Firm-level determinants of tax evasion in transition economies

Business tax evasion is an important issue for governments. Yet the factors that determine business tax evasion have not been sufficiently examined in the literature in general, and in transition contexts in particular. To address this gap, this study uses the WB/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) database with a sample of over 12,692 firms from 26 transition economies. Applying various modelling strategies, we argue that tax evasion is a function of firm-level and institutional-level variables. We contribute to the literature by providing robust evidence showing that the perceived tax burden has a positive impact on tax evasion. We also find that the tax evasive behaviour of firms is positively influenced by low trust in government and in the judicial system as well as by higher perceptions of corruption and higher compliance costs. We find that smaller firms, individual businesses and firms in sectors that are less visible to the tax administration are more likely to get involved in evasive behaviour. Overall, institutional factors play an important role in determining firms’ tax evasion behaviour in transition economies. This finding has important policy implications.     

Do governments tax agglomeration rents?

Empirical evidence suggests that firms receive rents from locating in economic agglomerations and industry clusters. Using the German local business tax as a testing ground, we empirically investigate whether these agglomeration rents are taxable for local governments. The analysis exploits a rich data source on the population of German plants to construct measures for the communities’ agglomeration characteristics. The findings indicate that economic agglomerations and industry clusters exert a positive impact on the jurisdictional tax rate choice. Further analysis moreover suggests that a municipality’s potential to tax agglomeration rents depends on its firm and industry agglomeration relative to neighboring communities. To account for potential endogeneity problems, our analysis exploits long-lagged population and infrastructure variables as instruments for the agglomeration measures.     

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

The choice of tax base by local authorities: voter preferences, special interest groups, and tax base diversification

We analyze local jurisdictions’ behaviors when selecting the type of tax levied in support of local services. Our analysis focuses on taxes that must be approved by voters. Taxes differ in their incidence; thus, even when proposed revenue amounts are held constant, voting patterns and the aggregate level of voter support differ among potential revenue sources. We use a general model of political cost minimization to derive three hypotheses about local tax authorities’ behaviors. Using Ohio school district data, we find that the expected probability of passage is a highly important determinant of tax choice. Further, there is evidence that special interest groups wield influence greater than their direct impact on voting behavior, and evidence that tax authorities attempt to diversify their tax structure.     

Labor mobility and the incidence of the residential property tax

This paper analyzes the incidence of the residential property tax in an economy with two communities. Workers are perfectly mobile so that their utility levels are equal in the two communities in equilibrium. The property tax is modeled as an ad valorem tax on housing services.     

A Comparison Between One‐Tier and Two‐Tier Board Structures in France

French companies operate in a unique environment characterized by the strong involvement of block shareholders such as families and banks. Furthermore, the French legal system allows firms to choose between a one‐tier or a two‐tier board structure. This study investigates whether this choice can affect the firm's operating and stock performance. Our regression results provide strong evidence that ownership and board structures are used together as corporate governance tools. In particular, the agency cost of debt is strongly affected by their interaction when institutional investors are also bank lenders. Our test results show that while family control has a negative impact on corporate governance, French institutional blockholders play a positive role as monitors of one‐tier structures. In contrast, they are more likely to misuse the two‐tier board system by promoting interlocked directorship, board opacity and their own interests as creditors. Our regression analysis reveals that foreign institutional investors do not have any impact on firm performance, regardless of board structure. Finally, we do not find any inverse relationship between board size and efficiency in France.     

Impulse response function analysis of the impacts of land value-added tax policy on government performance

In this study, an epsilon-based network data envelopment analysis is employed to construct assessment mechanisms for government performance. Moreover, performance indicators of two dimensions of tax collection efficiency and financial effectiveness are measured. We propose a vector autoregression model in which all economic variables are regarded as dependent variables to address the disadvantages of traditional regression model. The conclusions are as follows: (a) measures of tax collection efficiency deteriorated, whereas those of financial effectiveness improved. (b) In an impulse response analysis of the model, an increase in government-published land values produced significantly increased tax collection efficiency.     

Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file

In a situation in which people who are required to fill in a tax-return coexist with tax-return-exempt people, we prove that the optimal audit policy leads to different tax compliance behavior, depending on the difficulty of detecting an evader who does not fill in a tax return, passing himself of as a non-taxpayer.     

Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.      

Local business taxation and competition for capital: the choice of the tax rate

A theoretical model describes the local choice of the tax rate on capital income. It establishes preferences and various fiscal conditions — including the tax rates of competing jurisdictions — as determinants of the tax rate. The empirical implications are tested using a large panel of jurisdictions in Germany, which have discretion in setting the local rate of the business tax. Tax competition is identified by means of instrumental variables techniques. Despite significant competition effects between local neighbors, where tax rates are strategic complements, jurisdictions are found to have some leeway in using the tax rate as an instrument of their policy. In particular, large jurisdictions set higher tax rates in interjurisdictional competition.     

Property tax and urban sprawl: Theory and implications for US cities

We develop a model that adopts a log-linear utility function with a variable elasticity of substitution greater than one and show that increasing the property tax reduces city size unambiguously. We then test this result using a dataset of effective property tax rates we developed using GIS methods for 448 urbanized areas. The empirical analysis estimates a regression equation relating an urbanized area's size to the property tax rate measure and other control variables such as population, income, agricultural rent, and transportation expenditure. We find that higher property taxes indeed result in smaller cities.     

