Adverse selection, public information, and underpricing in IPOs

This paper generalizes the informational environment of the Rock model to address empirical evidence and conjectures that cannot be addressed within the standard model based on informed and uninformed investors such as underpricing being positively related to market returns observed prior to the IPO, the number of IPOs being positively related to market returns, underpricing being partly predictable based on public information, and the return to uninformed participation being negative overall but positively related to market returns observed prior to the IPO. Finally, the model suggests that a positive relation between market returns and underpricing need not represent an inefficiency in the pricing of IPOs.     

The Benefit of Excluding Institutional Investors from Fixed-Price IPOs: Evidence from Taiwan

A simple way to mitigate the winner's curse in initial public offerings (IPOs) is to reduce the number of informed investors in IPO markets. In Taiwan, institutional investors are not permitted to subscribe to fixed-price IPOs. Excluding institutional investors raises uninformed investors' allocation rates. We show that the winner's curse is still present in Taiwan's fixed-price IPO markets even without the participation of institutional investors, but that IPO underpricing is reduced by at least 4 percent due to alleviating the winner's curse, as institutional investors are excluded from the fixed-price offerings.     

Going-concern initial public offerings

We study the relation between audit reports and the capital-raising activities of small business by studying the role of going-concern (GC) audit opinions in IPOs. After controlling for other effects, we find that the presence of a GC opinion is positively related to whether a stock delists (for deleterious reasons) within two years of IPO. We also find that GC IPOs suffer less first-day underpricing. Based on Rock (1986), this implies that firms with GCs have less ex ante uncertainty in the sense that the information conveyed by a GC helps uninformed investors estimate the dispersion of secondary market values.     

IPO flipping in Australia: cross-sectional explanations

We access electronic share settlement records for each subscriber and aftermarket investor in 419 Australian IPOs to investigate whether initial subscribers flip their allocations, and we relate this flipping behaviour to issuer, shareholder, underwriter and market characteristics. We find that the main determinants are underpricing (consistent with the disposition effect, i.e., a tendency to realise gains before losses), whether the IPO market is “hot” (a proxy for the representativeness heuristic) and ex ante risk characteristics. When flipping is analysed separately for underpriced and overpriced IPOs we find that the most overpriced IPOs are flipped more than the less overpriced ones, a result which contrasts the disposition effect. This result is due to the action of institutional, rather than individual, investors. We also relate flipping activity to the firm's long-run return, and find that the flipping behaviour of large (informed) investors is unrelated to long-run returns, while uninformed investors consistently flip more of the IPOs that have better long-run returns.     

Noise from online discussion forums: Evidence from IPOs in China

In this study, we use initial public offerings (IPOs) in China to investigate how online stock forums influence information asymmetry and IPO valuation. The empirical analysis isolates the underpricing and overvaluation components of initial returns. The number of forum comments, postings, and readings are positively associated with initial returns and the degree of underpricing, implying that forums create noise that exacerbates information asymmetry during IPOs. This effect is amplified by the quiet period regulation, which drives investors to rely on online discussion forums to obtain information. Through sentiment analyses of forum posts and media coverage, we find that the negative effect of online forums is more prominent when bad news prevails. We clarify the role of online stock forums in IPO pricing and information asymmetry by separating underpricing from overvaluation in initial returns.     

机构投资者对IPO定价效率的影响分析

本文通过对沪深两地1996～2006年A股市场IPO样本的研究发现：IPO抑价率与IPO政策变量及机构投资者参与程度显著负相关。机构投资者参与询价和发行配售，对IPO抑价率的降低起到了显著作用，有利于提高市场发行定价效率。总体上看，现阶段中国A股发行市场定价效率仍然偏低。高抑价率的主要原因在于行政管制使股票发行人和承销商的议价能力发挥不足，根本原因还在于发行制度市场化程度不高。     

Narcissistic managers and IPO underpricing

Using hand-collected data on the signature size of managers in Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) from 2007 to 2019 as a proxy for managerial narcissism, we examine how IPOs with narcissistic managers (narcissistic IPOs) affect IPO underpricing. The findings suggest that narcissistic IPOs have higher underpricing than non-narcissistic IPOs. Specifically, we find that on average, a narcissistic IPO exhibits approximately 11.3% higher underpricing than a median IPO firm. Our results are robust to alternative metrics of narcissism and underpricing after controlling for endogeneity. Additional analyses suggest that narcissistic IPOs are more likely to engage in earnings management than non-narcissistic IPOs. The former exhibits excessive risk-taking behavior, gauged by earnings volatility pre-IPO and a higher beta post-IPO. In the cross-sectional analyses, we document that the impact of managerial narcissism on IPO underpricing is more salient for IPOs facing unsophisticated investors, high market sentiment, or poor corporate governance.     

