be efficient. In this note I criticize their result on two accounts: First, their result crucially depends on implicit restrictions they impose on the liability assignment function. If we drop the assumption that the liability apportionment between two non-negligent parties is constant for all combinations of non-negligent care levels, the equivalence between the condition of negligence liability and the efficiency of liability rules breaks down. Second, their attempt to drop the assumption of uniqueness for the social optimum improves the generality of the model at a substantial cost, since it must be accompanied by a new assumption that is possibly even more unrealistic. The importance of the uniqueness assumption is shown in a simple discrete care model, in which comparative negligence may lead to an inefficient outcome when the existence of two social optima leads us to interpret due care as a varying standard based on the other partys actual choice.     

Generalized Progress of Abatement Technology: Incentives Under Environmental Liability Law

This paper considers the incentives environmental liability creates to improve pollution abatement technology. Our analysis considers technical progress in end-of-pipe abatement and in the production technology used, thereby generalizing the approach taken by Endres et?al. (Environ Resour Econ 36:341?C366, 2007). We establish that this generalization has drastic repercussions on incentives under negligence liability, while the performance of strict liability is not compromised. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the social desirability of investment in abatement or production technology (or both) decisively determines how ex-ante and ex-post regulation fare with respect to welfare maximization in the case of negligence liability.     

Environmental Liability Law and Induced Technical Change – The Role of Discounting

We analyse the incentives of environmental liability law for inducing progress to emission abatement technology. We consider three liability rules: strict liability, a negligence rule with an emission norm as the due care standard, and a double negligence rule which combines the emission standard with an abatement technology norm. In the case of distortive discounting, i.e. where the private discount rate deviates from the social one, we show, how the level of distortion influences the ranking of liability rules, according to the criterion of generated social cost.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL CHOICE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF HALOGENATED SOLVENT WASTE SHIPMENTS

Disposal of hazardous waste is more complex than simply choosing the option with the lowest price: Legislation may hold a waste generator responsible for cleaning up a badly contaminated waste disposal site if the operator of that site goes bankrupt. This paper estimates conditional logit models of a generator's choice of waste management facility (TSDF) for shipments of halogenated solvent waste originating in California in 1995. The probability that a facility is selected as the destination of a shipment depends on the cost of shipping to and disposal at the facility, on existing contamination at the site, and on the track record of the facility, suggesting that generators do seem to balance current disposal costs with the likelihood of future liability. There is no evidence that generators prefer facilities owned by publicly traded firms, but when generators do choose TSDFs belonging to a publicly traded company, they prefer wealthier companies. (JEL Q21)     

An Economic Analysis of Australian Damage Remedies for Misleading Prospectuses: Trade Practices Act versus Corporations Law

Laws that address damages caused by deceptive or misleading prospectuses impact on the incentive issuers face to create such prospectuses, and hence impact on the level of investment. In Australia, it has been proposed to shift from a strict liability regime under s. 52 of the Trade Practices Act to a due diligence regime under the Corporations Law. I argue that due diligence is inferior to strict liability for large firms, but in some cases may be preferred to strict liability for small firms. I conclude that due diligence—as a liability rule—increases the cost and complexity of legal action, rather than being a 'corporate law simplification' as intended by the Corporations Law Simplification Task Force. Compared to strict liability, it is more likely to result in greater demand for the services of lawyers and accountants than it is to improve the accuracy of reporting.     

Health benefits: employer liability and the need for change

The cost of health care benefits has been rising much faster than overall inflation recently, and employees are increasingly dissatisfied with the programs being offered. This has left many human resources professionals searching for a better way. Against this background, attempts to increase employer liability pose serious threats. While some employers might consider abandoning health benefits to avoid this expanded liability, other alternatives may be more appealing and may be equally effective at limiting liability.     

环境污染赔偿责任保险制度可行性基础研究

作为环境污染责任保险之一的环境污染赔偿责任保险在美国、德国等西方发达国家以及巴西、印度等发达国家已趋于完善,并对环境的保护和纠纷的解决发挥了重要作用。然而,由于种种原因,该制度目前在我国只处于政策层面,尚没有上升为法律,在政策的指导之下,地方各自为战开展环境污染责任保险制度,虽然取得了一些成绩,但也存在诸多问题,迫切需要国家立法机关对制度制定统一的法律、法规,因此对其理论基础、实践基础等方面展开深入研究,对于环境污染赔偿责任保险制度的构建具有重要意义。     

论药品侵权责任中的若干法律问题

药品侵权责任是一种特殊的产品责任,它是产品责任的下位概念。这种产品责任的构成与一般产品责任有所区别,主要表现在药品缺陷的判断标准应采用不合理危险标准,而非质量标准;在缺陷与损害之间因果关系理论的适用上提出疫学因果关系和市场占有率决定因果关系适用的可能性;为确保受害人的合法权益,发展缺陷或科技抗辩不能作为责任的免除事由。     

