Moody's and S&P Ratings: Are They Equivalent? Conservative Ratings and Split Rated Bond Yields

We examine the relative impact of Moody's and S&P ratings on bond yields and find that at issuance, yields on split rated bonds with superior Moody's ratings are about 8 basis points lower than yields on split rated bonds with superior S&P ratings. This suggests that investors differentiate between the two ratings and assign more weight to the ratings from Moody’s, the more conservative rating agency. Moody's becomes more conservative after 1998 and the impact of a superior Moody's rating becomes stronger. Furthermore, the differential impact of the two ratings is more pronounced for the more opaque Rule 144A issues.     

INFORMATION OPACITY AND FITCH BOND RATINGS

We examine the marginal impact of Fitch ratings on the at‐issuance yields of industrial and utility bonds rated by Moody's and Standard & Poor's. We find that Fitch ratings reduce the yield premiums on information‐opaque bonds by about 30%, or 15 basis points. The finding is robust even when a Fitch rating exactly equals the two major ratings or their average. The findings suggest that Fitch ratings are not redundant but bring additional information to investors. Increased competition in the rating industry enhances the information efficiency of the bond market, and the existence of smaller rating agencies is economically justified.     

Market Implied Ratings and Financing Constraints: Evidence from US Firms

Financing constraints have been found to play an important role in several aspects of firm behavior, but no attention has been given to their effects on credit ratings. In this paper we analyze a unique and comprehensive data set for US firms rated by Fitch over the period 2001–07. We employ Fitch's market implied ratings derived from bond and equity prices. The analysis finds evidence that financial variables are more important in predicting credit ratings for firms likely to face financing constraints. We conclude that the financing constraint is an important dimension in the market implied ratings process. Our findings are of relevance to managers, investors and rating agencies seeking to understand the mechanism through which financing constraints affect credit ratings.     

THE INFORMATIONAL CONTENT OF BOND RATINGS

This paper explores the risk structure of interest rates. The focus is on whether yields on industrial bonds indicate that market participants base their evaluations of a bond issue's default risk on agency ratings or on publicly available financial statistics. Using a non-linear least squares procedure, the yield-to-maturity is related to Moody's rating, Standard and Poor's (S&P) rating, and accounting measures of creditworthiness such as coverage and leverage. Market yields are found to be significantly correlated with both the ratings and a set of readily available financial accounting statistics. These results indicate (1) that market participants base their evaluations of an issue's creditworthiness on more than the agencies' ratings and (2) that the ratings bring some information to the market above and beyond that contained in the set of accounting variables. The paper also asks whether the market views Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings as equally reliable measures of risk or whether the market attaches more weight to one agency's ratings than the other. Finally, the hypothesis that the market pays more attention to the accounting measures and less to the ratings if the rating has not been reviewed recently is tested.     

THE EFFECT OF BOND RATING AGENCIES ON BOND RATING MODELS

This paper addresses the problem of bond rating discrepancies and their effect on bond rating prediction models. Both Moody's and Standard & Poor's now use modified ratings. Results of this study indicate that the two agencies disagree 58 percent of the time and that Moody's rates bonds significantly lower than S & P. In addition, the classification rates of the multiple discriminant analysis models decrease approximately 24 percentage points when the modified ratings are used.     

Rating shopping and rating inflation in Israel

Firms may exploit the option of choosing among different rating agencies in order to pick the highest rating offered. This possibility, known as rating shopping, is relatively limited on the US corporate bond market because the two main rating agencies (S&P and Moody's) rate virtually all large bond issuers. In this study, we use the data on corporate bond ratings assigned by two Israeli rating agencies affiliated with S&P and Moody's during the period 2004–2012. We show that while one agency (Midroog) systematically assigned higher ratings, the ratings of the other agency (S&P-Maalot) were inflated due to rating shopping. However, despite the many features that encourage rating inflation, the resulting distortion was relatively small (one notch). This may be a fair price for maintaining a competitive rating industry.     

SPLIT RATINGS,BOND YIELDS,AND UNDERWRITER SPREADS

A split bond rating occurs when Moody's and Standard & Poor give different ratings to the same issue. We examine 1,277 public industrial bond issues, where 221 have split ratings, issued from 1980 through mid-1993. For split-rated industrial bonds, neither rating agency consistently gives higher ratings. Earlier studies find yields for split-rated bonds to be priced as either the higher or the lower of the ratings. We find the yields on split-rated bonds to be an average of the yields on the two ratings. Split ratings for industrial bonds appear to reflect random differences on the part of rating agencies. Our results differ from previous studies because we use a substantially larger sample and include high-yield bonds. As long as a bond has an investment-grade rating, the underwriter fees are found to be essentially the same for all rating categories. Below investment grade, the rating substantially affects the underwriter fee. Thus, split ratings for high-yield bonds have an important effect on the underwriter spread.     

