Deflation,bank credit growth,and non-performing loans: Evidence from Japan

In this paper, I examine the link between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in an economy with deflationary pressures. Using panel OLS regressions and two-step GMM regressions, I find evidence for the time-varying relationship between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in a sample of 82 publicly listed commercial banks in Japan during the period 1993–2013. I show that bank credit growth positively correlates with non-performing loans prior to the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007 but negatively correlates with non-performing loans afterwards. I find evidence to support the notion that large banks drive the observed effects of credit growth on non-performing loans. In addition, credit growth and non-performing loans have no effect on profitability. Overall, the findings suggest that while the increase in the supply of bank loans increases the level of non-performing loans, it does not lead to higher profitability.     

The effect of bank capital on lending: Does liquidity matter?

This paper uses a sample of quarterly observations of insured US commercial banks to examine whether the effect of bank capital on lending differs depending upon the level of bank liquidity. We find that the effect of an increase in bank capital on credit growth, defined as growth rate of net loans and unused commitments, is positively associated with the level of bank liquidity only for large banks and that this positive relationship has been more substantial during the recent financial crisis period. This result suggests that bank capital exerts a significantly positive effect on lending only after large banks retain sufficient liquid assets.     

The syndicate structure of securitized corporate loans

Securitized loans have lower lead bank shares, but larger shares held by non-CLO (collateralized loan obligation) institutional investors than nonsecuritized loans. The result can largely be explained by their degree of information asymmetry and credit risk. We find that lead banks increase their holdings after a nonsecuritized loan becomes securitized, but they do not reduce financial exposure to securitized facilities during the boom of the CLO market. Furthermore, we find that securitized loans do not perform differently from similar nonsecuritized loans. We conclude that differences in syndicate structure are likely shaped by participants’ investment preference rather than a manifestation of adverse selection.     

Credit unions vs. commercial banks,who takes more risk?

A unique feature of the financial services industry is that both shareholder-owned banks and member-owned credit unions coexist and compete against each other. In this study, we investigate two research questions. First, we compare risk-taking by banks and credit unions, with an additional consideration as to how regulatory oversight (state or federal) relates to such risk-taking. Second, we examine how competition affects the difference in risk-taking between these two types of financial institutions. To answer both questions, we rely on a matched sample (by loan type, size, and county) of commercial banks and credit unions, covering the period between 2010 and 2017. We use three empirical proxies for risk-taking, the Z-score, measuring an institution’s insolvency risk, as well as the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to total loans, measuring the credit risk. Our results suggest that banks tend to engage in more risk-taking than credit unions; however, state regulatory oversight reduces the risk-taking gap, especially in terms of the Z-score. We further find that competition induces different risk-taking behaviors in banks and credit unions. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.     

Bank loan announcements and borrower stock returns before and during the recent financial crisis

The impact of U.S. bank loan announcements on the stock prices of the corporate borrowers has been decreasing during the two last decades with estimated two-day cumulative abnormal returns slipping from almost 200 basis points in the beginning of the 1980s to close to zero by the turn of the Century. We estimate excess returns before and after the onset of the most recent financial crisis. We find that while prior to August 2007 returns were indeed close to zero, afterwards returns jump back up to around 200 basis points. We surmise that in a booming credit market the certification of corporate borrowers by banks started to play a lesser role, while during the crisis the banks’ role was revitalized. Consistent with this interpretation we find that after August 2007 excess returns increase especially for loans with a longer maturity, and for smaller, levered, less profitable or lowly rated firms.     

Do credit commitments compromise credit quality?

This paper focuses on banks’ risk-taking arising from potentially excessive growth of loans and off-balance sheet credit commitments. Credit quality is investigated both in macro and micro context, using a panel of 28 European countries over 2004–2014 and a panel of 478 European banks over 2004–2013. The dynamic panel data estimation results confirm that an increase in the ratio of credit commitments to total assets is a two year ahead warning indicator of growth in the ratio of non-performing loans and loan loss reserves. Simultaneous equation estimation exemplifies that the adverse effect of credit commitments on credit quality stems from the credit boom-bust context. As the economic impact of credit commitments to credit quality is significant compared to that of traditional credit quality determinants (real GDP growth and real growth in loans), the consideration of a credit commitments measure may improve timely recognition of credit risk accumulation episodes.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

Banking Market Size Structure and Financial Stability: Evidence from Eight Asian Countries

Using commercial bank data from eight major Asian countries, we examine the relationship between the banking market size structure and the stability of financial institutions. We also analyze the effect of bank upsizing on the financial stability. Our results show that a rise in large banks’ market power, accompanying an increase in their market shares, lowers the capital adequacy of small banks. Small banks’ nonperforming loans and the possibility of their bankruptcy also increase as large banks’ market shares rise. We further show that larger banks tend to have lower capital adequacy ratios, liquidity ratios, and distance-to-default ratios. Our study suggests that large banks’ greater market shares are associated with small banks’ financial instability. Overall, these findings are consistent with the notion of the recent banking literature that has important antitrust policy implications.     

