Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets

Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.     

Competition with Aftermarket Power When Consumers Are Heterogeneous

We study a model of competitive foremarkets and partly monopolized aftermarkets. We show that high aftermarket power prompts firms to engage in inefficiently aggressive below‐cost pricing in the foremarket. This inefficiency is driven by the presence of consumers with valuations below marginal cost. While for intermediate aftermarket power their presence leads to a competition‐softening effect, for high aftermarket power firms attract increasing numbers of unprofitable consumers by aggressively pricing below cost. For high aftermarket power, firms' equilibrium profits can therefore be decreasing in aftermarket power but are always higher than for low aftermarket power. If firms engage in price discrimination by bundling the foremarket and aftermarket goods or by reducing their aftermarket power, they avoid selling to unprofitable consumers but also reduce the competition‐softening effect. This decreases firms' equilibrium profits but increases consumer and social welfare.     

Pricing strategy in the product and service market

Existing studies have mainly focused on pricing in either primary markets or aftermarkets. However, in practice, prices in primary markets and aftermarkets are closely correlated. This study examines the joint pricing strategy in both primary markets and aftermarkets based on customer utility and establishes a pricing model for profit-maximization firms. Our results show that overpricing in the aftermarket is caused by customer myopia, while the motivation of the firm to avoid customer myopia depends on its pricing strategy. A quantity–price contract in the aftermarket is designed to raise the firm’s profit.     

When Does Aftermarket Monopolization Soften Foremarket Competition?

This paper investigates firms' abilities to tacitly collude when they each monopolize a proprietary aftermarket. When firms' aftermarkets are completely isolated from foremarket competition, they cannot tacitly collude more easily than single‐product firms. However, when their aftermarket power is contested by foremarket competition as equipment owners view new equipment as a substitute for their incumbent firm's aftermarket product, profitable tacit collusion is sustainable among a larger number of firms. Conditions under which introduction of aftermarket competition hinders firms' ability to tacitly collude are characterized.     

Competition in long-distance and telecommunications equipment markets: Effects of the MFJ

The Modification of Final Judgement (MJF) is now 10 years old. The MFJ was a historic change in US antitrust policy and in telecommunications policy. Pre-divestiture AT&T was divided into a single company, AT&T, which was allowed to compete in long-distance markets, telecommunications equipment markets and (with some delay) information service markets. Seven regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) were permitted to provide local service and nearby long-distance service. However, the BOCs were not permitted to enter the three markets reserved for AT&T. In 1991 the Information Services restriction was eliminated for the BOCs. However, the ban on provision of (interLATA) long distance and equipment remains. The policy experiment was quite interesting since no other nation has followed the USA, despite numerous other countries ending the formerly monopoly status of their telecommunications provider. In this paper I evaluate how competitive the remaining markets reserved for AT&T, and from which the BOCS are banned, have become. I conclude that (interLATA) long-distance market for residential and small business users, by far the largest fraction of users of long distance is currently uncompetitive. AT&Ts prices are constrained by FCC regulation, not by competition. AT&T has market power and is exercising market power. For equipment markets, I find a good deal more competition. However, I conclude that the BOCs could not impede competition in long distance and that removal of the MFJ restrictions would be pro-competitive. Thus, I conclude that removal of the MFJ estrictions on the BOCs would be pro-competitive, would increase economic efficiency, and would improve consumer welfare.     

National pricing with local quality competition

We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices.     

The Role of State‐Owned Enterprises in an Artificial Monopoly Market: The Case of Turkey