AN EXAMINATION OF THE YIELD SPREAD BETWEEN INSURED AND UNINSURED DEBT

Currently, municipal bonds insured by major insurance firms receive the highest credit rating from rating agencies. The interest rates on regular triple-A municipal bonds, however, have been persistently below those of insured bond issues. The yield spread between insured and uninsured triple-A bonds in the tax-exempt market is examined here, and it is shown that the yield spread may be attributable to split ratings and default-related risks.     

THE DIFFERENTIAL EFFECTS OF SINKING FUNDS ON BOND RISK PREMIA

This study analyzes the effect that two options created by the inclusion of a sinking fund clause in a bond indenture have on the bond issue's secondary market risk premium. The impact of market prices that exceed current sinking fund redemption prices, and of par versus premium redemption, is clearly apparent when a set of issue-specific and macroeconomic control variables are incorporated into a model of bond risk premia. Thus, secondary market prices for the large-volume utility bond transactions in the sample reflect knowledge of individual-issue, time-varying indenture characteristics.     

Asset Opaqueness and Split Bond Ratings

We examine the relation between asset opaqueness and split ratings. We find that firms with asset opaqueness problems are more likely to receive split bond ratings from Moody s and S&P rating agencies. Our results suggest that there is a causal link between asset opaqueness and split ratings.     

Reactions of Japanese markets to changes in credit ratings by global and local agencies

We examine data from the mid-1980s to 2003 to investigate whether stock prices set on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for Japanese firms react more strongly to changes in credit ratings of global rating agencies than of local agencies. This offers a strong test of relative influence of the two groups of rating agencies. We hypothesize that global raters will have more influence, but given that the two global agencies, Moody’s and Standard and Poors, are headquartered in the United States, analysis of stocks of Japanese firms listed on US exchanges would confound the results to the extent there is a home bias for raters. We find that global agencies are more influential than the two major local raters, Japan Rating and Investment Information and Japan Credit Rating Agency, for rating downgrades. Thus for credit downgrades, global raters are more influential than local ones even in the local market. Consistent with previous research, we find that upgrades are benign events, and this holds true for global as well as local agencies.     

多重信用评级与债券融资成本——来自中国债券市场的经验证据

本文揭示了多重信用评级的信息生产机制和信用认证机制,排除了“信用评级购买”假说对于多重评级动机的解释,研究发现:多重信用评级有利于降低债券融资成本;相对于不一致的多重信用评级,一致的多重信用评级更有利于降低债券融资成本。在多重信用评级中,相对于评级机构均为“发行人付费”模式,兼有“投资者付费”模式的信用评级更有利于降低债券融资成本。此外,当多重信用评级的评级意见不一致时,平均评级的信息含量最高,即综合不同信用评级所包含的多种信息比任何单一信用评级更加具有信息含量。本研究为我国债券市场双评级制度提供了理论和经验证据的支持,有助于完善多元化信用评级制度和债券市场监管制度,并提示发债企业可以通过多重信用评级向市场传递更多和更具效度的评级信息,以弥补单一信用评级的信息不足和评级结果失准,减少投资者决策的不确定性,从而降低债券融资成本。     

Why firm access to the bond market differs over the business cycle: A theory and some evidence

This paper presents a theory of firm access to the bond market in which information gathering agencies are valuable but alter the relative cost of bond financing across firms and over the business cycle. The theory builds on the assumption that information frictions prevent these agencies from rating firms correctly all of the time. As a result, the cost of bond financing becomes dependent on the state of the economy and the “quality” of the signal provided by these agencies’ ratings. In addition, when the mix of bond issuers becomes riskier, as happens in recessions, bond financing becomes more expensive for mid-quality firms. Bond financing may even become more expensive to all firms, in which case mid-quality firms will be affected the most. The analysis of the bonds issued in the last two decades by American firms shows that split ratings, our proxy for the “quality” of the rating agencies’ signal, do not affect the relative cost of bond financing across firms in expansions, but they do increase the relative cost of this funding source for mid-credit quality issuers in recessions.     

Do Rating Agencies Benefit from Providing Higher Ratings? Evidence from the Consequences of Municipal Bond Ratings Recalibration

We ask whether credit rating agencies receive higher fees and gain greater market share when they provide more favorable ratings. To investigate this question, we use the 2010 rating scale recalibration by Moody's and Fitch, which increased ratings absent any underlying change in issuer credit quality. Consistent with prior research, we find that the recalibration allowed the clients of Moody's and Fitch to receive better ratings and lower yields. We add to this evidence by showing that the recalibration also led to larger fees and to increases in the market shares of Moody's and Fitch. These results are consistent with critics’ concerns about the effects of the issuer‐pay model on the credit ratings market.     

