FOMC Forecasts as a Focal Point for Private Expectations

We explore empirically the theoretical prediction that public information acts as a focal point in the context of the U.S. monetary policy. We aim at establishing whether the publication of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) inflation forecasts affects the cross‐sectional dispersion of private inflation expectations. Our main finding is that publishing FOMC inflation forecasts has a negative effect on the cross‐sectional dispersion of private current‐year inflation forecasts. This effect is found to be robust to another survey data set and to various macroeconomic controls. Moreover, we find that the dispersion of private inflation forecasts is not affected by the dispersion of views among FOMC members.     

Survey forecasts in Brazil: A prismatic assessment of epidemiology,performance, and determinants

This paper assesses the behavior of survey forecasts in Brazil during the inflation targeting regime, when managing expectations is one of the cornerstones of the conduct of monetary policy. The distinctive database of the survey conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) among professional forecasters allows for a thorough investigation of the epidemiology, determinants, and performance of forecasts. The main results are: i) top performing forecasters are influential to other forecasters; ii) survey forecasts perform better than vector autoregressive model-based forecasts; iii) common forecast errors prevail over idiosyncratic components across respondents; iv) inflation targets play an important role in inflation expectations; and v) agents perceive the BCB as following a Taylor rule consistent with inflation targeting. The last two suggest high credibility of the monetary authority.     

Learnability and monetary policy: A global perspective

The recent literature on monetary policy design has emphasized the importance of equilibrium determinacy and learnability in the choice of policy rules. This paper contains an analysis of the learnability of the equilibrium in a class of simple, micro-founded models in which the policy authority uses a Taylor-type monetary policy rule. Unlike previous analyses, the model economy is not linearized about a steady state—instead, a global perspective is adopted. Globally, the nonlinear model economy can possess rational expectations equilibria other than the steady state consistent with the inflation target of the monetary authorities. These include a second, low inflation ‘liquidity trap’ steady state, periodic equilibria, and sunspot equilibria. The main results in the paper characterize the conditions under which these alternative equilibria maybe stable under adaptive learning, even when the policy rule obeys the Taylor principle. The stability of multiple equilibria is associated with policy rules which are forecast-based. An important finding is that backward-looking Taylor-type policy rules can guarantee that the unique learnable equilibrium is the steady state associated with the inflation target of the monetary authority.     

Labor market search, the Taylor principle, and indeterminacy

In a sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions, forecast-based interest rate policy almost always induces indeterminacy when it is strictly inflation targeting and satisfies the Taylor principle. Indeterminacy is due to a vacancy channel of monetary policy that makes inflation expectations self-fulfilling. The effect of this channel strengthens as the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption increases. When this relative sluggishness is high, the Taylor principle fails to ensure determinacy, regardless of whether the policy is forecast-based or outcome-based, whether it is strictly or flexibly inflation targeting, or contains policy rate smoothing.     

The expectations hypothesis: New hope or illusory support?

Recent studies of the expectations hypothesis of the term structure (EHTS) find evidence in favor of the EHTS using post 1980s US data. This has been attributed to the relative macro stability of this period and greater market efficiency. Using a panel of forecasts for 3-month interest rates for ten countries we test separately for EHTS and rational expectations. Assuming rational expectations holds we find support for the EHTS is illusory due to an off-setting time-varying term premia and non-rational expectations. Previous forecast-based studies suggest biased expectations tend to reinforce the effect of a time varying term premium. This change can be understood in the context of Fama’s (2006) argument that markets tend to underestimate future spot rates during periods of long-run increases and overestimate during declines.     

A ‘rational’ explanation for ‘irrational’ forecasts of inflation

This paper analyzes professionals' forecasts of nominal income and the inflation rate. The analysis indicates that both monetary and fiscal policy data was used efficiently to forecast income, but the monetary policy data was not used efficiently to forecast the inflation rate. Further analysis suggests that the apparent inefficient use of the monetary data results from the non-stationary money-inflation relationship predicted by rational expectations models. These models then provide an explanation for the inconsistent conclusions regarding the income forecasts and the inflation rate forecasts.     

Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous and Misspecified Expectations

In the recent literature on monetary policy and learning, it has been suggested that private sector's expectations should play a role in the policy rule implemented by the central bank, as they could improve the ability of the policymaker to stabilize the economy. Private sector's expectations, in these studies, are often taken to be homogeneous and rational, at least in the limit of a learning process. In this paper, instead, we consider the case in which private agents are heterogeneous in their expectations formation mechanisms and hold heterogeneous expectations in equilibrium. We investigate the impact of this heterogeneity in expectations on central bank's policy implementation and on the ensuing economic outcomes, and the general result that emerges is that the central bank should disregard inaccurate private sector expectations and solely base its policy on the accurate ones.     

Using a long-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument

Using a short-term interest rate as the monetary policy instrument can be problematic near its zero bound constraint. An alternative strategy is to use a long-term interest rate as the policy instrument. We find when Taylor-type policy rules are used by the central bank to set the long rate in a standard New Keynesian model, indeterminacy—that is, multiple rational expectations equilibria—may often result. However, a policy rule with a long-rate policy instrument that responds in a “forward-looking” fashion to inflation expectations can avoid the problem of indeterminacy.     

Optimal Monetary Policy and Transparency under Informational Frictions

This paper examines the optimal monetary policy and central bank transparency in an economy where firms set prices under informational frictions. The economy is subject to two types of shocks determining the efficient output level and firms' desired markups. To minimize the welfare‐reducing output gap and price dispersion between firms, the central bank controls firms' incentives and expectations by using a monetary instrument and disclosing information on the realized shocks. This paper shows that an optimal policy comprises the disclosure of a linear combination of the two shocks and the adjustment of monetary instruments contingent on the disclosed information.     

Bidder behavior in central bank repo auctions: Evidence from the Bundesbank

For many central banks, repo auctions are the most important monetary policy instrument. This paper employs a unique data set of individual bids submitted in the repo auctions of the Bundesbank to analyze the determinants of banks’ bidding behavior and the empirical performance of repo auctions. We conduct a panel analysis to estimate how banks bidding is affected by various auction as well as bidder-specific factors including interest rate expectations, interest rate uncertainty, maturing allotment, reserve fulfillment and a bank’s size.     

Heterogeneous Expectations,Optimal Monetary Policy,and the Merit of Policy Inertia

The design and analysis of optimal monetary policy is usually guided by the paradigm of homogeneous rational expectations. Instead, we examine the dynamic consequences of design and implementation strategies, when the actual economy features expectational heterogeneity. Agents have either rational or adaptive expectations. Consequently, the central bank's ability to achieve price stability under heterogeneous expectations depends on its objective and implementation strategy. An expectations‐based reaction function, which appropriately conditions on private sector expectations, performs exceptionally well. However, once the objective introduces policy inertia, popular strategies have similar determinacy properties, but they are less operational. This finding calls for new implementation strategies under interest rate stabilization.     

EARNINGS EXPECTATIONS, FIRM SIZE, AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF STOCK PRICES

The notion that prices impound a wide array of information, including market expectations, has led to earnings forecast models conditioned on prices. Yet, presumably, analysts' forecasts capture both public information and certain private information not previously impounded in prices. Accordingly, price-based models are seemingly an inefficient, and less effective, source of expecta-tions. This article investigates this hypothesis using financial analysts', price-based, and naive forecasts. Results indicate that analysts' forecasts (1) are at least as accurate as price-based and naive models, and (2) yield better expectations for market tests relating returns and earnings. These inferences are robust across different information environments. The evidence suggests that analysts either possess private information or are more effective information processors, or both.     

The Discounted Economic Stock of Money with VAR Forecasting

We measure the economic capital stock of money implied by the Divisia monetary aggregate service flow, in a manner consistent with asset pricing theory. Based on Barnett’s (Monetary policy on the 75th anniversary of the Federal Reserve System, pp. 232–244, Kluwer, Boston, 1991) definition of the economic stock of money, we estimate the expected discounted flow of expenditure on the services of monetary assets, where expenditure on monetary services is evaluated at the user costs of the monetary components. We use forecasts based on martingale expectations, asymmetric vector autoregressive expectations, and the Bayesian vector autoregressive expectations. We find the resulting capital-stock index to be surprisingly robust to the modeling of expectations.     

