如何强化操作风险管理

作为商业银行的三大风险之一．国内银行对操作风险的理解、认识及管理均远远落后于信用风险和市场风险。近来的美国次贷危机给国内各银行敲了一记警钟,操作风险管理已成为银行的重点工作。     

次贷危机:银行经营有变数

美国次贷危机愈演愈烈,因次贷问题引发的金融市场危机还在加剧。国际上一些大型的金融机构相继发生巨额亏损,美国第五大投资银行和主要的证券公司之一贝尔斯登甚至发生支付危机,被摩根大通收购。全球股市也出现大幅下跌和剧烈动荡。目前,次贷危机对国内银行的影响主要是间接的,表现为以下两个方面：     

次贷危机:考问中国银行业风险控制水平

中国银行业由于国际化程度不高和对境外证券投资规模有限,其风险控制能力与水平未在本次次贷危机中得到验证。随着国内银行国际化步伐加-陕,逐步融入全球金融市场,中国银行业将面临严峻的考验,从这个角度看,这次次贷危机不失为国内金融业的一次观战演习。从世界性投资角度看,此次美国次贷的影响波及全球。虽然从近期国内各家上市银行的澄清公告判断。国内银行受到的影响尚在可控范围之内。但通过本轮次贷危机的启示,思考中资银行的风险管理现状,改进风险管理观念,对于实施国际化战略的中资银行是十分有必要的。     

金融危机对中国商业银行风险管理的启示——基于国有商业银行金融安全的实证研究

一、引言2008年美国金融风暴是由次贷危机所引发的,次贷危机是美国房地产市场上的次级抵押贷款危机。美国次贷危机是从2006年春季开始逐步显现的,其负面影响不断扩大,美国金融业逐步陷入危机,许多银行相继破产,并逐步扩展至欧洲、日本等,演变成全球金融危机。     

金融危机对中国商业银行风险管理的启示——基于国有商业银行金融安全的实证研究

<正>一、引言2008年美国金融风暴是由次贷危机所引发的,次贷危机是美国房地产市场上的次级抵押贷款危机。美国次贷危机是从2006年春季开始逐步显现的,其负面影响不断扩大,美国金融业逐步陷入危机,许多银行相继破产,并逐步扩展至欧洲、日本等,演变成全球金融危机。     

美国的影子银行系统

影子银行是指游离于传统商业银行体系之外的、从事与传统银行相类似的金融活动但却不受监管或几乎不受监管的金融实体。次贷危机爆发前,美国的影子银行体系发展达到巅峰状态。在本次金融危机中,影子银行系统备受诟病,被认为是此次危机的罪魁祸首。文章对美国影子银行系统的构成、业务流程及投融资活动等进行了梳理,以期为理解次贷危机前美国金融体系的运行特征提供启示。     

从银行基础管理视角反思美国次贷危机

在“蝴蝶效应”的作用下,美国次贷危机引起了全球范围内金融市场的剧烈动荡,虽然对我国金融市场直接影响不大,但其造成的间接影响却不容忽视。剖析美国次贷危机形成原因,就其本质而言是金融机构风险管理的基础性工作不足。鉴于国内银行目前的经营管理实践存在类似问题：如忽视绩效激励机制的逆向选择、贷前尽职调查松懈、依赖第二还款来源、同质化竞争中过度营销、明显高估风险转移机制的作用等。国内金融从业者特别是管理者,应该汲取美国次贷危机的深刻教训,反思基础管理工作中可能存在的金融风险,更好地践行金融的科学发展。     

当前全球银行业竞争格局的解构与重构北大核心SSCI

始于美国次贷危机的国际金融危机本质上是银行危机,欧洲债务危机也正在向银行危机演变,所以2007年以来,国际金融危机和欧洲债务危机对全球银行产业的运行产生了巨大冲击。研究显示,由于国际金融危机和欧洲债务危机的双重冲击,欧洲、美国和日本三足鼎立的全球银行产业竞争旧格局已经瓦解,欧洲、美国、中国、日本共同主导的全球银行产业竞争新格局已经形成。     

浅议美国次贷危机对我国住房抵押贷款的启示

本文从以下两个角度,分析了美国次贷危机的成因,一是次级抵押贷款本身的缺陷,二是银行和信贷公司等金融机构的错误预期和对风险的估计不足所导致。并且从房地产市场供求的角度分析,得出银行等金融机构对于次贷危机的形成有着不可推卸的责任。并且在此基础上,提出了美国次贷危机对我国住房抵押贷款的启示。     

次贷危机与主要金融危机比较

次贷危机愈演愈烈,对美国实体经济产生巨大冲击,亦对金融市场影响深远。本文将次贷危机与美国80年代的储蓄信贷机构危机、北欧90年代金融危机,30年代大萧条和日本90年代银行危机等主要金融危机进行了细致的比较分析,并得出政府救市的经验教训。     

银行危机的蝴蝶效应、负外部性及其防治

对于银行突发事件,若处理不当则会演变成银行危机,乃至会对社会金融和经济产生严重影响。本文从内生性突发事件和外生性突发事件出发,探讨了“蝴蝶效应”导致发生局部银行危机的可能性;运用外部性经济学原理,对银行突发事件的负外部效应和风险溢出进行了探讨。对于突发事件与银行危机的解决,可以从监管机构与商业银行两个方面加强治理:对于监管机构而言,央行要发挥金融稳定职能实施外部援助,银行监管部门加强对商业银行的外部监督;对于商业银行而言,应加强内控机制建设,增强管理层对突发事件的预防和处置能力,防止工作人员道德风险的产生。     

全球金融危机后商业银行的资本管理改进策略

发端于美国次贷危机的全球金融危机近期似乎已经消停下来,但伴随此次危机产生的很多对于现行金融体系和金融机构运营模式所存在缺陷的思考却仍在继续.     

