试论我国地方政府债务及其风险控制

地方政府债务是指地方政府承担的,所有需要其在将来运用资产或其它经济资源偿还的义务。它具有以下几个特点:首先,地方政府债务是一种综合性的债务。它可能由多种因素诱发产生,或由其它形式的债务(例如金融债务)转化而来。其次,地方政府债务具有较大的隐蔽性。某些形式的地方政府债务并不直接表现在政府资产负债表上,可能直到需要偿还时才会最终暴露出来。第三,作为最终需要地方财政偿还的债务,地方政府债务一般由地方财政实施控制。     

财政分权、土地财政与地方政府债务

在保持宏观杠杆率基本稳定的政策背景下,防范化解地方政府隐性债务风险成为我国预算管理制度改革的重点。文章基于我国2013—2019年省级面板数据,研究财政分权、土地财政与地方政府债务的关系。结果表明：地方政府越多地通过出让土地资源获得土地财政收入,就会越少地将土地资源抵押或质押,从而削弱了隐性债务的扩张,土地财政与隐性债务呈现相互替代的作用。财政分权程度越高,财政压力就越大,地方政府就越需要通过其他方式获得资金来源,从而推动了隐性债务的扩张。进一步研究发现,财政分权程度的上升,会削弱地方政府的债务偿还能力,促使地方政府以土地作为偿还地方债务的保证,削弱土地财政与地方债务的替代效应。结论丰富了财政分权、土地财政与地方政府债务影响效应的研究,为控制地方政府债务,尤其是控制地方政府隐性债务提供对策建议。     

我国地方政府债务风险防控分析

政府债务问题已经引起了社会各界的重点关注,党的十八届三中全会通过的《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》指出了建立规范合理的中央和地方政府债务管理及风险预警机制。2014年经济工作将着力防控政府债务风险作为六项主要工作任务之一,这充分体现了党中央对政府债务问题的重视。如何有效的化解和防控中国地方政府债务存在的系列风险,已经成为中国财政理论和实践中急需解决的问题。从财政及经济理论的角度挖掘中国地方政府债务问题存在的深层次原因,以现代财政理论为指导,为中国建立可持续发展的地方政府债务风险管理提出政策建议。     

地方政府债务成因分析及解决办法

当前由于受多种因素的影响,我国地方政府债务规模急速膨胀,债务风险凸显。庞大的地方政府债务已严重影响了本级财政的运转,成为影响经济社会稳定和发展的因素,引起了各方的关注。本文通过对地方政府债务形成原因的分析,探究了地方政府债务对地方财政运行的客观影响,在此基础上提出了化解地方政府债务和促进地方财政发展的措施。     

攀枝花市地方政府债务管理研究

本文以攀枝花市地方政府债务为研究对象,使用国际通用的几个主要债务指标来衡量攀枝花市政府债务风险,得出其债务风险值得引起高度重视的结论.针对攀枝花市政府债务管理中存在的问题,本文提出化解攀枝花市政府债务风险的具体建议,并从六个方面强化债务管理:公开年度政府债务报告;成立地方政府债务管理委员会;大力培植地方财源;深化财政体制改革;调整地方债务结构;强化同级人大监督.     

建立监控预警系统防范政府债务风险

一、债务风险预警系统的基本功能 地方政府债务监控预警系统是以地方政府的财政及债务信息化为基础,对地方政府财政在地方经济运行活动中的潜在风险进行全面实时监控,及时了解评估真实的财政风险状况的综合分析系统。地方政府债务监控预警系统必须具有以下功能:     

中国地方政府债务现状与改革出路

由于金融体系缺乏硬预算约束、财政体制的不完善、缺乏政府债务风险预警和控制机制、政府债务动态变化的“内牵制”和政府间财政竞争等原因,中国地方政府的债务有失控的危险。本文认为应以立法形式限制地方政府债务规模,从理顺政府与市场之间的关系、理顺中央政府与地方政府的关系、建立债务风险预警机制、努力构建政府债务管理的良性循环机制、培植地方财源等方面来化解地方政府债务。     

地方政府债务风险来源分析与化解对策

财政分权、地方政府官员行为、公共支出结构、基础设施建设和地方政府债务的关联影响是重要的学术研究问题.本文在对地方政府债务问题进行研究,从经济、体制和政治三个层面分析总结地方政府债务的风险来源,提出化解地方政府债务风险的对策建议.     

