Childcare quality and pricing: evidence from Wisconsin

Childcare prices vary dramatically both between and within states. We identify the effects of demographic and provider characteristics on childcare pricing, but focus primarily on whether unique government-provided information on childcare quality has an effect on pricing. Using provider-level observations across three adjacent counties in southern Wisconsin, we find that this government-provided information on childcare quality does not significantly affect pricing. Recognizing that information asymmetry may be the root cause of the insignificant relationship, we test the relationship further within multiple subsamples and with alternative models. Only the lowest quality childcare providers are significantly associated with lower prices in areas that we hypothesize suffer from greater information asymmetry.     

The Relationship between the Environmental and Financial Performance of Public Utilities

A growing body of research has centered on theissue of the relationship between financial andenvironmental performance. The lack ofconsensus in this literature can be attributedto several factors. The cost of complying withenvironmental regulation can be significant anddetrimental to shareholder wealth maximization.Conversely, a firm that can effectively controlpollution might also be able to effectivelycontrol other costs of production and henceearn a higher rate of return. We utilize datafrom the Investor Responsibility ResearchCenter as well as a proprietary database toinvestigate the relationship betweenenvironmental performance and financialperformance in electric utilities. Utilities,as producers and distributors of energy,produce substantial amounts of pollution.However, since public utilities are regulated,studying the financial and environmentalperformance of utilities affords us theopportunity to see what role regulation playsin enhancing or diminishing the relationshipbetween financial and environmentalperformance.Our results differ from earlier studies in thatwe find do not find a positive relationshipbetween holding period returns and anindustry-adjusted measure of environmentalperformance nor do we find that regulatoryclimate appears to explain returns. While theredoes not appear to be a clearly definedrelationship between regulatory climate and acompliance based measure of environmentalperformance, there is evidence of a negativerelationship between financial return and amore pro-active measure of environmentalperformance. We offer several possibleinterpretations of these results and extensionsfor future research.     

The Impact of Price Regulation on the Cost of Capital

This paper investigates how price regulation under moral hazard can affect a regulated firm's cost of capital. We consider stylized versions of the two most typical regulatory frameworks that have been applied in the most recent decades by regulators: Price Cap and Cost of Service. We show that there is a trade‐off between lower operational costs and a higher cost of capital under Price Cap regulation and higher operational costs and a lower cost of capital under Cost of Service regulation. As a result, when the extent of moral hazard is not significant, Price Cap regulation generates lower welfare than does Cost of Service regulation.     

The threat of regulatory environmental inspection: impact on plant performance

The expected costs of violating a regulation would typically increase if the probability of regulatory inspection increases. Thus, changes in the anticipated threat of inspection should affect firm compliance. Like environmental protection agencies in several other countries, the Norwegian agency typically emphasizes compliance with institutional requirements (e.g. firm-internal routines and auditing systems) rather than emission caps. Using a panel dataset of polluting Norwegian plants, we find that the threat of inspection significantly reduces the probability of serious violation. However, emissions are not significantly affected. We point at various reasons for the regulator to emphasize institutional requirements, but we also argue that the lack of effect on emissions encourages the agency to review the pros and cons of the common emphasis on institutional requirements over emissions.      

Regulation,renegotiation and capital structure: theory and evidence from Latin American transport concessions

We examine the capital structure of regulated infrastructure firms. We develop a model showing that leverage, the ratio of liabilities to assets, is lower under high-powered regulation and that firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage when the cost of debt increases. We test the predictions of the model using an original panel dataset of 124 transport concessions in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru over 1992–2011. For each concession we have data on the regulatory regime, annual financial performance and contract renegotiations. We begin by demonstrating that, although pervasive, contract renegotiations do not fundamentally alter the regulatory regime. Importantly, firms are not systematically able to renegotiate when in financial difficulty, implying that price cap contracts remain high-powered in practice. We use this result for our main empirical work, where we find broad support for our theoretical predictions: when the cost of debt increases, firms operating under high-powered regulation make proportionally larger reductions in leverage.     