Heterogeneous Inflation Expectations and Learning

Using the panel component of the Michigan Survey of Consumers, we estimate a learning model of inflation expectations, allowing for heterogeneous use of private information and lifetime inflation experience. Life experience inflation has a significant impact on individual expectations, but only for 1‐year‐ahead inflation. Public information is substantially more relevant for longer horizon expectations. Even controlling for life experience inflation and public information, idiosyncratic information explains a nontrivial proportion of the inflation forecasts of agents. Women, ethnic minorities, and less educated agents have a higher degree of heterogeneity in their idiosyncratic information, and give less importance to recent movements in inflation.     

Biases in multi-year management financial forecasts: Evidence from private venture-backed U.S. companies

This paper studies the properties and determinants of managers’ multi-year financial forecasts. Using one- to five-year-ahead forecasts reported by private venture-backed firms, we ask whether, by how much, and why biases in managers’ forecasts of revenues, expenses and profits depend on the forecasting horizon and the verifiability of assets. We find that profitability forecasts contain a strategic component, in that [1] one-year-ahead revenue (expense) forecasts are slightly and asymmetrically pessimistic (optimistic), while five-year-ahead forecasts are hugely and asymmetrically optimistic (pessimistic); and [2] biases in revenue and expense forecasts are larger, the harder to verify or more intangible-intensive are firms’ assets.     

The effect of Regulation FD on the properties of management earnings forecasts

We investigate Regulation FD’s (FD) effect on management earnings forecast properties. We posit FD’s prohibition on private manager-analyst communication reduces (increases) optimism (pessimism) in management earnings forecasts. Prior to FD, managers could avoid publicly retracting prior optimistic forecasts by privately communicating with analysts, who could lower investor expectations with a new analyst forecast. After FD, managers with optimistic forecasts must either publicly admit their optimism by issuing a new management forecast or they must negatively surprise investors at the earnings announcement. Further, FD forces managers to use public forecasts instead of private communications to establish beatable expectations. Our evidence suggests FD reduced optimism in management forecasts. This reduction in optimistic bias is not offset by an increase in pessimistic bias. Consistent with this, we further find post-FD improvements in forecast accuracy and informativeness. We find no such changes around several potentially confounding events or for foreign firms surrounding FD. Overall, our evidence suggests FD improved firms’ forecast properties (less bias, greater accuracy, and greater informativeness).     

Monetary Policy and Inflation Expectations in Latin America: Long-Run Effects and Volatility Spillovers

This paper uses multiple cointegration analysis to estimate simultaneously a monetary reaction function and the determinants of expected inflation for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico. In addition, M-GARCH modeling is used to test for the presence of volatility spillovers between the monetary stance and inflation expectations. The analysis shows that there are long-term relationships between the interest rate, expected inflation, and the inflation target, and that greater volatility in the monetary stance increases the volatility of expected inflation in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico.     

The strategy of professional forecasting

We develop and compare two theories of professional forecasters’ strategic behavior. The first theory, reputational cheap talk, posits that forecasters endeavor to convince the market that they are well informed. The market evaluates their forecasting talent on the basis of the forecasts and the realized state. If the market expects forecasters to report their posterior expectations honestly, then forecasts are shaded toward the prior mean. With correct market expectations, equilibrium forecasts are imprecise but not shaded. The second theory posits that forecasters compete in a forecasting contest with pre-specified rules. In a winner-take-all contest, equilibrium forecasts are excessively differentiated.     

Using Survey Data to Correct the Bias in Policy Expectations Extracted from Fed Funds Futures

Many studies estimate risk premiums on federal funds futures to extract monetary policy expectations by assuming that average forecast errors of the expectations are zero or that survey forecasts are good proxies for the expectations. These assumptions, however, may fail due to an unanticipated declining trend in the federal funds rate and to survey respondents' strategic behavior. Consequently, the premiums estimated under these assumptions may be biased. We propose a new method to estimate the premiums and find that the premiums have been often negative since 2000, which is generally consistent with the negative betas observed in the 2000s.