Implementing property tax reforms in Bangalore: an actor-network perspective

Many municipal governments in developing countries are experiencing serious difficulties in dealing with the rapid growth of population in cities. Catalysed through processes of globalisation, the growth of cities, especially the so-called ‘mega-cities’, has not been matched by investments in infrastructure like roads and power due to the inability of local government organizations to collect adequate revenues from sources like property tax. Recognizing these difficulties, agencies such as the Asian Development Bank have initiated systems for property tax reforms in a number of Asian cities, including Bangalore. In this paper, we discuss the story of this reform process drawing upon the actor-network perspective on translations. We argue that such a perspective helps to go beyond studying innovation processes through the lens of ‘technology diffusion’, and provides a more interesting and insightful perspective of ‘technology translation’.     

Is corporate tax avoidance associated with investment efficiency?

The purpose of this study is to examine the association between investment efficiency and corporate tax avoidance. Using a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1993–2016, we show that there is a positive association between corporate tax avoidance activities and investment inefficiency. Moreover, we find that the association is mediated by financial statement readability, financial statement comparability and product market competition. Our results are robust to alternative measures of both tax avoidance and investment inefficiency. Propensity score matching (PSM), difference-in-difference (DID), and two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analyses confirm our results and mitigate any potential endogeneity issues that might result from the effect of omitted variables, reverse causality or model misspecification.     

Globalization and tax policy

Globalization is thought to reduce the ability of governments to collect taxes. If labor and capital can move between jurisdictions, then attempts to tax these factors will lead to a “vanishing taxpayer” as factors flee from high- to low-tax regions. More broadly, globalization suggests that there will be some convergence in tax rates across countries. This paper questions this view by examining the impact of globalization on taxation using a two-country, two-factor, two-good model. In particular, we ask how globalization, measured by increased international factor mobility, affects the ability of governments to tax factors. Our quantitative analysis indicates that, while increased mobility reduces revenues to some extent, governments still retain significant ability to collect taxes.     

Flat tax reform: A quantitative exploration

This paper explores quantitatively the general equilibrium implications of a revenue neutral tax reform in which the current income and capital income tax structure in the U.S. is replaced by a flat tax, as proposed by Hall and Rabushka (1995), (The Flat Tax, 2nd ed. Hoover). The central aspects of such reform, the impact of tax reform on capital accumulation and labor supply, as well as its distributional consequences, are analyzed in a dynamic general equilibrium model. Main results are that, (i) the elimination of the actual taxation of capital income has an important and positive effect on capital accumulation; (ii) mean labor hours are relatively constant across tax systems, but aggregate labor in efficiency units increases; (iii) in all circumstances analyzed, the distributions of earnings, income and especially wealth become more concentrated.     

论物业税开征对我国城市发展的影响

物业税属于地方税种,统一的物业税开征对于提高中国城市发展的效率和水平具有积极意义.我国的物业税体制改革应注意与地方公共服务的发展联系在一起,通过开征统一的物业税,构建公共财政框架,规范政府土地管理,改善城市公共服务,促进城市房地产业健康发展.     

企业所得税法对企业组建税务筹划主要方法的探讨

依法纳税是纳税人应尽的义务,而税务筹划亦是其应当享有的正当权利。在现实经济生活中,税务筹划已逐步成为纳税人理财的重要手段之一。在新形势下,企业作为纳税人,怎样熟悉了解我国企业所得税相关法律制度,利用税法所提供的优惠政策及可选择性条款,合法合理进行税务筹划,为企业提高经济效益已经成为当今企业一个必修的课题。     

Governance of tax courts

This paper attempts to penetrate the “black box” of the judiciary through an empirical investigation of the Italian tax courts of first instance. Both judicial delay and two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis approach with bootstrap are used to measure the efficiency of the court system and to further identify the main determinants of efficiency which, in line with the previous literature, seem to be mostly related to the judges’ effort. The study also takes advantage of an idiosyncratic feature of this branch of the Italian judiciary—in which judges are temporarily appointed and can continue to practice an external (though not conflicting) profession—to assess the impact of opportunity costs on the behavior of judges. The overall outcome confirms that judges maximize utility “the same as everybody else does” (Posner, Supreme Court Econ Rev 3:1–41, 1993).     

Social trust environment and firm tax avoidance: Evidence from China

We examine the impact of the social trust environment in which a firm is located on its tax avoidance in China and paying attention to the moderating effect of corporate governance and state-ownership. Drawing from theoretical and empirical work on firm tax avoidance and manager–shareholder agency conflict, we hypothesize that social trust can lower firm tax avoidance. It is because a high social trust environment can reduce agency conflict so that tax avoidance is less. Our findings are consistent with our hypothesis, and robust to a battery of robustness tests. Furthermore, we document that the association between social trust and firm tax avoidance is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance and state-owned. Moreover, we find that firms in more trustworthy provinces present less general and administrative expenses and higher asset turnover, corroborating our theoretical foundations with respect to agency cost in our hypothesis. Our findings suggest that social trust and its interactions with corporate governance and state ownership are important internal and external determinants on the variations in tax avoidance.     

Fiscal impact of privatization revisited: The role of tax revenues in transition economies

In contrast to earlier literature, this paper finds empirical evidence that privatization has deteriorated fiscal balances in transition economies. The investigation focuses on the role of tax revenues in explaining the fiscal impact of privatization, as it appears that tax revenue in many transition countries remained lackluster even after the adoption of several tax reforms in the last two decades, and no formal econometric assessment has been conducted of the extent to which privatization has affected tax revenues. Using panel data for 29 Eastern European and former Soviet Union countries, the analysis finds robust signs of a strong negative impact of privatization on different tax revenue sources. The paper also provides some empirical evidence favoring the early adoption of value-added taxes that appear to have contributed to government revenue recovery.