The World of Regulatory Influence

Models of firms’ influence over the regulatory agencies that oversee them have traditionally been constrained by several factors, including a lack of direct measures of “influence,” an inability to account for variations in the institutional environment within which firms operate, and a nearly singular focus on industry-level measures of interest group strengths. In this paper, we employ a global database and novel measures to provide a fresh look at the determinants of firms’ influence over regulatory agencies. We find that in addition to traditional industry-level determinants, important country-level institutional and firm-level determinants affect firms’ regulatory agency influence. We also find that regulatory process variations affect firms’ influence over regulators. With these empirical estimates in hand, we generate a Regulatory Influence Index that ranks influence levels of typical firms that operate in each sample country in the dataset, and then discuss the substantial country-level variation in regulatory agency influence that obtains.     

Quality competition,welfare, and regulation

In this paper, we study the supply of quality in imperfectly competitive markets, and explore the role of regulation in markets where firms may use both quality and price to compete for customers. In a model where firms first choose qualities and then prices, we find that quality decisions have strategic effects: firms react to quality disadvantages by price reductions. Because of this strategic effect, firms do not have the correct incentive to set socially efficient quality levels. Price and quality competition results in a socially suboptimal quality level. Efficiency can be restored by lump-sum transfers and price regulatory policies. Simple price regulation may result in lower price and higher quality.We thank Nicholas Economides, Randall Ellis, Thomas McGuire, Michael Riordan, and Monika Schnitzer for discussing various issues in this research with us. We are also grateful to a referee for helpful comments and suggestions. The first author acknowledges support from the Management Science Group, Department of Veterans Affairs at Bedford, Massachusetts. The ideas here do not represent those of the Department of Veterans Affairs.     

Regulation of State-Owned and Privatized Utilities: Ukraine Electricity Distribution Company Performance*

Both ownership and regulation affect the behavior of utility managers. Private ownership rewards managerial decisions that enhance shareholder value. Regulatory incentives reward behavior that affects profits and costs. An empirical analysis of 24 Ukraine electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2002 indicates that privately owned firms do respond to incentives that add to net cash flows (associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses). However, they also respond more aggressively than do state-owned distribution utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) regulatory incentives that increase shareholder value but decrease cost efficiency. This study was initiated while Val Tsaplin was a PURC Visiting Scholar with funding from the FSA Contemporary Issues Fellowship Program. Michael Pollitt, David Sappington, Fernando Damonte, and an unknown reviewer provided very helpful comments on earlier drafts. We thank Patricia Mason for copy-editing the paper. The conclusions do not necessarily represent the views of organizations with which the researchers are affiliated.     

Family Policies and Female Employment in Japan

This paper discusses how childcare and parental leave policies affect female employment by reviewing the international evidence and recent papers on Japan. These papers estimate causal effects of policies by exploiting policy changes, which is a more credible identification strategy than those applied in earlier observational studies. The literature on parental leave finds that a more generous leave package tends to delay mothers’ return to work, but it does not have detrimental effects on maternal labour supply in the medium to long run. Some papers also find that provision of job protection for around 1 year can increase maternal employment, but longer job protection has little additional effects. The literature on childcare policies finds that maternal employment does not necessarily increase, because the expansion of childcare may crowd out informal childcare arrangements, such as care provided by grandparents. Findings by recent papers on Japan are largely consistent with the international evidence.     

Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities

This paper investigates the relationship between investment and regulatory regimes (incentive vs. rate-of-return regulation) for a sample of EU energy utilities from 1997 to 2007. We control for the effect of firm ownership and for cross-country differences in the underlying energy demand and energy supply. To deal with potential endogeneity of the regulatory regime, we apply instrumental variable methods (2SLS and GMM). Our results show that investment rate is higher under incentive regulation than under rate of return regulation. Using original data on the regulatory tools (X factor and WACC), we find that investment of incentive regulated firms appears highly sensitive to the X factor, consistent with efficiency- and profit-seeking motivations. Electric utilities investment is also sensitive to the level and change in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, we find that the positive relationship between private control and investment is not robust to IV estimations, suggesting that in Europe regulation may have reduced the differences between private and public firms’ incentives to invest.     

