Delegation and Fiscal Policy in the Open Economy: More Bad News for Rogoff's Delegation Game

This article studies the open-economy Rogoff delegation game, taking into account both intra-country and intercountry interactions between fiscal authorities and central banks. With representative bankers, the Nash equilibrium of fiscal and monetary authorities independently responding to supply-side shocks sees insufficient monetary adjustment and an imbalance towards fiscal stabilization if shocks are sufficiently symmetric; the opposite occurs if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric. Appointing conservative bankers shifts the fiscal–monetary balance away from monetary towards fiscal policy. Unilateral delegation benefits that country; but when all countries independently delegate, the outcome is only favorable if shocks are sufficiently asymmetric.     

How China's accession to the WTO affects global welfare?

Conventional wisdom suggests that, if a large nation reduces tariffs, the Rest of the World (RoW) as a whole should immediately experience gains from trade. However, little simulation evidence has been provided to evaluate the welfare effects of China's tariff reduction upon its WTO accession on each of its trade partners. This paper addresses the above issue under both the perfectly competitive model and the monopolistic competition framework à la Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Melitz (2003). Armed by the method of Dekle, Eaton, and Kortum (2007, 2008) to quantify the individual countries' responses to the “China (trade liberalization) shock” at equilibrium, we could check the extent to which global welfare benefit from the import tariff reduction after China's entry into the WTO. The quantitative results show that, both China and the RoW benefit from Chinese participation into the WTO, with estimated welfare gains falling in a range of [1.4697%, 3.8743%] and [0.0743%, 0.1015%], respectively. That is to say, about 58.24% of total benefits extracted from China's accession into the WTO worldwide flow to countries other than China under perfect competition; while under monopolistic competition, the whole world enjoys a 0.1571% welfare increases if firms' entry is restricted, of which 42.64% are injected into the RoW, an equivalent amount of 23.3903 billion US dollars. Since allowing for firms' entry and exit would lead to adjustments in both aggregate price indices and government tariff revenues, welfare gains of the world significantly increase (0.2474%), but these adjustments would slightly distort the welfare changes for other countries in the sense that only 36.50%, which is equivalent to 32.1008 billion US dollars, overflow to the RoW. As a result, some countries gain more, while some less.     

Cultural Baggage: Do Immigrants Import Corruption?

Do immigrants undermine culture in a way that destroys productivity in destination countries? Some scholars have argued that because immigrants come from countries with dysfunctional social capital—norms and institutions—they will import it and pollute the social capital in destination countries. One potential channel through which this could occur is corruption. We examine stocks and flows of immigrants over a 20‐year time period to see if corruption increased in destination countries. We generally find that immigration is not associated with increases in corruption. Additionally, we find that immigration tends to decrease corruption in destination countries with low levels of corruption or high levels of economic freedom.     

BILATERALISM IS GOOD: TRADE BLOCS AND STRATEGIC EXPORT SUBSIDIES

This paper considers the effect of exogenous trade bloc enlargementin a multi-country version of the Brander-Spencer export subsidygame. In the single-shot game, it is shown that trade bloc enlargementleads to a reduction in the Nash equilibrium export subsidiesand thereby increases the welfare of the exporting countries.Although the welfare of the importing countries decreases, worldwelfare may increase if the export subsidies are financed bydistortionary taxation. When the export subsidy game is infinitelyrepeated, it is shown that trade bloc enlargement reduces thecritical discount factor making it easier to sustain free trade.     

A political economy theory of foreign investment: An alternative approach

The present paper uses the political economy model developed by Grossman and Helpman and studies the equilibrium of a game between the two countries; the home country, which exercises the trade policy for maximizing its objective function, and the foreign country, which controls the level of its capital export for the similar purpose. It is shown that if the production costs of the two countries are identical, the equilibrium of the game in which the two countries make simultaneous move will very likely achieve free trade.     

