Subprime Mortgage Defaults and Credit Default Swaps

We offer the first empirical evidence on the adverse effect of credit default swap (CDS) coverage on subprime mortgage defaults. Using a large database of privately securitized mortgages, we find that higher defaults concentrate in mortgage pools with concurrent CDS coverage, and within these pools the loans originated after or shortly before the start of CDS coverage have an even higher delinquency rate. The results are robust across zip code and origination quarter cohorts. Overall, we show that CDS coverage helped drive higher mortgage defaults during the financial crisis.     

Option compensation,risky mortgage lending,and the financial crisis

We examine how option compensation affects banks' risky mortgage origination and sale decisions before the financial crisis in 2008. We find that, in the period immediately before the financial crisis, option compensation has little impact on the riskiness of mortgages originated and is negatively associated with mortgage lenders' propensity to sell risky mortgages. The results are consistent with banks' incentives to maximize revenues from origination and servicing fees while managing risk exposure by adjusting the sale of risky mortgages. For identification, we use bank-year fixed effects and matched loan applications to control for both supply- and demand-side factors of mortgage lending. We find similar results when using the variation in option compensation generated by the implementation of FAS 123R.     

Breakeven Determination of Loan Limits for Reverse Mortgages under Information Asymmetry

Since the loan limit of a reverse mortgage is a major concern for the borrower as well as the lender, this paper attempts to develop an option-based model to evaluate the loan limits of reverse mortgages. Our model can identify several crucial determinants for reverse mortgage loan limits, such as initial housing price, expected housing price growth, house price volatility, mortality distribution, and interest rates. We also pay special attention to the important implication of mortgage lenders’ informational advantage over reverse mortgage borrowers concerning housing market risk. In reverse mortgage markets, the elderly borrowers typically hold far less, relative to the lenders, or no information about the lenders’ underlying mortgage pools. Such information asymmetry leads these two categories of market participants to generate different perspectives on the risk of the collateralized properties, which can be identified to be important in determining the maximum loan amounts of reverse mortgages. We further find that the maximum loan amount of a reverse mortgage decreases in the correlation between the returns on the pooled underlying housing properties but increases with the number of the pooled mortgages.     

Value Creation through Securitization: Evidence from the CMBS Market

Despite recent volatility and constraints in secondary market funding, analysts have ascribed substantial value creation to the securitization of commercial mortgages. Such value creation likely emanates from liquidity enhancements, regulatory arbitrage, price discrimination and risk diversification by pooling and tranching, gains from specialization in origination, servicing, and holding of mortgages, and the like. Indeed, such value creation would be consistent with past accelerated growth in the mortgage- and asset-based securities markets and the sizable profits earned by secondary market intermediaries. In this paper, we estimate the pricing effects of commercial mortgage securitization. We do so by applying loan level data from 1992–2003 to compare the pricing of conduit and portfolio loans held in CMBS structures. In contrast to portfolio loans, which are held for investment by originating institutions, conduit loans are originated for the sole purpose of sale and securitization in the secondary market. If securitization creates value, it should be evidenced in the relative pricing of conduit loans sold into CMBS pools and in a lower cost of capital to loan originators. We estimate a reduced-form model, in which the interest rate spread between commercial mortgages and comparable-maturity treasury securities varies with loan characteristics, capital market conditions, and conduit loan status. Estimation results indicate that securitization of conduit loans leads to an 11 basis points reduction in commercial mortgage interest rates. We assess robustness of results via hazard model tests for omitted variables and originator-specific effects. We further estimate a simultaneous equations model that accounts for the potential endogeneity of mortgage loan terms to the mortgage-treasury rate spread. Results of that analysis suggest a larger 20 basis points reduction in loan pricing among conduit loans sold into CMBS structures.     

Housing-Price Cycles and Prepayment Rates of U.S. Mortgage Pools

Empirical mortgage prepayment models generally have trouble explaining differences in mortgage-prepayment speeds among pools with similar interest rates on the underlying mortgages. In this article, we model some of the sources of termination heterogeneity across mortgage pools, particularly the role of regional variations in housing prices in generating atypical prepayment speeds. Using a sample of Freddie Mac mortgage pools from 1991 to 1998, we compare two classes of empirical models: a rational option-pricing model using a backward-solving pricing algorithm and an empirical hazard model. In both empirical estimation strategies, we find evidence that differences in house-price dynamics across regions are an important source of between-pool heterogeneity. This finding is then shown to be robust to alternative ways of parameterizing pool heterogeneity in mortgage termination models.     

SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET PURCHASE COMMITMENT YIELDS

We provide empirical evidence that quoted secondary market mortgage yields conform to the predictions of option theory. We compare Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac origination yields offered in the secondary market from 1985 to 2003 with the predictions of a two‐state binomial mortgage option valuation model. Our two‐state approach considers a mean‐reverting interest rate process as well as a stochastic housing price. Using predictions from option simulations, we find strong links between market practice and mortgage option prepayment and default factors over time. We also find cross‐sectional differences that are consistent with the institutional structure of the markets.     

What drives mortgage fees in Australia?

We investigate the factors that affect total, ongoing and origination fees of mortgages in Australia during the period 1996 to 2011. We find that banks charge significantly higher total and ongoing fees than mortgage corporations although they require lower origination fees. We also find that fee levels are dependent on loan size, loan‐to‐value ratio and loan features like term of the loan and presence of an offset account. Further, we confirm that lenders trade‐off higher (lower) interest rates with lower (higher) fee levels. Finally, our results show that mortgage fees are significantly affected by market conditions.     

Valuing mortgage loan servicing

We develop an intertemporal model for valuing mortgage loan servicing contracts. The model includes a stochastic short-term interest rate and realized inflation rate which jointly determine the current mortgage coupon rate, the mortgagor's prepayment decision, the servicer's future net cash flows, and the rate at which to discount these future cash flows. Several potential uses of the model for institutions that service mortgages and trade servicing portfolios are illustrated by the application of the model to servicing fixed-rate mortgages and adjustable-rate mortgages. The model also is applicable to regulatory issues and to the servicing of other types of loans.The authors gratefully acknowledge support from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Washington, D.C., the Purdue Research Foundation, West Lafayette, Indiana, and the Richard D. Irwin Foundation, Homewood, Illinois.     

Requiem for a market: an analysis of the rise and fall of a financial futures contract

Futures contracts often include a variety of delivery optionsthat allow participants flexibility in satisfying the contract.These options have the potential to broaden the appeal of thecontact. However, if these options are valuable, they may reducethe hedging effectiveness of the contract. This article analyzesthe GNMA CDR futures contract that appears to have failed becauseof flaws in the contract's design. For the first 6 years followingits introduction, the contract attracted significant and increasingvolume, but, subsequently, the volume declined to almost zero.Over the years during which the volume experienced its mostdramatic decline, the Treasury-bond futures contract provideda better hedge for current coupon GNMA securities than did theGNMA CDR futures contract. And, over this same period, the valueof the quality option embedded in the contract often exceeded5 percent of the futures price and reached a level of 19 percentat one point. We interpret the evidence to indicate that thecontract failed because the delivery options reduced the hedgingeffectiveness of the contract for current coupon mortgage securities.     

A Model of Mortgage Default

In this paper, we solve a dynamic model of households' mortgage decisions incorporating labor income, house price, inflation, and interest rate risk. Using a zero‐profit condition for mortgage lenders, we solve for equilibrium mortgage rates given borrower characteristics and optimal decisions. The model quantifies the effects of adjustable versus fixed mortgage rates, loan‐to‐value ratios, and mortgage affordability measures on mortgage premia and default. Mortgage selection by heterogeneous borrowers helps explain the higher default rates on adjustable‐rate mortgages during the recent U.S. housing downturn, and the variation in mortgage premia with the level of interest rates.     

The Structural Relation Between Mortgage and Market Interest Rates

This paper analyzes the dynamic relationship between primary and secondary mortgage markets and the short-term and long-term market interest rates. Using a series of monthly data on fixed rate mortgage rates and GNMA rates, we explore the dependence and speed of adjustment in these primary and secondary mortgage rates to each other as well as to the long and short-term government rates. The results indicate that residential mortgage rates in general, appear to follow the long-term rate and are not very sensitive to movements in the short-term interest rate.     

The role of prepayment penalties in mortgage loans

We study the effect of mortgage prepayment penalties on borrowers’ prepayments and delinquencies by exploiting a 2007 reform in Italy that reduced penalties on outstanding mortgages and banned penalties on newly-issued mortgages. Using a unique dataset of mortgages issued by a large Italian lender, we provide evidence that: 1) before the reform, mortgages issued to riskier borrowers included larger penalties; 2) higher prepayment penalties decreased borrowers’ prepayments; and 3) higher prepayment penalties did not affect borrowers’ delinquencies. Moreover, we find suggestive evidence that prepayment penalties affected mortgage pricing, as well as prepayments and delinquencies through borrowers’ mortgage selection at origination, most notably for riskier borrowers.     

