Risk‐Sharing or Risk‐Taking? Counterparty Risk,Incentives, and Margins

Derivatives activity, motivated by risk‐sharing, can breed risk‐taking. Bad news about the risk of an asset underlying a derivative increases protection sellers' expected liability and undermines their risk‐prevention incentives. This limits risk‐sharing, creates endogenous counterparty risk, and can lead to contagion from news about the hedged risk to the balance sheet of protection sellers. Margin calls after bad news can improve protection sellers' incentives and in turn enhance risk‐sharing. Central clearing can provide insurance against counterparty risk but must be designed to preserve risk‐prevention incentives.     

Can Interest‐Bearing Money Circulate? A Small‐Denomination Arkansan Experiment, 1861–63

Legal restrictions theory suggests that dominance of non-interest-bearing currency is possible only because legal impediments prevent financial institutions from offering interest-bearing alternatives. A viable interest-bearing medium must be issued in denominations low enough for day-to-day use, however, and without historical examples of small-denomination interest-bearing issues we cannot properly test whether interest-bearing currency will circulate as legal restrictions theory predicts. Civil War Arkansas offers a rare instance where large quantities of small-denomination interest-bearing money were actually issued, mostly below $5. The results of this Arkansan experiment show that small-denomination interest-bearing issues can indeed function as the primary medium of exchange.     

Does Say‐on‐Pay Matter? Evidence from Say‐on‐Pay Proposals in the United States

We investigate the effect of say‐on‐pay (SOP) proposals on changes in executive and director compensation. Relative to non‐SOP firms, SOP firms’ total compensation to CEOs does not significantly change after the proposal. However, the mix of compensation does change—companies move away from using cash compensation toward more incentive compensation, offsetting the reduction in bonus. Further, the mix of compensation of non‐CEO executives changes similarly to that of CEOs. Compensation to directors of SOP firms increases less than non‐SOP firms. Firms whose CEOs are well compensated, especially with cash‐based compensation, are most likely to receive a proposal.     

Marking‐to‐Market: Panacea or Pandora's Box?

Financial institutions have been at the forefront of the debate on the controversial shift in international standards from historical cost accounting to mark‐to‐market accounting. We show that the trade‐offs at stake in this debate are far from one‐sided. While the historical cost regime leads to some inefficiencies, marking‐to‐market may lead to other types of inefficiencies by injecting artificial risk that degrades the information value of prices, and induces suboptimal real decisions. We construct a framework that can weigh the pros and cons. We find that the damage done by marking‐to‐market is greatest when claims are (1) long–lived, (2) illiquid, and (3) senior. These are precisely the attributes of the key balance sheet items of banks and insurance companies. Our results therefore shed light on why banks and insurance companies have been the most vocal opponents of the shift to marking‐to‐market.     

When Is a Treasury Security On‐the‐Run?

The literature contains two conflicting definitions of the on‐the‐run period for Treasury securities. We address the conflict by empirically examining the implications of the two definitions. We conclude that it is important that researchers clearly understand the implications of each definition. Our results suggest that on‐the‐run activity spans different auction calendar time in T‐notes and T‐bills.     

Do Not‐For‐Profits Need Their Own Conceptual Framework?

This paper raises the issue of whether not‐for‐profit (NFP) oganisations require a conceptual framework that acknowledges their mission imperative and enables them to discharge their broader accountability. Relying on publicly available documentation and literature, it suggests the current Conceptual Frameworks for the for‐profit and public sectors are inadequate in meeting the accountability needs of NFPs. A NFP‐specific conceptual framework would allow the demonstration of broader NFP‐specific accountability and the formulation of NFP‐appropriate reporting practice, including the provision of financial and non‐financial reporting. The paper thus theoretically challenges existing financial reporting arrangements and invites debate on their future direction.     

How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.     

Are Stock‐for‐Stock Acquirers of Unlisted Targets Really Less Overvalued?

Extant studies assume that targets’ private ownership mitigates acquirers’ incentives and opportunities to finance acquisitions with inflated stocks. This view stems from the observation that, although the average stock‐for‐stock acquirer's merger announcement return is negative when the target is listed, it is positive when the target is unlisted. Accordingly, extant studies often suggest that announcements of stock‐for‐stock acquisitions of unlisted targets convey favorable private information about the acquirers. However, an analysis of stock‐for‐stock acquirers’ stock performance, abnormal accruals, net operating assets, and insider trading suggests the opposite. Acquirers of unlisted targets are generally more overvalued than acquirers of listed targets.     

What Drives Sell‐Side Analyst Compensation at High‐Status Investment Banks?

We use proprietary data from a major investment bank to investigate factors associated with analysts’ annual compensation. We find compensation to be positively related to “All‐Star” recognition, investment‐banking contributions, the size of analysts’ portfolios, and whether an analyst is identified as a top stock picker by the Wall Street Journal. We find no evidence that compensation is related to earnings forecast accuracy. But consistent with prior studies, we find analyst turnover to be related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that analyst forecasting incentives are primarily termination based. Additional analyses indicate that “All‐Star” recognition proxies for buy‐side client votes on analyst research quality used to allocate commissions across banks and analysts. Taken as a whole, our evidence is consistent with analyst compensation being designed to reward actions that increase brokerage and investment‐banking revenues. To assess the generality of our findings, we test the same relations using compensation data from a second high‐status bank and obtain similar results.     

Stock Return Predictability of Residual‐Income‐Based Valuation: Risk or Mispricing?

