MBO与中国国有企业改革

本书系统分析了管理层收购（MBO）的产生背景、发展历史和主要特征，阐释了委托代理理论、产权激励理论和公司治理理论与MBO的关系；着重研究了MBO的价值评估和融资模式；重点介绍了英国，美国等西方国家MBO的实践和经验；着力分析了我国MBO的发展现状、存在问题，从制度，法律、政策等方面提出完善我国MBO环境的意见和建议，并提出在中国实施MBO的范式选择。     

我国上市公司MBO若干法律问题研究

由于环境和背景不同,我国的MBO与西方的MBO存在本质区别.本文从我国现行法律制度出发,从设立MBO收购主体、客体、融资、收购定价、信息披露等几个方面研究了我国上市公司MBO的现状.为了避免国有资产的流失和维护社会公平,我们应当停止上市公司MBO和各种曲线MBO.     

我国上市公司管理层收购及监管研究

本剖析了我国上市公司管理层收购(MBO)的发展现状。针对MBO存在的问题，本提出的相关对策是完善实施MBO的市场环境，修订有关法律法规，加强对MBO信息披露和定价的监管，重视上市公司MBO后的监管，强化对管理层任期经济责任的监管。     

我国MBO实践的理论分析与创新

管理层收购(MBO)是优化我国国有企业公司治理结构、充分发挥企业家才能、提高公司绩效的有效途径。但是,由于法律制度不健全、产权关系不明晰、企业家市场不成熟等,使我国的MBO造成国有资产严重流失。因此,为防止MBO中国有资产的流失,必须加强法律制度建设,理顺国有企业的产权关系,明晰产权主体,并积极培育企业家市场,提高企业家素质。     

经济法角度下我国企业MBO面临的问题探析

MBO制度,即管理层收购制度,其核心理论基础是两权合一。由于我国现有的法律制度不甚完善,导致许多企业在进行管理层收购时与国有资产发生冲突,而这种方式的实质是对国有资产的一种处理手段。本文对我国企业的MBO存在的漏洞以及这些问题发生的根源进行了阐述。     

MBO在我国的变异及其危害

目前,我国国有资产管理体制改革处于探索阶段,制度环境尚不健全,与成熟的市场经济国家相比,MBO在我国发生了重大变异,一些地方借MBO加速变卖国有资产,造成了国有资产流失.如果不尽快廓清MBO概念,规范MBO行为,对国有资产保值增值、国有经济控制力甚至是国有资产管理体制改革,可能形成灾难性冲击.     

我国管理层收购(MBO)融资合法性研究

我国管理层收购不规范行为表现在:资金来源紧张、操作行为不规范;资金来源透明度差、披露不规范。造成我国管理层收购不规范的原因是:资本市场不发达,投资银行发展滞后的融资环境;与MBO相关之法规、政策缺乏协调性。加强管理层收购融资合法性建设的建议:优化我国MBO法律机制;解决资金来源、规范管理层收购融资行为;培育机构投资者,优化管理层收购融资结构;创新金融工具,推行专业的MBO基金、MBO信托融资模式。     

管理层收购背景下的上市公司盈余管理研究

以我国实施管理层收购(MBO)的上市公司为研究样本,采用改进的基本JONES模型来计量盈余管理程度,研究管理层收购(MBO)这一事件是否引发了我国上市公司显著的盈余管理行为.实证研究表明,上市公司管理层收购这一事件在MBO实施前后各一年没有引发显著的盈余管理行为.这一结论与我国MBO的动因和制度背景是高度相关的,并不能由此说明我国上市公司MBO过程是规范和透明的.     

MBO:外部环境须完善

西方国家MBO的理论与实践，对于正处在转型时期的我国企业来说具有很重要的借鉴意义。但是，由于企业所处的环境不尽相同，在MBO的实施过程中应充分考虑它的地域特色。就目前而言，我们一方面要强调应用MBO的现实意义，另一方面更要完善MBO实施过程中的外部环境。     

我国管理层收购问题探析

管理层收购(MBO)是20世纪80年代以来流行于欧美国家的一种企业收购方式。近年来，随着我国产权结构调整的稳步进行，MBO逐渐为我国理论界和实务界所认可和重视。但现阶段我国MBO的实施还存在许多的障碍。本对这些障碍进行了分析，并提出相应的对策。     

管理层收购(MBO)与我国国企改革

管理层收购(Management Buy-outs,MBO)广泛流行于欧美国家,为企业提供了一种新的发展模式。近几年来,管理层收购(MBO)在中国也有了较快的发展。本文的宗旨在于对管理层收购自身的优缺点及其在我国的发展现状进行客观评价,进而推动国有企业改革走上健康发展之路。     

The integration of zero-base budgeting with management-by-objectives: An empirical inquiry

Popular arguments in the management literature advocate the implementation congruity and complementarity of zero-base budgeting (ZBB) with an established management-by-objectives (MBO) system. The present study examined management perceptions on 28 ZBB implementation variables for MBO users and non-MBO users which were gathered from 153 managers at two hierarchical levels within a single private sector organization. Results from both univariate and multivariate tests indicate that ZBB implementation was not facilitated by the existence of an MBO system for either lower level management or for upper level management. The evidence obtained here strongly suggests that the purported conventional rationale underlying ZBB coupling with an extant MBO system is seriously defective; ZBB design implementation issues need to be thoroughly re-assessed, with the emphasis on matching compatible systemic properties between information sub-systems.     

