Emergence versus neoclassical reductions in economics

ABSTRACT

Many epistemic anomalies of the neoclassical research programme originate from its ontologically reductionist meta-axioms, which predicate how economic macro-systems are constituted from their micro-entities and how the latter behave – namely atomistic aggregativity, normative equilibration and global instrumental rationality. This paper explores the metaphysical foundations of the premise of emergence and argues that it can be a remedy to the ills of neoclassical reductions, and a foundational epistemic principle in a progressive systemic research programme in economics, which would bridge existing streams of ‘heterodox’ economic theory.     

Are Optimal CO2 Emissions Really Optimal?

Although the greenhouse effect is by many considered as one of the most serious environmental problems, several economic studies of the greenhouse effect, most notably Nordhaus's DICE model, suggest that it is optimal to allow the emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) to increase by a factor of three over the next century. Other studies have found that substantial reductions can be justified on economic grounds. This paper explores into the reasons for these differences and identifies four (partly overlapping) crucial issues that have to be dealt with when analysing the economics of the greenhouse effect: low-probability but catastrophic events; cost evaluation methods; the choice of discount rate; the choice of decision criterion. The paper shows that (i) these aspects are crucial for the policy conclusions drawn from models of the economics of climate change, and that (ii) ethical choices have to be made for each of these issues. This fact needs wider recognition since economics is very often perceived as a value neutral tool that can be used to provide policy makers with “optimal” policies.     

Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs

The hard core of conventional economics consists of a set of four main premises regarding the economy. Simply put they are the law of nature, the individual, certainty, and contracts. Juxtapositioned to these four premises of conventional economics, there are four from personalist economics: institutions, the person, uncertainty and status. In sharp constrast with the overwhelming majority of our contemporaries in economics whose views on economic affairs are grounded in individualism, we think about economic affairs in a market system in terms of personalism. Personalist economics is human economics because it puts the human person at the center of economic affairs. Here our presentation focuses on three central economic activities: consumption, work and leisure. In addressing these activities we emphasize that (1) human persons are materialized spirits and (2) human nature is two dimensional — individual and social. In our remarks we rely heavily on Emmanuel Mounier and John Paul II. Mayo Research Institute In the field of scientific research, a positivistic mentality took hold which not only abandoned the Christian vision of the world, but more especially rejected every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision. It follows that certain scientists, lacking any ethical point of reference, are in danger of putting at the centre of their concerns something other than the human person and the entirety of the person's life. Further still, some of these, sensing the opportunities of technological progress, seem to succumb not only to a market-based logic, but also to the temptation of a quasi-divine power over nature and even over the human being [John Paul II, 1998, sect. 46].     

Homo Economicus,AIs, humans and rats: decision-making and economic welfare

ABSTRACT

Critics of economics often highlight two related issues: the empirical falsity of the ‘homo economicus’ assumption of rational, self-interested maximisation; and the ethical consequences of models based on this assumption. Yet many experiments in biology show non-human creatures often seem to behave as if they were rational maximisers, suggesting that context rather than cognitive capacity is important for determining behaviour. The critique of rational choice poses a less serious methodological challenge to economics than is sometimes thought. However, economists do need to respond to the ethical critique that decisions and policies based on the assumption of rational self-interested maximisation change the norms of individual behaviour for the worse. This paper argues that economics has become divorced from ethics because for a century it has dealt only with ordinal, not cardinal, welfare rankings and has thus ruled out interpersonal comparisons. While enabling economists to separate normative from positive analysis, this separation protocol has left welfare economics both internally contradictory and unable to address major societal decisions, even though welfare economics is used constantly in limited ways, such as cost-benefit analysis. This separation reflects empirically inaccurate assumptions concerning preference formation and the conditions of supply and demand (but not the rational choice assumption) in the foundational welfare economic theorems. Economics must urgently revisit welfare economics, particularly in the context of modern economies in which individuals are increasingly interdependent, and the assumptions required for the fundamental welfare theorems therefore increasingly invalid.     

The Economics and Ethics of Minimum Wage Legislation

Recent empirical studies have led the economics profession to question the proposition that minimum wage legislation necessarily leads to greater unemployment. This paper extends the analysis of these studies by providing several theoretical reasons why these empirical results may reflect a larger truth. Moreover, it addresses a relatively neglected aspect of the minimum wage debate - its ethical dimensions. Specifically, do the elementary principles of economic justice mandate that employees who “play by the rules”, should earn a “living wage”? This paper argues that the minimum wage is a successful economic policy that is consistent with economic justice.     