Environmental Protection,Agency Motivations,and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana

Direct environmental regulation has been in place in the United States for more than twenty-five years. Yet there has been little study of what actually affects regulatory enforcement levels. This study examines enforcement issues by focusing on water quality enforcement by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality. The study finds that penalties are more likely to occur, and are likely to be higher, the more serious a firm's violation of a regulation. Penalties are also more likely, and likely to be higher, if a firm has a previous record of environmental violations. In contrast to other studies, however, we do not find that enforcement varies across regional offices. In addition, we did not find any systematic effects of the Weingast and Moran (1983) theory of legislative dominance. We did, however, find evidence of rent extraction, along the lines of McChesney (1987; 1991).     

The business environment and Moroccan firm productivity

The paper focuses on the role of the business environment in understanding differences in the total factor productivity of Moroccan firms. The business environment is captured by measures which include the investment climate in which firms operate, i.e. access to credit, regulatory and institutional environment and infrastructure. The evidence on the relationship between credit and productivity is strongly indicative of credit resources misallocation in Morocco. We also find that, heavier bureaucracy and differences in regulations appear to have a negative effect on firm productivity. This last result is particularly relevant for small firms, and/or those that do not export and/or those with no access to foreign capital.     

The Financial and Operational Impacts of FERC Order 636 on the Interstate Natural Gas Pipeline Industry

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Order 636 fundamentally altered the regulatory and operational environment of the natural gas industry in 1992, as the culmination of several directives aimed at relaxing regulation and fostering competition. We hypothesize that gas pipeline firms subsequently changed their operational and financial behavior in ways consistent with reduced balkanization, increased competition, and reduced expense preference behavior. Our results indicate that these firms have become more homogeneous financially but less so operationally. We find evidence that the marginal profitability of various pipeline activities has responded more to financial market conditions than to the regulatory environment.     

What influences firms’ perceptions?

Perceptions-based indicators are sometimes used to measure the quality of the business environment. For instance, firms are asked about the major constraints on business operations and expansion. Little is known, however, about what shapes their responses. In this paper, using perceptions-based indicators from 38 countries (84 country-year pairs) from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, we argue that firm responses are critically influenced by macroeconomic conditions. Paradoxically, we find that perceptions worsen during periods of high GDP growth. We also examine other indicators from the Enterprise Surveys that are objective measures of constraints, and find mixed evidence on how business constraints vary with the business cycle. Finally, we find that firms that introduce new product lines, which are likely those with the most interactions with regulatory agencies, have particularly bad perceptions of the business environment. We conclude that changes in firms’ perceptions over time may not reflect changes in the business environment.     

Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are Incomplete

The investment of a regulated firm affects the service/good provided on many dimensions. Should an integrated regulator take care of them all? Or is it better to have separate regulators responsible for them? We analyze the effect of the separation of regulatory powers on the regulated firm's ex ante incentive to invest in a “cooperative” innovation. The effects of the innovation are not verifiable and the cost of investing is sunk, hence, there is a problem of hold‐up. We find that when the innovation produces opposite effects the ex ante firm's incentive to invest is larger in the case of separation than in the case of integrated regulation. We also stress the risk of over‐investment that the separation of regulatory powers may induce. We maintain that along with classical incentive regulation—which mainly provides incentives for the firm to be efficient—the separation of regulatory powers may play a role in providing an incentive for cooperative innovations.     

Fertility,household structure,and parental labor supply: Evidence from China

This study examines the effects of fertility on household structure and parental labor supply in China. To solve the endogeneity problem, we use a unique survey on households with twin children and a comparison group of non-twin households. The ordinary least squares estimates show a negative correlation between fertility and parental labor supply in rural China. Using twinning as a natural experiment, we do not find evidence on the negative effects of fertility on parental labor supply. By contrast, we find that the twinning-induced increase in fertility significantly enhances the coresidence of grandparents in rural China. We suggest that the negative effects of fertility on parental labor supply are mitigated by the childcare provided by grandparents in rural China. We also find that fertility does not induce coresidence of grandparents in urban China. Our results have important implications for population and public childcare policies.     

