劳动合同对于进城务工人员收入影响的有效性分析

本文重点讨论了《劳动合同法》的颁布对于进城务工人员收入的影响，我们用博弈论模型证明了签订劳动合同可以提高务工人员的收入，并且在一定条件下企业也可以通过生产率的上升而获利，实现“双赢”。从统计上看，签订合同的工人月收入高出347．19元，小时收入高出2．16元，OLS回归结果也发现合同对于收入有显著的正影响。但同时我们注意到有合同的劳动者本身有着更好的素质，Probit和Logit模型都验证了这一点，基于这种可能的内生性偏误，我们使用了“处置效应”来控制这一问题，并发现签订合同依旧显著提高了收入，估计月收入提高14．0％～14．9％，小时收入提高18．2％-21．5％。     

合同异质性对农民工工资的影响

目前,合同对农民工工资影响的研究,主要停留在是否签订合同对农民工工资的影响上,忽视了不同性质合同可能对农民工工资造成的影响。本文采用2008年珠三角城市农民工调查数据,在对合同进行详细分类的基础上,根据Mincer收入方程,分析各类合同对农民工工资收入水平的影响。经检验分析后发现,有农民工参与协商的长期性个人合同的签订,农民工工资水平显著提高。因此,只有重视合同的内容和性质,才能有效地维护农民工权益。     

中国农民工参与工会的收入溢价效应 ——基于组织层面的考察

与国外工会不同,中国工会具有维护国家稳定发展和保障劳动者权益双重职能定位,因此,进城农民工参与工会是否存在收入溢价效应还有较大争议.本文基于国家卫生健康委员会2017年流动人口动态监测数据,综合运用普通最小二乘法(OLS)和两阶段最小二乘法(2SLS)分析农民工参与工会对工资性收入及福利性收入的影响.研究发现:(1)参与工会的农民工月工资收入高出未参与者28.7％,可见,中国农民工参与工会存在收入溢价效应.(2)中国农民工参与工会的收入溢价效应存在地区差异,其中,北方地区收入溢价效应比南方地区高14.9％;西部地区收入溢价效应比中部地区高29.2％,比东部地区高31.9％.(3)参与工会农民工的福利性收入显著高出未参与工会者的35.8％,且地区差异也较为显著,北方地区比南方地区高6.6％.进一步分析发现,农民工参与工会收入溢价效应主要是通过工资集体协商、合同保护、提高维权意识及提高职业技能等运行机制实现的.     

空气污染与劳动力的空间流动——基于流动人口就业选址行为的研究

本文利用2011—2015年全国流动人口动态监测调查数据,采用条件logit模型实证考察了空气污染对流动人口就业选址行为的影响。研究结果发现:第一,空气污染对于流动人口的就业选址具有显著的负向影响;城市的PM2.5浓度上升1μg/m~3,流动人口到该城市就业的概率将显著下降0.39个百分点。第二,通过对比空气污染和收入对流动人口就业选址概率的影响可以计算得到流动人口对于PM2.5浓度降低1μg/m~3的支付意愿约为326元/月。第三,年龄越大、受教育水平越高,以及男性、已婚/已生育、非农业户口的流动人口在就业选址时对空气污染的敏感性要更高。此外,研究还发现空气污染对于流动人口的健康状况具有显著的负向影响。本文的研究结论一方面丰富了环境污染与劳动力流动的相关研究成果,另一方面也为中国城市与环境治理和劳动力流动相关的政策制定提供了经验依据。     

农村金融排斥与城乡收入差距 ——基于我国省级面板数据模型的实证研究

本文基于2006—2011年全国省级面板数据,从理论与实证角度分析了金融资源分配的不公平如何导致收入分配的不公平。通过广义矩估计（GMM）模型估计发现,农村金融排斥显著影响城乡收入差距。其中,条件排斥、地理及营销排斥显著扩大城乡收入差距,价格排斥却能在一定程度上缩小城乡收入差距。回归方程分解分析结果表明,这四大排斥平均解释度分别为1075%,100%和1435%,农村金融排斥共解释城乡收入差距的261%。此外,非农业就业比例的提高与城镇化的有效推进对缩小城乡收入差距也有重要影响。因此,金融资源配置的“效率”与“公平”并重、提高农民家庭生产性固定资产的积累和增加农村金融服务宽度对于缩小城乡收入差距具有重大意义。     

合同审查法律实务指引

合同审查主要是从法律方面对合同进行把关,是正式签订合同之前的必经程序。对合同进行法律审查,可以通过发现合同中的某些问题而予以修正,减少和避免在履行合同的过程中产生不必要的分歧和争议,提高合同履约率;即使因为某些特殊原因发生了违约或者争议的情况,也可以比较顺利地解决问题,得到必要的补偿,避免或减少损失的发生,从而达到为当事人防控风险的目的。     

