Reappraising the performance of China's state-owned industrial enterprises, 1980-96

This paper seeks to reappraise the performance of China's state-ownedindustrial enterprises over the period 1980-96. By examiningall the available indicators of performance, and by placingthat performance in the context of the country's specific pathof economic system reform and industrial growth, it argues thatthe state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed much betterthan is widely perceived in the literature. In particular, theperformance of large-scale, state-owned enterprises has beenat least comparable to that of the acclaimed collectively-ownedenterprises. The latter have been much more market-orientedthan SOEs, but their status has been equally unclear from thestandpoint of private ownership. The paper thus constitutesa challenge to the big-bang or shock-therapy approach to thetransformation of Soviet-type economic systems.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.     

Formal and real ownership structure of the Polish economy: state-owned versus state-controlled enterprises

This article analyses the difference between the state’s formal and real shares in the Polish economy. We identify two basic types of corporate control exercised by the state over enterprises through ownership (in the case of majority ownership) and non-ownership tools (in the case of minority ownership). Consequently, we distinguish between two types of state enterprises: state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and state-controlled enterprises (SCEs). In post-communist economies, SCEs mainly originate from so-called reluctant privatisation, in which the transfer of ownership rights takes place without the appropriate transfer of control rights. We discuss the tools of non-ownership control used by the state. Our estimates of the real share of state enterprises in the Polish economy (which include both SOEs and SCEs) show that it is almost two times higher than the formal share (only SOEs). The share of state enterprises is also highest in the group of Poland’s largest and most important firms. We conclude that the real importance of state enterprises in the Polish economy is much higher than might be expected if only the formal share of state ownership is taken into account.     

How much of the world economy is state-owned? Analysis based on the 2005–20 Fortune Global 500 lists

This paper analyzes the share of state-owned enterprises on the Fortune Global 500 lists from 2005 to 2020. The purpose is to answer two research questions—what is the share of SOEs among the world's largest companies, and is this share increasing over the years? Regarding studies of large sets of companies, the novelty of this article is the method in which SOEs were identified—based on the criterion of actual corporate control of the state and not the threshold of state ownership. The results show that the share of SOEs in the group of the world's largest companies is higher than indicated in previous similar studies, and this value has increased significantly over the last 15 years. In 2005, there were 64 SOEs on the list; in 2020, there were 141 (with the highest number—142—in 2015). In this period, the share of SOEs in revenues doubled (to almost 30%), in assets more than tripled and the total number of employees from SOEs from the list more than doubled. However, these increases were almost solely due to the growth of the Chinese economy, which resulted in more Chinese SOEs being included on the list.     

MASSIVE DIVESTITURE AND PRIVATIZATION LESSONS FROM CHILE

Between 1974 and 1989, the Chilean government privatized 550 state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Before 1974, all but a handful of major corporations were SOEs. About 50 of the largest enterprises privatized during the 1970s fell into government hands again, only to be re-privatized later. This was due partly to the economic and financial crisis affecting most Latin American countries during the early 1980s but also was a consequence of the privatization modes used. This paper analyzes that unique privatization experience so as to extract policy lessons. The analysis focuses on economic conditions, objectives of government policy, privatization modes, and the divestiture effects on employment, fiscal revenues, public sector wealth, spread of ownership, and capital market development.     

A healthy hybrid: The technological dynamism of minority-state-owned firms in China

Since its economic reform began in 1979 China's economy has grown rapidly but its dynamism has not been shared by the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at its core. Although some progress has been made, a large proportion of SOEs remain inefficient and uncompetitive, failing to exploit their advantages in scale, experience and resources. In contrast there has been rapid growth first of the collective and township enterprises, and then of the private sector, now the largest ownership type. However, private businesses continue to be handicapped by poor access to finance and other resources. These have however been made freely available to firms with only a minority state shareholding and otherwise owned by private shareholders and employees. This paper, focussing on the telecoms manufacturing sector, compares minority-state-owned hybrids favourably with other ownership types and argues that in the Chinese setting they can and should play a key role in future development.     

Industry and Labour: Class Struggle at Work and Monopoly Capitalism; Social Standing in America: New Dimensions of Class; Class Structure and Social Mobility in Poland

A very well-established economic literature maintains that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are inefficient as compared to privately owned ones (POEs). In this paper, I argue that SOEs' inefficiency is not due to state ownership per se, but is rather caused conditions other than ownership, to which SOEs often — though not necessarily always — relate. In particular, I focus on dynamic efficiency — specifically, the production of technological innovation — of SOEs in manufacturing industries, where SOEs should contend with POEs in a competitive environment. I suggest that targeted measures, which are aimed at increasing managers' commitment to long-term investment strategies and at reducing corruption and political interference — albeit complex and difficult to implement — can be much more (positively) impactful on long-run technical progress than the simple privatization of companies. This leaves room for exploration and implementation of policies that might reconcile state ownership and market competition in industrial sectors.     

