分散决策下的双渠道供应链补偿策略——基于消费者渠道选择行为

为了有效解决由于对消费者的争夺从而引发的渠道之间关于定价、服务水平、利润等方面的冲突,基于消费者渠道选择行为,构建了网络直销市场与传统零售市场需求模型和双渠道供应链利润模型,运用Stackelberg模型,在制造商与零售商实施分决策时,通过制造商对零售商实施补偿激励前后的对比,分析了消费者渠道选择行为对网络直销渠道和传统零售渠道定价、制造商与零售商利润以及供应链总利润的影响,并求得最优定价及制造商的最优补偿额度和零售商的最优销售努力水平,进行了不同情况下的双渠道供应链利润的比较分析。结果表明,无论制造商是否实施补偿激励,都应随着网络消费者比例的增加而增加其网络直销价格;零售商的零售渠道价格应根据网络消费者比例的增加先降低到一定水平后再提升。当更多的消费者选择网络直销渠道时,制造商的补偿激励水平和零售商的销售努力程度均会下降。制造商应提高其补偿水平,进而激发零售商提高销售的努力水平,并使双方利润及供应链总利润最大化。研究结果为基于消费者选择行为的供应链补偿研究提供了新方法,对双渠道的供应链补偿研究有借鉴意义。     

基于消费者网络接受度的双渠道供应链补偿激励研究

线上直销渠道与线下零售渠道相结合构成的双渠道供应链是众多公司选择的销售模式,但也引发了线上渠道与线下传统零售渠道之间关于在商品定价、服务投入、信息共享之间的冲突。制造商通过对零售商提供一定的补偿能够有效协调双渠道供应链中存在于上述渠道中的冲突问题。针对这一问题,以消费者的网络接受程度变化为切入点,通过对双渠道供应链中制造商对零售商补偿激励与否的比较分析,得出结论:制造商实施补偿激励的方式能够有效协调渠道之间的冲突,激励零售商增加其销售努力程度,这种情况下存在着定价的最优解;同时,消费者的网络接受程度影响着最优定价策略、补偿激励水平、销售努力程度及供应链利润水平。此项研究为公司平衡线上直销与线下零售的双渠道销售模式提供了借鉴建议。     

传统品牌与网货品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价研究

基于传统制造商品牌的双渠道供应链，引入网货品牌的网络直销渠道，构建了两个品牌竞争下的多渠道供应链定价模型。并考虑了两条网络渠道的双重搭便车行为，通过Nash博弈得到供应链成员在分散和集中式决策下的均衡策略。研究表明各博弈方的最优定价和利润是关于渠道间及品牌间交叉价格弹性系数的增函数，且渠道竞争的影响显著于品牌竞争；两个制造商的搭便车行为与自身的最优定价和利润呈正相关，但它们的相互影响取决于直接价格弹性系数；搭便车行为对零售商是不利的。最后采用价格加成契约来协调多渠道供应链，以弥补分散决策下双重边际效应带来的损失。     

零售商开辟电子渠道的双渠道供应链定价决策

研究两层双渠道供应链中，在制造商实施直销渠道的基础上，零售商开辟电子渠道对供应链的影响。建立了双渠道供应链的定价决策模型，针对零售商未开辟电子渠道和开辟电子渠道两种情形，分别求解集中决策、Stackelberg博弈分散式决策模式下的零售商和制造商各自的最优定价及利润，并利用数值算例，进行对比分析。研究发现零售商开辟电子渠道的影响是多重的，一方面零售商的市场被拓展，竞争力增强，利润显著提高，有利于其与制造商进行抗衡。另一方面，制造商的利润有所下降，且整个供应链系统的渠道冲突加剧。因此，面对制造商的直销渠道，零售商可以选择开辟电子渠道来增强其话语权，与制造商进行谈判，实现互利双赢。     

考虑交叉销售的双渠道供应链定价策略研究

为探讨交叉销售对双渠道供应链决策的影响规律， 本文构建了不考虑交叉销售及考虑交叉销售两种情形下由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链的定价决策模型。 通过对模型求解和比较分析， 研究表明： 由网络直销渠道到传统零售渠道的交叉销售效应较大时， 制造商相比不考虑交叉销售情形会降低在直销渠道的售价， 并提高在零售渠道的批发价， 反之， 制造商则会提高在直销渠道的售价并降低在零售渠道的批发价， 当两渠道之间交叉销售效应相同时不会对制造商定价产生影响； 若由直销渠道到零售渠道的交叉销售效应不小于由零售渠道到直销渠道的交叉销售效应， 零售商定价相比不考虑交叉销售情形会较高， 且交叉销售效应使零售商利润增加。     

