Is the Selection of the Amortization Period for Goodwill a Strategic Choice?

This study examines whether the choice of amortization life for purchased goodwill is predictive of the firm's post-acquisition earnings levels, given that shorter lives could lead to a dilution in earnings. Our findings support this interpretation. Further, consistent with Andrade (2001), we demonstrate a link between post-acquisition earnings changes and stock performance. These results suggest that the amortization life chosen is a reliable predictor of the success of the acquisition both in terms of earnings changes and future stock performance. These findings are relevant since the information concerning the life chosen was eliminated by the adoption of SFAS No. 142.     

Do investor expectations affect sell-side analysts’ forecast bias and forecast accuracy?

We examine the association between investor expectations and its components and sell-side analysts’ short-run quarterly earnings forecast bias and forecast accuracy. To measure investor expectations, we use the Index of Consumer Expectations survey and decompose it into the “fundamental” component related to underlying economic factors (FUND) and the “sentiment” component unrelated to underlying economic factors (SENT). We find that analysts are the most optimistic and the least accurate when SENT is higher. Management long-horizon earnings forecasts attenuate the effects of SENT on forecast optimism and forecast accuracy. Analysts are also the most accurate when FUND is higher. Last, the market places more weight on unexpected earnings when SENT is high. These findings suggest that analysts are affected by investor sentiment and the market reacts more strongly to unexpected earnings when analyst forecasts are the least accurate. The last result potentially explains why prior research (for example, Baker and Wurgler, The Journal of Finance 61:1645–1680, 2006) finds an association between investor sentiment and cross-sectional stock returns.     

Stock Market Reactions to SFAS No. 96: Evidence from Early Bank Adopters

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 96, “Accounting for Income Taxes,” issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in December 1987 changed accounting for income tax recognition and accrual. The original deadline for implementation of SFAS No. 96 was December 15, 1988, and earlier adoption was encouraged. This study examines empirically the stock price impact of four pertinent announcement dates regarding SFAS No. 96 for 19 banks that adopted the statement in late 1987 and early 1988. Our results suggest that these early bank adopters have different characteristics from other banks that cause them to benefit from the changes in accounting for deferred taxes and explain their voluntary adoption of the standard.     

The impact of SFAS No. 141 on earnings predictability of merging firms: Evidence from the initial year of implementation

This study examines the impact of SFAS 141 on earnings predictability of merging firms. I expect a relative improvement in analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy for merging firms versus non-merging peers after SFAS 141 adoption. I restrict the post-SFAS 141 sample to the initial year of SFAS 141 implementation. This research design disentangles effects of SFAS No. 141 from those of SFAS No. 142. The evidence from analysis of 48 pairs of merging and matched non-merging firms is consistent with expectations and confirms the increase in earnings predictability for merging firms versus their non-merging peers post-SFAS 141. Results of additional tests suggest that earnings predictability improvement more likely follows from extended disclosure requirements and the other changes in the Purchase Method (“better purchase” issue) than from the elimination of Poolings-of-Interest (“purchase vs. pooling” issue).     

Creating a Bigger Bath Using the Deferred Tax Valuation Allowance

Abstract:  The provisions of SFAS No. 109 allow US companies to make an earnings big bath even bigger through the establishment of a deferred tax valuation allowance. At the time a firm recognizes a non-cash charge, it also recognizes a deferred tax asset to represent the future tax benefits of the charge. Recognition of the deferred tax asset partially mitigates the negative earnings impact of the special charge. However, if the firm does not expect to have sufficient future taxable income to utilize the future tax benefits of the charge, SFAS No. 109 requires the firm to establish a deferred tax valuation allowance, effectively eliminating the recognized deferred tax asset. Thus, the establishment of the valuation allowance amplifies the negative earnings impact of the non-cash charge. We use a valuation allowance prediction model to identify firms that create a larger-than-expected valuation allowance; these firms may be creating a large valuation allowance as a reserve to be used to manage earnings in a subsequent period. We find that the vast majority of these larger-than-expected valuation allowances apparently reflect informed management pessimism about the future in that these firms actually do have poorer operating performance in subsequent periods. We do not find any evidence that subsequent reversals of valuation allowances are used to turn a loss into a profit. However, we do find a very small number of firms that appear to have used a valuation allowance reversal to meet or beat the mean analyst forecast.     

Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts

This paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) provide more frequent “bad news” management forecasts than firms with no established string of MBE, particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic. This suggests that firms with a consistent MBE record are more likely to guide analysts’ expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency. Subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened, implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic. The relation between management forecasts and MBE consistency is stronger after Regulation FD.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

The role of “other information” in analysts’ forecasts in understanding stock return volatility

This study identifies “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a legitimate proxy for future cash flows and examines its incremental role in explaining stock return volatility. We suggest that “other information” contains information about fundamentals beyond that reflected in current financial statements and reflects firms’ fundamentals on a more timely basis than dividends or earnings. Using standardized regressions, we find volatility increases when current “other information” is more uncertain and increases more in response to unfavorable news compared to favorable news. Variance decomposition analysis shows that the variance contribution of “other information” dominates that of expected-return news. The incremental role of “other information” is at least half of the effect of earnings in explaining future volatility. The results are more pronounced for firms with poor information environments. Overall, our results highlight the importance of including “other information” as an additional cash-flow proxy in future studies of stock prices and volatility.     

Tests of Market Reaction and Analysts' Forecast Revisions to the Disclosure of Improved Management Earnings Expectations: A Case of Concurrent Bad News Management Earnings Forecasts

This paper tests whether a negative stock market reaction, associated with a management forecast of near term bad earnings, is lessened by a concurrent management forecast of improved longer term earnings expectations. Stock market reactions depend on the creditability of management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In this analysis, the authors examined market reactions around the time of management forecasts of bad earnings, with and without longer-term management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The results show that the stock market reaction is significantly less negative when management forecasts of bad earnings are followed by management forecasts of improved long run earnings expectations than when management forecasts of bad earnings are not accompanied by management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. In addition, this paper examines financial analysts' reactions to management bad earnings forecasts and management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. The findings show that analysts react less negatively to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations than to management forecasts of bad earnings. An analysis of a sub-sample of observations shows that analysts consider management forecasts of improved earnings expectations to imply improved expected future performance, thus conveying that analysts give credence to management forecasts of improved earnings expectations. However, results show that the stock market and analysts are unable to distinguish management forecasts of improved earnings expectations that come true from management forecasts of improved earning expectations that do not come true.     

Accounting for inventory costs and real earnings management behavior

Prior research finds that managers engage in inventory overproduction to inflate current earnings despite the fact that overproduction is associated with significant economic costs. Additionally, Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 151 (SFAS 151) limited the fixed costs that can be capitalized to inventory in periods of low production, thereby introducing a penalty for underproduction by requiring firms to expense unallocated overhead in the current period. Because periods of underproduction often follow periods of overproduction, and because SFAS 151's emphasis on the subjective determination of normal capacity can erroneously categorize overproducing firms as underproducers in subsequent years, we posit that SFAS 151 makes overproduction less desirable than before. Therefore, we posit that management's propensity to use overproduction to meet earnings benchmarks should decrease after the adoption of SFAS 151. Consistent with expectations, we find a lower propensity to use overproduction to meet benchmarks following SFAS 151. These results challenge the view that SFAS 151 inadvertently encouraged overproduction.     

Capitalized intangibles and financial analysts

We examine whether firms that capitalize a higher proportion of their underlying intangible assets have higher analyst following, lower dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts and more accurate earnings forecasts relative to firms that capitalize a lower proportion. Under Australian generally accepted accounting principles, capitalization of intangible assets has become increasingly ‘routine’ since the late 1980s. It is predicted that this experience leads Australian analysts to expect firms with relatively more certain intangible investments to signal this fact by capitalizing intangible assets. Our results are consistent with this. We find that capitalization of intangible assets is associated with higher analyst following and lower absolute earnings forecast error for firms with a stock of underlying intangible assets. Our tests suggest a weaker association between capitalization and lower earnings forecast dispersion. We conclude that there are benefits for analysts, for management to have the option to capitalize intangible assets. These findings suggest that IAS 38 Intangible Assets and AASB 138 Intangible Assets reduce the usefulness of financial statements.     