In an influential paper, Frankel and Lee (1998) conclude that the stock return predictability of the value‐to‐price ratio (V/P) results from market mispricing. This paper confirms whether the V/P reflects the rational risk premiums associated with the V/P factor or is better explained by market inefficiency. Following Daniel and Titman (1997), this paper examines whether the V/P characteristics or the V/P factor loadings predict stock returns. The findings show that the V/P loadings are positively associated with average returns even after controlling for the V/P characteristics in both time series and cross‐sectional tests. The overall results suggest that the mispricing explanation of the V/P effect is premature.     

Do the Investment and Return‐on‐Equity Factors Proxy for Economic Risks?

We study the information content of two new return factors, the investment factor (IA) and the return‐on‐equity factor (ROE), as proposed by Chen, Novy‐Marx, and Zhang in 2011. First, IA is a strong predictor for future gross domestic product (GDP) growth despite the presence of other financial and economic variables. IA subsumes the pricing power of the GDP factor for the cross section of asset returns. Second, ROE is closely related to innovations in dividend yield and term spread. When modeled together with innovations in state variables that forecast future investment opportunities, IA and ROE lose their explanatory power.     

Click or Call? Auction versus Search in the Over‐the‐Counter Market

Over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets dominate trading in many asset classes. Will electronic trading displace traditional OTC “voice” trading? Can electronic and voice systems coexist? What types of securities and trades are best suited for electronic trading? We study these questions by focusing on an innovation in electronic trading technology that enables investors to simultaneously search many bond dealers. We show that periodic one‐sided electronic auctions are a viable and important source of liquidity even in inactively traded instruments. These mechanisms are a natural compromise between bilateral search in OTC markets and continuous double auctions in electronic limit order books.     

Bank credit constraints for women‐led SMEs: Self‐restraint or lender bias?

We test the existence of possible gender biases affecting firm behavior in demanding and obtaining bank credit using a cross‐country sample of European small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs). We show consistent evidence that female‐led firms are more likely than their male counterparts to refrain from applying for loans. When they apply, female‐led enterprises do not seem to face gender discrimination from the lender. Interestingly, however, signs of gender bias appear to arise during the upside phase of the economy. Overall, our study provides support for policy actions aimed at reducing the frictions faced by women‐led SMEs when accessing credit markets.     

The Puzzle of Persistently Negative Interest‐Rate–Growth Differentials: Financial Repression or Income Catch‐Up?

The interest‐rate–growth differential (IRGD) plays a critical role in determining the sustainability of government debt. Yet it is striking that IRGDs are correlated with income levels, and are generally negative in emerging and developing economies, which contradicts standard economic theory. Negative IRGDs constitute a powerful debt‐stabilising force, driving down debt ratios or keeping them stable even in the presence of persistent primary deficits. Motivated by the puzzling facts, this paper examines the IRGDs for a large panel of advanced and non‐advanced economies by utilising a newly assembled data set. The evidence shows that large negative IRGDs in emerging and developing economies are largely due to real interest rates well below market equilibrium – stemming from financial repression and captive and distorted markets – whereas the income catch‐up process plays a relatively modest role. Therefore, the IRGD in non‐advanced economies is likely to rise with financial market development and financial global integration, perhaps even before their GDP per capita converges to advanced‐economy levels.     

2010,财富缩水战

"物价涨几个点无须着急."这个令人为之惊奇的言论,是国家发改委宏观研究院副院长刘福垣,在"2010亚洲经济合作论坛"上谈到当前国内物价时讲的.     

2010,货币信贷政策瞭望

2010年的货币信贷政策需要关注两方而外部风险：一是通胀压力会不断增大,二是信贷资金仍可能会流入房市和股市,推动资产价格的大起大落。     

2010,基金投资路

2009年的资本市场,又一次以超出大多数投资者预期的方式走完了多变的历程。以史为鉴,可以知兴替。2009年,基金业大变局在不知不觉中发生,股票方向基金业绩大幅反转,而债券型基金业绩表现相对弱势;新锐公司脱颖而出,业绩分化现象再现;指数基金异军突起,收益可观;QDII年度收益颇丰,凸显其全球配置优势。那么,2010年的基金投资路该怎么走?     

2010,货币信贷政策瞭望

2009年,货币信贷政策对于保八的作用非常明显,但在银行业的信贷扩张背后,结构失衡问题日益突出。2010年,在继续保持适度宽松货币政策的思路下,预计会出现各种微调的压力,这对于商业银行和监管层来说都面临新的挑战。     

High‐Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation,Long Horizons,and Portfolio Choice

We study the portfolio choice of hedge fund managers who are compensated by high-water mark contracts. We find that even risk-neutral managers do not place unbounded weights on risky assets, despite option-like contracts. Instead, they place a constant fraction of funds in a mean-variance efficient portfolio and the rest in the riskless asset, acting as would constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) investors. This result is a direct consequence of the in(de)finite horizon of the contract. We show that the risk-seeking incentives of option-like contracts rely on combining finite horizons and convex compensation schemes rather than on convexity alone.     

Do Low‐Priced Stocks Drive Long‐Term Contrarian Performance on the London Stock Exchange?

We investigate whether low‐priced stocks drive long‐term contrarian performance on the U.K. market. We find that contrarian performance at low, middle, and high price levels is positive. On the Fama‐French risk adjusted basis, we find both low‐priced and middle‐priced losers have significantly positive returns. When we adjust returns by market and liquidity risk, only middle‐priced losers maintain their positive returns. Our results reveal that low‐priced stocks are not fully responsible for contrarian performance. Our empirical evidence is generally consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and behavioral models of value investing.