State‐owned enterprises (SOEs) benefit from many privileges based on their unique structure, their substantial capital, and their position in the economic system. Like all business corporations, they have no fixed duration, which makes them effectively immortal. In addition, they are adjuncts of the state, which enables them to survive in noncompetitive markets with little effort. Therefore, under today's ruthless global market conditions, SOEs engage in unfair competition with privately financed businesses. By relying on their identity as state operations, they do not follow the rules of the market—they define those rules. In addition to SOEs, which are direct arms of the state, some privately financed businesses dominate markets in which the state allows them to develop an artificial monopoly and thus increase their power day by day. These artificial monopolies distort market processes and create conditions that frequently give rise to corruption. This study examines the problems associated with monopolies, with a special emphasis on establishing more efficient market structures for SOEs in Turkey. The original mission of SOEs was to balance markets through regulation and to be transparent and accountable to the public. Simply striving to meet those criteria would go a long way toward preventing the abuse of power and unfair competition. In addition, SOEs and artificial monopoly markets distort public institutions by promoting rent‐seeking behavior that corrupts politics and blocks innovation from potential competitors. Privatization has been employed by international financial institutions in recent decades, but it has mostly transferred monopolies from the public sector to private owners, which has made the problem worse and done little to enhance competition. Establishing genuinely competitive economies will require a new political culture around the world.     

On how size and composition of customer bases affect equilibrium in a duopoly with switching costs

Switching costs may facilitate monopoly pricing in a market with price competition between two suppliers of a homogenous good, provided the switching cost is above some critical level. It is also well known that asymmetric size of customer bases makes monopoly pricing more difficult. Adding consumer heterogeneity to the model we demonstrate that also composition of each firms customer base affects pricing, and this composition may aggravate or ease the incentives to break out of the monopoly pricing equilibrium.Received: 16 August 2001, Accepted: 27 September 2004, JEL Classification: D43, L10, L13This research has been sponsored by Telenor, through the Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration. We thank participants at the 2002 EARIE conference in Madrid, Matthew Jackson and an anonymous referee for helpful and constructive comments to an earlier version. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Rebates in a Bertrand game

We study a price competition game in which customers are heterogeneous in the rebates they get from either of two firms. We characterize the transition between competitive pricing (without rebates), mixed strategy equilibrium (for intermediate rebates), and monopoly pricing (for larger rebates).     

我国审计市场类型分析及其启示

从市场中的“厂商”、“产品”、价格等要素来看,我国目前的审计市场显示为完全竞争市场。而根据福利经济学、信息经济学等对审计市场的分析,寡头垄断市场类型更适合理性的审计市场。结合国际上审计行业发展经验,本文认为,我国的审计市场类型将经历从完全竞争市场到寡头垄断市场的转变过程。在此基础上对市场类型转变过程中政府应给予的政策支持进行了探讨。     

The impact on the pricing process of costly active management and performance chasing clients

One of the necessary features of markets to produce efficient pricing is competition between information-based investors who quickly impound new information into price. However, a significant proportion of funds invested in today’s equity markets are in the hands of managers who pursue a style that utilises little or none of the available information. We simulate such a market where the funds are being managed using the following three investment styles: fundamental, momentum and index. We confirm that the major pricing anomalies that have been highlighted previously in the literature are a natural consequence of competition between managers utilising these three investment styles. More importantly, we show that this situation is unlikely to change as long as markets continue to be dominated by costly active managers with clients who pursue outperformance.     

Asset pricing for inefficient markets: Evidence from China and India

Over last four decades, evidence of market inefficiencies has been widely documented by several scholars for all major stock markets in the globe. Chinese and Indian markets are not exempt. Inefficiencies in these markets are described by many authors as roots of all mispricing. Mispricing might be the outcome of application of familiar asset pricing models which may mislead an investor into adopting inappropriate policies for his new investments or for reallocating his old investments. In an alternative approach, we propose a transformation on original market returns in the objective of relaxing the strong assumption of market efficiency behind application of an asset pricing model. This modification will widen the scope of rational models on asset pricing ranging from an efficient to an inefficient market.     

Horizontally Differentiated Market Makers

I analyze a model of competition between two market makers who are located at the opposite ends of the Hotelling line, both of which are also occupied by a search market. Buyers and sellers are uniformly distributed between the two market places, yet can only trade at one of them. In equilibrium, market makers net a positive profit and trade with buyers and sellers close to them, while buyers and sellers further away participate in search markets. Interestingly, a duopolistic market maker nets a larger profit than a monopoly because search markets make the quantities market makers trade strategic complements.     