Using Field Experiments to Change the Template of How We Teach Economics

In this article, the author explains why field experiments can improve what we teach and how we teach economics. Economists no longer operate as passive observers of economic phenomena. Instead, they participate actively in the research process by collecting data from field experiments to investigate the economics of everyday life. This change can be shown to students by presenting them with evidence from field experiments. Field experiments related to factor markets, behavioral economics, and discrimination are presented to explain how this approach works across different economic content. The three questions that are highlighted are the following: (1) Why do women get paid less than men in labor markets? (2) How can we use behavioral economics to motivate teachers? (3) What seven words can end third-degree price discrimination?     

What are the ethics of welfare economics? And,are welfare economists utilitarians?

Four questions: (1) What is welfare economics? (2) Is it an ethical system?  (3) How do welfare economists differ from one another? And (4), how do they differ from other economic ethicists? Then utilitarianism is discussed. I was taught, and have inferred to others, that welfare economists are utilitarians. They are not. Welfare economics is an atypical form of welfare consequentialism: consequentialist in that whether an act or policy is right or wrong is a function of only its consequences—the adjective “welfare” because the only consequences that matter are the welfare (well-faring) consequences. Most welfare consequentialists are neither welfare economists nor utilitarians. And, most moral philosophers are not welfare consequentialists—neither are most normal folk.     

Instrumentalism and Economic Policy: The Quest for Reasonable Value

Neuroeconomics and behavioral economics (NEBE) is one of the most dynamic fields in contemporary economics. However, from the viewpoint of economic methodology there are still substantial reasons why NEBE is irrelevant for economic theory. This paper argues that they will only become an essential part of economics if they are embedded into a fully-fledged institutional and evolutionary paradigm. I develop a Neo-Veblenian theory of the individual that starts out from the observation that modern brain sciences do not support the notion of the brain to be an integrated and consistent rational decision apparatus. An evolutionary explanation is offered for this, which reinstates Veblen's distinction between adaptation as engineering optima and social selection. Individual identity does only emerge through communication and interaction among brains, in particular via language. The concept of the "extended brain" is proposed, which is applied to define human individuality as a social phenomenon. Thus, the systematic unity of neuroeconomics and institutional economics is established.     

Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice.     

Evolution,complex systems and technological change 1

A particularly weak area of mainstream economics is its theoretical capacity to handle structural economic change. And yet the advent of major new technologies, combined with the growing integration of the international economic system, has placed structural change high on the policy agenda. This paper suggests an alternative theoretical approach. By portraying economic systems as complex open systems it is possible to view their long-term evolution in a more realistic way. However, in order to do this it is also necessary to borrow from other disciplines such as biology, physics and computer science where research of a similar genre has been carried out. The paper explores what this means for our understanding of many of the underlying concepts associated with technological change and ends with a programmatic plea to broaden the disciplinary bounds of economics.     

The Ethics of Intergenerational Distribution: Reply and Response to John E. Roemer

Recent concerns among economists over global climate change have given rise to an uneven literature on intergenerational welfare economics. Environmental & Resource Economics in its March 2011 issue published a paper by the political philosopher John E. Roemer that contains not only errors of interpretation of what others have written, but also misunderstandings of settled matters. I respond and reply to Roemer by re-exploring the foundations of intergenerational welfare economics. I show that ethical pluralism gives rise to a very different framework for thinking about the subject than the one Roemer presents in his paper. Moreover, his dismissal of much of what welfare economists write on such concepts as social discount rates has as its source an utterly narrow view of the contexts in which economic evaluation is undertaken in the contemporary world.     

Pigou on philosophy and religion

Abstract

This article discusses a group of essays on ethical issues written by Pigou between 1900 and 1908. It is argued that they contain the foundations of his economic philosophy. Pigou's research on the meaning and content of the good merged into his definition of welfare, and his interest in religion as a subjective experience resurfaced in the subjective framework of his economics. A methodological pragmatism informed his economics as well as his ethics; moreover, the endorsement of interpersonal comparisons of the good in the ethical texts was consistent with Pigou's adoption of utility comparisons in welfare economics. Pigou's philosophical pessimism was reflected in his analysis of the economic evils of society, eventually leading to his advocacy of governmental intervention to foster economic welfare. The article contends that Pigou's philosophy derived not only from Sidgwick, as commonly believed, but also from G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica.     

Alternative perspectives on connections in economic systems

This paper explores the significance of Potts’s (2000) claim that the key difference between orthodox and heterodox economics lies in the former viewing the economy as a mathematical field in which everything is connected to everything else, and the latter viewing it as a complex system in which only some elements are connected. It focuses on the types of connections in economic systems that different economists have identified and the significance of the degree of connectivity for how economic systems function. Topics explored include separable consumer networks, separable utility functions, checklist-based decision rules, lifestyles, goodwill, the nature of business strategies and evolution.     

