Narcissism is a bad sign: CEO signature size,investment, and performance

Using the size of CEO signatures in SEC filings to measure individual narcissism, we find that CEO narcissism is associated with several negative firm outcomes. We first validate signature size as a measure of narcissism but not overconfidence using two laboratory studies, and also find that our measure is correlated with employee perceptions of CEO narcissism used in prior research. We then use CEO signatures to study the relation between CEO narcissism and the firm’s investment policies and performance. CEO narcissism is associated with overinvestment, particularly in R&D and M&A expenditures (but not in capital expenditures). Firms led by narcissistic CEOs experience lower financial productivity in the form of profitability and operating cash flows. Despite this negative performance, narcissistic CEOs enjoy higher absolute and relative compensation. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications, including controlling for a popular options-based overconfidence measure used in prior research.     

CEO power,M&A decisions,and market reactions

In this study we examine the relationship between CEO power, corresponding acquisition activities and market reactions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements with a Canadian M&A dataset (1997–2005). We use CEO excess pay as a proxy for CEO power. Our empirical results show that the market reactions to M&A announcements are not related to CEO power. It implies that powerful CEOs do not necessarily make value destroying acquisitions. Our results further show that CEO power levels are significantly higher for acquiring firms compared to the CEOs of non-acquiring firms. In other words, CEOs with more relative power make more acquisitions. Such acquisitions will increase the size of the firm and will allow CEOs to demand a higher compensation level for managing larger asset pools and to derive higher performance incentives that are also generally tied to firm size.     

Glamour versus value,market timing and firm performance: evidence from mergers and acquisitions

This study examines the performance of glamour versus value firms in M&As. Specifically, the current study takes into account the market timing to explore the performance of glamour versus value firms in M&As. Using the standard event study methodology with 1109 targets and 6980 bidders during the 2000–2013 period, the results show that glamour (value) firms are more likely to choose the hot (cold) market condition to engage in M&As for both targets and bidders. The evidence also reveals that the performance of glamour versus value firms is less sensitive to the market timing for targets. While glamour bidding firms obtain lower announcement returns, the losses are even more significant during long run post-announcement period. A further analysis indicates that bidders in general experience negative announcement returns in the hot market irrespective of glamour versus value firms. While glamour bidding firms obtain lower post-announcement returns in the hot market relative to their value counterparts, glamour bidders generate higher post-announcement returns during the cold market than value bidders. The regression analysis finds consistent results for bidders. Overall, this study sheds lights on the importance of the market timing on the performance of glamour versus value firms in M&As.     

Corporate governance when founders are directors

We examine chief executive officer (CEO) compensation, CEO retention policies, and mergers and acquisition (M&A) decisions in firms in which founders serve as a director with a nonfounder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay-for-performance sensitivity for nonfounder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high-powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average US board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared with nonfounder firms.     

Managerial ability,corporate social culture,and M&As

We investigate the predictive power of corporate social culture, as measured by corporate social responsibility (CSR) intensity, on shareholder wealth when mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are carried out by managers with different traits. We find acquiring firms with talented managers are more inclined to engage in CSR activities to shape corporate social culture, thereby realizing larger short- and long-term gains than their counterparts. We also document that acquiring firms with higher levels of CSR commitment led by talented managers tend to acquire targets of similar corporate social culture and experience significantly positive post-merger returns, suggesting that corporate cultural similarity constitutes an important source of M&A synergies. These findings suggest that corporate culture built through stakeholder relations acts as a differentiation strategy that pays off when skilled managers engage in M&As, which typically prompt information asymmetries between managers and outsiders.     

The spillover effect of financial information in mergers and acquisitions

In this study we investigate whether and how a firm's investment activities are affected by the financial information of peer firms on merger and acquisition (M&A) efficiency. Using changes in M&A accounting performance to measure efficiency, we find a positive association between the post-M&A accounting performance of an acquiring firm and that of previous peer acquirers. We show that this spillover effect is derived from peer firms with improved rather than poorer post-M&A accounting performance. We also find that the spillover effect varies with the characteristics of both the acquiring and the peer firms. The effect is stronger when the peer firms are larger, are non-SOEs (vs. SOEs), have improved accounting performance after M&As and undertake M&As with unrelated (vs. related) entities, and when the acquiring firms are smaller, non-SOEs (vs. SOEs) and have poorer accounting performance before M&As.     

The influence of corporate social responsibility on investment efficiency and innovation

We examine two important channels through which corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects firm value: investment efficiency and innovation. We find that firms with higher CSR performance invest more efficiently: these firms are less prone to invest in negative net present value (NPV) projects (overinvestment) and less prone to forego positive NPV projects (underinvestment). We also find that firms with higher CSR performance generate more patents and patent citations. Mediation analysis indicates that firms with higher CSR performance are more profitable and valuable, consequences partially attributable to efficient investments and innovation. These results, robust to alternate model specifications, lend support to enlightened stakeholder theory.     