声誉激励、社会监督与质量规制——城市垃圾处理行业中的博弈分析

我国实施市政公用事业市场化改革以来,民营企业通过竞标等方式从政府手中获取特许经营权,凭借其垄断地位和信息优势降低服务标准,导致垃圾处理行业陷入质量规制的困境。本文针对城市垃圾处理行业的问题,先是构建以规制机构与垃圾处理特许经营企业为参与者的博弈模型,分析了声誉激励和社会监督对博弈参与双方损益及其策略的影响;然后构建纳入举报机制的由社会民众、规制机构和特许经营企业三方参与的序列博弈模型。研究得出四点结论：（1）减少规制成本,增加对违规垃圾处理企业的惩罚力度,可减少企业违规概率;（2）声誉激励和社会监督均可减少垃圾处理特许经营企业违规概率;（3）社会监督有助于节约规制成本,减弱规制机构与企业间信息不对称程度,提高规制效率;（4）规制机构的检查行为与公众举报行为之间存在明显的互补性。最后针对性地提出了提高城市垃圾处理行业质量规制效果的政策建议。     

Analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity: evidence from regulation changes in China’s IPO market

This article investigates the relation between analyst coverage and stock return synchronicity in the IPO market. Using a unique data set in China from 2005 to 2012, we find a significantly different effect of analyst coverage on synchronicity before and after the implementation of important 2009 IPO regulation changes in China. Specifically, we document that analyst coverage reduces synchronicity but that this effect is significant only after 2009. In addition, we extend this research to further distinguish the information production role of underwriter and independent analysts. We find that prior to 2009, underwriter analysts’ coverage decreases synchronicity but independent analysts’ coverage does not. However, in the post-2009 period, both types of analyst coverage are significantly and inversely associated with synchronicity. Overall, our results support analysts’ role as producers of firm-specific information in an emerging IPO market and shows that this role depends on the institutional environment.     

国际旅游岛建设旅游用地生态效应调控机制研究

中国经济的迅速崛起,产业结构的高端化形势,海南岛所处的改革前沿、政治战略地位和地缘优势催生了国际旅游岛国家战略,旅游业快速发展超过人们的预期。海南沿海及周边岛屿是国际旅游岛建设的核心地区,环境相对封闭,生态系统较为脆弱。不尽合理的旅游用地规划、低效的旅游地生态效应调控技术手段和缺位的生态监管机制旅游地生态系统管理政策措施,已造成海南旅游用地的环境污染和生态破坏。文章认为必须建立海南国际旅游岛旅游产业用地的生态效应评估和生态监管机制。(1)加强国际旅游岛建设生态效应的研究,预测国际旅游岛建设生态效应发展趋势。(2)设立旅游用地生态准入制度,建立旅游用地生态效应评估机制。(3)设计生态系统管理优化范式,制订旅游产业生态效应调控政策。(4)制订旅游用地生态安全评价指标体系,建立生态安全预警模型。以有效调控旅游用地生态效应,为旅游用地生态监管、旅游产业结构调整奠定科学基础与决策依据,改善海南省生态环境质量,提高生态安全等级,提升海南国际旅游岛建设综合效益。     

电信广电应分业规制还是统一规制——基于跨国数据的实证研究

针对三网融合进程中规制机构应采取分业规制还是统一规制的问题,利用国际电联的规制机构问卷调查数据,建立规制机构设置模式的Probit选择模型。实证结果表明,产业技术经济特征和国家制度环境是影响规制体制设计的关键因素,同时经济和社会因素也对此有重要影响,这验证了规制制度设计需满足技术理性和制度理性的基本原则。基于基准比较方法得出的选择概率预测结果,得到我国应该对电信与广电业实施统一规制的政策结论。