The impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk—Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

The aim of this paper is to analyze the impact of central bank transparency on systemic risk in emerging banking markets using a sample composed of 34 banks from Central and Eastern Europe for a period spanning from 2005 through 2012. Results indicate a positive and significant relationship between central bank transparency and financial institutions’ contribution to systemic risk. On the other side, increased central bank transparency significantly reduces the idiosyncratic risk of banks. The relationship is influenced by the restrictiveness of regulatory framework. We argue that a more transparent central bank is beneficial for the banking sector from a microprudential perspective. However, it may create incentives for financial institutions to engage in risky activities and through herd behavior may increase individual contribution to the risk of the banking system.     

Financial derivatives and bank risk: evidence from eighteen developed markets

We examine the relationship between equity risk and the use of financial derivatives with a sample of 555 banks from eighteen developed markets from 2006 to 2015. Our main findings suggest that banks’ use of financial derivatives increased their risk. This increase in risk can be driven by banks’ use of derivatives for speculative purposes, by suboptimal hedging to obtain hedge accounting status, or from accounting mismatches that generate volatility in earnings. We also show that this relationship is nonlinear. Too-Big-To-Fail banks and those that employ a traditional retail banking business model are subject to lower idiosyncratic risk. We address endogeneity concerns using instrumental variables capturing the use of derivatives with portfolio ranking. Overall, our study contributes to understanding the impact of derivatives use on bank risk and the risk consequences of a bank’s business model choice.     

Can fintech improve the efficiency of commercial banks? —An analysis based on big data

This paper assess the potential impact of Fintech on the banking industry. Results suggest that, for commercial banks, development of Fintech leads to increased profitability, financial innovation, and improved control of risk. Overall, by using financial technology, commercial banks can improve their traditional business model by reducing bank operating costs, improving service efficiency, strengthening risk control capabilities, and creating enhanced customer-oriented business models for customers; thereby improving comprehensive competitiveness. We also find that levels of such outcomes vary with levels of respective bank’s use of technological innovation.     

政策连续性与商业银行系统性风险

本文基于2007年第一季度至2019年第四季度中国A股32家上市银行非平衡面板数据,从“冲击”和“传染”两个维度考察了政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响。实证结果表明,政策连续性程度的提高通过降低银行个体风险和减弱银行个体与系统的关联性进而显著降低了银行系统性风险。进一步分析发现,政策连续性降低了银行被动风险承担水平而非主动风险承担意愿,减弱了银行间接关联程度而非直接关联程度。异质性分析表明,经济下行和货币宽松时期,政策连续性对系统性风险的降低效应更大,并且本身破产风险越高、信息透明度越低的银行,其系统性风险受政策连续性的影响越大。区分不同类型的政策发现,货币政策、财政政策、汇率与资本项目政策的连续性上升均能显著降低银行系统性风险,其中货币政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响力度最大。     

What do financial intermediaries do?

This paper presents evidence that the traditional banking business of accepting deposits and making loans has declined significantly in the US in recent years. There has been a switch from directly held assets to pension funds and mutual funds. However, banks have maintained their position relative to GDP by innovating and switching from their traditional business to fee-producing activities. A comparison of investor portfolios across countries shows that households in the US and UK bear considerably more risk from their investments than counterparts in Japan, France and Germany. It is argued that in these latter countries intermediaries can manage risk by holding liquid reserves and intertemporally smoothing. However, in the US and UK competition from financial markets prevents this and risk management must be accomplished using derivatives and other similar techniques. The decline in the traditional banking business and the financial innovation undertaken by banks in the US is interpreted as a response to the competition from markets and the decline of intertemporal smoothing.     

金融科技布局、银行信贷风险与经营绩效——来自商业银行与科技企业战略合作的证据

商业银行通过布局金融科技进行的金融服务创新,已成为深化金融供给侧结构性改革的重要举措。本文通过手工搜集2005—2019年323家商业银行与科技企业战略合作的数据,研究银行布局金融科技如何影响其信贷风险与经营绩效。结果表明:(1)银行布局金融科技战略能降低银行信贷风险,提高银行经营绩效;(2)银行布局金融科技通过提高其自身创新能力与竞争力从而降低银行的信贷风险水平;(3)银行布局金融科技,通过降低信贷风险、提升普惠金融服务、提高运营管理能力与拓展中间业务这四个渠道提高了银行经营绩效;(4)全国性银行发展金融科技使其信贷风险水平得到降低,资本充足率低的银行通过布局金融科技降低信贷风险的效果更强。同时,信用贷款比重越高的银行通过发展金融科技降低信贷风险、提高经营绩效的效果更加明显。本文研究有助于理解商业银行顺势而为所进行的金融科技布局的微观经济后果,也为进一步完善金融服务实体经济相关政策提供参考。     