Bookbuidling, Auctions, and the Future of the IPO Process

Auction theorists predict that bookbuilding, long the standard process for selling equity IPOs in the U.S., is about to give way to an Internet‐based IPO auction process that is both more efficient and more fair. The promise of auctions is that, by using an electronic platform that gives all investors the opportunity to bid on IPOs, the underpricing of IPOs and commissions to underwriters will be reduced, leading to an increase in net proceeds to issuers. Largely missing from such arguments, however, is an appreciation of why bookbuilding has dominated U.S. practice (and continues to supplant auctions in IPOs in most countries outside the U.S) and the role of undepricing in the IPO process. Rather than canvassing all investors, bookbuilding involves eliciting expressions of interest from institutional investors, and then allocating shares mainly according to the strength of their professed interest. In contrast to auctions, which allocate shares according to a set of explicit rules, bookbuilding involves a set of implicit “rules” that provide considerable room for judgment by the underwriter. This does not mean that the rules are arbitrary or not well understood by participants, particularly after thousands of IPOs conducted over the better part of two centuries. But to manage the exchange of information between issuers and investors, and the potential conflicts of interest in representing both groups, such rules must be administered by an intermediary with a considerable stake in protecting its reputation for fair dealing. Investment banks that deal with both issuers and the investment community on a regular basis are well positioned to perform this function. The underpricing of IPOs is best viewed not as a transfer of wealth from issuers to favored investors but rather as compensation to the large influential investors that play a major role in the price discovery process. By opening the process to all comers, auctions will discourage these large investors from bidding aggressively because less sophisticated investors will be able to “free ride” on their research and due diligence. To the extent this happens, auctions may suc ceed in reducing underpricing (in fact, they may even lead to over pricing), but they will also reduce the net proceeds for issuers. Nevertheless, recent advances in communications technology and auction theory will undoubtedly reshape current securities underwriting practices. In particular, Internet auctions are likely to replace bookbuilding in debt IPOs and less risky equity issues (say, IPOs of LBOs). But the argument that Bookbuilding will be completely cast aside in favor of largely untested alternatives fails to appreciate a successful institutional response to major market imperfections, some of which can never be wholly eliminated. Especially in the case of risky (first‐time) equity IPOs, there will continue to be an important role for managing the information exchange between issuers and investors that is critical to the IPO process.     

Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry

The U.S. book-building method has become increasingly popular for initial public offerings (IPOs) worldwide over the last decade, whereas sealed-bid IPO auctions have been abandoned in nearly all of the many countries in which they have been tried. I model book building, discriminatory auctions, and uniform price auctions in an environment in which the number of investors and the accuracy of investors’ information are endogenous. Book building lets underwriters manage investor access to shares, allowing them to reduce risk for both issuers and investors and to control spending on information acquisition, thereby limiting either underpricing or aftermarket volatility. Because more control and less risk are beneficial to all issuers, the advantages of book building's allocational flexibility could explain why global patterns of issuer choice are surprisingly consistent. My models also predict that offerings with higher expected underpricing have lower expected aftermarket volatility; that an auction open to large numbers of potential bidders is vulnerable to inaccurate pricing and to fluctuations in the number of bidders; and that both book-built and auctioned IPOs will exhibit partial adjustment to both private and public information.     

Underpricing and long-term performance of IPOs in China

We study the underpricing and long-term performance of A- and B-share initial public offerings (IPOs) issued in China during the 1993–1998 period. The average underpricing for A- and B share IPOs are 178% and 11.6%, respectively. The underpricing of A-share IPOs is positively related to the number of days between the offering and the listing and the number of stock investors in the province from which the IPO comes, and negatively related to the number of shares being issued. None of these characteristics explain the underpricing of B-share IPOs. In the long run, A-share IPOs slightly underperform the size- and/or book/market (B/M)-matched portfolios while B-shares outperform the benchmark portfolios.     

How Much Do REITs Pay for Their IPOs?

Previous studies have documented the reversal in the initial returns of REIT IPOs from overpricing in the 1980s to underpricing in the 1990s. We find that the gross spreads of REIT IPOs decreased significantly in the 1990s. In particular, there is a bimodal clustering for gross spreads at 6.5 and 7.0%. Moreover, in the 1980s around 94% of REIT IPOs had integer offer prices, most of which were priced at either $10 or $20. However, the proportion of integer offer prices decreased to 64% in the 1990s. Higher gross spreads, overpricing, and high frequency of integer offer prices for REIT IPOs in the 1980s are consistent with the marketing hypothesis that in the 1980s REIT IPOs were mainly marketed to less-informed individual investors. Our results explain the dynamic process employed by underwriters in the setting of gross spreads and the pricing of REIT IPOs as a new financial product in response to various structural changes in REITs.     

THE UNDERPRICING OF “SECOND” INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

The underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity represents a well-documented empirical phenomenon. One prominent explanation for this underpricing relies on the uncertainty investors feel about the value of the issuer. In this paper, this asymmetric information hypothesis is tested by examining the underpricing of IPOs of seventy-four firms for which the uncertainty about the value of the firm is likely to be substantially reduced. These firms were once publicly owned, then taken private, and subsequently returned to public ownership. Findings show that the IPOs of these “reverse leveraged buyouts” are significantly less underpriced than typical IPOs. These results support the asymmetric information hypothesis.     