Food crisis and export taxation: the cost of non-cooperative trade policies

This paper aims to assess the rationales for export taxes in the context of a food crisis. First, we summarize the effects of export taxes using both partial and general equilibrium theoretical models. When large countries aim to maintain constant domestic food prices, in the event of an increase in world agricultural prices, the optimal response is to decrease import tariffs in net food-importing countries and to increase export tariffs in net food-exporting countries. The latter decision improves national welfare, while the former reduces national welfare: this is the price that must be paid to keep domestic food prices constant. Small net food-importing countries are harmed by both decisions, while small net food-exporting countries gain from both. Second, we illustrate the costs of a lack of regulation and cooperation surrounding such policies in a time of crisis using a global computable general equilibrium (CGE) model, mimicking the mechanisms that appeared during the recent food price surge (2006–2008). This model illustrates the interdependence of trade policies, as well as how a process of retaliation and counter-retaliation (increased export taxes in large net food-exporting countries and reduced import tariffs in large net food-importing countries) can contribute to successive augmentations of world agricultural prices and harm small net food-importing countries. We conclude with a call for international regulation, in particular because small net food-importing countries may be substantially harmed by those policies that amplify the already negative impact of a food crisis.     

THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES

Studies on the economic impact of the Uruguay Round of the GATT have frequently suggested that all or almost all countries–developed and developing–will gain. In the present paper it is argued that the number of developing countries which lose from the Round may be much larger than is generally assumed. This issue is discussed in the context of Thailand and the Philippines, two countries generally considered to be so similar for trade analysis purposes that they are often grouped together as if their interests were the same. It is suggested here that Thailand is a net gainer from the Round and the Philippines a net loser.     

Commitment and coordination in a dynamic game model of international economic policy-making

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game model of two identical countries. Policy-makers of both countries have quadratic intertemporal objective functions and want to stabilize domestic output, domestic inflation, and the real rate of exchange. We present different analytical and numerical solutions for this policy game. Noncooperative open-loop equilibria are interpreted as requiring unilateral commitment and policy-makers' credibility. Potential gains from cooperation are present, as the noncooperative equilibrium solutions are not Pareto-optimal. Under an information pattern that admits memory strategies, the possibility of obtaining cooperative results without coordination and commitment arises.     

Perfect foresight dynamics in binary supermodular games

The present paper considers equilibrium selection in binary supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. We provide complete characterizations of absorbing and globally accessible equilibria and apply them to two subclasses of games. First, for unanimity games, it is shown that our selection criterion is not in agreement with that in terms of Nash products, and an example is presented in which two strict Nash equilibria are simultaneously globally accessible when the friction is sufficiently small. Second, a class of games with invariant diagonal are proposed and shown to generically admit an absorbing and globally accessible equilibrium for small frictions.     

Knowing when to splurge: Precautionary saving and Chinese-Canadians

Why do household saving rates differ so much across countries? This micro-level question has global implications: countries that systematically “over-save” export capital by running current account surpluses. In recipient countries, interest rates are therefore too low and financial stability is put at risk. Existing theories argue that saving is precautionary; however tests of these theories are limited to cross-country comparisons and the results are mixed. We report the findings of an original survey experiment. Using a simulated financial saving task implemented online, we compare the saving preferences of a large and diverse sample of Chinese-Canadians with other Canadians. This comparison is instructive given that Chinese-Canadians migrated from, or descend from those who migrated from, a high-saving environment to a low-saving, high-debt environment. We also compare behavior in the presence and absence of a simulated “welfare state”, which we represent in the form of mandatory insurance. Our respondents exhibit behavior in the saving task that corresponds to standard economic assumptions about lifecycle savings and risk-aversion. We find strong evidence that precautionary saving is reduced when a mandatory insurance is present, but no sign that Chinese cultural influences, represented in either linguistic or ethnic terms, have any effect on saving behavior. Overall, the results suggest that Chinese “over-saving” is likely to be addressed when more generous welfare state policies are put in place.     

