Crossing Networks and Dealer Markets: Competition and Performance

This paper studies the interaction between dealer markets and a relatively new form of exchange, passive crossing networks, where buyers and sellers trade directly with one another. We find that the crossing network is characterized by both positive ('liquidity') and negative ('crowding') externalities, and we analyze the effects of its introduction on the dealer market. Traders who use the dealer market as a 'market of last resort' can induce dealers to widen their spread and can lead to more efficient subsequent prices, but traders who only use the crossing network can provide a counterbalancing effect by reducing adverse selection and inventory holding costs.     

Capital Commitment and Illiquidity in Corporate Bonds

We study trading costs and dealer behavior in U.S. corporate bond markets from 2006 to 2016. Despite a temporary spike during the financial crisis, average trade execution costs have not increased notably over time. However, dealer capital commitment, turnover, block trade frequency, and average trade size decreased during the financial crisis and thereafter. These declines are attributable to bank‐affiliated dealers, as nonbank dealers have increased their market commitment. Our evidence indicates that liquidity provision in the corporate bond markets is evolving away from the commitment of bank‐affiliated dealer capital to absorb customer imbalances, and that postcrisis banking regulations likely contribute.     

DO DEALERS INFER INFORMATION FROM ORDER FLOW?

I examine strategic behavior among dealers in the NASDAQ market and document that there is a lead quote‐setting dealer in each security and that the quotes posted by this leader are informative. Other dealers free‐ride this information by following the lead quote‐setting dealer. The lead dealer can be identified by two information signals: (1) percentage of time spent on the inside market (i.e., posting inside quotes), and (2) trade volume transacted. Dealers that free‐ride the leader's quotes quickly update their posted quotes in the same direction as the leader's quote change. My findings suggest that directing trade to the lead dealer may be more advantageous than randomly routing trade.     

Dealer behavior and trading systems in foreign exchange markets

We study dealer behavior in the foreign exchange spot market using detailed observations on all the transactions of four interbank dealers. There is strong support for an information effect in incoming trades. The direction of trade is most important, but we also find that the information effect increases with trade size in direct bilateral trades. All four dealers control their inventory intensively. Inventory control is not, however, manifested through a dealer's own prices in contrast to findings by Lyons (J. Financial Econ. 39(1995) 321). Furthermore, we document differences in trading styles, especially how they actually control their inventories.     

Dealer attention,the speed of quote adjustment to information,and net dealer revenue

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.     

When It's Not The Only Game in Town: The Effect of Bilateral Search on the Quality of a Dealer Market

We report results from experimental asset markets with liquidity traders and an insider where we allow bilateral trade to take place, in addition to public trade with dealers. In the absence of the search alternative, dealer profits are large—unlike in models with risk-neutral, competitive dealers. However, when we allow traders to participate in the search market, dealer profits are close to zero. Dealers compete more aggressively with the alternative trading avenue than with each other. There is no evidence that price discovery is less efficient when the specialists are not the only game in town.     

Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market

Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealermarkets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyzea database of trades between broker-dealers and customers inmunicipal bonds. These data were only released to the publicwith a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower averagemarkups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higherrisk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargainingmodel and compute measures of dealer’s bargaining power.Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of marketpower decrease in trade size and increase in the complexityof the trade for the dealer. (JEL G0, G24)     

Dealer Networks

Dealers in the over‐the‐counter municipal bond market form trading networks with other dealers to mitigate search frictions. Regulatory data show that this network has a core‐periphery structure with 10 to 30 hubs and over 2,000 peripheral broker‐dealers in which bonds flow from periphery to core and partially back. Central dealers charge investors up to double the round‐trip markups compared to peripheral dealers. In turn, central dealers provide immediacy by matching buyers with sellers more directly and prearranging fewer trades, especially during stress times. Investors thus face a trade‐off between execution cost and speed, consistent with network models of decentralized trade.     

Who makes markets

A dealer needs access to order flow and information to make a market profitably in a Nasdaq stock. Several variables that proxy for the stocks that an individual market maker's brokerage customers trade, including volume, location, underwriting participation and analyst coverage, are significant determinants of market making activity. Informational advantages may also factor in the market making decision as evidenced by dealers specializing in industries. These findings suggest that individual dealers have competitive advantages in making markets in specific stocks, and that potential market making competition comes from the dealers who share those advantages rather than all Nasdaq market makers.     

Belief-free price formation

We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for the opportunity to trade with short-lived retail traders. We characterize equilibria in which dealers’ pricing strategies are optimal irrespective of the private information that each dealer may possess. Thus, our model’s predictions are robust to different specifications of the dealers’ information structure. These equilibria reconcile, in a unified and parsimonious framework, price dynamics that are reminiscent of well-known stylized facts: excess price volatility, price to trading flow correlation, stochastic volatility and inventory-related trading.     

So who gains from a small tick size?

We investigate the relation between price discreteness and the number of dealers in a dealer market. We present a model featuring a finite number of dealers competing in prices for supplying liquidity to a forthcoming market order. We find that a decrease in tick size benefits dealers and tends to hurt investors when the number of dealers for a stock is small. In contrast, a decrease in tick size hurts dealers and benefits investors when the number of dealers is large. This result yields several new empirical implications relating a change in tick size to entry and exit of dealers, order aggressiveness and transaction rates.     

