Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

The effect of affiliated analysts on stock recommendations: Evidence from share pledges in China

We use the share pledge context in China to examine how affiliated analysts whose securities companies are pledgees of share pledge firms issue stock recommendations on these listed firms. We find that their recommendations are more optimistic than those of non-affiliated analysts, and they are more likely to issue Buy and Add recommendations, suggesting that they issue optimistic rating reports for share pledge firms due to their conflicts of interest. We also find a dynamic adjustment in the stock recommendation behavior of these analysts, and their probability after issuing optimistic stock recommendations is significantly reduced before and after the years that the affiliation relationship between them and share pledge firms both began and ended. These affiliated analysts continue to issue optimistic stock recommendations after visiting the share pledge firms if they work in the same location as the firms, or if they are star analysts among New Fortune’s “top five analysts,” and when the information transparency of the share pledge firms is higher. In addition, the optimistic stock recommendation behavior of affiliated analysts is more significant in our sample of firms with high share pledge ratios and downward stock price pressure. The earnings forecast quality of affiliated analysts is also found to be lower, and they are less inclined to downgrade stock recommendations for these share pledge firms. Buy recommendations issued by both non-affiliated and affiliated analysts can bring cumulative excess returns in the short event window, but those issued by affiliated analysts are significantly negative in the long-term event window, and significantly lower than those issued by non-affiliated analysts. Overall, our study shows that affiliated analysts issue optimistic rating reports on share pledge firms due to conflicts of interest, which leads to decision-making bias in investors and thus decreases the stock price crash risk of the firms. Our findings further reveal the economic consequences of share pledging and extend our understanding of the behavior of analysts in a conflict of interest situation from the share pledge perspective.     

Bucking the Trend: The Informativeness of Analyst Contrarian Recommendations

This paper examines price reactions to analysts’ recommendations issued in the opposite direction of recent stock price movements. We find that upgrade and downgrade contrarian recommendations induce larger market reactions than noncontrarian recommendations, consistent with the view that they are more informative. These results are strongest in the period before Regulation Fair Disclosure, consistent with the view that private information was likely curbed after its implementation. Contrarian downgrades are more likely to be issued by all‐star analysts, but less likely by experienced and busy analysts suggesting that contrarian recommendations are subject to career concerns.     

Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses

Some Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.     

The Impact of NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 on Analyst Behavior: The Strategic Timing of Recommendations Issued on Weekends

Amendments to NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472, enacted in May 2002, mandate that sell‐side analysts disclose the distribution of their security recommendations by buy, hold and sell category. This regulation enhances the transparency of analysts’ information and mitigates the long‐recognized optimistic bias in their recommendations. However, we find that analysts are more likely to issue sell recommendations or downgrade revisions on weekends when investors have limited attention after these rule changes. This pattern is more pronounced for prestigious analysts, who are more likely to influence stock prices. Market reaction tests reveal an incomplete immediate response and a greater drift to unfavorable recommendations issued on weekends. Finally, analysts who are more likely to release unfavorable recommendations on weekends exhibit higher future forecast accuracy. Our findings suggest that, while these regulatory changes effectively reduce analysts’ optimistic bias, they are also associated with an increased prevalence of a different form of distortion in the capital market.     

Are chartists artists? The determinants and profitability of recommendations based on technical analysis

The value of technical analysis (TA) has been debated for decades; however, limited evidence exists on the profitability of investment recommendations issued by technical analysts. These ‘chartists’ sometimes claim that TA is an art rather than a science. We evaluated > 5000 TA-based buy and sell recommendations for stocks and a market index in the Netherlands issued during the period 2004–2010. The sign of a recommendation was generally in line with trading signals resulting from technical trading rules. While recommendation levels were positively associated with price trends prior to the recommendation, we did not find evidence of (abnormal) stock returns after the publication of these recommendations. In addition, stop-loss levels did not contain informational value as no meaningful returns were detected after these trigger levels were met. Given that technical recommendations follow well-known trading rules and that these recommendations are not associated with future abnormal returns, we conclude that technical analysts do not exhibit ‘artistic’ skills.     

Underwriting Relationships and Analyst Independence in Europe

This paper examines the accuracy of security analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for firms in 13 European countries. We document at least three key findings. First, we find strong evidence that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings estimates and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic than those provided by unaffiliated analysts. Second, we find that lead and co‐lead underwriter analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendations are significantly more optimistic for underwriter stocks than for those they provide for other stocks. Third, we also find evidence that these biases found within earnings forecasts and stock recommendations are not driven by one particular country. In short, these findings suggest that affiliated analysts are more optimistic perhaps to maintain investment banking relations.     