CEO任期与企业资本投资

本文基于管理者在一定约束条件下追求自身利益最大化的逻辑思路,分析管理者任期与企业资本投资之间的关系,重点检验我国上市公司CEO的既有任期和预期任期对企业投资水平和投资效率的影响。研究结果发现,在管理者任期与投资水平的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业表现一致:CEO的既有任期越长,企业的投资水平越高;CEO的预期任期越短,企业的投资水平越低。在管理者任期与投资效率的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业表现不同:非国有企业的过度投资程度与CEO的既有任期及预期任期无关,而国有企业CEO的既有任期越长,过度投资问题越严重;CEO的预期任期越短,过度投资问题越能得到缓解。     

Mergers and acquisitions in the US property-liability insurance industry: Productivity and efficiency effects

This paper analyzes the productivity and efficiency effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the US property-liability insurance industry during the period 1994–2003 using data envelopment analysis (DEA) and Malmquist productivity indices. We seek to determine whether M&As are value-enhancing, value-neutral, or value-reducing. The analysis examines efficiency and productivity change for acquirers, acquisition targets, and non-M&A firms. We also examine the firm characteristics associated with becoming an acquirer or target through probit analysis. The results provide evidence that M&As in property-liability insurance were value-enhancing. Acquiring firms achieved more revenue efficiency gains than non-acquiring firms, and target firms experienced greater cost and allocative efficiency growth than non-targets. Factors other than efficiency enhancement are important factors in property-liability insurer M&As. Financially vulnerable insurers are significantly more likely to become acquisition targets, consistent with corporate control theory, and we also find evidence that M&As are motivated to achieve diversification. However, there is no evidence that scale economies played an important role in the insurance M&A wave.     

Long-term performance of mergers and acquisitions in ASEAN countries

The study looks at mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in ASEAN countries and examines the post-M&A performance using data from 2001 to 2012. The industry-adjusted operating performance tends to decline in the 3 years following an M&A. Yet, the results suggest that M&As completed during the financial crisis are more profitable than those implemented before and/or after the crisis. We argue that this is mainly due to the synergies created between the firms’ resources during the crisis which augur well for firms’ economic performance. We find that, during the crisis, certain characteristics of the firms like the relative size of the target, cross-border nature of deals, acquirer's cash reserves and friendly nature of deals are important determinants of long-term post-M&A operating performance. However, for M&As during the crisis, there appears to be no relationship between performance and firms’ characteristics linked to M&A activity such as payment method, industry relatedness and percentage of target's share acquired.     

Lead independent directors and investment efficiency

I show that the presence of a lead independent director on the corporate board is positively associated with investment efficiency. The result is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance standards, less transparent financial disclosure, and greater financial constraints. The lead director presence is negatively associated with overinvestment (underinvestment) for firms with large cash balances and low leverage (high cash flow volatility). Moreover, the lead director investment-related committee membership as well as CEO power matter in this setting. The lead director board role is also positively associated with future firm performance.     

Integrating corporate social responsibility criteria into executive compensation and firm innovation: International evidence

Using a large sample of firms from 30 countries, we find that the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) criteria into executive compensation is associated with greater innovation output in countries around the world. We also find that this positive association is stronger in countries with weak stakeholder orientation, countries with weak legal environments, and countries without mandatory CSR reporting requirements. These findings suggest that CSR contracting can compensate for institutional voids and high stakeholder demand for CSR, and thereby foster firm innovation. The results of the channel analyses suggest that a greater level of employee innovation productivity, enhanced managerial risk-taking, and greater responsiveness of firms' R&D investment to their investment opportunities play a significant role in the association between CSR contracting and innovation. Overall, our study demonstrates in a global context the importance of linking executive compensation to nonfinancial criteria in addition to financial criteria, and it documents the heterogeneity in the effect of CSR contracting on firm innovation in different countries.     

Corporate social responsibility culture and international M&As

We examine the role of corporate culture in M&As by utilizing a unique corporate social responsibility (CSR) dataset, providing in-depth information on multiple dimensions of organizational culture in 22 developed markets. In accordance with the prediction of the culture clash theory, a wider divergence between the CSR corporate cultures of the acquiring and target firms is associated with lower acquirer announcement and long-run returns as well as synergistic gains for the combined firm. Cultural misalignment also increases the time required to finalise a deal, reduces the likelihood of deal completion and the percentage of stock payment. Our results are robust to alternative explanations (e.g., similarities in national culture, acquirer CSR performance, institutional configurations), different regression specifications, and additional cultural misalignment measures. Our findings highlight the importance of the need for a deeper understanding of the role of CSR for the target selection process, integration planning, and financing choice of M&As to corporations and their investors.     

The role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection

Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are among the most important investment activities for companies, but they contain great risks. We investigate the role of accounting conservatism in M&A target selection and risk. We find that for risk-averse reasons, firms with high accounting conservatism are likely to acquire profitable targets and avoid loss-making targets. When such firms acquire loss-making targets, the conservatism’s risk-control role reduces M&A risk and increases M&A performance, but only when control of the target is transferred and the acquirer has high long-term debt and low management power. Furthermore, accounting conservatism reduces risk by increasing the maturity match between cash flow and debt. Our results suggest that accounting conservatism plays not only a risk-averse role but also a risk-control role, providing new evidence for the usefulness of accounting conservatism in M&A decisions.     