董事高管责任保险与企业绿色创新：激励工具还是自利手段

以2011—2019年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，通过手动收集企业董事高管责任保险及绿色专利数据，实证考察董事高管责任保险对绿色创新的影响，结果发现：①董事高管责任保险能够显著促进企业绿色创新，即董事高管责任保险是企业绿色创新的激励工具，而非管理层阻碍绿色创新的自利手段；②通过Heckman两阶段模型、倾向得分匹配缓解可能存在的内生性问题，并经过一系列其它稳健性检验后，基本结论仍保持不变；③董事高管责任保险对绿色创新的促进作用在不同规模、不同股权集中度的企业间存在差异，主要表现为对中小型企业的影响大于大型企业，对股权较为集中企业的影响大于股权分散企业。从董事高管责任保险这一全新视角对企业绿色创新进行解读，可为加速我国上市企业董事高管责任保险知识普及，驱动企业绿色创新跨越式发展提供理论支撑。     

有限责任合伙制会计师事务所民事责任若干疑难问题研究

有限责任合伙制是西方国家大会计师事务所普遍采用的组织形式,我国政府为了加快会计师事务所的做大做强,也在采取相应措施推动大中型会计师事务所采用有限责任合伙制组织形式。而系统研究和解决有限责任合伙制会计师事务所民事责任的一些重大问题,如对故意、重大过失、过失的界定,如何把损失赔偿额在各虚假陈述行为主体之间特别是合伙人之间进行分配,以及与此相关的配套措施的建立和完善,将有助于有限责任合伙制会计师事务所的做大做强,最终实现跨越式发展。     

智力负债研究述评

描述了现有的智力负债研究文献的总体特征,然后分别从概念、计量和管理等角度分析了智力负债研究的现状,最后展望了智力负债的未来研究方向。     

Entitling the Pollutee: Liability versus Standard under Private Information

This paper considers and compares two different legal means -- full liability and standard – to reduce and to regulate pollution at a local level accounting for private information about benefits and costs. The familiar polluter pays principle makes the polluter liable for any damage. Since the courts lack information about the true damage the pollutee can and presumably will overstate this damage. Nevertheless, voluntary arrangements bypassing the courts exist (e.g., for Coasean reasons). However, such out-of court arrangements fail to improve in many cases the inefficient allocation of pollution due to agency costs. Given these unsatisfactory consequences of the polluter pays principle even after allowing for contracts around the law, we propose a modification of standards: the pollutee is entitled that a certain standard is satisfied, yet can trade this right for financial compensations. Contracts induced by this legal rule are countervailing (the optimal mechanism switches between subsidies and payments and first best efficiency holds at both ends) and this characteristic allows such a privatized standard to track the first best quite well and (often) better than the polluter pays principle. This relative ranking under private information is the opposite of the one that holds under uncertainty (here liability dominates the standard).JEL classification: D62, D82     

责任保险在大规模侵权中的运用

随着大规模侵权事件的不断出现,传统侵权法仅由"加害人承担损失"的观念正逐渐改变,责任保险成为侵权领域中一种新的救济方式.本文在对大规模侵权的可保性进行深入分析的基础上,提出责任保险与其他救济方式相比存在独特的优势,并从法律和保险实务两个角度明确了其保障范围、保障程度及发生责任竞合时的处理方式.     

负债与流动性:抑制还是协同

负债和流动性的关系是资本结构的一个新问题.负债之于流动性,是相互抑制还是协同,成为近年来有争议的话题.一般而言,负债比率和流动性会因为上市公司所处的行业不同而有很大的差别.基于以上认识,本文试图在已有研究成果基础上有所突破,结合实证检验,按行业研究我国上市公司负债和流动性的关系.因地制宜地采取措施,提升企业价值,会对上市公司有更切合实际的的理论和现实指导意义.     

关注公众利益 健全公众责任保险

公共场所事故的频繁发生造成了大量人财物的损失。当业主补偿成问题，政府救助又不能充分满足需求，公众责任保险就成了人们分散风险的重要手段之一。然而，中国公众责任保险的发展并未充分发挥其应有的社会管理功能，其原因包括民事赔偿法律制度、目标投保人意识等多个方面。有针对性地在上述方面加强措施，将有助于为这一符合社会友展规律的险种迎来蓬勃的发展契机。     

Product Liability: Beyond Class Action

Can punitive product liability enhance economic efficiency? A very simple economic theory, assuming that the probability and the degree of product dissatisfaction are functions only of the producer's not of the consumer's effort, is modelled and analysed in this paper. The qualitative conclusion hinges critically upon whether the legal liability is reflected on price determination. If the price of the product is insensitive to product liability legislation, then punitive liability beyond the class action (i.e., compensatory payments more than proportional representation of potentially dissatisfied consumers) can induce socially desirable levels of effort exerted by the producer firm. This affirmative effect disappears if the price fully reflects all the expected legal liabilities, whereby punitive liability tends to reduce economic efficiency by encouraging costly lawsuit.