Conflicts of Interest and Research Quality of Affiliated Analysts in the German Universal Banking System: Evidence from IPO Underwriting

The quality of equity research by financial analysts is a prerequisite for an efficient capital market. This study investigates the quality of earnings forecasts and stock recommendations for initial public offerings (IPOs) in Germany. The empirical study includes 12,605 earnings forecasts and 6,209 stock recommendations of individual analysts for the time period from 1997 to 2004. The focus of this study is on analysing the potential conflicts of interest that arise when the analyst is affiliated with the underwriter of an IPO. In a universal banking system these conflicts of interest are usually more pronounced and therefore interesting to investigate. The empirical findings for the German financial market suggest that earnings forecasts and stock recommendations of the analysts belonging to the lead-underwriter are on average inaccurate and biased, indicating some conflicts of interest. Moreover, the stock recommendations of the analysts that are affiliated with the lead-underwriter are often too optimistic resulting in a significant long-run underperformance for the investor. In contrast, unaffiliated analysts provide better earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that result in a superior performance for the investor.     

Short selling and the independence of business-related analysts: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates whether short-sale deregulation improves analysts' independence in an emerging market where conventional mechanisms mitigating conflicts of interest are either ineffective or absent. Short selling reduces the effectiveness of analysts' favourable opinions in creating or sustaining overvalued stock prices, thus decreasing the incentives of institutional clients of brokerages to exert pressure on related analysts to initiate coverage and issue biased opinions. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find strong evidence that stocks that are eligible for short sales experience a greater reduction in coverage by related analysts than stocks that are ineligible for short sales. When covered firms become eligible for short sales, the quality of forecasts and recommendations issued by related analysts improves considerably. Further analyses show that shortable firms with a significant reduction in related analysts' coverage are more likely to underperform and to experience stock price crashes in the future. Altogether, our results are consistent with short selling effectively restoring related analysts' independence in emerging markets.     

Behavioural Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Analyst Stock Recommendations

Abstract:  This paper tests whether sell-side analysts are prone to behavioural errors when making stock recommendations as well as the impact of investment banking relationships on their judgments. In particular, we analyse their report narratives for evidence of cognitive bias. We find first that new buy recommendations on average have no investment value whereas new sell recommendations do, and take time to be assimilated by the market. We also show that new buy recommendations are distinguished from new sells both by the level of analyst optimism and representativeness bias as well as with increased conflicts of interest. Successful new buy recommendations are characterised by lower prior returns, value stock status, smaller firms and weaker investment banking relationships. On the other hand, successful new sells do not differ from their unsuccessful counterparts in terms of these measures. As such, we provide evidence that analysts are prone both to behavioural bias as well as potential conflicts of interest in their new buy stock recommendation decisions. We also show that these two explanations of analyst behaviour are to a great extent independent of each other. Consequently, the recent attempts by regulators to address potential conflicts of interest in analyst behaviour may have only limited impact.     

Underwriting relationships,analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations

We examine the effect of underwriting relationships on analysts' earnings forecasts and recommendations. Lead and co-underwriter analysts' growth forecasts and recommendations are significantly more favorable than those made by unaffiliated analysts, although their earnings forecasts are not generally greater. Investors respond similarly to lead underwriter and unaffiliated `Strong buy' and `Buy' recommendations, but three-day returns to lead underwriter `Hold' recommendations are significantly more negative than those to unaffiliated `Hold' recommendations. The findings suggest investors expect lead analysts are more likely to recommend `Hold' when `Sell' is warranted. The post-announcement returns following affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations are not significantly different.     

Do independent research analysts issue more or less informative recommendation revisions?

This paper studies whether independent research analysts issue more informative stock recommendation revisions than investment bank analysts. I find independent analyst recommendation upgrades and downgrades significantly less informative. I also investigate whether the identified differences in informativeness are the result of systematic cross-sectional variation in analyst ability, portfolio complexity, and brokerage firm resources. Including these variables reduces the disparity in information content between groups. However, independent revisions continue to have lower informativeness. I follow prior research and compute daily buy-and-hold abnormal returns to portfolios formed based on analyst firm type. I find that investment bank analyst portfolios generally outperform those of independent research analysts. Lastly, I examine market reactions before and after the Global Settlement Agreement that was enacted to limit the perceived conflicts in the industry. Lastly, investment bank analyst upgrades generate an 18.7% greater reaction in the post-regulation period, suggesting the Global Settlement helped mitigate biased research. Independent analysts continue to issue less informative recommendations.     

Independents�� day? Analyst behavior surrounding the Global Settlement

In this paper, we examine the impact of NASD Rule 2711, NYSE Rule 472, and the Global Research Settlement on the recommendation performance of independent, affiliated, and unaffiliated analysts. We find that analysts from all three types of institutions issued fewer strong buys following these regulations designed to separate investment banking and equity research. Affiliated analysts were less likely to issue innovative recommendations. While downgrades became more prevalent following the regulations, they were significantly less informative. Independent research firms set up after the Global Research Settlement are of inferior quality; they issue more optimistic and less innovative recommendations that generate lower announcement period returns than independent firms existing prior to the Settlement. Our overall findings question whether investors will be better served via the shift in equity research to analysts at independent research firms.     

Analysts’ stock recommendations,earnings growth and risk

A key output of sell‐side analysts is their recommendations to investors as to whether they should, buy, hold or sell a company's shares. However, relatively little is known regarding the determinants of those recommendations. This study considers this question, presenting results that suggest that recommendations are dependent on analysts’ short‐term and long‐term earnings growth forecasts, as well as on proxies for the analysts’ unobservable views on earnings growth in the more distant future and risk. Furthermore, analysts who appear to incorporate earnings growth beyond the long‐term growth forecast horizons and risk into their recommendation decisions make more profitable stock recommendations.     