合作与竞争的零售商供应链价格与广告决策研究

建立了制造商领导下多个零售商竞争与合作时,制造商做广告与零售商做广告4种供应链广告模型,给出了制造商与零售商的广告投入水平、批发价、零售价的最优解,并对4种模型的结果进行了灵敏性及比较静态分析,最后对模型进行了仿真.结果表明:通过对竞争的零售商的结果比较分析得出在价格敏感因子及广告效率一定的情况下,制造商无论是选择利润最大化还是市场需求量最大化为目标,采用哪种广告形式取决于广告竞争因子与价格竞争因子的大小.在制造商广告的情形下,零售商竞争时的市场需求量与制造商的利润均较零售商合作时的大,此时制造商应鼓励零售商竞争.在零售商合作的情形下,制造商的利润在零售商广告时较大,此时则应将广告权交于零售商.零售商的合作使得零售商的利润增加,制造商利润减小.     

损失厌恶型双渠道供应链定价与减排策略研究

本文针对一个由制造商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链， 纳入制造商的损失厌恶行为， 以制造商 Shapley 值为参考点， 构建损失厌恶型双渠道供应链决策模型， 研究集中式、 风险中性分散式和损失厌恶分散式决策下最优定价、 减排策略和利润， 并对3 种不同情形下策略比较分析。 研究结果表明：（1） 集中式决策下减排水平和供应链利润都高于制造商风险中性分散式决策； 制造商具有损失厌恶行为时， 减排水平和供应链利润进一步下降， 批发价格则升高； 而3 种不同情形下线上和线下零售价格大小关系取决于减排成本系数； （2） 随着线上偏好系数增大， 线上零售价格不断增大而线下零售价格不断减小；（3） 损失厌恶型分散式决策中， 随着损失厌恶程度增大， 减排水平不断减小， 批发价格不断增大， 而制造商和零售商利润则不断减小。     

“双碳”目标下考虑价格参照效应的双渠道绿色供应链优化决策与协调研究

绿色供应链管理是在供应链层面落实“双碳”目标的具体举措。本文构建消费者价格参照效应下由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的双渠道绿色供应链模型，在考虑消费者参照价格的基础上，研究绿色供应链在传统零售渠道和网络直销渠道上的最优渠道定价和最优产品绿色度决策，并设计二部定价契约以促进制造商和零售商实现共赢，最后，通过数值算例分析消费者价格参照效应对双渠道绿色供应链最优渠道定价和最优产品绿色度的影响。研究表明，传统零售渠道和网络直销渠道的消费者参照价格对两个渠道的最优定价和产品最优绿色度均有正向影响，而双渠道中考虑价格参照效应的产品需求价格敏感程度与最优渠道定价和产品最优绿色度存在负相关关系。通过应用二部定价契约这一协调机制可以实现双渠道绿色供应链中制造商和零售商的共赢。     

利他偏好下双渠道供应链定价决策研究

本文针对由单一制造商和单一零售商组成的双渠道供应链， 考虑供应链中成员的利他行为偏好， 建立了相应的供应链决策模型。 通过数理模型推导和数值分析发现： 制造商和零售商的利他偏好系数满足一定条件时才能促进双方合作； 批发价格、 零售价格会随着制造商利他偏好程度的增加而下降， 随着零售商利他偏好程度的增加而提高， 网络直销价格则不会受影响； 制造商、 零售商的利他偏好会提高对方利润， 降低自身利润， 且能增加双方的效用； 占主体地位的制造商的利他偏好对提高供应链效率起决定作用。     

制造商统一定价下双渠道供应链促销及协调策略

考虑制造商统一定价， 本文构建制造商主导的双渠道供应链， 在集中决策、 分散决策和协调决策下， 对促销及协调策略进行了研究， 并通过数值算例分析了零售商谈判能力、 制造商促销成本分担比例对供应链决策的影响。 结果表明： 集中决策下产品价格最高， 总利润最大； 零售商谈判能力大小决定制造商是否采用促销成本分担契约； 当零售商谈判能力较小时， 促销成本分担契约虽不能实现供应链的完全协调， 但会实现供应链各成员利润的 Pareto 改进。     

Mobile channel and channel coordination under different supply chain contexts

The paper proposes different supply chain contexts where one manufacturer sells the same product to two retailers, one traditional and one online. The first context is when two retailers are distinct entities and the second context is when a dominant manufacturer owns and controls the traditional retailer. In each context, we study a no cooperation scenario versus various cooperation strategies (namely the minimum pricing strategy, the whole channel price, and the revenue sharing cooperation). Besides, we investigate the use of a dual channel by the online retailer via a mobile channel and a computer channel. The online retailer could use the same price online or a price differentiation (called also personalized pricing) depending on where the purchase is done. Our results show the crucial role of the product compatibility to the web and the mobile baseline incremental sales in influencing the performance of each channel member.     