The role of state enterprises in the transition from command to market economies

In transition from command to market economies total privatization has proved to be impossible to achieve, and a substantial part of large enterprises are likely to remain in full or partial state ownership. Hasty privatization has in many cases even proved to be destructive. There is a need to reconsider the basic approach to transition. Contrary to conventional wisdom prevailing in mainstream economics state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are not necessarily inferior to private firms in economic efficiency. J. Kornai's soft-budget constraint is reconsidered. Two models are suggested under which SOEs may prove to be viable in the long run and serve to promote a smoother physical transition. Under Model One (which is the general case) SOEs are largely separated from the state and operate on the basis of profit maximization. Under Model Two (which applies to certain industries) different objective functions are chosen for purposes of economic efficiency. Finally, preserving SOEs is seen as an alternative means of reducing inequitable income distribution at the source where primary incomes are created.     

Bank competition and the cost of debt: the role of state ownership and firm size

The argument on the puzzling relationship between bank competition and the cost of debt remains inconclusive as the effects of state ownership and firm size are intertwined. We find that bank competition is negatively associated with the cost of debt and observe that the negative effect of bank competition is stronger for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and weaker for large-sized enterprises. Our findings accord with the market power hypothesis. State ownership strengthens the negative impact of bank competition on the cost of debt, but firm size tends to weaken it. SOEs and large-sized enterprises are associated with a lower cost of debt compared to non-SOEs and small- and medium-sized enterprises, respectively.     

税负抑制了公司投资吗?——基于国有股权私有收益的解释

文章分析了税负对公司投资决策的影响.与民营控股股东不同,作为国有企业的最终股东,政府不仅可以获得与股权投资相关的收益,而且可以获得独占性的税收,独占性的税收收入越高,政府控股的私有收益越大.因此,国有企业在投资决策时不仅考虑税后现金流量,而且会关注相关的预期税负,这提高了国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性;政府对税收的需求越大,国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性越高.实证结果表明:(1)与民营控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关关系更弱;(2)随着注册地基础设施投资回报率的增加,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关性显著下降.因此,最大化税收收入也是国有企业投资决策的重要考虑因素.文章为我国股权结构在公司财务决策中的作用提供了新的研究视角.     

中国的金融发展、所有制结构调整与经济增长

本文利用中国分省面板数据证明:银行虽然将大部分资金贷给了国有企业,但是通过所有制结构调整,主要包括合法的国有企业改制,和不合法的国有资产流失等形式的资金漏损,使得银行信贷资产从国有企业手中转移到民营企业手中,提高了信贷资金的使用效率和资本边际生产率,促进了经济增长."拨改贷"使得银行贷款成为国有企业的主要外部资金来源,银行贷款的偿还压力推动了国有企业的改制,而政府出于保护银行信贷资产安全的需要也会催促国有企业加快改制.本文的结论为财政、外汇资金补充银行资本金和国有银行体制改革提供了理论和经验支持,为转轨国家的经济改革次序提供了启示.     

国有企业双重效率损失研究

本文基于企业效率最大化要求剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应这一企业理论分析了国有企业的生产效率损失和创新效率损失问题。国有企业的公有产权属性决定了国有企业中存在着生产效率和创新效率的双重损失。国有企业改革通过监督和激励机制设计在一定程度上实现了生产中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,从而提高了国有企业的生产效率。然而,由于创新具有不同于一般生产的特殊属性,已有国有企业改革措施并不能实现创新中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,因而无法改善国有企业的创新效率。由此,本文提出了国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。基于中国省级国有企业和民营企业的工业行业数据,统计分析和计量模型估计结果都稳健地支持了该假说。     

国有企业改革30年

经过30年的改革和制度创新,国有企业不但走出了困境,而且成为具有较高劳动生产率、较强盈利能力和竞争力的市场主体。理论研究与实践证明,很难有最优的所有制结构和股权结构。我们要毫不动摇地"坚持和完善公有制为主体、多种所有制经济共同发展的基本经济制度,毫不动摇地巩固和发展公有制经济",坚持在公有制为主体的框架内通过制度建设来完善国有企业公司治理结构。国有企业公司治理结构的完善是一项长期而艰巨的任务。     

国有企业对资本和劳动价格扭曲的非对称影响

要素市场化的滞后是我国改革进程中的一个突出问题,要素价格的负向扭曲则是其重要表现.文章从国有企业的视角研究了要素价格扭曲的原因.一方面,金融抑制和所有制歧视使得国有企业以低于市场利率的价格获得了大量资本,加剧了资本价格的负向扭曲;另一方面,由于国有企业提供的社会保障、收入调节功能以及工会的作用会导致国有企业的劳动力价格高于非国有企业,反而有可能改善劳动力价格的负向扭曲.本文测算了171个三位数行业的资本价格扭曲和劳动力价格扭曲指数,通过实证研究发现,国有企业比重越高的行业资本价格扭曲越严重,但是劳动力价格扭曲越小.本研究具有重要的政策含义:虽然国有企业在提高劳动者收入上的作用值得肯定,但降低竞争性行业的国有企业比重、加快金融市场化改革、促进劳动力自由流动、减少政府对国有企业的补贴和保护,将有利于促进资源优化配置,提高社会的总福利水平.     

