The Effect of Crossing‐Network Trading on Dealer Market's Bid‐Ask Spreads

This article provides new insights into market competition between traditional exchanges and alternative trading systems in Europe. It investigates the relationship between the trading activity of a crossing network (CN) and the liquidity of a traditional dealer market (DM) by comparing data from the SEAQ quote‐driven segment of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and internal data from the POSIT crossing network. A cross‐sectional analysis of bid‐ask spreads shows that DM spreads are negatively related to CN executions. Risk‐sharing benefits from CN trading dominate fragmentation and cream‐skimming costs. Further, risk‐sharing gains are found to be related to dealer trading in the CN.     

Relationship Trading in Over-the-Counter Markets

We examine the network of trading relationships between insurers and dealers in the over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bond market. Regulatory data show that one-third of insurers use a single dealer, whereas other insurers have large dealer networks. Execution prices are nonmonotone in network size, initially declining with more dealers but increasing once networks exceed 20 dealers. A model of decentralized trade in which insurers trade off the benefits of repeat business and faster execution quantitatively fits the distribution of insurers' network size and explains the price–network size relationship. Counterfactual analysis shows that regulations to unbundle trade and nontrade services can decrease welfare.     

Dynamic order submission strategies with competition between a dealer market and a crossing network

We analyze a dynamic microstructure model in which a dealer market (DM) and a crossing network (CN) interact for three informational settings. A key result is that coexistence of trading systems generates systematic patterns in order flow, which depend on the degree of transparency. Further, we study overall welfare, measured by the gains from trade of all agents, and compare it with the maximum overall welfare. The discrepancy between both measures is attributable to two inefficiencies. Due to these inefficiencies, introducing a CN next to a DM, as well as increasing the transparency level, not necessarily produces greater overall welfare.     

Brokered versus dealer markets: Impact of proprietary trading with transaction fees

In this study, we consider a one-period financial market with a dealer/broker and an infinite number of investors. While the dealer who trades on his own account (with proprietary trading) simultaneously sets both the transaction fee and the asset price, the broker who brings investors' orders to the market (with no proprietary trading) sets only the transaction fee, given that the price is determined according to the market-clearing condition among investors. We analyze the impact of proprietary trading on the asset price, transaction fee, trading volume, and the welfare of investors. We find that the bid and ask prices set by the dealer who can engage in proprietary trading are more favorable to average investors. As a result, both the trading volume and the transaction fee increase, and social welfare improves.     

HIGH‐FREQUENCY EXCHANGE‐RATE PREDICTION WITH AN ARTIFICIAL NEURAL NETWORK

This paper examines how market microstructure variables can be used to forecast foreign exchange (FX) rates at frequencies of one to several minutes. We use a unique FX dataset of global inter‐dealer electronic transactions and applied the artificial neural network (ANN) as the predicting model. The immediately preceding bid and ask prices are significant factors in these predictions, which is in keeping with market microstructure theory. These microstructure factors have not been tested in an ANN model before. High‐frequency trading strategies based on the ANN model are shown to be profitable even when transaction costs are included. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intra‐Dealer Integration

This paper examines the quotation behaviour of dealers who made markets in the same stocks on both NASDAQ and either EASDAQ or the LSE. Whereas previous studies examine international integration at the market level, we examine integration at the dealer level. In other words, do dealers within the same market‐making firm use information from their arm on the opposite side of the Atlantic in forming their own quotes? We find that while there is some evidence of integration at the market level, integration is hard to detect at the dealer level. The results are largely unaffected by differences in fungibility between our two samples.     

DO DEALERS INFER INFORMATION FROM ORDER FLOW?

I examine strategic behavior among dealers in the NASDAQ market and document that there is a lead quote‐setting dealer in each security and that the quotes posted by this leader are informative. Other dealers free‐ride this information by following the lead quote‐setting dealer. The lead dealer can be identified by two information signals: (1) percentage of time spent on the inside market (i.e., posting inside quotes), and (2) trade volume transacted. Dealers that free‐ride the leader's quotes quickly update their posted quotes in the same direction as the leader's quote change. My findings suggest that directing trade to the lead dealer may be more advantageous than randomly routing trade.     

Market structure, informational efficiency and liquidity: An experimental comparison of auction and dealer markets

We report the results of 18 market experiments that were conducted in order to compare the call market, the continuous auction and the dealer market. Transaction prices in the call and continuous auction markets are much more efficient than prices in the dealer markets. The call market shows a tendency towards underreaction to new information. Execution costs are lowest in the call market and highest in the dealer market. The trading volume and Roll's (Journal of Finance (1984) 1127–1139) serial covariance estimator are inappropriate measures of execution costs in the present context. The relation between private signals, trading decisions and trading profits is analyzed.     

Does internalization diminish the impact of quote aggressiveness on dealer market share?

We analyze data provided by NASDAQ to examine how quote aggressiveness affects dealer market share and whether the practice of internalization mitigates the impact of quote aggressiveness. Our empirical results show that although internalization does not reduce the impact of price aggressiveness on dealer market share, it mitigates the impact of size aggressiveness. This result suggests that although internalization may not affect the dealer's incentive to post aggressive prices, it may reduce the incentive to post large depths. We find that aggressive quotes are more effective in raising dealer market share in stocks with a less competitive (more concentrated) market structure. Our results also show that the effective spread is wider (narrower) for stocks with a smaller price (size) elasticity of dealer market share.     

