Worker poaching in a supply chain: Enemy from within?

Worker poaching represents the primary mode by which workers change employers. We examine worker poaching between firms linked in a value chain. We find that, in a value chain, the less productive firm may offer its workers higher wages and poach workers from the more productive firm. We also find that worker flows accomplished via poaching impact supply chain management: (a) the identity of the bottleneck firm may depend on whether poaching is available; (b) poaching between linked firms may benefit both, and (c) the value chain cannot be fully coordinated without controlling wages in the labor market.     

Labour market oligopsonistic competition: The effect of worker immobility on wages

We suggest that firms in a local labour market may be able to exploit worker mobility costs and offer immobile workers wages that are lower than their marginal product. If so, the ability of employers to exploit worker immobility in setting wages would decline in the competitiveness of the local labour market. We test this intuition using a measure of individual mobility costs and measures of local labour market competition. Our findings suggest that worker immobility causes substantial wage variation across workers in small, weakly competitive markets, and in occupations where wages are individually bargained.     

Who is considered an ‘older worker'? Extending our conceptualisation of ‘older’ from an organisational decision maker perspective

A refinement of the construct of age, specifically ‘older’, is recognised as a critical measurement concern for experts in both ageing research and policy formation. In this context, we set out to both chronologically define an ‘older worker’ and to identify on what basis the age of ‘older’ is determined. In doing so, we draw on open‐ended survey data (collected in 2011) from a sample of 407 organisational decision makers across all industries in Ireland. Our focus was specifically on the perspective of organisational decision makers because these individuals will be instrumental in facing the challenges associated with workforce ageing. The results show that workers are considered as ‘older’ at a younger age than might be expected and that decision makers conceptualise workers as ‘older’ using various approaches in the organisational context. Our findings contribute to the literature in three ways: firstly, by providing an important empirically derived understanding of the term ‘older worker’; secondly, by empirically examining previously suggested ‘possible’ indicators of age; and thirdly, by demonstrating that these indicators are conceptually and empirically distinct, advancing theory on the concept of age in the workplace.     

Fine‐tuning what we know about employees' experience with flexible work arrangements and their job attitudes

Prior research has generally found positive relationships between flexible work arrangements (FWAs) and employee attitudes. However, we know relatively little about organizational contingencies that affect the strength of these relationships, as there is little multilevel, multicompany research on FWAs. This study explores three aspects of employees' experience with FWAs—perceived availability of the number of FWAs, different types of FWAs, and actual use of FWAs—and their corresponding effects on employee job satisfaction and organizational commitment. Using a large multicompany data set (1,799 companies, 17,895 workers), we found that employees who perceive more FWAs available to them have higher job satisfaction and organizational commitment, especially in organizations that report offering fewer formal FWA policies. Among different types of FWAs, perceived availability of flexible scheduling is more positively associated with job satisfaction than flexible location and hours, and both flexible scheduling and location are more positively associated with organizational commitment than flexible number of hours. We also found that employees who actually use flexible scheduling have lower job satisfaction and organizational commitment than those who have it available but do not use it. The theoretical contributions and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Managing dispersed workers: the new challenge in Knowledge Management

Knowledge Management (KM) has become a central theme in today's business environment and a commonly cited source of competitive advantage. In today's global economy, many economic activities in and among firms are based on the contribution of workers that are geographically dispersed and have loose contractual links with the company. Building on evidence from three case studies, this paper explores the relations between dispersed worker activities, KM tools and worker satisfaction.     

The determinants of hiring older workers: UK evidence

This is the first research using UK establishment data to examine the relationship between back loading of compensation, training and the hiring of older workers. Recognizing that many firms employ older workers but do not hire older workers, we argue this may reflect strategic deferred compensation or the role of specific human capital. Using the combined establishment and employee data of the 1998 WERS, we identify that firms which defer compensation hire a smaller share of older workers and present somewhat weaker evidence that firms which require greater specific human capital also hire a smaller share of older workers.     

Performance Pay and Offshoring

In this paper, we construct a North–South general equilibrium model of offshoring, highlighting the nexus among endogenous effort‐based labor productivity and the structure of wages. Offshoring is modeled as international transfer of management practices and production techniques that allow Northern firms to design and implement performance compensation contracts. Performance–pay contracts address moral hazard issues stemming from production uncertainty and unobserved worker effort. We find that worker effort augments productivity and compensation of those workers assigned to more offshorable tasks. An increase in worker effort in the South, caused by a decline in offshoring costs, an increase in worker skill, or a decline in production uncertainty in the South, increases the range of offshored tasks and makes workers in the North and South better off. An increase in Southern labor force increases the range of offshored tasks, benefits workers in the North, and hurts workers in the South. International labor migration from low‐wage South to high‐wage North shrinks the range of offshored tasks, makes Northern workers worse off and Southern workers (emigrants and those left behind) better off. Higher worker effort in the North, caused by higher worker skills or lower degree of production uncertainty, decreases the range of offshored tasks and benefits workers in the North and South.     