Strategic Incentives for Keeping One Set of Books in International Transfer Pricing

We study the equilibrium accounting and transfer pricing policies in a multinational duopoly with price competition in the final product market. We find that the firms in a duopoly can benefit from strategically using the same transfer price for tax and managerial purposes instead of using separate transfer prices for both objectives. According to our results, the practice of one set of books should be the prevalent accounting method in markets with a small number of competitors and similar products.     

Hassle Costs: The Achilles' Heel of Price-Matching Guarantees*

We show that price-matching guarantees can facilitate monopoly pricing only if firms automatically match prices. If consumers must instead request refunds (thereby incurring hassle costs), we find that any increase in equilibrium prices due to firms' price-matching policies will be small; often, no price increase can be supported. In symmetric markets price-matching guarantees cannot support any rise in prices, even if hassle costs are arbitrarily small In asymmetric markets, higher prices can be supported, but the prices fall well short of maximizing joint profits. Our model can explain why some firms adopt price-matching guarantees while others do not.     

高科技产业结构调整中的政府资金资助模式研究:以上海高新区为例

中国高新区地方政府主导的政府创新资金,过度强化了地区竞争,弱化了市场优胜劣汰机制,导致了各地高新区产业严重趋同和产业集聚规模非有效,以致资本市场和市场中介无效率,不利于产业升级和产业结构调整。因此有必要转变政府创新资金的运作模式,打破政府创新资金的区域垄断和发挥国家产业政策的引导作用,从而有利于加快产业结构调整和推动产业结构按市场规律演进升级。     

Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision

Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments. We assume that there are a finite number of potential input suppliers with private information about their costs. We first show that a monopoly buyer of such inputs will often prefer to own the seller's assets even though it would be more efficient for the seller's assets not to be so owned. We then show that an increase in the number of potential partners on either side of the market reduces this inclination towards vertical integration. With perfect competition on either side of the market, the make-buy decision will reflect only efficiency considerations.     

双边平台型信息产品企业版本划分策略研究

新兴的信息产品市场大多是双边市场,其中企业进行竞争时如何利用信息产品特性和市场双边特性,对产品质量和双边定价进行决策,运用纵向差异化策略达到最优收益,是双边平台型信息产品企业面对的重要问题。结合双边市场理论与版本划分理论,建立博弈模型,分析双边信息产品市场内平台型企业竞争的最优双边定价和产品版本划分的具体质量。结果显示:企业产品定价受产品组合质量差异的影响,对卖家定价由市场情况决定;企业提高付费产品质量可以提高收益,此时免费产品质量应根据市场双边特性强度进行调整;市场双边特性显著时企业免费产品质量应降低以提高收益,反之亦然;企业产品质量决策保证了双边规模和上游收益,下游收益则受市场双边特性强弱影响,市场双边特性显著时,平台付费产品价格和付费消费者规模提高,下游收益和总收益提高。     

Information markets, product markets and vertical merger

In many markets, firms have the option of advertising at price comparison sites to broaden their market reach. Such sites are often controlled by profit-maximizing “information gatekeepers” charging advertising fees. This paper considers vertical merger between such a monopoly information gatekeeper and a firm in the product market. We find that: (i) If the integrated firm can act as a price leader before independent firms make advertising and pricing decisions, then the merger is profitable. (ii) If the integrated firm cannot move first, then the merger is unprofitable, or divestiture is optimal in the case where the firm has already created the gatekeeper. As a result, the merged entity has an incentive to invest in technologies to support a price leader.     

Chain-Store Pricing Across Local Markets

Chain‐stores now dominate most areas of retailing. While retailers may operate nationally or even internationally, the markets they compete in are largely local. How should they best operate pricing policy in respect of the different markets served—price uniformly across the local markets or on a local basis according to market conditions? We model this by allowing local market differences, with retail markets differing by their size and the number of players present. We show that practising price discrimination is not always best for a chain‐store. Competitive conditions exist under which uniform pricing can raise profits.