HOW TO FIX ACCOUNTING—MEASURE AND REPORT ECONOMIC PROFIT

Bending accounting rules has become so ingrained in our corporate culture that even ethical business leaders succumb to the temptation to “manage” their earnings in order to meet analysts' demands for smoothly rising results. The author of this article argues that such behavior reflects not a general decline in ethical standards so much as executives' growing sense that accounting itself has become “unhinged from value.” For example, clearly valuable expenditures on R&D, customer acquisition, and employee training are generally expensed immediately against earnings. And reported corporate income is often further reduced by provisions for losses that most companies never expect to incur, by “book” taxes they never expect to pay, and by depreciation charges on assets that are actually increasing in value. At the same time, the opportunity costs associated with employee stock options and the corporate use of equity capital are not reflected in the accountant's measure of profit. To improve the quality of corporate governance and revitalize the public's faith in reported earnings, the author proposes a complete overhaul of GAAP accounting to measure and report economic profit, or EVA. Stated in brief, the author's concept of economic profit begins with an older, but now seldom used, definition of accounting income known as “residual income,” and then proposes a series of additional adjustments to GAAP accounting that are designed to produce a reliable measure of a company's annual, sustainable cash‐generating capacity. Besides expensing the cost of equity capital as well as stock options, the author recommends bringing off‐balance‐sheet items such as pension assets and liabilities back onto the balance sheet, eliminating reserve accounting, capitalizing R&D and other expenditures on intangible assets, and recording economic rather than accounting depreciation. Such changes, by replacing the accountants' current flawed definition of earnings with a comprehensive new statement of value added, could restore investor confidence in financial statements. Even more important, managers would be less likely to pursue their now common practice of boosting earnings by making value‐reducing operating and investment decisions and more likely to use financial reporting not to mislead the market but as an opportunity to communicate relevant, forward‐looking information.     

TO PURCHASE OR TO POOL: DOES IT MATTER?

The recent decision by the Financial Accounting Standards Board to eliminate pooling accounting for acquisitions raises several important questions: Does the choice of “purchase” or “pooling” affect firm valuations? How do differences in goodwill and its amortization affect cash flow and price/earnings multiples? How has the market reacted to purchase and pooling acquisition announcements? The authors' new research suggests that the market already judges mergers and acquisitions based on fundamental economics, not on GAAP earnings. In a study of 1,442 large acquisitions in the 1990s, the authors find that, in the first month after the announcement of pooled transactions, the acquirer's stock fell by an average of almost 4%. By contrast, the market reaction to purchase acquisitions was extremely favorable, with a 3% positive abnormal return in the first month. But what about the ongoing effect of goodwill amortization on values? In the second part of their two-part study, the authors report that the P/E multiples of acquirers reporting increases in goodwill amortization increase significantly following the acquisitions, and that the increases in P/E are large enough to offset the negative impact of goodwill amortization on earnings. Moreover, the authors also tested for and were unable to find any evidence of a market bias against balance sheet goodwill as an indicator of future amortization charges. The authors thus conclude that changes in accounting for acquisitions should not be a concern for acquirers, and that the elimination of pooling should have no lasting impact on corporate strategic decisions or M&A activity. Nevertheless, they do suggest that companies with significant goodwill would benefit from making their amortization transparent in their financial statements by, for example, breaking out amortization from depreciation on their income statements.     

Is there a dark side to exchange traded funds? An information perspective

We examine whether an increase in ETF ownership is accompanied by a decline in pricing efficiency for the underlying component securities. Our tests show an increase in ETF ownership is associated with (1) higher trading costs (bid-ask spreads and market liquidity), (2) an increase in “stock return synchronicity,” (3) a decline in “future earnings response coefficients,” and (4) a decline in the number of analysts covering the firm. Collectively, our findings support the view that increased ETF ownership can lead to higher trading costs and lower benefits from information acquisition. This combination results in less informative security prices for the underlying firms.     

Is silence golden? An empirical analysis of firms that stop giving quarterly earnings guidance

We investigate firms that stop providing earnings guidance (“stoppers”) either by publicly announcing their decision (“announcers”) or doing so quietly (“quiet stoppers”). Relative to firms that continue guiding, stoppers have poorer prior performance, more uncertain operating environments, and fewer informed investors. Announcers commit to non-disclosure because they (i) do not expect to report future good news or (ii) have lower incentives to guide due to the presence of long-term investors. The three-day return around the announcement is negative. Stoppers subsequently experience increases in analyst forecast dispersion and decreases in forecast accuracy but no change in return volatility or analyst following.     