村庄选举和收入分配——来自8省48村的证据

运用1986—2002年间8省48村和家庭的调查数据,本文研究了村庄选举的引进如何影响村一级的收入分配,发现引进选举制度使村级基尼系数降低6·4%—8%。我们也分析了选举的时间效应,发现首届选举后的第3—6年间,选举降低收入分配差距的效果最显著。这些结论对正确地认识和完善村庄选举具有重要的参考意义。     

工作经验对外来务工人员收入差异的影响——基于群体内部异质性的探讨

从群体内部异质性的角度考察了工作经验对外来务工人员收入差异的影响。基于对大连市1032名外来务工人员的经验研究,发现工作经验对外来务工人员获得高收入的可能性会依户籍性质或教育程度的不同而产生不同的影响:外来工人与农民工的收入差异随着工作经验的积累呈现出先扩大后缩小的趋势,户籍制度以及由此产生的户籍歧视在很长一段时期内仍将是影响农民工群体收入劣势的一个主要原因;工作经验与教育程度的交互作用对收入的影响呈现出倒"U"型关系,工作经验在一定时期内对高教育程度的外来务工人员收入上升具有显著的动力作用。     

健康风险冲击对农户收入的影响

本文基于中国8个省份、1354个农户、跨度15年的微观面板数据,测算了大病冲击对于农户长期收入的影响以及健康风险冲击持续的时间。我们发现:(1)大病冲击在随后的12年里对于农户人均纯收入都有显著的负面影响;(2)大病冲击对于农户的短期与中期影响使得患病户人均纯收入平均降低5%—6%;(3)健康风险冲击的长期影响可持续大约15年,并且冲击对于中低收入农户的影响更为严重。     

地区间收入差距对农村劳动力迁移的影响——基于第五次全国人口普查数据的研究

本文利用中国第五次全国人口普查数据,对农村劳动力迁移决策的影响因素进行了经验分析,发现地区间人均收入差距和迁移距离对劳动力迁移有显著的影响。通过对收入差距变动的模拟,我们发现1985—1990年至1995—2000年期间增加的模拟农村移民数量只约有40%,与实际移民数量一倍以上的增加幅度有很大差距。这说明1990年代移民的大幅增加还与户籍制度改革等其他因素有关。     

LABOR INCOME INDICES DESIGNED FOR USE IN CONTRACTS PROMOTING INCOME RISK MANAGEMENT

We propose that labor income indices be used to define settlements in many contracts, such as labor contracts, indexed bonds, or income securities. We discuss the issues in producing labor income indices for such uses, and develop prototype indices using US. data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). People are grouped by a clustering algorithm based on an estimated transition matrix between jobs, by education level, and by skill category. The groupings are defined so that few people move between them. For each grouping we generate a labor income index (1968–87) using a hedonic repeated-measures regression method. The indices show substantial variability through time, confirming the potential importance of the use of such indices in contracts. There is also substantial variability across groupings, as for example between the agriculture/labor grouping and other groupings, confirming the importance of using the grouping indices rather than aggregate indices in contracts.     

The Impact of Aging and Automation on the Macroeconomy and Inequality

We build a life-cycle model in which a representative firm produces a final good using routine and non-routine labor as well as traditional and automation capital (e.g. robots). Robots can substitute for routine labor. We show that both, population aging and higher robot productivity, foster the increased use of robotics. Population aging decreases and progress in robot technology increases long-run output per capita. In both cases, inequalities in labor income, wealth and consumption rise. Although expected advances in automation technologies are able to mitigate or even circumvent output losses in the aggregate and improve consumption possibilities for everyone, this comes at the cost of increased inequality because non-routine workers benefit disproportionately.     

When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation

We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e., they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e., if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive.     

Self-Enforcing Intergenerational Social Contracts for Pareto Improving Pollution Mitigation

We consider, in an overlapping generations model with an environmental externality, a scheme of contracts between any two successive generations. Under each contract, agents of the young generation invest a share of their labor income in pollution mitigation in exchange for a transfer in the second period of their lives. The transfer is financed in a pay-as-you-go manner by the next young generation. Different from previous work we assume that the transfer is granted as a subsidy to capital income rather than lump sum. We show that the existence of a contract which is Pareto improving over the situation without contract for any two generations requires a sufficiently high level of income. In a steady state with social contracts in each period, the pollution stock is lower compared to a steady state without contracts. Analytical and numerical analysis of the dynamics under Nash bargaining suggests that under reasonable conditions, also steady state income and welfare are higher. Delaying the implementation of a social contract for too long or imposing a contract with too low mitigation can be costly: Net income may inevitably fall below the threshold in finite time so that Pareto improving mitigation is no longer possible and the economy converges to a steady state with high pollution stock and low income and welfare. In the second part of the paper, we study a game theoretic setup, taking into account that credibly committing to a contract might not be possible. We show that with transfers granted as a subsidy to capital income, there exist mitigation transfer schemes which are both Pareto improving and give no generation an incentive to deviate from any of its contracts even in a dynamically efficient economy. Social contracts coexist with private savings.     