THE WEALTH EFFECTS OF TRACKING STOCK RESTRUCTURINGS

We provide a comprehensive examination of the post‐issue wealth effects of 29 completed tracking stock restructurings. We document that for the parent stock and for the combined firm, tracking stock restructurings lead to insignificant long‐term excess returns. However, we find that shareholders of tracking stocks realize significant post‐issue wealth losses. Unlike spin‐offs and carve‐outs, announcements of tracking stock restructurings are preceded by negative one‐year excess returns, and unlike the positive post‐issue long‐term excess returns to spin‐off stocks and the insignificant long‐term excess returns to carve‐out stocks, tracking stocks experience negative long‐term excess returns.     

Stock recommendations and investment portfolio formation: A study in the Brazilian market

The stock analysts have a relevant role in the capital market, since, directly or indirectly, they contribute to the paper pricing and to the composition of the investment portfolio. The purpose of this study is to verify if it is possible to obtain extraordinary returns, above those offered by a market portfolio, with the monitoring of the stock recommendations issued by Brazilian capital market analysts, one of the most important in Latin America. Based on a wide range of consensual recommendations concerning the period from 2000 to 2010, and with the monitoring of the historical series of paper returns covered by the analyses, the performance of two portfolios were compared, one formed by stocks that received favorable and the other one formed by stocks that received unfavorable analyst recommendations. The results showed bias in recommendations, since there is, systematically, a greater number of favorable against unfavorable recommendations. The results mainly showed that the analysts were unable to identify the stocks that actually offered greater returns within the period considered.     

Measure for Measure: The Relation between Forecast Accuracy and Recommendation Profitability of Analysts

We examine the contemporaneous relation between earnings forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability to assess the effectiveness with which analysts translate forecasts into profitable recommendations. We find that, after controlling for expertise, more accurate analysts make more profitable recommendations, albeit only for firms with value‐relevant earnings. Next, we show that conflicts of interest from investment banking activities affect the relation between accuracy and profitability. In the case of buy recommendations, more accurate forecasts are associated with more profitable recommendations only for the nonconflicted analysts. For hold recommendations, higher levels of accuracy are associated with higher levels of profitability for conflicted analysts, provided these recommendations are treated as sells. Finally, we find that regulatory reforms aimed at mitigating analyst conflicts of interest appear to have improved the relation between accuracy and profitability. Specifically, the integrity of buy and hold recommendations has improved and the change is more pronounced for analysts expected to be most conflicted.     

A comparison of buy‐side and sell‐side analysts

There is very little research on the topic of buy-side analyst performance, and that which does exist yields mixed results. We use a large sample from both the buy-side and the sell-side and report several new results. First, while the contemporaneous returns to portfolios based on sell-side recommendations are positive, the returns for buy-side analysts, proxied by changes in institutional holdings, are negative. Second, the buy-side analysts' underperformance is accentuated when they trade against sell-side analysts' recommendations. Third, abnormal returns positively relate to both the portfolio size and the portfolio turnover of buy-side analysts' institutions, suggesting that large institutions employ superior analysts and that superior analysts frequently change their recommendations. Abnormal returns are also positively related to buy-side portfolios with stocks that have higher analyst coverage, greater institutional holding, and lower earnings forecast dispersion. Fourth, there is substantial persistence in buy-side performance, but even the top decile performs poorly. These findings suggest that sell-side analysts still outperform buy-side analysts despite the severe conflicts of interest documented in the literature.     

Do Stars Shine? Comparing the Performance Persistence of Star Sell-Side Analysts Listed by Institutional Investor,the Wall Street Journal,and StarMine

We investigate the profitability persistence of the investment recommendations from analysts listed in four different star rankings, Institutional Investor magazine, StarMine’s “Top Earnings Estimators” and “Top Stock Pickers”, and The Wall Street Journal, and show the predictive power of each evaluation methodology. We found that only Buy and Strong Buy recommendations from the entire group of Star analysts outperform those of the Non-Stars in the year after election, while Sell and Strong Sell recommendations performed as those of the Non-Stars. We document that the highest average monthly abnormal return of holding a long-short portfolio, 0.97 %, is obtained by following the recommendations of the group of star sell-side analysts rated by StarMine’s “Top Earnings Estimators” during the period from 2003 to 2014. Since earnings are one of the main drivers of stock prices, the results obtained are in line with the notion that focusing on superior earnings forecasts is one of the top requirements for successful stock picks.     

The Geography of Equity Analysis

I provide evidence that geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than other analysts. Stock returns immediately surrounding forecast revisions suggest that local analysts impact prices more than other analysts. These effects are strongest for firms located in small cities and remote areas. Collectively these results suggest that geographically proximate analysts possess an information advantage over other analysts, and that this advantage translates into better performance. The well‐documented underwriter affiliation bias in stock recommendations is concentrated among distant affiliated analysts; recommendations by local affiliated analysts are unbiased. This finding reveals a geographic component to the agency problems in the industry.