“投资人付费”vs.“发行人付费”:谁的信用评级质量更高？

本文选择2011-2015年被中债资信覆盖的发债A股上市公司作为主要研究对象,比较了“投资人付费”与“发行人付费”模式下的评级质量高低。研究发现:(1)与“发行人付费”评级相比,采用“投资人付费”模式的中债资信所作评级显著更低。(2)与“发行人付费”评级相比,当采用“投资人付费”模式的中债资信所作评级越低时,发行人未来盈利能力越差、预期违约风险越高,投资者要求的风险补偿也越高,这表明“投资人付费”模式下的信用评级质量更高。(3)“发行人付费”模式的评级结果可以在一定程度上反映公司的内部私有信息,但由于同时存在独立性缺失问题,“发行人付费”模式的信用评级质量仍然不如“投资人付费”模式的信用评级质量,这说明独立性对于评级机构尤其重要。     

THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF BANK LOAN RATINGS

We analyze the relatively new phenomenon of credit ratings on syndicated loans, asking first whether they convey information to the capital markets. Our event studies show that initial loan ratings and upgrades are not informative, but downgrades are. The market anticipates downgrades to some extent, however. We also examine whether public information reflecting borrower default characteristics explains cross‐sectional variation in loan ratings and find that ratings are only partially predictable. Our evidence suggests that loan and bond ratings are not determined by the same model. Finally, we estimate a credit spread model incorporating bank loan ratings and other factors reflecting default risk, information asymmetry, and agency problems. We find that ratings are related to loan rates, given the effect of other influences on yields, suggesting that ratings provide information not reflected in financial information. Ratings may capture idiosyncratic information about recovery rates, as each of the agencies claims, or information about default prospects not available to the market.     

Mergers in the bond rating industry: does rating provider matter?

I examine whether investors favour bond ratings from established global agencies by analyzing the market response to Standard and Poor’s (S&P) acquisition of the Canadian Bond Rating Service (CBRS). As a result of the acquisition, CBRS ratings were completely eliminated and replaced with ratings from S&P. While little reaction was apparent for bonds, the stocks of firms with CBRS ratings responded positively to the acquisition announcement. Small firms and those with little institutional ownership experienced the greatest benefit. The findings suggest that ratings from S&P may increase the exposure of foreign firms to international investors.     

Credit agency regulation and the impact of credit ratings in the international bond market

The use of credit ratings in financial and other legal documents — both in the USA and Europe —, has led to a situation in which the major rating agencies have become (largely unwilling) participants in the legislative process. This situation has become partly formalized in the US (and is being repeated elsewhere in the European Union, Eastern Europe and Latin America) through the creation of officially ‘recognized’ agencies whose ratings now carry the imprimatur of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the necessity for formal legal status to be sustained in the market for bond credit ratings. In this context, the criteria for a credible rating agency are examined and evidence is provided on one element of the criteria which is under-researched: namely, the impact of the ratings in the market place. The influence of rating agencies in international capital markets is assessed through an analysis of the impact of ratings on the yields of bonds, represented by a comprehensive sample of actively traded debt. The sample contains analysis of ratings introductions on both new and seasoned debt and also examines the impact of ratings revisions. It is concluded that official recognition has no market-based role and it is argued that ratings are used by regulators because of the success of the major agencies in performing their market function.     

信用评级变动能反映企业真实财务信息吗?——基于财务重述的视角

本文以2007-2018年拥有主体信用评级的A股上市公司为研究对象,利用企业财务错报在未来被重述这一场景,检验主体信用评级变动能否反映企业真实财务信息。研究发现,评级机构在发债企业财务错报年显著下调了主体信用评级,而在重述公告发布年没有上述现象,这表明主体信用评级下调反映了企业的真实财务信息。在控制内生性影响后,结论仍然成立。进一步研究发现,发债企业当期财务错报涉及盈余时,主体信用评级被下调的幅度更大,说明评级机构更加关注与盈余相关的财务信息。机制分析表明,评级机构维护自身声誉是主体信用评级变动能够反映企业真实财务信息的主要机制。此外,主体信用评级被下调还导致了资本市场投资者的负面反应。本文的研究结果为主体信用评级变动反映企业真实财务信息提供了直接的证据支持,揭示了主体信用评级的信息含量,也对理解中国情境下评级机构调整主体信用评级的行为动机提供参考。