Free trade and income redistribution in some developing and newly industrialized countries

A competitive general equilibrium model of production is specified and the long-run comparative static elasticities of changing prices on factor prices are examined in eight developing and newly industrialized countries. Unskilled labor in these developing countries stands to gain from a program of global free trade characterized by increased manufacturing exports and falling prices of imported business services, while capital owners and skilled labor lose. Results are contrasted with developed countries, the United States in particular, where unskilled labor will lose while capital and skilled labor enjoy gains with global free trade.     

Market structure, pigouvian taxation, and welfare

Using a short-run partial equilibrium model of social welfare, this paper examines the social welfare implications of changing Pigouvian taxes under three markets: perfect competition, monopoly, and Cournot oligopoly. The result for perfect competition supports the earlier finding that Pigouvian taxation increases social welfare [Buchanan, 1969]. However, in contrast to the previous result that Pigouvian taxes lower welfare under monopoly, the authors show that if the noncompetitive distortion is small, these taxes might still be useful in correcting monopoly-generated externalities and in improving social welfare. Cournot firms react to the tax depending upon their individual perceptions of the gain in post-tax marginal revenue. Policy implications of the study's results are discussed.     

Is there a yen optimum currency area? Evidence from 18 Asian and Pacific economies

This paper examines the macroeconomic costs and benefits of adopting a common currency (the yen) for 18 Asian and Pacific countries. Economic theory suggests that the main benefit is enhanced price stability, while the main cost is higher business-cycle volatility if the adopting country’s output is not sufficiently correlated with that of Japan. Using data from 1960–2001, the paper finds that the estimated cost and benefit measures exhibit substantial variability across the countries and are often positively correlated: countries (such as Bangladesh or Nepal) that have a lot to gain from adopting the yen, also have a lot to lose from it; while other economies (such as Singapore, Thailand, or Taiwan) that have little to lose by adopting the yen, have also little to gain by it. The empirical results can be also used to compare net benefits for individual countries, showing, for example, that Korea is a more promising candidate for adopting the yen than Pakistan or Malaysia.     

政府干预下的本国与外国科技合作演化博弈研究

为判别本国与他国科技合作的演化方向及其实现条件,假定各国科技合作成本或收益为科技创新投入成本的线性函数,通过构建演化博弈动态方程、矩阵求解和数值仿真模拟对本国与外国之间的科技合作行为进行博弈分析,得出以下结论：策略稳定均衡点及演化路径受博弈双方参与者初始状态影响;在一定条件下,科技合作成本越低,双方合作欲望越强烈,若科技合作成本超过某一阈值,将驱使博弈双方采取不合作策略,引入政府控制力度参数可以一定程度上加强博弈双方合作可能性。     

The gain from commitment in a two-country economy with inflation persistence

In recent years, the worldwide inflation rate appears to be converging to a low stable level. Moreover, the Phillips curve is flattening in many countries. These facts indicate that the output gap fluctuations associated with inflation persistence in one country influence other countries and suggest that the central bank consider the effect of inflation persistence on the real economy in an open economy framework. The objective of this paper is to explore optimal monetary policy in a two-country economy with inflation persistence. To consider the case in which inflation persistence is present in both countries, we assume that a fraction of firms that change their prices follows the rule-of-thumb pricing rule. In this case, the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) in each country becomes flatter as the fraction of firms employing the rule-of-thumb pricing rule increases in both countries. Our results show gains from commitment in a two-country economy with inflation persistence. This paper addresses that the presence of a severe deflationary bias is the main source of the large gain from a commitment policy in a two-country economy with inflation persistence.     

Real interest rate parity in East Asian countries based on China with flexible Fourier stationary test

This study applies stationary test with a flexible Fourier function proposed by Enders and Lee (2012) to test the validity of long-run real interest rate parity (RIRP) to assess the non-stationary properties of the real interest rate convergence relative to China for ten East Asian countries. We find that our approximation has higher power to detect U-shaped breaks and smooth breaks than linear method if the true data generating process of interest rate convergence is in fact a stationary non-liner process. We examine the validity of RIRP from the non-linear point of view and provide robust evidence clearly indicate that RIRP holds true for ten East Asian countries. It implies that the choices and effectiveness of the monetary and fiscal policies in the East Asian economies will be highly influenced external factors originating from China. Also, our findings point out their real interest rate convergence relative to China is mean reversion towards RIRP equilibrium values in a non-linear way.     

