政府补贴促进制造业企业研发投入了吗?——基于资本结构的门槛效应研究

本文以2016~2018年沪深股市的制造业上市公司为研究样本,通过建立门槛效应模型,验证了政府补贴与企业研发投入的作用关系会随着资本结构的变化而变化。研究发现,政府补贴能够促进企业研发投入,并且在资本结构的调节作用下呈现三重门槛效应。进一步研究还发现,政府补贴对非国有企业研发投入的影响系数更高。因此,政府研发补贴政策需要综合考虑企业资金状况、企业性质,建立有效甄别机制,实施差异化补贴策略,加大对非国企补贴力度,拓宽中小企业融资渠道。     

政府补助与公司投资行为——基于中国上市公司的数据

基于公司投资视角,以2007—2012年我国资本市场上A股上市公司为样本,研究政府补助对公司投资行为的影响,结果显示：政府补助越多,公司投资支出水平越高;政府补助对非国有公司的投资激励作用比国有公司更有效;公司产权性质差异会影响政府补助的投资激励效应;市场化程度越低、经济增长越缓慢的地区,政府补助对公司投资支出的影响越敏感;上市公司的非效率投资问题比较突出,政府补助加剧了上市公司的过度投资行为。因此,政府应根据微观企业主体的差异性来制定和实施相应的补助政策,以实现预期效果。     

NON-WELFARIST OPTIMAL TAXATION AND BEHAVIOURAL PUBLIC ECONOMICS

Abstract.  Research in behavioural economics has uncovered the widespread phenomenon of people making decisions against their own good intentions. In these situations, the government might want to intervene, indeed individuals might want the government to intervene, to induce behaviour that is closer to what individuals wish they were doing. The analysis of such corrective interventions, through taxes and subsidies, might be called 'behavioural public economics'. However, such analysis, where the government has an objective function that is different from that of individuals, is not new in public economics. In these cases the government is said to be 'non-welfarist' in its objectives, and there is a long tradition of non-welfarist welfare economics, especially the analysis of optimal taxation and subsidy policy where the outcomes of individual behaviour are evaluated using a preference function different from the one that generated the outcomes. First of all the object of this paper is to present a unified view of the non-welfarist optimal taxation literature and, second, to present behavioural public economics as a natural special case of this general framework.     

经济适用房不同补贴方式的效果

通过数学模型,分析政府对经济适用房生产商或购买者实施补贴对购买者的效用影响、对生产商行为的影响、对政府补贴成本的影响,及至对经济适用房成交量、成交价格和净社会福利的影响。研究结果表明：对经济适用房生产商采用降低土地价格的补贴方式不如对其按单位价格补贴或按成交价的一定比例补贴,这后两种方式都更有效率,能够降低政府补贴成本,减少政府腐败行为,促进房地产商开发适合低收入者所需要的住房并提高销售效率。     

上市企业政府补贴决定中的博弈效应估算研究

政府补贴决定问题是学界长期关注的热点问题,补贴规模和强度不仅受政府和企业个体特征因素的影响,还受政府和企业间博弈行为的影响。采用双边随机边界模型,使用2007—2018年沪深两市A股上市企业样本数据,实证研究了政府和企业间博弈行为对补贴决定的影响,研究结果表明：政府和企业间博弈行为对补贴决定具有重要影响;平均水平上,政府剩余显著高于企业剩余,即综合博弈效应表现为政府方获得净剩余,政府和企业最终达成的补贴水平因此被压低;博弈行为对补贴决定的影响于政企双方个体特征维度上呈现出显著异质性。     

Programme Evaluation with Multiple Treatments

Abstract.  This paper reviews the main identification and estimation strategies for microeconometric policy evaluation. Particular emphasis is laid on evaluating policies consisting of multiple programmes, which is of high relevance in practice. For example, active labour market policies may consist of different training programmes, employment programmes and wage subsidies. Similarly, sickness rehabilitation policies often offer different vocational as well as non‐vocational rehabilitation measures. First, the main identification strategies (control‐for‐confounding‐variables, difference‐in‐difference, instrumental‐variable, and regression‐discontinuity identification) are discussed in the multiple‐programme setting. Thereafter, the different nonparametric matching and weighting estimators of the average treatment effects and their properties are examined.     