资产透明度、监管套利与银行系统性风险

资产不透明的金融机构过度依赖批发性融资进行监管套利不利于系统性风险的防控。在此背景下,本文首先在经典银行道德风险模型的基础上引入关联性,从资产透明度和监管套利的视角分析银行系统性风险累积的内在机理。而后利用2007-2018年中国上市银行微观数据,构建资产透明度指标和系统性风险指标(SRISK、MES),对理论推论进行实证检验。主要结论有:(1)资产不透明、监管套利会提高银行的系统性风险。(2)监管套利弱化了资产透明度和资本监管机制对银行系统性风险承担的约束作用,资产透明度与资本监管机制在约束系统性风险承担中的协调作用不明显。(3)以大银行为主的债权银行受监管套利的影响相较于受资产透明度的影响更明显。在此基础上,我们对完善金融风险防范体系以及监管机制提出了若干建议。     

Fund Management and Systemic Risk – Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis

Fund managers play an important role in increasing efficiency and stability in financial markets. But research also indicates that fund management in certain circumstances may contribute to the buildup of systemic risk and severity of financial crises. The global financial crisis provided a number of new experiences on the contribution of fund managers to systemic risk. In this article, we focus on these lessons from the crisis. We distinguish between three sources of systemic risk in the financial system that may arise from fund management: insufficient credit risk transfer to fund managers; runs on funds that cause sudden reductions in funding to banks and other financial entities; and contagion through business ties between fund managers and their sponsors. Our discussion relates to the current intense debate on the role the so‐called shadow banking system played in the global financial crisis. Several regulatory initiatives have been launched or suggested to reduce the systemic risk arising from non‐bank financial entities, and we briefly discuss the likely impact of these on the sources of systemic risk outlined in the article.     

Back to the basics in banking? A micro-analysis of banking system stability

This paper analyzes the relationship between banks’ divergent strategies toward specialization and diversification of financial activities and their ability to withstand a banking sector crash. We first generate market-based measures of banks’ systemic risk exposures using extreme value analysis. Systemic banking risk is measured as the tail beta, which equals the probability of a sharp decline in a bank’s stock price conditional on a crash in a banking index. Subsequently, the impact of (the correlation between) interest income and the components of non-interest income on this risk measure is assessed. The heterogeneity in extreme bank risk is attributed to differences in the scope of non-traditional banking activities: non-interest generating activities increase banks’ tail beta. In addition, smaller banks and better-capitalized banks are better able to withstand extremely adverse conditions. These relationships are stronger during turbulent times compared to normal economic conditions. Overall, diversifying financial activities under one umbrella institution does not improve banking system stability, which may explain why financial conglomerates trade at a discount.     

Banking industry volatility and banking crises

While studies using balance sheet information of banks and macroeconomic indicators to forecast banking crises are prolific, empirical research using market information of banks is relatively sparse. We investigate whether banking industry volatility, constructed with the disaggregated approach from Campbell et al. [Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G., Xu, Y., 2001. Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk? The Journal of Finance 56, 1–43] using exclusively publicly available market information of banks, is a good predictor of systemic banking crises in the analyses including data from 18 developed and 18 emerging markets. We find that banking industry volatility performs well in predicting systemic banking crises for developed markets but very poor for emerging markets, which suggest that the impact of market forces on the soundness of the banking system might be different for developed and emerging markets. We also find that those macroeconomic and banking risk management indicators have different impact on the probability of banking crises. Therefore, the traditional cross-country results of the studies on banking crises need to be interpreted cautiously.     

Banking regulation and the output cost of banking crises

Using a cross-section time-series of 47 banking crisis episodes in 35 industrial and emerging market economies between the 1970s and 2003, this study analyses the relationship between banking regulation and supervision, and the severity of banking crises measured in terms of the magnitude of output loss. The empirical results show that countries that provide comprehensive deposit insurance coverage and enforce strict bank capital adequacy requirements experience a smaller output cost of crises. Restrictions on bank activities also influence the severity of crises. The results, however, do not suggest that there is a significant impact of bank supervision. In addition, there is no robust evidence that the magnitude of the output cost of crises depends on the extent of banks’ financial intermediation.     

Nontraditional banking activities and bank failures during the financial crisis

We test whether income from nontraditional banking activities contributed to the failures of hundreds of U.S. commercial banks during the financial crisis. Estimates from a multi-period logit model indicate that the probability of distressed bank failure declined with pure fee-based nontraditional activities such as securities brokerage and insurance sales, but increased with asset-based nontraditional activities such as venture capital, investment banking and asset securitization. Banks that engaged in risky nontraditional activities also tended to take risk in their traditional lines of business, suggesting that deregulation was neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for bank failure during the crisis.     

Banking industry volatility and economic growth

Utilizing the recent dynamic panel GMM estimation techniques for 36 markets, this research investigates the relationship between banking industry volatility and future economic growth, and provides empirical evidence complementary to Cole et al. (2008) who examine the finance-growth nexus from a unique asset pricing theory perspective and document a positive relationship between bank stock returns and future economic growth that is significantly influenced by a series of country-specific and banking institutional characteristics. We find that the negative link between banking industry volatility and future economic growth is significantly affected by government ownership of banks, the enforcement of the insider trading law, systemic banking crises, and bank accounting disclosure standards, while the impact of financial development is ambiguous. The significant results are primarily driven by the data from emerging markets.     