Cultural Factors and Study Destinations of International Students

In this paper, we examine the role of cultural factors in attracting international students using data of 102 countries and regions from 2000 to 2015. Our results show that the export of cultural products is conducive to the increase in international students. International students choose to study in developing countries with an official language and religious beliefs that are different from their home country, but tend to choose developed countries with a common language. We also analyze the features of inbound and outbound international students specific to China. Our study indicates that “soft power,” such as a unique culture, common values and migration networks, is important for attracting foreign students.     

Investing in Health: A Macroeconomic Exploration of Short-Run and Long-Run Trade-Offs

This paper aims to unravel the competing effects of health investment. It explores, both analytically and numerically, the equilibrium shift and transitional dynamics after a one-time policy of health investment. We find that such a policy improves health status in the long run, but harms economic growth in both the short- and long-term. The relative sizes of these competing effects depend on the specific health parameters. Within the plausible range for the value of health relative to consumption, households gain welfare in the long run as long as the effectiveness of labor in health production is large. The expanded health sector policy makes households worse off only if labor is rather unproductive in producing health and if households value health relatively little. Nevertheless, the findings challenge the policy recommendations of the World Bank (1993) and World Health Organization (2001) in that good health does not necessarily increase the productivity of workers and the economic growth rate. We hope that the relative simplicity of our model, compared to the existing theoretical literature, can help close the gap between formal academic work on this topic and actual debates among policy makers in both developed and developing countries.     

Free Trade Agreements and the SADC Economies

Countries in southern Africa have engaged in a variety of tradeliberalisation initiatives such as the European Union (EU)–SouthAfrica Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the EU's ‘Everythingbut Arms’ (EBA) initiative to eliminate trade barriersagainst imports from the least developed countries and a potentialFTA among Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.In this paper we use a multi-country computable general equilibrium(CGE) model to analyse the impact of trade liberalisation inthe region. First, we analyse the FTA between South Africa andthe EU. Then, we consider how the rest of southern Africa mightrespond: (i) by enforcing an SADC FTA; (ii) by exploiting theadvantages of unilateral access to the EU in addition to anSADC FTA; and (iii) by entering an FTA with the EU and otherSADC countries. The scenarios are ordered such that the SADCcountries pursue increased trade liberalisation. We find thatunder all FTA arrangements the increased total imports fromFTA partners exceeds the reduction in imports from non-FTA partners— the FTAs examined are all net trade creating. Some SADCeconomies are slightly hurt by the FTA between the EU and SouthAfrica, while others gain slightly. Overall, the agreement isnot a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. We also find that unilateralaccess to the EU is more beneficial for SADC countries thanan SADC FTA because the SADC countries trade more with the EUthan with each other. However, reciprocal reforms under an EU–SADCFTA dominate unilateral access to the EU because they requiremore structural adjustment in the SADC countries. Finally, wefind that South Africa is not large enough to serve as a growthpole for the region. Access to EU markets provides substantiallybigger gains for the other SADC countries than access to SouthAfrica.     

Equipping immigrants: migration flows and capital movements in small open economies

This paper explores the extent to which migration-related capital flows can explain the variation in investment rates and current and capital account imbalances in OECD countries. We begin with a general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which migration is exogenous. Migrants must be equipped with capital, and the resulting demands for capital will generate cross-border flows of capital. Next, we move to an empirical exercise in which we allow both capital and labor flows to be endogenous. We test this model using data from a panel of OECD countries. We conclude that migration flows do in fact generate substantial matching capital flows. We calculate that increased migration may have accounted for as much as one-fifth of the increase in the US current account deficit since 1960.