Quote-based competition,market share,and execution quality in NASDAQ-listed securities

We show that competitive quotes help increase dealer market share on NASDAQ, despite the fact that a large proportion of order flow is preferenced. We find that decimal pricing and the introduction of new trading platforms such as SuperSOES and SuperMontage have significantly changed the effect of quote aggressiveness on dealer market share. In particular, decimal pricing reduces (increases) the price (size) elasticity, SuperSOES increases the size elasticity, and SuperMontage increases both the size and price elasticity of dealer market share. We also show that market centers provide greater price improvements and faster executions when they post competitive quotes.     

Intensive margin of the Volcker rule: Price quality and welfare

We analyze the impact of dealer regulation on price quality (informativeness and volatility) and its implications for the welfare of market participants. We argue that although price informativeness, volatility, and the dealer’s profitability all deteriorate, against conventional wisdom, other market participants are better off due to the dealer’s risk-shifting motive. A static model is used to clarify the main intuition, and the robustness of the welfare results, as well as the fragility of the conventional wisdom about price quality, are discussed by incorporating dynamics and endogenizing information acquisition.     

THE DEALER AND MARKET CONCEPTS OF BID-ASK SPREAD: A COMPARISON FOR NASDAQ STOCKS

Two models of bid-ask spread are estimated with a unique sample of matched observations of dealer spreads and market (inside) spreads for NASDAQ stocks. The estimates demonstrate that dealer and market spreads relate differently to their common determinants, indicating that the two measures are not interchangeable. Consequently, studies must select the spread concept that is appropriate to the hypothesis being tested to get unbiased estimates and correct interpretations of model parameters. In particular, the cost of immediacy to investors is measured directly by market spreads, while market-making costs and interdealer competition relate directly to dealer spreads.     

Cournot model of brokered FX trading

This paper develops a Cournot model of rival dealers placing limit orders with a broker, who in turn makes a market by acting as a liaison between dealers. The broker's limit-book lists the various prices and quantities at which dealers are willing to exchange currency vis-à-vis electronic broking. The size and volatility of the inside spread is simulated relative to dealer entry–exit and the price elasticity of linear order arrival functions. Our simulations reveal non-linear price dynamics from dealer participation in market development, with an additional rival narrowing the inside spread by 1.82% while diminishing its volatility. These findings may shed some light on the “excess volatility puzzle” raised by Killeen, Lyons and Moore (forthcoming) as to why price behavior under flexible exchange rate regimes is significantly more volatile than macro fundamentals would suggest.     

Interest rate variability,government securities dealers,and the stability of financial markets

Monetarists argue that monetary policy should focus on controlling monetary growth rather than interest rates. Arguments to smooth rates at the expense of stabilizing monetary growth frequently emphasize the adverse effects of rate variability on financial markets. Assuming that financial market performance can be correctly inferred from dealer positions and spreads, this paper estimates the parameters of a model that allows for both short- and long-term effects of rate variability on dealer positions and spreads. Estimates of variability effects on government securities dealer positions and spreads provide little support for limiting variability to maintain or improve market performance because most of the adverse effects of variability are temporary.     

Risk Management with Derivatives by Dealers and Market Quality in Government Bond Markets

This paper investigates how bond dealers manage core business risk with interest rate futures and the extent to which market quality is affected by their selective risk taking. We observe that dealers use futures to take directional bets and hedge changes in their spot exposure. We find that, cross‐sectionally, a dealer with longer (shorter) risk exposure sells (buys) a larger amount of exposure the next day. However, this risk control takes place via the futures market and not the spot market. Finally, we find strong support for the price effects of capital constraints emphasized by Froot and Stein (1998).     

Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets

We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative matching. The model predictions allow us to distinguish these two theories in the data, and we find evidence for both.     

Liquidity,volume and price efficiency: The impact of order vs. quote driven trading

As equity trading becomes predominantly electronic, is there still value to a traditional, intermediated dealer system? We address this question by comparing the impact of the organization of trading on volume, liquidity, and price efficiency in a quote-driven dealer market and in an order-driven limit order book. Small order price impacts are higher and large order price impacts are lower in a dealer market. Prices are more efficient in the limit order book, except when the level of informed trading is high. Volume is higher in a limit order market, making this system most attractive for trading venues.     

Trading activity,dealer concentration and foreign exchange market quality

We study the relation between foreign exchange market quality and both trading activity and dealer concentration by considering two currency pairs with significant differences along both dimensions – the Euro–US dollar and Canadian dollar–US dollar. A variance ratio test reveals over-reaction in currency prices, but that this is smallest when trading activity is high and dealer concentration at its peak. A GARCH model shows that over-reaction declines as trading activity and dealer concentration increase, with the results being stronger for the Euro. Our results confirm that trading activity is an important determinant of market quality, but also point to a significant role for dealer concentration.     

Information shares in a two-tier FX market

Using several measures of information share, we examine price discovery across the inter-dealer and dealer–customer market tiers in the currencies market. In the spot market, the information share of the inter-dealer tier is higher than that of the dealer–customer one for non-financial sector trades and is lower than the dealer–customer tier for foreign investors’ sell trades. In the forward market, the dealer–customer tier generally has the greater information share at the dealer’s buy side. Our results indicate the market where customers’ trades are the most informative and demonstrate how exogenous events affect price discovery across markets and market tiers.     

Liquidity and leverage

In a financial system in which balance sheets are continuously marked to market, asset price changes appear immediately as changes in net worth, and eliciting responses from financial intermediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets. We document evidence that marked-to-market leverage is strongly procyclical. Such behavior has aggregate consequences. Changes in dealer repos – the primary margin of adjustment for the aggregate balance sheets of intermediaries – forecast changes in financial market risk as measured by the innovations in the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index VIX index. Aggregate liquidity can be seen as the rate of change of the aggregate balance sheet of the financial intermediaries.