Predictors of flexible working arrangement provision in small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

SMEs comprise 99.7% of all private sector businesses in Australia and employ 70% of the private sector workforce. They are therefore important to policies on flexible work arrangements (FWAs). The provision of FWAs has been found to usually contribute positively to employee well-being and business performance. However, the majority of studies focus on large firms and it is unclear whether these associations apply equally to SMEs. Using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics Business Longitudinal database for 2007–2011(n = 2788), this study investigates the extent to which factors such as firm size, industry sector, terms of employment, employees’ skills and use of the internet at work affect the provision of FWAs in SMEs. The findings show that smaller businesses are constrained by resources to provide FWAs, but do so in pursuit of industry norms and/or as a result of the profile of their employees. It is also easier to provide FWAs in certain industries than in others and use of the internet facilitates the provision of FWAs.     

Why should I share my knowledge? A multiple foci of commitment perspective

Knowledge‐intensive firms need to leverage their individual knowledge assets via knowledge sharing to create collective knowledge resources. This process is, however, in the control of the knowledge worker. We explore this personal and emotive quality of knowledge sharing by asking: ‘How does employee commitment impact on knowledge sharing?’ We study professional service firms operating in cross‐boundary environments and examine the impact of commitment to the organisation, profession, team and client on knowledge sharing. The article contributes directly to our understanding of the interrelationship between (a) the types and foci of commitment and (b) bidirectional knowledge sharing.     

How do workers decide their jobs? The influence of income,wage and job characteristics

This paper provides results on the economic decision‐making process of Spanish workers, who decide their jobs from the effects of variations in the non‐wage income, the wage and the prices of non‐pecuniary job characteristics. To that end, we formulate a non‐separable generalization of the Linear Expenditure System (NLES) as a joint model of labor supply and job characteristics demand, estimated separately for both males and females, using a 1991 Spanish survey. The main results show that: (i) some job characteristics have a positive effect on the wage, whereas others have a negative effect; (ii) the average percentage effect of employer size and the complexity index are higher for males than for females, with the fatal accident risk displaying similar values; (iii) if the non‐wage income of every worker increases, these individuals will prefer to devote less hours to work, and will also prefer jobs in smaller companies and with a lower risk; and (iv) if the wage and hedonic prices of non‐pecuniary job characteristics increase, then both males and females will prefer to reduce their labor supply, and devote their available time to jobs in bigger firms, with a higher risk and complexity. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Turnover and Knowledge Loss: An Examination of the Differential Impact of Production Manager and Worker Turnover in Service and Manufacturing Firms

This research examines the comparative effects of production manager and worker turnover in service and manufacturing settings. We suggest that, due to the centrality of human action in services and the ability of manufacturers to insulate the technical core, service and manufacturing companies are differentially dependent on and impacted by the loss of production manager and worker knowledge. The results from a survey of 150 service and manufacturing firms provide partial support for this notion and show that turnover impacts these organizations differently. More specifically, we find that: (1) the negative impact of production worker turnover on firm performance is greater in service settings than in manufacturing settings; and (2) the negative impact of production worker turnover on firm performance is greater than the impact of production manager turnover in service firms. In addition, our findings show that organizational capital moderates the turnover–performance relationship for production workers in service firms.     

Effects of work–family and family–work conflicts on flexible work arrangements demand: a gender role perspective

In recent years, a growing number of firms have adopted flexible work arrangements (FWAs) to help managers balance their work–family demands. Based on a sample of 1336 married managers in Korea, we found that work–family conflict increased the FWAs demand more for female managers than for male managers. When facing work–family conflict, the absence of family-supportive supervision increased the demand for FWAs, particularly among female managers. No such effect was found for family–work conflict. In addition, having a female supervisor led to an increased demand for FWAs from company managers. These results suggest that firms should pay close attention to gender difference and supervisory roles in predicting the demand for FWAs to alleviate work–family conflicts.     

