经济开放进程中金融危机冲击比较研究

亚洲金融危机和美国次贷危机对中国经济产生了明显的影响,但在经济开放进程中这两次危机冲击特点和结果均有所不同。本文对开放进程中金融危机向国内传导的渠道进行分析,利用指标对比分析法、干扰模型、脉冲响应以及方差分解技术分析比较了两次金融危机对我国冲击的不同影响机制。研究结论表明,在经济开放进程中,美国次贷危机对国内经济的冲击要远超于亚洲金融危机;在资本项目没有完全开放条件下,国际贸易渠道越来越成为国际金融危机冲击向国内传导的重要渠道;尽管经济开放增加了金融风险,但良好的制度设计和金融风险管理手段的加强,使金融危机通过金融渠道传导而产生的冲击波有所降低。     

The 2008 financial crisis: Stock market contagion and its determinants

In this paper, we investigate worldwide contagion and its determinants during the 2008 financial crisis. Utilizing an international sample of returns from 2003 to 2009, we consider both uni- and bi-directional contagion. After controlling for crisis-related volatility, we find strong evidence that cross-market linkages increase among many financial markets. In contrast to previous crises, contagion following the 2008 global financial crisis is not confined to emerging markets. The United States and other mature financial markets in the sample transmit and receive contagion. Country markets are less influenced by regions than they are by other country markets. We also construct variables that represent relative changes in economic variables before and during the crisis. We find that both economic fundamentals such as trade structure, interest rates, inflation rates, industrial production, and regional effects, and investors’ risk aversion contribute to international contagion.     

Extreme risk spillover network: application to financial institutions

Using the CAViaR tool to estimate the value-at-risk (VaR) and the Granger causality risk test to quantify extreme risk spillovers, we propose an extreme risk spillover network for analysing the interconnectedness across financial institutions. We construct extreme risk spillover networks at 1% and 5% risk levels (which we denote 1% and 5% VaR networks) based on the daily returns of 84 publicly listed financial institutions from four sectors—banks, diversified financials, insurance and real estate—during the period 2006–2015. We find that extreme risk spillover networks have a time-lag effect. Both the static and dynamic networks show that on average the real estate and bank sectors are net senders of extreme risk spillovers and the insurance and diversified financials sectors are net recipients, which coheres with the evidence from the recent global financial crisis. The networks during the 2008–2009 financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis exhibited distinctive topological features that differed from those in tranquil periods. Our approach supplies new information on the interconnectedness across financial agents that will prove valuable not only to investors and hedge fund managers, but also to regulators and policy-makers.     

Gender matters most. The impact on short‐term risk aversion following a financial crash

This paper examines how investors in an emerging market react to a domestic financial crisis. We conjecture that risk aversion increases following such events and that the effect is more pronounced among specific groups of investors. Our study makes use of a unique dataset of mutual fund investors from one of Colombia's largest stock brokers. Our results reveal that women and self‐employed individuals make the largest withdrawals from risky funds after financial crises.     

从货币地位角度看美国次贷危机与亚洲金融危机的差异

相比亚洲金融危机等历次金融危机,美国次贷危机有着类似的宏观经济和制度背景,但次贷危机在形式、影响和危机国应对政策方面均体现出与传统金融危机不同的特征。该文比较了美国次贷危机与亚洲金融危机的差异,认为危机发源国货币地位的不同是这些差异产生的重要因素。     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

What is the systemic risk exposure of financial institutions?

I compare the performance of three measures of institution-level systemic risk exposure — Exposure CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2016), systemic expected shortfall (Acharya et al., 2016), and Granger causality (Billio et al., 2012). I modify Exposure CoVaR to allow for forecasting, and estimate the ability of each measure to forecast the performance of financial institutions during systemic crisis periods in 1998 (LTCM) and 2008 (Lehman Brothers). I find that Exposure CoVaR forecasts the within-crisis performance of financial institutions, and provides useful forecasts of future systemic risk exposures. Systemic expected shortfall and Granger causality do not forecast the performance of financial institutions reliably during crises. I also find, using cross-sectional regressions, that foreign equity exposure and securitization income determine systemic risk exposure during the 1998 and 2008 crises, respectively; financial institution size determines systemic risk exposure during both crisis periods; and executive compensation does not determine systemic risk exposure.     

Financial liberalization,insurance market,and the likelihood of financial crises

This paper provides empirical evidence to investigate the direct impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and examines the roles of insurance market, country risk, and economic conditional variables on the relationship between financial liberalization and financial crises in 39 countries. Our empirical results support that financial liberalization does have a significantly negative impact on the likelihood of currency/systemic banking crises, and that the indirect effects of insurance development and lower country risk decrease the probability of crises, but the indirect effect of economic conditional proxies is enhanced with the likelihood of a financial crisis. The policy implication is that the government or authority should strengthen the positive role of the insurance sector in order to combat financial crises.     

How the Dutch government responded to financial,economic and fiscal crisis

This article describes how the Dutch government responded to that country's financial, economic and fiscal crises. The article covers the financial crisis in 2008 when the Dutch government took measures to support and save banks; the economic crisis in 2009, which forced the government to take economic recovery measures; and the resulting fiscal crisis of increasing state debts and budget deficits which led the incoming government in 2010 to begin cutbacks in public expenditure.     