The credit crisis around the globe: Why did some banks perform better?

Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that have been put forth as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis. The evidence is supportive of theories that emphasize the fragility of banks financed with short-term capital market funding. The better-performing banks had less leverage and lower returns immediately before the crisis. Differences in banking regulations across countries are generally uncorrelated with the performance of banks during the crisis, except that large banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities performed better and decreased loans less. Our evidence poses a substantial challenge to those who argue that poor bank governance was a major cause of the crisis because we find that banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed significantly worse during the crisis than other banks, were not less risky before the crisis, and reduced loans more during the crisis.     

Credit growth in Central,Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe: The case of foreign bank subsidiaries

In this paper, we investigate the credit growth of foreign-owned banks in Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe from 2000 to 2014. We intend to show whether foreign capital in the banking sector should be treated as a monolith, as it currently is in the literature. To this end, we analyse credit growth based on the status of the parent company (global systemically important banks, or G-SIBs, vs. non-GSIBs) and European Union membership of the countries of the subsidiaries. The analyses are carried out on a panel of banks with the use of the panel corrected standard error methodology. Additionally, we differentiate between the pre-crisis and crisis/post-crisis periods to identify whether the policy of parents changed after the outbreak of the crisis. We find important differences in the determinants of the credit growth of subsidiaries, indicating that foreign capital in the banking sector should not be treated as a monolith.     

Why European Banks Are Undercapitalized and What Should Be Done About It

Major European banks are significantly undercapitalized as compared to large American banks, and, more importantly, as compared to the capital levels they would need to survive another severe financial crisis. Bank capital shortfalls in Italy, Spain, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, in particular, are largely the consequence of European bank regulations that: (1) apply static risk weights to assets like mortgages and sovereign debt; (2) fail to require an overall market‐based capital ratio that is high enough to enable banks to survive a severe financial crisis; (3) fail to get banks to promptly write down their impaired assets to market value; (4) subject banks to weak stress tests that can create a false impression of capital adequacy; and (5) fail to compel banks to retain sufficient earnings and to raise sufficient capital externally to eliminate capital shortfalls promptly, all apparently out of fear that being tougher might cause investors and customers to lose confidence in the banks. This article summarizes important recent independent bank stress testing that has quantified the capital shortfalls in European banks. The recent highly publicized regulatory interventions to resolve failing European banks were inevitable due to these shortfalls. The authors recommend steps European bank regulators should take to address the problem and to eliminate the risk of serious capital shortfalls. In the absence of such steps, bank depositors, customers, and security holders should be prepared to expect further unwelcome surprises as the risks inherent in allowing undercapitalized banks to operate will continue to materialize in more bank failures.     

疫情危机与商业银行数字化对策研究

疫情危机的发生导致社会经济链条断裂,供应链流通受阻,并不断向上下游和其他节点传导,引爆诸多潜在的风险点,对社会经济产生巨大负面影响。本文以商业银行为例,研究疫情危机对商业银行的影响和管理危机的对策。研究表明,疫情危机的发生既是对社会经济秩序的一种破坏,同时也会在应对危机过程中催生出一些新的行业、产业或经营模式的变化。面对疫情危机,数字化不仅仅是商业银行应对危机的有效手段,更是商业银行转型升级的新方向。全面推进数字化对于其他行业应对疫情危机同样具有示范和借鉴意义。     

货币政策在银行危机管理中的效果

本文从货币政策的信贷传导渠道出发,探讨了金融危机条件下商业银行资本管理、准备金需求的变化、信贷配给对货币政策有效性的影响机制。分析表明,货币政策的有效性不仅取决于中央银行的政策意图,还受制于商业银行资本量、风险偏好以及信贷配给程度的变化。因此,强化危机时期的货币政策效果必须配合影响银行信贷行为的措施。     

Return Dependence and the Limits of Product Diversification in Financial Firms

Copula‐GARCH models indicate dependence between bank returns and those to insurance underwriting, securities brokerage, and mortgage finance increased during the recent crisis. In contrast, dependence between banks and the broader market was little changed. The crisis‐related jump in return dependence within the financial services sector was greatest for banks that had previously appeared the most independent. Larger banks were also especially prone to increased dependence. These findings raise doubts about the ability of financial conglomerates to diversify effectively and highlight the need for policy progress in methods for resolving such institutions should they become illiquid or insolvent.     

银行危机救助策略的分析

银行危机的救助策略一直是理论界关注的焦点。本文通过构建一个两期模型,以银行危机是否会引发货币危机为评判标准,探讨政府在面对商业银行清偿能力危机时救助与不救助的抉择。经研究发现:当商业银行的不良资产率高,或商业银行在经济中起重要作用,抑或产出的价格弹性较小时,为了避免货币危机的发生,政府应该出手对商业银行提供救助。在相反的情况时,固定汇率制度下,政府为了维护其固定汇率的信誉应该出手对商业银行提供救助;浮动或管理浮动汇率制度下,考虑到商业银行的道德风险问题,政府应该不予以救助。