Valuable strategy and firm performance in the O2O competition

When the manufacturer opens an online channel to compete with its traditional retailer, what valuable strategy can be utilized to alleviate the O2O (online to offline) competition and conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating an innovative strategy considering the retailer's sales effort and the manufacturer's support in local advertising simultaneously in a manufacturer – retailer O2O supply chain. Our results show that although the retailer's sales effort helps improve the channel coordination and leads to a win-win solution for both the manufacturer and the retailer, investing in both the retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's support in local advertising is a more effective strategy to be employed to coordinate the O2O distribution and achieve higher profits for all parties in the manufacturer - retailer supply chain. In addition, our results also show that compared to the simultaneous mode, the Stackelberg leader-follower mode provides no competitive advantage to the manufacturer or the retailer when the retailer's sales effort and manufacturer's support in local advertising strategy is implemented to coordinate the O2O distributions.     

回收质量不确定下的废旧电子产品三级逆向供应链定价模型研究

本文针对废旧电子产品回收质量的不确定性,研究了由制造商、零售商和回收中心构成的废旧电子产品三级逆向供应链系统的定价模型。通过设定回收废旧电子产品的质量类别来分析回收质量的不确定性,构建了合作情况与非合作情况下的逆向供应链定价与利润模型,并利用逆向归纳法求解,得出了合作与非合作情况下的三级逆向供应链成员的最优定价策略以及相应的利润。通过比较合作与非合作情况下的最优价格及逆向供应链系统利润,发现合作情况下三级逆向供应链系统的总利润更高,同时可分解再制造的废旧电子产品与可维修再制造的废旧电子产品回收价格也更高。通过Matlab仿真分析,研究发现：随着废旧电子产品中可分解再制造废旧电子产品比例的增加,在合作和非合作两种情况下,可分解再制造废旧电子产品的回收价格和三级逆向供应链系统的总利润均减少,而可维修再制造废旧电子产品的回收价格增加。     

Impact of demand uncertainty on supply chain cooperation of single-period products

Cooperation is an approach of improving competitive advantages of a supply chain. A two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer for a single-period product is studied, and retail-market demand uncertainty is described by coefficient of variation. We develop a cooperation mechanism to address the cooperation and its implementation between the manufacturer and the retailer, two market situations are considered: (i) the wholesale price and the order quantity are decision variables, (ii) the wholesale and the retail prices as well as the order quantity are decision variables. In both market situations, our research shows that: (1) the cooperation mechanism can improve the overall channel profits and the supply chain members’ allocated profits, (2) the described cooperation is conditional on retail-market demand uncertainty: it can be implemented if, and only if, the fluctuation of retail-market demand is relatively small and coefficient of variation of retail-market demand does not exceed an upper bound. Impacts of retail-market demand uncertainty on wholesale price, order quantity and/or retail price have also been investigated through analytical and numerical analyses. Although our research is based on the assumption that the manufacturer dominates the supply chain in the non-cooperative situation, which is not the case for most retailer-driven supply chains, this research is still significant on providing guidelines for practitioners in current China mid-level car market that is similar to situations described in the paper.     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

This paper evaluates the impact of price discount contracts and pricing schemes on the dual-channel supply chain competition. Channel conflict occurs when the supplier enters the online direct channel. Traditional contracts normally require tedious administrational participation, full information of the cost structures, and other factors. The introduction of simple price discount contracts aims at providing easy implementation and effective coordination results. From supplier Stackelberg, retailer Stackelberg, and Nash game theoretic perspectives, we show that the scenarios with price discount contracts can outperform the non-contract scenarios. In addition, we show consistent pricing scheme can reduce the channel conflict by inducing more profit to the retailer. The leader in the games might, but is not guaranteed to, have advantages.     

Which one is more valuable in coordinating the online and offline distribution? Service support or online price coordination

Nowadays effective mechanisms to coordinate the online and offline distribution become increasingly important in the business market. In this research, we first propose two mechanisms (i.e. the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination) for the manufacturer and the retailer to employ. Our results show that the online price coordination does help coordinate the online and offline distribution and bring higher profits to the manufacturer-retailer supply chain and thus both the manufacturer and the retailer, while the offline service to the retailer does not; comparing to the offline service to the retailer, the online price coordination is a better strategy to be utilized to alleviate the online to offline competition. Furthermore, we investigate if a novel coordination mechanism, which combines the offline service to the retailer with the online price coordination, can help coordinate the online and offline distribution better and becomes the optimal coordination mechanism. Surprisingly, our results show that compared to both the offline service to the retailer and the online price coordination, this combination coordination mechanism does show a dominant competitive advantage to bring highest profits to all parties.