地方政府债务风险的预警评价与控制

地方政府债务风险是政府债务风险的重要组成部分,是地方财政风险的集中表现,地方债务风险已经成为威胁我国经济安全与社会稳定的重要因素。我国地方政府债务风险管理中存在财政预算权限划分不清、融资责任主体不明确、缺乏债务管理统一规划、缺乏债务风险预警和监控机制等问题。构建地方政府债务风险预警的模糊评价指标体系和评价方法,以期达到防范和化解地方政府债务风险的目的     

地方政府综合负债率上限及债务可持续性研究——以重庆市为例

地方政府隐性债务规模大、范围广、边界模糊,且许多相关数据并未公开,估算难度大。近年来,隐性债务规模越来越大,仅仅依靠显性负债率不能有效地显示出重庆市地方政府负债的水平。想要准确估计出重庆市地方政府负债水平,需要计算出隐性债务的规模,再计算出综合负债率。通过总结地方政府隐性债务的类型,评估地方政府隐性债务的规模,进而计算重庆市地方政府的综合负债率,可以直观地反映重庆市债务的水平。利用基于非线性财政反应函数的地方财政可持续性模型,得出重庆市综合负债率上限即“警戒线”,然后用当前综合负债率与综合负债率上限作比较,能够看出重庆市的综合负债率是否已经超过了警戒线,或者接近警戒线,如果超过或者接近警戒线,那么即面临债务风险,旨在通过测算重庆市目前的综合负债率上限来分析重庆市债务的可持续性。     

Mispricing of Risk in Sovereign Bond Markets with Asymmetric Information

The likelihood that a government will repay its sovereign debt depends both on the amount of debt it issues and on the government's future ability to repay. Whilst the former is publicly observable, the government may have more information about the latter than investors. This paper shows that this asymmetric information problem impairs the market's ability to differentiate economies according to their fiscal sustainability, and can lead to a disconnect between bond prices and default risk. The model can help rationalise the behaviour of Eurozone bond prices prior to the recent European sovereign debt crisis.     

How big is the Chinese Government debt?

China’s public debt does not provide a meaningful guidance about the government’s overall debt burden, since it also has various forms of contingent liabilities such as shortfalls in the pension fund, debts of local government investment vehicles, and nonperforming loans of the state-owned commercial banks. However, there is no authoritative data on the government’s overall debt burden. In this paper, we try to put together a complete picture by piecing together information available, following a consistent framework. Our results suggest that the Chinese Government’s total debt could be already above 100% of GDP, in contrast to the public debt/GDP ratio of 15.5. Urgent reforms are needed in order to reduce fiscal risks, although risks of debt crisis look small in the short term, given sound balance sheet of the public sector. Local governments’ borrowing without hard budget constraint presents the greatest risk to sustainability of China’s fiscal system.     

Is the Sky the Limit? Can Japanese Government Bonds Continue to Defy Gravity?

This paper presents a simulation model based on the growth rate, the inflation rate, and the consumption tax rate in the future. Future tax revenues and fiscal expenditures are projected using regression models estimated from past data. The fiscal situation is called unsustainable if the outstanding amount of Japanese government bonds (JGBs) becomes higher than the level of private sector financial assets. We focus on the general account of the central government, which is the source of JGB issues. We find that the higher the economic growth, the more likely it is that the fiscal situation is sustainable. When a larger portion of interest income is reinvested in JGBs, the chance is higher that the fiscal situation is sustainable. Most importantly, raising the consumption tax to 20% guarantees fiscal sustainability in most cases. Our analysis shows that without a consumption tax hike beyond the 10% rate, a fiscal crisis will be almost a certainty, even with a real economic growth rate of 2% despite a shrinking labor force. A reasonably quick hike of the consumption tax, namely a hike by 1% a year, up to 20%, combined with high or moderate economic growth rates, seems to keep the economy out of a fiscal crisis, where a moderate growth rate is defined to be generated by a productivity increase per working‐age population of 1.9%, which was the average during the Koizumi years.     

Comparative analyses of fiscal sustainability of the budgetary policy rules

We construct a continuous-time overlapping generations model with an endogenous growth structure and consider fiscal sustainability under two fiscal rules: (i) the government fixes the budget deficit-to-GDP ratio and (ii) the government fixes the primary balance-to-GDP ratio. Under the constant budget deficit-to-GDP rule, fiscal sustainability is ensured when the initial public debt-to-GDP and budget deficit-to-GDP ratios are sufficiently small. Under the constant primary balance-to-GDP rule, it is difficult to ensure fiscal sustainability when the primary balance is in deficit or zero. However, fiscal sustainability is ensured when the primary balance is in surplus and the initial government debt-to-GDP ratio is sufficiently small.     