TARP funds distribution and bank loan supply

This paper investigates the determinants of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds distribution to banks and the stimulus effect of TARP investments on credit supply in the economy. Using banks’ political and regulatory connections as instruments, this paper finds that TARP investments increased bank loan supply by an annualized rate of 6.36% for banks with below median Tier 1 capital ratios. This increase is found in all major types of loans and can be translated into $404 billion of additional loans for all TARP banks. On average, TARP banks employed about one-third of their TARP capital to support new loans and kept the rest to strengthen their balance sheets. Furthermore, there is little evidence that loans made by TARP banks had lower quality than those by non-TARP banks. In sum, this paper shows a positive stimulus effect of TARP on credit supply during the 2008–2009 financial crisis.     

后危机时代商业银行不良资产形成因素的实证研究——基于江西省数据的经验分析

2009年,我国信贷高增长引致未来银行不良资产大量积聚的潜在风险引起了各方关注。在后金融危机背景下,研究商业银行不良贷款的现状,发掘不良贷款存在的根源,对信贷风险管理具有重要的现实意义。本文在回顾以前研究成果的基础上,试图以更加全面的视角,从宏观经济金融环境、宏观调控政策以及银行业运行情况等三个方面深入分析商业银行不良资产的影响因素。文章运用协整分析、格兰杰因素检验和脉冲响应模型对资产价格、固定资产投资、通胀率、存款准备金率、基准利率、银行利润等指标与不良贷款率（或不良贷款余额）的因果关系、影响程度进行了实证分析。结果表明,宏观经济金融形势的变化和货币政策调整都是影响不良贷款变化的重要原因,而不良贷款率的变化对商业银行利润影响明显。     

十二五期间如何优化商业银行信贷结构

为了应对国际金融危机,2009年中国政府采取了投资拉动政策,商业银行也加大了信贷投放,信贷资产规模急剧增加,存量资产和新增资产的结构发生了一些变化。尽管股改以来商业银行信贷结构趋于优化,但是仍存在房地产业、地方政府融资平台、部分风险较高行业的贷款规模偏大等问题,未来商业银行调整信贷结构应从以下六方面着手:科学配置信贷资源;通过信贷增量优化带动存量优化;创新中间业务,带动传统业务发展;依托产业价值链,引导信贷资金投向;关注金融生态变化,明确信贷优先投放区域;紧紧围绕"十二五"规划,把握贷款行业投向。     

Financial Statements as Monitoring Mechanisms: Evidence from Small Commercial Loans

Using a data set that records banks’ ongoing requests of information from small commercial borrowers, we examine when banks use financial statements to monitor borrowers after loan origination. We find that banks request financial statements for half the loans and this variation is related to borrower credit risk, relationship length, collateral, and the provision of business tax returns, but in complex ways. The relation between borrower risk and financial statement requests has an inverted U‐shape; and tax returns can be both substitutes and complements to financial statements, conditional on borrower characteristics and the degree of bank–borrower information asymmetry. Frequent financial reporting is used to monitor collateral, but only for non–real estate loans and only when the collateral is easily accessible to lenders. Collectively, our results provide novel evidence of a fundamental information demand for financial reporting in monitoring small commercial borrowers and a specific channel through which banks fulfill their role as delegated monitors.     

When arm's length is too far: Relationship banking over the credit cycle

We conduct face-to-face interviews with bank chief executive officers to classify 397 banks across 21 countries as relationship or transaction lenders. We then use the geographic coordinates of these banks’ branches and of 14,100 businesses to analyze how the lending techniques of banks near firms are related to credit constraints at two contrasting points of the credit cycle. We find that while relationship lending is not associated with credit constraints during a credit boom, it alleviates such constraints during a downturn. This positive role of relationship lending is stronger for small and opaque firms and in regions with a more severe economic downturn. Moreover, relationship lending mitigates the impact of a downturn on firm growth and does not constitute evergreening of loans.     

