Non-GAAP reporting following debt covenant violations

Review of Accounting Studies - We investigate whether firms change their non-GAAP reporting practices after debt covenant violations. We find that the likelihood that a firm will disclose non-GAAP...     

Real Incentive Effects of Soft Information

Both soft, noncontractible, and hard, contractible, information are informative about managerial ability and future firm performance. If a manager's future compensation depends on expectations of ability or future performance, then the manager has implicit incentives to affect the information. We examine the real incentive effects of soft information in a dynamic agency with limited commitment. When long-term contracts are renegotiated, the rewards for future performance inherent in long-term contracts allow the principal partial control over the implicit incentives. This is because the soft information affects the basis for contract renegotiation. With short-term contracts, the principal has no control over the basis for contract negotiation, and thus long-term contracts generally dominate short-term contracts. With long-term contracts, the principal's control over implicit incentives is characterized in terms of effective contracting on an implicit aggregation of the soft information that arises from predicting (forming expectations of) future performance. We provide sufficient conditions for soft information to have no real incentive effects. In general, implicit incentives not controllable by the principal include fixed effects, such as career concerns driven by labor markets external to the agency. When controllable incentives span the fixed effects of career concerns, the latter have no real effects with regard to total managerial incentives—they would optimally be the same with or without career concerns. Our analysis suggests empirical tests for estimating career concerns that should explicitly incorporate noncontractible information.     

Insights Regarding the Applicability of the Defining Issues Test to Advance Ethics Research with Accounting Students: A Meta-analytic Review

Numerous researchers have investigated accounting students’ levels of moral reasoning, ethical choice and judgment employing the Defining Issues Test (DIT) and using its P score as an indicator of moral reasoning. Not surprisingly, a number of DIT studies report conflicting results. Moreover, despite widespread use of the DIT, there is concern that it may not adequately measure all facets of ethical judgment (cf. Bailey et al., Behav Res Account 22(2):1–26, 2010). Thus, we endeavor to provide insight not only into the contradictory results but also about the applicability of the DIT for studying accounting students. To do so, we collect published and unpublished DIT studies employing accounting students as subjects and use meta-analysis to aggregate findings across these studies to quantify their results, examining commonly employed variables. We show significant relationships between P scores and some variables (length of professional experience, choice of major, political ideology, gender, GPA and education level) but not others (age). Further, our findings demonstrate that the DIT provides added insights when exploring questions of ethical choice, and ethics instruction, particularly when the instruction is embedded in an accounting course. Finally, we find that the level of DIT P scores reported in the studies relates to whether the study was published. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research.     

Auditing and the Purification of Blame

Although public sector special audit and performance audit are frequently involved in blame, very few studies (save for Radcliffe 1997) provide detailed empirical accounts on how auditing participates in blame allocation. This study sets out to study one case of blame allocation by describing and characterizing the origins of failure and antecedents leading to the need for blame allocation, the institutional entities and arrangements that participate in the blame game, and how these entities, including the supreme audit institution, are mobilized in the processes of blame allocation. Applying a case methodology with Actor–Network Theory principles, the study extends Hood's (2002, 2007) research on blame and blame avoidance strategies by showing how a blame‐frame evaluates and allocates blame. The contribution of the paper is in four parts: first, it reveals the mechanisms that cause scapegoating of particular people and the role of auditors as experts in such mechanisms; second, it assists to develop an understanding of some factors at the core of the “accountability paradox” noted by Roberts (2009); third, it contributes to explanations as to why failing public sector reforms survive controversy and scandal since a scapegoating process can “reboot” reforms by erasing the reform's problems; and fourth, it demonstrates that an understanding of blame can be a useful addition to Actor–Network Theory.     

Policy implications of research on non-GAAP reporting

Over the past two decades, the regulatory landscape for non-GAAP reporting has evolved significantly. Despite a temporary decline in the frequency of non-GAAP reporting following Regulation G, the incidence of non-GAAP disclosure has continued to increase steadily, leading to a current all-time high in reporting activity. This proliferation of non-GAAP disclosure has captured the attention of standard setters and regulators in recent years. This paper provides an academic perspective on policy implications for both regulation and standard setting. We contend that current Compliance and Disclosure Interpretations (C&DIs) of the SEC staff may perhaps have gone too far in restricting certain types of non-GAAP disclosures. As a result, we advocate a slight relaxation of the current enforcement of Regulation G. We agree with FASB proposals for greater disaggregation in the income statement to allow for more transparency in non-GAAP reporting. Finally, we believe the PCAOB should consider requiring auditors to take a more direct role with respect to non-GAAP disclosures.     

Higher Highs and Lower Lows: The Role of Corporate Social Responsibility in CEO Dismissal

Research summary: Investing a firm's resources in corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives remains a contentious issue. While research suggests firm financial performance is the primary driver of CEO dismissal, we propose that CSR will provide important additional context when interpreting a firm's financial performance. Consistent with this prediction, our results suggest that past CSR decisions amplify the negative relationship between financial performance and CEO dismissal. Specifically, we find that greater prior investments in CSR appear to expose CEOs of firms with poor financial performance to a greater risk of dismissal. In contrast, greater past investments in CSR appear to help shield CEOs of firms with good financial performance from dismissal. These findings provide novel insight into how CEOs' career outcomes may be affected by earlier CSR decisions. Managerial summary: In this study, we examined a potential personal consequence for CEOs related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). We explored the role prior investments in CSR play when a board evaluates the firm's financial performance and considers whether or not to fire the CEO. Our results suggest that while financial performance sets the overall tone of a CEO's evaluation, CSR amplifies that baseline evaluation. Specifically, our results suggest that greater past investments in CSR appear to (a) greatly increase the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is poor, and (b) somewhat reduce the likelihood of CEO dismissal when financial performance is good. Thus, striving to deliver profits in a socially responsible manner may have both positive and negative personal consequences. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Long memory in stock market volatility and the volatility-in-mean effect: The FIEGARCH-M Model

We extend the fractionally integrated exponential GARCH (FIEGARCH) model for daily stock return data with long memory in return volatility of Bollerslev and Mikkelsen (1996) by introducing a possible volatility-in-mean effect. To avoid that the long memory property of volatility carries over to returns, we consider a filtered FIEGARCH-in-mean (FIEGARCH-M) effect in the return equation. The filtering of the volatility-in-mean component thus allows the co-existence of long memory in volatility and short memory in returns. We present an application to the daily CRSP value-weighted cum-dividend stock index return series from 1926 through 2006 which documents the empirical relevance of our model. The volatility-in-mean effect is significant, and the FIEGARCH-M model outperforms the original FIEGARCH model and alternative GARCH-type specifications according to standard criteria.     

Sophisticated but confused: The impact of brand extension and motivation on source confusion

Legal and consumer psychology scholars have focused recent attention on source confusion, which is the likelihood that consumers will be confused regarding the company that is a product's source or sponsor. The authors evaluate two potential antecedents of source confusion: (1) consumer motivation and (2) a brand extension that has been undertaken by a competitor. There have been disagreements in the courts, the scholarly legal literature, and the consumer psychology literature concerning the nature and extent of the impact of these two variables on the likelihood of consumer confusion. Based on schema theory, the authors hypothesize that consumer motivation and brand extension will influence the likelihood of source confusion. An interaction between the two variables is proposed, with consumer motivation having an effect that is opposite to the effect typically identified in the literature and case law. The results of a controlled laboratory experiment support the theoretical predictions. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.