Zombie Board: Board Tenure and Firm Performance

We show that board tenure exhibits an inverted U‐shaped relation with firm value and accounting performance. The quality of corporate decisions, such as M&A, financial reporting quality, and CEO compensation, also has a quadratic relation with board tenure. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that directors’ on‐the‐job learning improves firm value up to a threshold, at which point entrenchment dominates and firm performance suffers. To address endogeneity concerns, we use a sample of firms in which an outside director suffered a sudden death, and find that sudden deaths that move board tenure away from (toward) the empirically observed optimum level in the cross‐section are associated with negative (positive) announcement returns. The quality of corporate decisions also follows an inverted U‐shaped pattern in a sample of firms affected by the death of a director.     

Corporate social responsibility and inside debt: The long game

We examine the effect of CEO inside debt on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We document a positive relation between CEO inside debt and CSR. This positive relation is attenuated not only when firms face high risk, but also when firms have high short-term institutional ownership. Our evidence supports the view that CEOs with large inside debt holdings are more concerned about firm sustainability and, are therefore more likely to prefer CSR for long-term firm benefits, i.e., the long game. We also find that CSR and CEO inside debt jointly exert a significantly positive impact on long-run stock performance, particularly in the presence of a low level of short-term institutional holdings. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of aligning institutional investor preferences with CEO incentives in order to maximize shareholder benefits from CSR investment.     

One way out of the share pledging quagmire: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Share pledging by controlling shareholders is accompanied with a risk of control transfer when stock price decline triggers a margin call. This situation motivates controlling shareholders and firms to initiate value-enhancing activities to manage the pledging quagmire. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to implement mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than other firms. Their M&As also perform better, regardless of whether using short- or long-term stock returns or operating income as the performance measure. Furthermore, the positive effect of share pledging on M&As is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, firms with individual controlling shareholders (especially families), firms with better governance, and firms with higher financial capabilities. Additional analyses on deal types also show that firms with pledging controlling shareholders are more likely to engage in diversified, non-affiliated, and cash-financed acquisitions. These results consistently suggest that M&As may effectively eliminate firms' pledging risks and that share pledging mitigates shareholders' conflict of interest regarding M&A decisions.     

Does takeover activity affect stock price crash risk? Evidence from international M&A laws

We exploit the staggered initiation of merger and acquisition (M&A) laws across countries as a plausibly exogenous shock to the threat of takeover to examine whether the market for corporate control has a real effect on firm-level stock price crash risk. Using a difference-in-differences regression on a large sample of firms from 32 countries, we find that stock price crash risk significantly decreases following the passage of M&A laws. This effect is stronger for firms domiciled in countries with poorer investor protection and information environments and for firms with weaker firm-level governance. Further, financial reporting opacity and overinvestment significantly decrease in the post-M&A law periods. Our study suggests that an active takeover market has a disciplining effect on managerial bad news hoarding and leads to lower future crash risk.     

Generalists vs. specialists: Who are better acquirers?

We examine the impact of lifetime work experience of top executives on mergers and acquisitions (M&As) behavior and outcome. Based on hand-collected data of top executives in a sample of Chinese firms during 2002–2018, we construct a generalist ability index of top executives to study the impact of generalist top executives (GTEs) vs. specialist top executives (STEs) on M&As. Our findings suggest that GTEs conduct more M&As than those of STEs. The results are robust to alternate specifications of M&A frequencies and after accounting for endogeneity issue. Furthermore, the M&A announcement and long-term returns are better for acquirers with GTEs than those with STEs. We attribute the findings to GTEs' ability of searching target ex ante, making the M&A process efficient, and fully leveraging their social networks post M&A. In addition, we find the increase in M&A activities in GTE firms are primarily due to GTEs' experience of M&As rather than their talents. Finally, the M&As from GTEs improve investment efficiency and are less likely to divest targets post M&As. In sum, GTEs conduct more M&As and they create value in the process.     

Cross-border mergers and acquisitions and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from Chinese listed firms

This study examines the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on acquirers’ corporate social responsibility (CSR). Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with cross-border M&A activities experience an improvement in subsequent CSR performance. Specifically, the CSR rating is approximately 8.24% higher in firms with cross-border M&As than in those without such activities. We also find that this positive influence is more pronounced in firms with low initial CSR ratings than in those with high initial CSR ratings at the time when a cross-border M&A deal is completed. Additional analyses reveal that this positive effect is mainly driven by the target firms from countries with high social preference relative to China and that the enhancement in CSR driven by cross-border M&As translates into higher operating performance and easier access to finance. Overall, our findings demonstrate that cross-border M&As can serve as a critical channel for acquirers from a country with low institutional quality to build a better reputation through environmentally friendly behaviour and socially responsible engagement, and therefore gain capital market benefits.