中小企业信贷可得性的影响因素

本文利用中国人民银行征信系统的相关数据,实证研究湖南地区中小企业信贷可得性的影响因素,以检验银行对中小企业的贷款技术。实证结果表明:大型和跨区域性银行对中小企业未采取关系型贷款;贷款银行对中小企业的财务特征不太重视;大型和跨区域性银行对中小企业贷款主要采用信用评分技术。作者建议:第一,整合信息资源,发展独立的信用评估机构对中小企业进行信用评估,降低大型和跨区域性银行对中小企业贷款成本和信息不对称程度;第二,大力发展区域性中小商业银行,并鼓励其形成和充分发挥对中小企业进行关系型贷款的比较优势。     

Risk Overhang and Loan Portfolio Decisions: Small Business Loan Supply before and during the Financial Crisis

We estimate a structural model of bank portfolio lending and find that the typical U.S. community bank reduced its business lending during the global financial crisis. The decline in business credit was driven by increased risk overhang effects (consistent with a reduction in the liquidity of assets held on bank balance sheets) and by reduced loan supply elasticities suggestive of credit rationing (consistent with an increase in lender risk aversion). Nevertheless, we identify a group of strategically focused relationship banks that made and maintained higher levels of business loans during the crisis.     

Herding behaviour in the Australian loan market and its impact on bank loan quality

We examine the effect of herding behaviour on the credit quality of bank loans in Australia. We find that bank herding varies with different types of loans. It tends to be more prevalent in owner‐occupied housing loans and credit cards than other types of loans. During the global financial crisis period, herding in owner‐occupied housing loans was most pronounced due to the flight‐to‐quality phenomenon in the housing sector. Furthermore, we find that the big four banks tend to herd more than smaller and regional banks. Bank herding behaviour is countercyclical, as it is negatively related to real GDP growth and the cost of funding but is positively related to market risk. Regulatory capital requirements may also encourage herding as banks are required to hold less risk‐weighted capital for residential loans. Most importantly, bank herding is related to higher impaired assets and therefore lower loan quality. Our findings may have implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

The changing structure of local credit markets: Are small businesses special?

In many countries consolidation in the banking industry has reduced the number of small banks and led to significant shifts in market shares; deregulation has fostered entry in local credit markets and the expansion of branch networks, increasing competition in local markets. Small businesses are believed to be more vulnerable to these changes, since they are more dependent on credit from local banks. In this paper we investigate the consequences of consolidation and entry for these borrowers compared with those for large firms. We employ a data set for Italy, which provides information on volumes of loans and bad loans by size of borrower with a detailed geographical partition. We find that mergers are followed by a temporary reduction in outstanding credit to all sizes of borrowers and by an increase in bad loans, most likely due to the reassessment of banks portfolios. Entry has a relatively persistent negative impact on credit supply to small and medium-sized firms. Our results also show that concentration, branch density and the share of branches of small banks affect the volumes of credit and bad loans of small borrowers.     

Do some lenders have information advantages? Evidence from Japanese credit market data

Using detailed Japanese credit data, we test for the existence of a credit market hierarchy. Empirical tests indicate that firms with information problems are more likely to carry higher proportions of relationship loans from main banks than non-main banks, holding constant risk and control factors. We further examine credit specialization on the part of lenders by testing the relationship between client firms' information and risk characteristics and the concentration of loans obtained from depository institutions versus other financial institutions. However, no significant differences in information superiority between these two types of financial institutions are found. We conclude that our evidence supports the credit market hierarchy hypothesis for Japanese main banks in particular but not depository institutions in general.     

Quality of information disclosure,property rights,and bank loans: A bank heterogeneity perspective

Using the context of the financial reform and the development of the non-state sector in China in the past decade, we examine the roles that the quality of information disclosure and property rights play in the allocation of different types of bank credit. We find that foreign banks and policy banks exercise “financial discrimination,” and that local commercial banks, large state-owned commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks not only exercise financial discrimination but also provide significant “financial support” to non-state-owned enterprises by providing more lending opportunities and larger loans. However, when enterprises commit information disclosure violations, the local commercial banks, national joint-stock banks, local city commercial banks, and rural commercial banks reverse their credit decisions and begin to exercise financial discrimination against non-state-owned enterprises. At the same time, large state-owned commercial banks continue to provide financial support to non-state-owned enterprises. We also find that the quality of the information disclosed by enterprises has a moderating effect rather than an intermediary effect on the relationship between property rights and bank loans. Overall, the results of this paper shine new light on the market-oriented reform of the banking industry, and provide new empirical evidence for the presence of financial discrimination in the supply of bank credit. Our findings also have practical implications for solving the financing difficulties of non-state-owned enterprises.     

Bank risk and monetary policy

We find evidence of a bank lending channel operating in the euro area via bank risk. Financial innovation and the wider use of new ways of transferring credit risk have tended to diminish the informational content of standard bank balance sheet indicators. We show that bank risk conditions, as perceived by financial market investors, need to be considered, together with the other indicators (i.e., size, liquidity and capitalization), traditionally used in the bank lending channel literature to assess banks’ ability and willingness to supply new loans. Using a large sample of European banks, we find that banks characterized by lower expected default frequency are able to offer a larger amount of credit and to better insulate their loan supply from monetary policy changes.