Influencing the perception of what and who is important in ecological economics

In a recent article using citation analysis Hoepner et al. (2012) make strong claims to have identified the most influential works, authors, journals and institutions in a hypothetical field they call environmental and ecological economics. This paper shows that their work is biased by its framing, far from the non-subjective approach they claim and highly sensitive to minor data errors. More than this the exercise can be seen as another example of how ecological economics is susceptible to suppression by a dominant mainstream economic perspective which attempts to override, belittle and dismiss a whole range of alternative thought, including that which is heterodox, interdisciplinary, from the natural sciences and based in the non-economic social sciences. Ecological economics is not the same as agricultural, resource or environmental economics, and if it were it would be pointless. Neither can it be understood or treated as a subfield of resource and environmental economics, as done by Hoepner et al. (2012). I argue that the study promotes a limited perspective on social, environmental and economic problems that includes an implicit political and ideological framing. What is most influential, important or high quality in ecological economics is certainly not defined by such work.     

The power of stereotyping and confirmation bias to overwhelm accurate assessment: the case of economics,gender, and risk aversion

Behavioral research has revealed how normal human cognitive processes can tend to lead us astray. But do these affect economic researchers, ourselves? This article explores the consequences of stereotyping and confirmation bias using a sample of published articles from the economics literature on gender and risk aversion. The results demonstrate that the supposedly ‘robust’ claim that ‘women are more risk averse than men’ is far less empirically supported than has been claimed. The questions of how these cognitive biases arise and why they have such power are discussed, and methodological practices that may help to attenuate these biases are outlined.     

Kaldor and Robinson on money and growth

Post-Keynesian theory was developed as an alternative to mainstream neoclassical economics. However, post-Keynesians have not succeeded in getting their message through, partly because of the difficult and controversial economic issues upon which they embarked, partly because they emphasized, both in their monetary and growth analysis, theories that do not radically depart from the mainstream of economics. This paper therefore argues that post-Keynesian economics got off on the wrong foot. Rather than having emphasized the works of Minsky and (the early) Kaldor in money, post-Keynesians should have considered the contributions of Robinson and Kahn. Also, rather than having emphasized the work of Robinson and Harrod on growth, they ought to have given greater emphasis to Kaldor's demand-oriented growth theory. Hence, as a simplification, post-Keynesians should have considered Robinson on money, not Kaldor; and Kaldor on growth, not Robinson.     

Participatory Economic Research: Benefits and Challenges of Incorporating Participatory Research into Social Economics

Participatory action research (PAR) and community-based participatory research (CBPR) involve traditional subjects of research in the co-creation of research design, data collection, and analysis. PAR has been used in the fields of public health, education, and geography. A case study of a local economy CBPR project will be discussed. The increasing use of field and behavioral experiments in economics together with recent critiques of the ethical commitments of economic policy raises important questions about the role of expert knowledge, indigenous knowledge, and the relationships of power and privilege involved in mainstream academic research. The applicability of the PAR method for economics will be investigated in light of the epistemological and ethical commitments of social economics.     

Gender and graduate economics education in the US

Abstract

This paper reports on the findings of a survey of top economics graduate schools as they relate to women and men. The results provide strong evidence that at these top graduate schools, women graduate students are less integrated in their economic disciplines than are male graduate students. In the second part of the paper, this paper relates those findings to alternative theories as to why this is the case. This paper concludes by suggesting that the emphasis on theoretical studies in the current core of the graduate economics program can be seen as a type of hazing process that seems to have a significant cost since many women (and men) with great creative promise are discouraged from continuing in economics and do not benefit nearly as much as they would have from more policy-driven core courses.     

Comparing the economic views of American and South Korean teenagers

Drawing directly upon responses to an economics questionnaire, this study offers a comparative perspective on how 125 American and 106 South Korean teenagers understand, view, and interact with their national economies. The study primarily focuses on responses to three questions. Should teenagers work for their parents without pay? What possessions do teenagers consider of most value? What do the terms "rich" and "poor" mean to teenagers? Analysis of the responses revealed that teenagers in both countries have a complex understanding of economic issues and hold a wide range of opinions on the concept of economic wealth and personal economic responsibility. Significantly, the study suggests that popular perceptions depicting teenagers as singularly materialistic may be misguided. The study also explores the extent to which cultural traits impact how teenagers view and interact with their economies.