量化宽松、财政赤字与美元资产安全

次贷危机爆发以来,美国采取了一系列货币和财政政策以拯救深陷泥潭的本国经济。美联储运用非常规政策工具向金融体系注入大量流动性资产,美联邦政府也大幅度提高了财政支出,使得财政赤字愈加恶化。在此背景下,美元资产的安全性成为投资者关注的焦点。本文分别从货币政策效果、财政赤字的可持续性以及投资主体等方面考察了美元资产的安全性,分析了美国宏观经济政策的实际作用,并从投资主体结构探讨了美国联邦政府的经济取向,最后以所涉及资产的市场表现回应美元资产安全问题。笔者认为,与其它货币资产相比,持有美元资产并不会承担额外的币种风险。     

Fiscal adjustment and the costs of public debt service: evidence from OECD countries

We use a panel of 21 OECD countries from 1970 to 2009 to investigate the effects of different fiscal adjustment strategies on long-term interest rates – a key fiscal indicator reflecting the costs of government debt service. As Europe’s sovereign debt crisis has shown, governments confronted with high deficits and rising debt may be forced to enact fiscal adjustments in order to avoid increasing market pressure and solvency problems. Over the last four decades, such measures taken by governments in OECD countries have varied in duration, size, composition and in their success to re-establish fiscal sustainability. We find that large and expenditure-based adjustments lead to substantially lower long-term interest rates. Small and revenue-based measures do not have an effect on interest rates. Financial markets thus only seem to value strict and decisive measures – a clear sign that the government’s pledge to cut the deficit is credible.     

基于可流动性资产负债表的我国政府债务风险研究

政府资产是政府债务顺利偿还的基础,当政府资产低于其负债时,政府债务将面临一定风险,因此基于政府资产负债的视角,本文结合中国实际首先编制了一个简化的政府"可流动性资产"负债表,然后,分析了1998—2008年我国政府仅考虑直接债务时的政府债务风险,并且对2009—2010年的政府债务风险进行了分析。研究表明,2003—2006年因外汇储备急剧增长使我国政府债务风险总体较小且比较稳定,但因金融危机的爆发,我国政府债务风险在此期间前后的两次金融危机中都比较大,金融危机对政府债务风险的影响显著。研究还表明,积极的财政政策对短期降低政府债务风险具有明显效果,且1997年亚洲金融危机和2007年美国次贷危机对我国政府债务风险的影响具有相似性,即金融危机爆发后的几年内政府债务风险会因积极的财政政策而经历"大—小—大"的变化过程。最后,通过引入政府或有债务,分析了具有或有债务时的政府债务风险。本文认为,只要我国政府的或有债务规模不超过24万亿元人民币,则我国的政府债务风险较小。     

How do experts forecast sovereign spreads?

This paper assesses how forecasting experts form their expectations about future government bond spreads. Using monthly survey forecasts for France, Italy and the United Kingdom between January 1993 and October 2014, we test whether respondents consider the expected evolution of the fiscal balance—and other economic fundamentals—to be significant drivers of the expected bond yield differential over a benchmark German 10-year bond. Our main result is that a projected improvement of the fiscal outlook significantly reduces expected sovereign spreads. This suggests that credible fiscal plans affect market experts’ expectations and reduce the pressure on sovereign bond markets. In addition, we show that expected fundamentals generally play a more important role in explaining forecasted spreads compared to realized spreads.     

我国地方政府自行发债的理论及管理方式探讨

地方政府自行发债具备其理论基础,随着社会经济的发展,我国也逐步具备了自行发债的条件。中央决定开展地方政府自行发债试点,对于化解地方政府债务危机和完善我国的财税体制都具有重要意义。然而,这其中也存在一些潜在问题,比如监督机制不完善、隐性债务规模巨大等。合理确定地方债的发债规模,科学编制地方债的使用计划以及完善地方债的信息披露与监督机制,将有利于构建我国良好的地方债管理体制。     

Investment scaling up and the role of government

This article studies the fiscal and welfare implications of a scaling up of public investment when the government is subject to inefficiencies on the spending and on the tax collection side. In our simulations, the scaling up of public investments results in higher long-run output and consumption levels but requires a fiscal stabilization package in order to preserve fiscal sustainability. The effects on consumers’ welfare after the fiscal adjustment are nontrivial. Our welfare analysis shows that consumers’ welfare is increased when the government smooths the fiscal adjustment via higher borrowing and not through an increase in taxation. Moreover, the comparison between several stabilization packages via tax adjustment shows that higher welfare is achieved when the government relies mostly on taxation of capital as this allows higher levels of consumption. Lower fiscal costs that do not undermine fiscal sustainability can however be achieved if the government manages to reduce inefficiency in tax collection. Finally, we consider a change in the trade regime that causes a decline in revenues. We find that the higher fiscal burden required to preserve fiscal sustainability would completely wipe out the welfare gain of higher public investments.