Guard labor

We explore the economic importance of the private and public exercise of power in the execution of contracts and defense of property rights. We define power and represent it in a model of growth in a modern capitalist economy, borrowing themes from the classical economists (unproductive labor, profit-driven investment), Marx (the labor disciplining effect of unemployment), and the contemporary theory of incomplete contracts (the role of monitoring and enforcement rents). We use this model to identify the resources devoted to the exercise of power, which we term guard labor as we measure these in labor units. Data from the United States indicate a significant increase in its extent in the U.S. over the period 1890 to the present. Cross-national comparisons show a significant statistical association between income inequality and the fraction of the labor force that is constituted by guard labor, as well as with measures of political legitimacy (inversely) and political conflict. Some observations on the welfare implications of guard labor conclude the paper.     

Crime and punishment in the “American Dream”

We observe that countries where belief in the “American dream”(i.e., effort pays) prevails also set harsher punishment for criminals. We know that beliefs are also correlated with several features of the economic system (taxation, social insurance, etc). Our objective is to study the joint determination of these three features (beliefs, punitiveness and economic system) in a way that replicates the observed empirical patterns. We present a model where beliefs determine the types of contracts that firms offer and whether workers exert effort. Some workers become criminals, depending on their luck in the labor market, the expected punishment, and an individual shock that we call “meanness”. It is this meanness level that a penal system based on “retribution” tries to detect when deciding the severity of the punishment. We find that when initial beliefs differ, two equilibria can emerge out of identical fundamentals. In the “American” (as opposed to the “French”) equilibrium, belief in the “American dream” is commonplace, workers exert effort, there are high powered contracts (and income is unequally distributed) and punishments are harsh. Economists who believe that deterrence (rather than retribution) shapes punishment can interpret the meanness parameter as pessimism about future economic opportunities and verify that two similar equilibria emerge.     

The Impact of Income Taxation on the Labor Supply of Part-time and Full-time Workers

This paper estimates the effect of income taxation on the labor supply of part-time and full-time workers in the United States. Using a model that incorporates the endogeneity of the net wage rate and the virtual income, and correcting for self-selection into part-time and full-time jobs, the results indicate that part-time workers are relatively more responsive to changes in income tax than full-time workers. Estimated wage elasticities are relatively larger for part-time than for full-time workers.The simulation results indicate that income tax has a disincentive effect on both part-time and full-time workers, with part-time and full-time workers reducing their labor supply by 0.87 and 0.58 hours, respectively, if a 5% tax is imposed. However, the percentage reduction in hours of work is very small, and a tax policy may have little effect on the labor supply of workers.The results seem to suggest that female and black part-time workers are more likely to drop out of the labor force at higher levels of income tax. It also tests the hypothesis that the labor supply behavior of parttime and full-time workers differs.The test results indicate that the determinants of the labor supply of part-time workers are different from those of full-time workers. It is noted that there is a significant difference between the labor supply of male part-time and female parttime workers, as well as between the black part-time and white part-time workers. In order to reduce voluntary unemployment in market activities among married females and blacks, the government can encourage part-time work by sponsoring legislation or instituting a scheme that will allow part-time workers to pay relatively less in payroll taxes.     

不同期限类型劳动合同的工资决定机制及差异——基于中国家庭住户收入调查数据的经验研究

文章利用2002年住户收入调查(CHIP)数据对我国不同期限类型劳动合同的工资决定机制及工资差异进行了经验研究。结果发现,长期劳动合同与短期劳动合同的工资差异符合补偿性工资差别理论,企业对没有签订劳动合同的员工存在工资歧视。排除特征因素和选择性因素,长期劳动合同工的工资比短期劳动合同工低42.84%,比无劳动合同员工高29.6%。文章研究表明:短期劳动合同没有对生产率表现出显著的负面影响,提升劳动合同签订率是比限制短期劳动合同使用更为合适的劳动政策。     

苏南农民工社会保障的实证研究

苏南农民工社会保障虽略好于江苏全省情况,但仍存在不少问题。苏南民工就业劳动合同签订率低,大部分农民工未参加任何社会保险,参加医疗、养老、工伤、失业、生育和综合保险的人数比例低。苏南农民工主要就业于私营、个体和股份制企业,就业于集体、国有企业的也有一定的比例。农民工平均工作时间长,而月收入仅相当于本地居民平均收入的60-80%。其原因,除了劳动力过剩、城乡两元体系和关系网络外,主要是由于农民工受教育程度低,工会组织不健全等。     

Tax and transfer programs,retirement behavior,and work hours over the life cycle

In this paper, we use a computable overlapping generations model economy to analyze the quantitative effects of some reforms on tax and transfer programs, aimed at easing the tax burden on the labor supply of older workers. We focus on retirement behavior, work hours over the life cycle, and efficiency gains. We find that the labor supply of older workers is very responsive to changes in tax and transfer programs and show that the gains, in terms of old-age work hours, are non-trivial. However, we also find that longer careers may not substantially increase aggregate hours because workers may reallocate labor supply over the life cycle in response to retiring later. Moreover, since longer careers may also reduce saving rates, we also find that changes in tax and transfer programs aimed at boosting the employment rates of the elderly may reduce output per head.