Lending Booms and Lending Standards

We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.     

Bank size, market concentration, and bank earnings volatility in the US

We examine whether bank earnings volatility depends on bank size and the degree of concentration in the banking sector. Using quarterly data for non-investment banks in the United States for the period 2004Q1-2009Q4 and controlling for the quality of management, leverage, and diversification, we find that bank size reduces return volatility. The negative impact of bank size on bank earnings volatility decreases (in absolute terms) with market concentration. We also find that larger banks located in concentrated markets have experienced higher volatility during the recent financial crisis.     

银行价格竞争、融资约束与企业研发投资——基于“中介效应”模型的实证研究

近年来我国利率市场化改革积极推进,实体经济发展积极向创新驱动转型,一个亟须研究厘清的关键问题是,银行业竞争如何驱动企业创新活动？本文关注银行价格竞争对企业创新的影响,以2013—2018年沪深两市的上市企业为样本,采用“中介效应”因果分析模型,实证检验了银行价格竞争对企业研发投资的影响,并识别出以融资约束为中介渠道的作用机制。研究发现,银行价格竞争不仅会提高银行的风险容忍度,直接增加R&D投资的信贷供给意愿,而且还会通过降低贷款价格和增加贷款可得性来缓解企业整体的融资约束,间接促进企业创新活动。这一机制在解除贷款利率管制之后以及在民营企业层面体现得更加明显。本文的研究结果对于深化金融市场化改革、改善金融服务实体经济效果以及实施经济创新驱动发展战略,具有明确的政策启示。     

改进的效率测算模型、影子银行与中国商业银行效率

商业银行及其效率的高低是金融供给侧结构性改革的关键环节,而可以压缩的“坏”投入和影子银行对商业银行效率产生重要影响。本文首次建立理论模型并分析影子银行影响商业银行效率的路径;方法上,同时区分投入和产出的“好”或“坏”,拓展只区分产出的“好”或“坏”的效率测算模型;实证上,首次测算并分析“坏”投入、影子银行业务对商业银行利润、风险和效率的影响。结果表明:理论上,影子银行会同时增加风险承担和利润,但无法确定经风险调整后的利润增加能否提升效率;只区分产出的模型高估了效率,尤其是显著高估四大行和股份制商业银行第一阶段的效率,大型商业银行依靠网点的扩张不利于效率的提升;影子银行业务提升了四大国有银行尤其是股份制银行的效率,但对中小型商业银行效率影响较小。总的来看,压缩“坏”投入和规范影子银行是增加有效金融供给、优化金融供给结构和提升银行效率的重要途径。     

对外开放是否导致银行业的风险上升？——基于外资持股比例与海外资产占比的实证检验

对外开放是否导致商业银行的风险上升,以往学者的研究结论并不统一。本文基于中国392家商业银行的微观数据,检验了“引进来”(用外资持股比例作为替代指标)与“走出去”(用海外资产占比作为替代指标)对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。结果显示,对外开放与商业银行的风险之间呈现非线性曲线特征并存在临界点;对中小型商业银行而言,过高的外资持股比例与过低的境外投资规模会带来风险;对大型商业银行而言,境外投资规模存在一个阈值区间,在阈值区间内,可能导致银行风险上升。政策建议是:外资参股中小型商业银行的比例可能不宜过高,鼓励中小型商业银行加大境外投资力度,大型商业银行可以根据特定时期的目标来调整对外开放策略,同时应强化风险预警与防范手段,在坚持与扩大银行业对外开放的背景下,实施宏观审慎原则,维护我国金融体系的整体稳定。     

How credible is a too-big-to-fail policy? International evidence from market discipline

This paper analyzes in an international sample of banks from 104 countries if the sensitivity of the cost of deposits to bank risk varies across banks depending on their systemic and absolute size. We analyze a period before the 2007 financial crisis and control for endogeneity of bank size, intervention policies in past banking crises, and soundness of countries’ public finances. Our results are consistent with the predominance of the too-big-to-fail hypothesis, although this effect is stronger in countries that did not impose losses on depositors in past banking crises and in countries with sounder public finances.     

风险分担机制变迁、银行经营模式转型与银行安全

经济全球化过程中,金融市场横向风险分担机制侵蚀了银行中介跨期风险分担机制;一部分资金从银行中介转移到金融市场,致使商业银行传统盈利模式遭受冲击。银行必须从传统的存贷款经营模式转变为参与金融市场和衍生工具交易的、提供综合金融服务的现代经营模式。在这一转型过程中,如果转型过快或者银行不能适应变化,银行体系则可能积累大量风险,并导致银行危机。实证检验结果显示,风险分担机制变迁显著增加了银行危机的概率。