Upward influence tactics and their effects on job performance ratings and flexible working arrangements: The mediating roles of mutual recognition respect and mutual appraisal respect

Supervisor's human resources (HR) decisions have a significant impact on the employees they manage but have been found to be subject to bias. The upward influence tactics use by subordinates can play a role in this. We investigated the effects of seven upward influence tactics on supervisor job‐performance ratings and the extent of subordinate flexible working arrangements (FWAs). Supervisors are often responsible for determining whether employees are granted FWAs. We posit an alternative theoretical mechanism by which upward influence tactics bring about their effects, mediated through two distinct types of respect, mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect. We collected data from 389 matched supervisor–subordinate dyads, and found that both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect mediated relationships between several upward influence tactics and both job‐performance ratings and FWAs. Our findings show that upward influence tactics affect the quality of the relationship between employees and their supervisors, specifically, these two forms of mutual respect. Further, both mutual appraisal respect and mutual recognition respect may explain why supervisors show favoritism to some subordinates over others, in reaching HR decisions in these areas.     

An empirical assessment of assortative matching in the labor market

In labor markets with worker and firm heterogeneity, the matching between firms and workers may be assortative, meaning that the most productive workers and firms team up. We investigate this with longitudinal population-wide matched employer–employee data from Portugal. Using panel data methods, we quantify a firm-specific productivity term for each firm, and we relate this to the skill distribution of workers in the firm. We find that there is positive assortative matching, in particular among long-lived firms. Using skill-specific estimates of an index of search frictions, we find that the results can only to a small extent be explained by heterogeneity of search frictions across worker skill groups.     

A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

We consider a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms where each firm’s preferences satisfy substitutability, increasing choice and no external effect by unchosen workers, which are defined by  Bando (2012). We first illustrate that a sequential version of the deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm with worker-proposing may not find a worker-optimal quasi stable matching. Then, we provide a modified DA algorithm in which (i) each worker simultaneously proposes to his most preferred firm that has not rejected him and (ii) each firm chooses its acceptable workers from the cumulative set of workers who have ever proposed to it, assuming that the other workers proposing to its rival firms are hired. We show that this algorithm finds a worker-optimal quasi stable matching. We also show that this algorithm can be generalized into a fixed point algorithm.     

A note on the multiple partners assignment game

In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M., 1972. The assignment game. I. The core, International Journal of Game Theory 1, 11–130] agents are allowed to form one partnership at most. That paper proves that, in the context of firms and workers, given two stable payoffs for the firms there is a stable payoff which gives each firm the larger of the two amounts and also one which gives each of them the smaller amount. Analogous result applies to the workers. Sotomayor [Sotomayor, M., 1992. The multiple partners game. In: Majumdar, M. (Ed.), Dynamics and Equilibrium: Essays in Honor to D. Gale. Mcmillian, pp. 322–336] extends this analysis to the case where both types of agents may form more than one partnership and an agent's payoff is multi-dimensional. Instead, this note concentrates in the total payoff of the agents. It is then proved the rather unexpected result that again the maximum of any pair of stable payoffs for the firms is stable but the minimum need not be, even if we restrict the multiplicity of partnerships to one of the sides.     

Institutions as constraints and resources: Explaining cross‐national divergence in performance management

This article compares performance management practices in call centres from four telecommunications firms in the United Kingdom, France, Denmark, and Germany. Findings show that different combinations of institutional constraints, such as strong job security protections, and participation resources supporting worker voice were influential in shaping choices among policies to motivate and discipline workers. Performance management most closely approached a high‐involvement model where both constraints and resources were high, where worker representatives were able both to restrict management's use of sanctions and to establish procedures that improved the perceived fairness of incentives. Findings contribute to debates concerning the role of contextual factors in the design and effectiveness of HRM.     

Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms

We study a labor market described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm’s preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability and investigate its existence problem. We show that when the preferences of firms satisfy an extension of substitutability and two new conditions called increasing choice and no external effect by an unchosen worker, then a weakly stable matching exists. We also show that a weakly stable matching may fail to exist without these restrictions.     

Compensation Schemes and Labor Market Competition: Piece Rate versus Wage Rate

We investigate the choice of compensation scheme by firms. Our basic model shows that the unique equilibrium choice for profit maximizing duopsonists in a labor market is for one firm to offer a wage rate and for the other to offer a piece rate. This result arises because the firms recognize that, by offering different compensation schemes, they induce self-selection among workers, which thereby decreases the intensity of competition in the labor market. We find this asymmetry to be robust to allowing for firing, free entry, and a class of more general compensation schemes. When we broaden our model to permit firms to be differentiated in the eyes of workers (either geographically or by "other working conditions," e.g.), we find that our results are preserved when differentiation is low, but that both firms choose to offer a piece rate when differentiation is high.