Non-commercial goals and financial performance of state-owned enterprises – some evidence from the electricity sector in the EU countries

This study considers the financial performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in relation to non-commercial goals. We focus on enterprises operating in the production of electricity sector in the EU countries and analyse their profitability conditioning on the level of electricity prices. We reveal that SOEs underperform as compared to their privately owned counterparts when they operate in those markets that have lower prices. This suggests that their profitability is likely to be substantially affected by pursuing goals other than profit-maximisation - providing crucial products and services at affordable prices - and emphasises a need to consider the non-commercial objectives of SOEs in the empirical research.     

Economic policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions: Evidence from China

This study examines the relationship between economic policy uncertainty and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in China. Using all listed Chinese companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as well as 4188 ​M&A deals from the period of 2001–2018, we show that Chinese firms are more likely to make acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty, which contradicts the behavior of US firms. We further show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely than non-SOEs to make acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. SOEs are less likely to use only cash for their acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. These results indicate the prudence of SOEs regarding acquisitions relative to non-SOEs during periods of high economic policy uncertainty. Moreover, acquisitions during periods of high economic policy uncertainty are associated with an increase in shareholder wealth for acquirers, and this wealth effect is more pronounced for SOEs.     

Provincial economic performance and underpricing of IPOs: Evidence from political interventions in China

We examine the underpricing of 2,131 Chinese initial public offerings (IPOs) between 2005 and 2017. The results indicate that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) controlled by the local government (local SOEs) offer significantly higher underpricing when they go public than SOEs controlled by the central government and non-SOEs do. This phenomenon is evident for local SOEs from less developed provinces, after controlling for the direct effect of regional economic performance. These results suggest local government officials underprice initial public offerings to make regional companies successfully go public to promote the regional economy.     

地方国有上市公司持股商业银行动机和效应研究*

本文研究地方政府或地方国资委控股国有上市公司（地方国有上市公司）持股商业银行的动机和效应。研究发现，相比于其他国有上市公司，地方国有上市公司更偏好持股商业银行，且多为同地区的商业银行；当公司注册地为省会城市、金融业市场化水平较低、地方官员任职年龄较小时，上述关系更加显著；当政府发布相关促进银行业发展政策后，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的概率显著上升。除此之外，本文对经济后果进行分析发现，持股商业银行提升了地方金融业水平以及地方官员晋升概率。本文的研究结论表明，地方国有上市公司持股商业银行的经济行为更多地反映了政府动机和地方官员晋升激励动机。     

Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

If China’s economy is an example of “state-capitalism,” then its large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could be expected to monopolize key sectors. But previous estimates of industrial concentration, using the Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (HHI), have suggested that the level of industrial concentration—and therefore the potential for the abuse of monopoly power—is very low. These studies have significantly underestimated HHI, since they do not consolidate subsidiary enterprises in Chinese survey data into larger business groups, or according to ultimate ownership. After making these adjustments, a measure of potential HHI shows that large state monopolies remain in oil and gas, electricity, tobacco and, potentially, automobiles. In particular, SOEs supervised by the central government are heavily invested in potentially concentrated industries. But aggregate profits of the state sector are driven more by the portfolio distribution of assets between resources, manufacturing and utilities, rather than industrial concentration within sectors.     

自利抑或协同：非国有股权参与如何影响国有企业绿色技术创新

基于外部性理论与制度理论，以2013-2019年A股国有上市公司为研究样本，利用面板Tobit模型考察非国有股权参与对国有企业绿色技术创新的影响。结果发现，非国有股权参与显著促进国有企业绿色技术创新，股权融合程度越高，绿色技术创新水平越高，外资股东参与有利于国有企业绿色技术创新，但机构投资者未表现出明显作用；分层分类检验结果表明，非国有股权参与更有利于中央国有企业、公益类国有企业绿色技术创新。外部治理环境调节效应检验结果表明，环保补贴可以增强非国有股权的环境研发激励作用，分析师关注有利于抑制私有股权短视化自利行为，二者均正向调节非国有股权参与对国有企业绿色技术创新的促进作用。