Expected Mispricing: The Joint Influence of Accounting Transparency and Investor Base

We examine how accounting transparency and investor base jointly affect financial analysts' expectations of mispricing (i.e., expectations of stock price deviations from fundamental value). Within a range of transparency, these two factors interactively amplify analysts' expectations of mispricing—analysts expect a larger positive deviation when a firm's disclosures more transparently reveal income‐increasing earnings management and the firm's most important investors are described as transient institutional investors with a shorter‐term horizon (low concentration in holdings, high portfolio turnover, and frequent momentum trading) rather than dedicated institutional investors with a longer‐term horizon (high concentration in holdings, low portfolio turnover, and little momentum trading). Results are consistent with analysts anticipating that transient institutional investors are more likely than dedicated institutional investors to adjust their trading strategies for near‐term factors affecting stock mispricings. Our theory and findings extend the accounting disclosure literature by identifying a boundary condition to the common supposition that disclosure transparency necessarily mitigates expected mispricing, and by providing evidence that analysts' pricing judgments are influenced by their anticipation of different investors' reactions to firm disclosures.     

Discounting earnings with stochastic discount rates

This paper presents new equity valuation formulae in closed form that extend the abnormal earnings growth (AEG) valuation of Ohlson [2005. “On Accounting-Based Valuation Formulae.” Review of Accounting Studies 10: 323–347] to the cases of time-varying or stochastic cost of capital as in Ang and Liu [2004. “How to Discount Cash Flows with Time-Varying Expected Returns.” Journal of Finance 59 (6): 2745–2783] or to cases of stochastic interest rates as in Ang and Liu [2001. “A General Affine Earnings Valuation Model.” Review of Accounting Studies 6: 397–425]. Interest rates are modelled by quadratic term structure models, which are not hindered by restrictions to factors correlation or by other shortcomings of affine term structure models in discounting long-term earnings. This is crucial since valuation can be very sensitive to the correlation between the factors driving earnings and interest rates. Positive correlation reduces price-earnings ratios according to US data. Valuation is also sensitive to the ‘volatility’ of abnormal earnings growth. The residual earnings risk-neutral valuation of Ang and Liu (2001) is adapted to quadratic term structure models.     

Analyst Earnings Forecasts for Publicly Traded Insurance Companies

Several trends in the insurance and financial services industry, including demutualizationconsolidation, and deregulation, have attracted increasing attention from investors and financial analysts. This paper investigates the accuracy of the earnings forecasts of financial analysts for insurance companies. Our empirical results indicate that analyst forecasts outperform random walk time-series forecasts. Furthermore, we find that both disagreement over earnings forecasts among analysts and the relative forecasting error in the mean forecasts is smaller for life insurers than for property-casualty insurers, whereas the relative errors for forecasts for multiple-line insurers are in between the two. Forecasting error is a negative function of firm size and the number of analysts who are following a company, and is a positive function of the disagreement among analysts.Analyst forecasts have a timing advantage over the random walk model. Our results also suggest that the fair value reporting requirement (SFAS 115), which has been in effect since 1994, has enhanced the accuracy of analyst forecasts. The SFAS 115 has improved the superiority of analyst forecasts over the random walk forecasts for life insurers, but not for property-casualty insurers, and there is a weak improvement for multiple-line insurers. JEL Classification: G15     

Leaning Against the Wind: Debt Financing in the Face of Adversity

We offer evidence of a new stylized feature of corporate financing decisions: the tendency of managers to rely more on debt financing when earnings prospects are poor. We term this “leaning against the wind” and consider three possible explanations: market timing, precautionary financing, and “making the numbers.” We find no evidence in favor of the first two hypotheses, and provisionally accept the making the numbers hypothesis that managers who are under pressure due to unrealistically optimistic earnings expectations by analysts and deteriorating real opportunities will rely more heavily on debt financing to boost earnings per share and return on equity.     

Firms' Voluntary Recognition of Stock-Based Compensation Expense

We investigate factors associated with firms' decisions in 2002 and early 2003 to recognize stock‐based compensation expense under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 123. We find that the likelihood of SFAS 123 expense recognition is significantly related to the extent of the firm's participation in capital markets, the private incentives of top management and members of the board of directors, the level of information asymmetry, and political costs. Although recognizing firms have significantly smaller SFAS 123 expense, we find no significant incremental relation between recognition likelihood and SFAS 123 expense magnitude after controlling for other factors that we expect explain the recognition decision. We also find positive and significant announcement returns for earlier announcing firms, particularly those stating that increased earnings transparency motivates their decision.