Individual financial risk tolerance and the global financial crisis

We investigate individual investors’ tolerance towards financial risk by focusing on changes associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is analysed longitudinally controlling for demographic, socio‐economic and regional variations. In absolute terms, the change in FRT is small and contrasts with a popular view that risk tolerance is an elastic psychological state overly influenced by the pervading market conditions. Even in the presence of significant financial events, FRT tends to be a reasonably stable attribute in the shorter term but possibly influenced and reshaped by events more gradually over time.     

加强市场基础建设 提高风险预警能力——希腊主权债务危机的反思

近来,希腊债务危机成为全球经济舆论的焦点。文章指出,希腊债务危机是希腊经济自身缺陷、主权债务信息披露不完善、欧元区体制弊端等问题的集中体现。借鉴希腊债务危机的教训,我们应进一步强化信息披露对金融市场发展基础性作用的认识,通过发展直接融资促进地方政府融资的显性化,并尽快建立和完善我国金融市场的风险监控、预警和处理机制。     

金融危机启示:金融一体化监管趋势下的保险监管

任何一次危机的爆发都是风险释放的过程,研究危机更重要的是关注风险的积累过程。因此,分析危机前的风险积累过程,查找危机产生的原因,对防范和化解危机具有现实意义。本文通过对新近发生的美国次贷危机进而延伸到对10年前亚洲金融危机分析,以及全球金融一体化监管最新演进趋势的借鉴,论述我国保险监管组织架构的未来展望。     

Global systemic risk measures and their forecasting power for systemic events

Since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, many market-based systemic risk measures have been proposed. Prominent examples are MES, SRISK or ΔCoVaR. Based on a simulation study in an extended banking network model that incorporates several sources of systemic risk, we analyze how well these systemic risk measures perform in indicating the risk of a systemic event. For this analysis, the systemic risk measures of the banks that default and whose default is followed by a systemic event are compared with the systemic risk measures of those defaulting banks for which no subsequent systemic event can be observed. Within the simulation study, we find that many bank-individual systemic risk measures are statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of a systemic event after a bank’s default. However, the economic significance of the bank-individual systemic risk measures is relatively low.     

The effect of financial market development on bank risk: evidence from Southeast Asian countries

This paper examines how bank risk varies with changes in financial markets development in a broad data set of 52 publicly listed commercial banks in five Southeast Asian countries over a 23-year period between 1990 and 2012. A consequence of two financial crises (i.e. the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009) provides a natural experiment in which linkages between financial markets development and bank risk are measured. Empirical results show that higher degrees of financial markets development are associated with weaker bank capital positions and are positively related to higher degrees of bank revenue diversification. There is also evidence for a U-shaped relationship between the degree of financial markets development and bank capital.     

How the German government responded to the financial,economic and fiscal crises

This paper explains the German government's response to the financial, economic and fiscal crises. It covers the financial crisis in 2008 when banks were supported (SoFFin), the economic crisis in 2009, and the fiscal crisis of increasing state debts and budget deficits which caused the German government to cut spending (Sparpaket) in 2010. The author looks at the contents of the government's responses, but also at the political and administrative aspects of the government's decision-making processes.     

How the UK government responded to the fiscal crisis: an outsider's view

This article presents an outsider's view of the UK government's response to recent financial, economic and fiscal crises. The article covers the financial crisis in 2008 when the then New Labour government rescued UK banks; the economic crisis in 2009 which resulted in economic stimulus measures; and the fiscal crisis of increasing national debts and budget deficits which led the newly-elected coalition government in 2010 to take fiscal consolidation measures. The author is an administrative scientist, and unpicks government responses, focusing on the political and administrative aspects of the governmental decision-making processes. The article ends with some lessons and foreign perspectives.     

后金融危机时代江西民营企业发展的战略选择

受全球性金融危机的影响，江西省部分民营企业的生产、销售、发展出现了前所未有的困难。江西民营经济已成为江西经济发展的生力军，在后金融危机时代江西民营企业要汲取金融危机的教训，不断创新发展，变危为机是江西民营经济发展的战略选择。     

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

Uncertainty and risk management from Islamic perspective

Most decisions are taken in very uncertain contexts and all objective economic behaviour is dictated by the efforts of different agents to protect themselves against uncertainty. So, how to act in the face of uncertainty to minimise the harmful consequences of recurrent financial crises? The purpose of this article is to answer this question by highlighting the ethical aspect of investments and finance from the Islamic perspective, which notoriously, forbids excessive uncertainty, gharar. Islamic law proposes a legal framework that specifies the rules by which risk is understood, managed, taken or shared. The way the Islamic financial system resisted the recent crisis leads us to study its unusual interpretation of risk. We also investigate whether Islamic ethics as an alternative could help to prevent the disaster of repeated financial crises.     

How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis

Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks which lead to excessive risk-taking. We examine the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to and during the recent financial crisis. We find that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. Our findings suggest that the “moral hazard effect” of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the “stabilization effect” of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. The overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample we study remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared to the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, we find that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.