The Pricing of Insurer Demutualization Initial Public Offerings

This article examines the pricing of the initial public offerings (IPOs) that follow insurance company demutualizations. Insurers that convert from mutual to stock form typically cite the need for capital as a key motivation. Given that capital adequacy is a primary regulatory objective for insurers, one would expect that for a given number of shares to be sold, these firms would price their offerings to maximize proceeds. However, the vast literature on IPO pricing suggests various theories as to why it may be in the issuing firm's best interest to underprice its offering. By examining the initial and long‐run stock returns for these conversion IPOs, the existence and degree of underpricing, as characterized by large initial returns, can be determined. It is observed that on average demutualization insurer IPOs post significantly higher first‐day returns than nondemutualization insurer IPOs. These gains would accrue to the initial investors and to those policyholders who receive compensation in the form of shares in the newly created stock insurer. Attractive returns are sustained for both groups of insurers during the first few years after IPO.     

Regulatory underpricing: Determinants of Chinese extreme IPO returns

The Chinese stock market with its unique institutions is rather different from western stock markets. The average underpricing of Chinese IPOs is 247%, the highest of any major world market. We model this extreme underpricing with a supply-demand analytical framework that captures critical institutional features of China's primary market, and then empirically test this model using a sample of 1377 IPOs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges between 1992 and 2004. We find that Chinese IPO underpricing is principally caused by government intervention with IPO pricing regulations and the control of IPO share supplies. Besides the regulatory underpricing, this paper also documents some specific investment risks of IPOs in China's stock market.     

Venture capital‐backed and commitments test entity initial public offerings on the ASX

This paper examines initial returns to venture capital (VC) backed and non‐VC‐backed IPO companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). We find support for the theoretical predictions of Rossetto (2008), by providing empirical evidence that VC‐backed CTE IPOs exhibit greater wealth losses to pre‐IPO investors compared to non‐VC‐backed CTE IPOs during hot issue markets. We also find that greater retained ownership increases IPO underpricing. In the subsample of IPOs with below the median level of retained ownership IPOs, VC‐backed CTE IPOs and VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs have significantly higher levels of underpricing and wealth loss compared to non‐VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs.     

Allocation of shares to foreign and domestic investors: Firm and ownership characteristics in Swedish IPOs

In this article, we analyze underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) and holdings following offerings in Sweden. By exploiting a unique hand-collected data set with information on the ultimate holdings by institutional and individual investors, as well as boards of directors, we find, as most prior studies, that IPOs on average are underpriced. IPOs with low (high) initial return have higher (lower) holdings by individual investors. Institutional investors are, to a greater extent than individual investors, also able to identify underpriced firms.     

Underpricing, Subsequent Equity Offerings, and the Long-Run Performance of Japanese IPOs

Using data on IPOs that are issued in Japan during January 1975–March 1989, we examine the deliberate underpricing and overreaction hypotheses to explain high initial returns at offering dates. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional pattern of the short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The obtained results indicate that the deliberate underpricing theories which we examine are unable to explain the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs. Furthermore, for the average of the IPOs, the empirical results are not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that for a certain minority group of IPOs, the high initial returns occur due to overreactions by investors. We interpret the overall results as indicating that the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs can be attributed to a mixture of both underpricing and investor overreaction. We conjecture that the binding regulations in Japan led to underpricing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

The world cup in football and the US IPO market

We document that US IPOs that take place during a world cup in football (soccer), compared to IPOs before or after, exhibit 9% lower underpricing and 6% lower price adjustment. IPOs during world cups receive less attention from foreign investors and exhibit significantly higher long-run returns. Our results are robust to excluding the IPO bubble period of 1999 and 2000, including only listings during summer months, controlling for overall market sentiment and market conditions, and to using various matched samples of non-world cup IPOs. Firm characteristics of world cup IPOs are indistinguishable from those of non-world cup IPOs, suggesting that selection is not driving the results. Consistent with prior studies showing that world cups affect market sentiment, we show that this extends to US IPOs, where lower sentiment, driven by foreign investors, leads to reduced investor attention and lower valuations.     

Underpricing and aftermarket performance of American depositary receipts (ADR) IPOs

American depositary receipts (ADRs) are negotiable instruments representing foreign company shares traded in US dollars in the US capital market. We present comparative analyses of the pricing and aftermarket performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by ADRs and a matching sample of US firms over the 1990–2001 period. Offered by large, well-known multinationals, ADR IPOs go through a detailed scrutiny, and incur significant costs, during the pre-IPO period to recast financial statements in conformity with SEC rules and the US GAAP. This mitigates the information asymmetry between the IPO firm and investors. We categorize the ADR issuing country as developed or emerging, and our sample includes several cases of privatization of state owned corporations. The analyses indicate that (1) ADR IPOs are significantly less underpriced than comparable US IPOs; (2) IPOs from developed countries are more underpriced; and (3) Privatization IPOs are less underpriced than non-privatizations. The lower underpricing of ADR IPOs persists even after differential IPO attributes, the traditional proxies for information asymmetry and, the unique characteristics associated with ADR IPOs, are accounted for. We conclude that extant literature offers only partial explanation for this puzzling phenomenon.