Efficiency Gains in Unsuccessful Management Buyouts

This article uses a sample of 120 unsuccessful management buyouts (MBOs) to test whether operational improvements following successful MBOs are a result of organizational changes or private information. The findings are consistent with the organizational changes hypothesis. Firms with an unsuccessful MBO had no increase in operating performance following the buyout attempt. In addition, the cumulative abnormal stock return from before the attempted buyout until two years after the attempt is insignificantly different from 0 percent. I also find that management turnover following an unsuccessful MBO is significantly higher than normal.     

中国上市公司MBO前一年盈余管理实证研究

2004中期以来社会各界对于MBO过程中是否存在国有资产流失出现了较大的争论,其中一种意见认为公司管理层在MBO前通过会计处理对公司盈余进行管理,以利于其随后MBO的实施。本文选取截至2002年底公认实行了MBO而又可获取资料的15家上市公司,研究其在MBO前一年是否存在减少报告盈余的会计应计处理。通过扩展的JONESMODEL进行实证分析,未能发现证据支持管理层在MBO前一年采用了减少报告盈余的会计应计统计证据。     

激励增强、效率提高与内部人控制的加深——一个关于管理者收购(MBO)的假设性诠释及其应用

MBO是在我国国有企业和上市公司改革进入新阶段而从国外引进的新事物。通过MBO能够改善我国国有企业和上市公司的股权结构,增强国有企业和上市公司的经营者激励力度,从而实现国退民进,增加社会福利。但是MBO的实施会导致可能的国有资产流失、新的内部人控制等问题。如何衡量MBO的利弊成为理论和实践界的难题。本文分析了实施MBO的权益替代效应,并提出了我国进行MBO的基本框架。     

国有控股上市公司MBO的绩效变动成因分析

本文以16家国有控股上市公司为样本，研究MBO对公司绩效的影响。研究发现，MBO对经营性现金流产生了积极的正向作用，但对其余财务指标的影响并不显著。本文认为，导致MBO对公司绩效影响不显著的主要原因是，资本市场基础性制度缺陷诱使管理层追求“制度性套利空间”的动因强化，MB0部分收购模式的固有缺陷引发管理层“内部人控制”问题恶化，以及MBO制度约束导致管理层行为扭曲。     

Managerial incentives for discretionary disclosure: evidence from management leveraged buyouts

Managers in management leveraged buyout (MBO) firms prefer to purchase their firms at a low offer price. This motive gives them a clear incentive to make pessimistic discretionary disclosures. Using a sample of press releases, I find that managers involved in their firms’ MBO selectively release negative disclosures to denigrate their firm just before the MBO transaction when compared with prior period: they issue more bad news disclosures and more pessimistic quotes. Additionally, they issue less optimistic quotes, fewer good news disclosures, less positive earnings forecasts, and they manage earnings downwards. I control for factors that may not be caused by managers’ purchase motives by comparing the MBO sample with a third-party leveraged buyout sample where management is not involved in the buyout and with a performance-matched control sample. I find that the disclosure of MBO firms becomes significantly more pessimistic than the leveraged buyout firms where management is not involved in the transaction and significantly more pessimistic than the performance-matched control sample.     

我国上市公司管理层收购财务绩效的实证研究

管理层收购(MBO)是优化公司治理结构、降低代理成本、充分发挥企业家才能,从而提高公司财务绩效的有效途径。本文以我国深、沪两市中具有代表性的24家上市公司为样本,采用合成数据(Panel Date)截面回归的计量模型,对我国上市公司MBO的财务绩效问题进行了实证研究,结果表明:(1)在比较低的管理层持股比例下,MBO并未提高我国上市公司的财务绩效,且管理层持股比例与公司财务绩效成反向关系;(2)管理层收购前后,公司每股净资产均呈向上的凸性;每股收益随着管理层持股比例的扩大而呈递减趋势。     

Loan Covenants and Relationship Banking in MBOs

This paper examines the role of accounting-based covenants and other sources of information in signalling financial distress in UK MBOs. Using an in-depth questionnaire and follow-up interviews to investigate the perceptions of senior UK MBO lenders, we find that: MBO loan agreements contain more covenants than general corporate lending agreements; monthly management accounts and telephone communication are more frequent first indicators of distress than are accounting-based covenant breaches; lenders with specialist MBO lending units are more likely to waive covenant breaches and less likely to recall loans in default than those without such units; syndicate members find both information flows prior to breach and subsequent action taken to be less effective than do syndicate leaders or sole lenders; and the presence of a specialist MBO lending unit provides the skills and reputation needed to establish a high degree of trust between the banks on the one hand and the MBOs and the equity houses on the other, but there is wide variety in the ways that banks manage these relationships. These findings confirm the expectation that the relatively more acute adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in MBO lending increase the demand for monitoring via covenants, and that the closer the lender/borrower relationship, the more effective the monitoring.