The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the Trading of Nasdaq Stocks

This paper provides an analysis of the nature and evolution of a dealer market for Nasdaq stocks. Despite size differences in sample stocks, there is a surprising consistency to their trading. One dealer tends to dominate trading in a stock. Markets are concentrated and spreads are increasing in the volume and market share of the dominant dealer. Entry and exit are ubiquitous. Exiting dealers are those with very low profits and trading volume. Entering market makers fail to capture a meaningful share of trading or profits. Thus, free entry does little to improve the competitive nature of the market as entering dealers have little impact. We find, however, that for small stocks, the Nasdaq dealer market is being more competitive than the specialist market.     

PRICE AND QUANTITY QUOTES ON NASDAQ: A STUDY OF DEALER QUOTATION BEHAVIOR

We show that the majority of quotes posted by NASDAQ dealers are noncompetitive and only 19.5% (18.4%) of bid (ask) quotes are at the inside. The percentage of dealer quotes that are at the inside is higher for stocks with wider spreads, fewer market makers, and more frequent trading, and lower for stocks with larger trade sizes and higher return volatility. These results support our conjecture that dealers have greater incentives to be at the inside for stocks with larger market‐making revenues and smaller costs. Dealers post large depths when their quotes are at the inside and frequently quote the minimum required depth when they are not at the inside. The latter quotation behavior leads to the negative intertemporal correlation between dealer spread and depth.     

Cournot model of brokered FX trading

This paper develops a Cournot model of rival dealers placing limit orders with a broker, who in turn makes a market by acting as a liaison between dealers. The broker's limit-book lists the various prices and quantities at which dealers are willing to exchange currency vis-à-vis electronic broking. The size and volatility of the inside spread is simulated relative to dealer entry–exit and the price elasticity of linear order arrival functions. Our simulations reveal non-linear price dynamics from dealer participation in market development, with an additional rival narrowing the inside spread by 1.82% while diminishing its volatility. These findings may shed some light on the “excess volatility puzzle” raised by Killeen, Lyons and Moore (forthcoming) as to why price behavior under flexible exchange rate regimes is significantly more volatile than macro fundamentals would suggest.     

Anonymity, Adverse Selection, and the Sorting of Interdealer Trades

This article uses unique data from the London Stock Exchangeto examine how trader anonymity and market liquidity affectdealers' decisions about where to place interdealer trades.During our sample period, dealers could trade with each otherin the direct, nonanonymous public market or use one of fouranonymous brokered trading systems. Surprisingly, we find thatadverse selection is less prevalent in the anonymous brokeredmarkets. We show that this pattern can be explained by the waydealers "price" the adverse selection risk inherent in tradingwith other dealers. We also relate our findings to recent changesin dealer markets.     

Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets

We present empirical evidence supporting that used cars sold by dealers have higher quality: (i) dealer transaction prices are higher than unmediated market prices, and this dealer premium increases in the age of the car as a ratio and is hump-shaped in dollar value, and (ii) used cars purchased from dealers are less likely to be resold. In a model, we show that these empirical facts can be rationalized either when dealers alleviate information asymmetry, or when dealers facilitate assortative matching. The model predictions allow us to distinguish these two theories in the data, and we find evidence for both.     

Information Revelation in Decentralized Markets

How does information get revealed in decentralized markets? We test several hypotheses inspired by recent dealer‐network theory. To do so, we construct an empirical map of information revelation where two dealers are connected based on the synchronicity of their quote changes. The tests, based on the euro to Swiss franc spot rate (EUR/CHF) quote data including the 2015 crash, largely support theory: strongly connected (i.e., central) dealers are more informed. Connections are weaker when there is less to be learned. The crash serves to identify how a network forms when dealers are transitioned from no‐learning to learning, that is, from a fixed to a floating rate.     

Making a Market with Spreads and Depths

Abstract:   In this paper we study the quote revision behavior of NASDAQ market makers by analyzing inter‐temporal changes in their spread and depth quotes. Using individual dealer quote and trade data for a sample of 2,319 stocks, we find that NASDAQ dealers make more frequent revisions in depths than in spreads and the extent of liquidity management is greater for stocks of smaller companies, lower‐priced stocks, and stocks with larger trade sizes and fewer number of transactions. We show that intraday variation in the number of quote revisions follows the U‐shaped pattern, indicating that the extent of liquidity management is greater during the early and late hours of trading than during midday.     

Intra‐Dealer Integration

This paper examines the quotation behaviour of dealers who made markets in the same stocks on both NASDAQ and either EASDAQ or the LSE. Whereas previous studies examine international integration at the market level, we examine integration at the dealer level. In other words, do dealers within the same market‐making firm use information from their arm on the opposite side of the Atlantic in forming their own quotes? We find that while there is some evidence of integration at the market level, integration is hard to detect at the dealer level. The results are largely unaffected by differences in fungibility between our two samples.     

The dynamics of dealer markets and trading costs

In this study we examine the temporal dynamics of dealer market share and their ramification for competition and trading costs using a large sample of NASDAQ securities. Our results show that although the total market share of the top five dealers is relatively stable over time, there is significant monthly variation in the composition of the top five dealers. We show that market share turbulence among top dealers is another form of competition that narrows bid–ask spreads, especially for stocks with less competitive market structure.