基于博弈论的中欧国际班列政府补贴优化——以“义新欧”为例

针对中欧国际班列发展中存在的政府补贴优化问题,制定了一个基于中欧国际班列运营企业集装箱运输量和服务水平的补贴方案。运用不完全动态博弈分析政府、运营企业及托运人之间的关系,假设以实现三者效益最大化为目标,构建了一个以政府补贴为变量的三阶段博弈模型,采用逆行归纳法对模型进行求解,得到运营企业的补贴系数和努力程度系数。参考“义新欧”班列的运行数据,进行实证分析,并帮助政府确定合适的补贴金额。     

Environmental regulations in private and mixed duopolies: Taxes on emissions versus green R&D subsidies

In this article, we compare two kinds of environmental regulations—emissions taxes and green R&D subsidies—in private and mixed-duopoly markets in the presence of R&D spillovers. We show that a green R&D subsidy is better (worse) than an emissions tax when the green R&D is efficient (inefficient), irrespective of R&D spillovers, whereas the existence of a publicly owned firm encourages the government to adopt a subsidy policy. We also show that the optimal policy choice depends on R&D efficiency and spillovers. In particular, when green R&D is inefficient and the spillover rate is low (high), the government should choose an emissions tax and (not) privatize the state-owned firm. When green R&D is efficient, however, an R&D subsidy is better, but a privatization policy is not desirable for society, irrespective of spillovers.     

对新政府补助准则下运输企业信息披露问题的思考

新政府补助准则实施后,主要是针对准则内容、处理方法和新准则的应用对企业产生的影响等方面变化进行的研究,缺少从新准则如何影响具体行业的变化方面进行探讨。以运输业上市公司为代表,分析了运输行业政府补助信息披露的变化、运输业新政府补助信息披露存在的问题。针对出现的这些问题,对上市公司政府补助信息披露提出相关建议。     

THE SIZE OF HOUSING SUBSIDIES IN CHINA*

Inexhaustible, strong demand for housing, which is generated from the current low rents and the work-unit-distribution housing system, has caused permanent housing shortages in China's urban sector. It is also one of the main sources of China's cost-push inflation. The transition from public to private saving, which is included in current housing reform, is the only way to solve the housing problems facing the country. Calculation of the size of housing subsidies is the very foundation of any housing reform program. Based on my estimates, the annual housing subsidy per woker expanded 8.6 limes during the period from 1978 to 1988, increasing at an anual rate of 24.1%. Total housing subsidies expanded 12.4 times, rising at an annual rate of 28.6%. Relative to GNP, the housing subsidies grew from 1.3% to 4.2% during the period. The rapid expansion of housing subsidies has several significant policy implications for China's economy. These include the need for reappraising real worker income identifying the enlarged portion of revenue in kind, and recalculating housing consumption.     

On the Optimal Structure of Government Subsidies for Enterprise Zones and Other Locational Development Programs

Government locational development programs often reward businesses for decisions they would have made or that are going to be quickly reversed. This paper presents a model to determine the amount and structure of government locational subsidies that minimize this problem. We model the firm's decision to switch locations as an option whose value depends on stochastic operating costs, the costs to switch locations and subsidies offered by the government. The government maximizes the expected benefit from the operation of the firm within its preferred location by choosing a subsidy package that explicitly and endogenously recognizes the firm's switching option.     

THE DESIGN OF DIRECT DEMAND SUBSIDY PROGRAMS FOR HOUSING IN LATIN AMERICA

Traditional Latin American housing programs, which have used below-market interest rates to convey subsidies, have suffered from serious vices: high per-unit cost and subsidies, low population coverage, lack of transparency, benefits to the middle-class rather than the poor, and inefficiency. Chile broke out of this flawed traditional mode by launching a housing program that conveys subsidies directly to households in die form of a one-time, non-reimbursable grant This approach has spread to other Latin American countries, increasingly with the support of donors. The paper describes and then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of direct subsidy programs in Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, and Uruguay to distill ten design lessons: target to low-income households and ensure political autonomy; replace below-market interest rates with direct demand subsidies; use group mechanisms for low-income households; stimulate supply, not just demand; adjust key amounts for inflation; balance progressivity and financial feasibility; join die efforts of various levels of government; use NGOs; establish mechanisms for on-going consolidation of housing solutions; and include measures to promote broader housing sector reform. The conclusion applies these lessons to the design of a housing pilot project in Venezuela.     