Bank and Nonbank Lenders and the Commercial Mortgage Market

This paper develops an equilibrium model of the commercial mortgage market that includes the sequence from commitment to origination and allows testing for differences by type of lender. From borrowers, loan demand is based on the income yield, capital gains, and expectations about return distributions. Lenders use prices such as mortgage rates and their distributions, and quantities in underwriting standards. There are separate equilibria in the markets for loan commitments and originations. Bank and nonbank lenders are not restricted to the same lending technology, nor to the weights placed on mortgage rates as opposed to underwriting standards. Empirical results for the United States commercial mortgage market indicate that banks use interest rates in allocating credit while nonbanks rely on underwriting standards, notably the loan-to-value ratio. A consequence is that nonbanks have a clientele incentive towards making low cap rate loans compensated by low loan-to-value ratios.     

Pricing interest rate options in a two-factor Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of the term structure

Solutions are presented for prices on interest rate optionsin a two-factor version of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model of theterm structure. Specific solutions are developed for caps onfloating interest rates and for European options on discountbonds, coupon bonds, coupon bond futures, and Euro-dollar futures.The solutions for the options are expressed as multivariateintegrals, and we show how to reduce the calculations to univariatenumerical integrations, which can be calculated very quickly.The two-factor model provides more flexibility in fitting observedterm structures, and the fixed parameters of the model can beset to capture tie variability of the term structure over time.     

Credit History and the Performance of Prime and Nonprime Mortgages

Although nonprime lending has experienced steady or even explosive growth over the last decade very little is known about the performance characteristics of these mortgages. Using data from national secondary market institutions, this paper estimates a competing risks proportional hazard model, which includes unobserved heterogeneity. The analysis examines the performance of 30-year fixed rate owner occupied home purchase mortgages from February 1995 to the end of 1999 and compares nonprime and prime loan default and prepayment behavior. Nonprime loans are identified by mortgage interest rates that are substantially higher than the prevailing prime rate. Results indicate that nonprime mortgages differ significantly from prime mortgages: they have different risk characteristics at origination; they default at elevated levels; and they respond differently to the incentives to prepay and default. For instance, nonprime mortgages are less responsive to how much the option to call the mortgage or refinance is in the money and this effect is magnified for mortgages with low credit scores. Tests also reveal that default rates are less responsive to homeowner equity when credit scores are included in the specification.     

Fitting the term structure of interest rates for Taiwanese government bonds

The term structure of interest rates provides a basis for pricing fixed-income securities and interest rate derivative securities as well as other capital assets. Unfortunately, the term structure is not always directly observable because most of the substitutes for default-free bonds are not pure discount bonds. We use curve fitting techniques with the observed government coupon bond prices to estimate the term structure. In this paper, the B-spline approximation is used to estimate the Taiwanese Government Bond (TGB) term structure. We apply the B-spline functions to approximate the discount function, spot yield curve, and forward yield curve respectively. Among the three approaches, the discount fitting approach and the spot fitting approach are reasonable and reliable, but the spot fitting approach achieves the most suitable fit. Using this methodology, we can investigate term structure fitting problems, identify coupon effects, and analyze factors which drive term structure fluctuations in the TGB market.     

Housing,mortgage bailout guarantees and the macro economy

What are the macroeconomic and distributional effects of government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (e.g., Fannie Mae)? A model with heterogeneous, infinitely lived households and competitive housing and mortgage markets is constructed to evaluate this question. Households can default on their mortgages via foreclosure. The bailout guarantee is a tax-financed mortgage interest rate subsidy. Eliminating this subsidy leads to a large decline in mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare by 0.5% in consumption equivalent variation, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: it hurts low-income and low-asset households.     

A comprehensive structural model for defaultable fixed-income bonds

An exact valuation formula for defaultable corporate coupon bonds is proved. The model incorporates discrete coupons, bankruptcy costs, taxes and the market risk generated by a stochastic risk-free structure. The aim of this paper is twofold: first, we generalise previous pricing models for corporate bonds; second, we provide a comprehensive formula in order to properly disentangle the contribution of several risk factors to credit spreads.     

A Theoretic Analysis of Extent of Lender Participation in a Participating Mortgage

A participating mortgage is a loan in which a lender accepts a below-market coupon rate in return for a share (participation) in the cash flows generated by income-producing real property. The cash flows provided by participation are classified as contingent interest and are intended to compensate the lender for additional risk exposure as well as the reduction in coupon rate. In this paper, we present a partial equilibrium wealth-maximizing model to estimate the extent of lender participation and an analysis of the factors affecting it. The results of formal comparative statics analysis show that the lender's percentage participation is, in general, positively related to changes in the loan-to-value ratio and threshold cash flows above which participation is payable. Among yet other results, a change in the contracted loan life has an ambiguous effect on the lender's percentage participation. Then, in an effort to resolve ambiguities in the comparative statics results, we employ a numerical procedure in conducting sensitivity analyses. This allows us to estimate percentage participation levels, and their elasticities, under various assumptions regarding the underlying factors. JEL Classification: G21, C65     

Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans

We examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators’ capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have ‘skin in the game’ and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders’ incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.