The impact of RFID adoption on donor subsidy through for-profit and not-for-profit newsvendor: Implications for Indian Public Distribution system

Subsidy programs are sponsored by government and international agencies to improve affordability and accessibility of food and health products for socially deprived community. Although the donors in such programs allocate substantial resources to fund subsidies, a lot of it is wasted due to the inefficiency in the system arising out of product shrinkage and misplacement. This study analyzes the impact of private participation and advanced technology like RFID adoption on the donor subsidy under target consumption level. We formulate the problem as a donor funding the subsidy program through for-profit/not-for-profit newsvendor and compare the equivalent subsidy per consumption with and without RFID. We perform numerical analysis, collecting data from the public distribution system of India, and the results indicate that, unless the for-profit firm operates under a substantially reduced level of shrinkage and misplacement, the donor should always prefer a not-for-profit firm for program implementation. We also observe that among all the scenarios, a not-for-profit firm with advanced technology like RFID requires minimum donor subsidy to generate the target expected consumption.     

政府基金政策下电器电子产品再制造闭环供应链决策

为分析我国现有废弃电器电子产品回收处理相关政策对其闭环供应链决策的影响,分别构建有政府基金政策、无政府基金政策两种情况下废弃电器电子产品回收再制造闭环供应链决策模型,探讨政府基金政策设置的环境税和回收处理补贴力度对闭环供应链各成员最优决策和利润的影响。结果表明:政府征收环境税越高,新产品批发价格和零售价格越高,市场需求量越低。政府补贴力度越大,废弃电器电子产品回收价格越高,回收量越高。     

Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

Reprint to: Infrastructure provision and macroeconomic performance

This paper studies the differences between private and government provision of infrastructure. Capital utilization decisions and their differential role in determining market prices for capital goods under the two regimes of infrastructure provision serve as a critical transmission mechanism for fiscal policy. A subsidy to private providers of infrastructure is preferable to direct government provision irrespective of how the subsidy or expenditure is financed. The case for private provision is much stronger in economies characterized by high levels of congestion. The choice between private and government provision also has a crucial effect on the design of optimal fiscal policy.     

Macroeconomic conditions and investment stimuli

Based on a calibrated real options model, this paper examines a tax-subsidy program offered by a government to stimulate corporate investment under business cycles. We derive and discuss optimal incentive policies for different states of the economy. We find that it is optimal for the government to offer a combination of tax cuts and lump-sum subsidy for stimulating levered firms’ investment under business cycles. Furthermore, the government should adopt counter-cyclical tax-subsidy policy, namely a higher (lower) tax cuts and a larger (smaller) lump-sum subsidy during recessions (booms). In particular, we provide a possible explanation why many governments around the world have reduced and even implemented negative interest rates to stimulate the economy during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Finally, our conclusions also predict that the break-even tax-subsidy program always provides effective investment stimulus under business cycles.     

考虑政府补贴因素的宁波海铁联运腹地划分

首先在宁波海铁联运已有研究基础上考虑政府补贴因素,通过量化综合效用值构建决策效用模型,并基于效用值范围提出了新的腹地划分标准。其次以与宁波已开展海铁联运业务的腹地城市合肥为例验证模型。结果表明,当政府补贴高于160元时,在与宁波已开展海铁联运业务的沿海港中,合肥的综合效用值最高,合肥属于宁波间接腹地;当补贴低于160元时,连云港成为宁波海铁联运首选港,合肥降级为宁波海铁联运可竞争腹地。同时模型也可为政府确定合理补贴范围提供理论支持。     

城市生活垃圾资源化政府最优补贴博弈分析

城市生活垃圾资源化能够带来巨大的经济效益、环境效益与社会效益,是贯彻国家绿色发展理念的必经之路。城市生活垃圾资源化体系的持续发展需要政府补贴作为保障,减少资源化产品与同类非资源化产品的价格差异,弥补相关企业投入产出不匹配的矛盾。本文基于社会福利最大化理论,将政府补贴作为决策变量,构建各利益主体之间的价格博弈模型,确定政府最优补贴额度和其他主体的最优决策,并根据结论提出相关建议。研究表明:要实现整体效益最大化,政府需要在不同环节采取不同的补贴方式与补贴额度。     

GRANT EQUIVALENT EXPENDITURE ON INDUSTRIAL SUBSIDIES IN THE POST-WAR UNITED KINGDOM

ABSTRACT The paper constructs a consistent series for UK central government expenditure on industrial subsidies over the post-war period, valuing incentives in grant equivalent terms from the position of a firm undertaking investment appraisal. The analysis includes direct subsidy payments, as well as tax allowances, and provides a disaggregation between those subsidies available on a national, regional and sectoral or firm specific basis. A time-series analysis of the assembled data shows important differences between these components, with regional assistance performing a long-run distributive role, while other elements perform a stabilisation function. The short-run patterns are broadly constant across governments, but the long-run relationships exhibit structural breaks related to both political and economic events.