Efficient bargaining,welfare and strategic export policy

We present an efficient bargaining model and analyse the welfare effects of unionization, where rival exporting governments employ strategic export policy. The domestic firm is unionized and conducts a Nash bargain with its union to determine wage and employment. The union may be wage oriented, wage neutral or employment oriented. The foreign firm is non-unionized. Stability of the reaction function equilibrium in policy space is sufficient for the following results: (i) domestic welfare increases with the degree of wage orientation; (ii) an increase in the union's bargaining power leads to higher (lower) domestic welfare if the union is wage (employment) oriented; (iii) if the domestic social marginal cost of labour is less than or equal to the foreign marginal cost, domestic market share is higher under wage orientation.     

Strategic trade policy and union-firm bargaining agenda

In this paper, we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between duopolistic firms and unions in an open economy with strategic trade policy. It is shown that, in contrast with the case of the absence of export tax/subsidy, a right-to-manage (RTM) arrangement always emerges endogenously as a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in agreement between parties. Moreover, such an arrangement may be also Pareto-optimal in both exporting countries in the sense that profits, workers' welfare (provided that union's power is sufficiently high) and social welfare as a whole are higher than the efficient bargaining (EB) arrangement. Moreover, since the government of the country in which there is EB (while in the other country the alternative agenda RTM is used) levies a tax on export, then the conventional result that under quantity competition it is always optimal for exporting countries to subsidise exports may be reversed.     

A reappraisal of strategic trade policies with the endogenous mode of competition under vertical structures

This paper examines the endogenous choice of competition mode with strategic export policies in vertically related markets when each upstream firm located in each country determines the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximizing generalized Nash bargaining. We show that (i) choosing Cournot (Bertrand) competition is the dominant strategy for both downstream firms when goods are substitutes (complements), which leads Pareto superior regardless of the nature of goods under the optimal trade policies; (ii) irrespective of rival’s competition mode, the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under Cournot competition and an export tax under Bertrand competition; and (iii) trade liberalization may give rise to changes of competition mode and increase of social welfare.     

Strategic Interactions,Bargaining Power and Stability of Joint Venture in an Emerging Nation

We model strategic interaction between a domestic firm and a foreign firm involved in a joint venture, incorporating negotiations over equity shares and its implications for stability in the context of an emerging country. The foreign firm has superior technology, whereas the domestic firm has better local market knowledge. Modelling simultaneous innovation effort and bargaining power over equity share, we provide a rationale for the stability of the joint venture. We find that a certain level of technological knowledge can empower the bargaining power under certain parameter configurations and assumptions, such that the firms will negotiate to agree over their equity shares and maintain the joint venture. In this context, the stability of the joint venture is always an expected outcome. We have also shown that the domestic firm’s bargaining power and knowledge acquisition directly affect the domestic firm’s R&D effort and threaten the stability of the JV. We try to justify a probable situation where the firms may negotiate hard over equity shares but still maintain the joint venture.

     

Environmental Policy,North-South Trade and FDI

We analyze trade between two countries, called the North and the South. There is one firm in each country and production costs are lower in the South. To serve foreign markets firms may export or engage in FDI. Both countries set tariffs on imported goods. We find that the implementation of an environmental policy by the South may affect the location decision of the Southern firm. When only the North sets an environmental tax, firms engage in FDI if the difference in costs between the two countries is low, otherwise the South exports and the Northern firm engages in FDI. If the South also sets an environmental tax, this does not restrict FDI by Northern firm, encourages FDI by the domestic firm, reduces its environmental damage and increases joint welfare. Finally, in equilibrium the South decides to implement an environmental policy and both firms engage in FDI.     

Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System

If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified.     

Taxation of Foreign Profits with Heterogeneous Multinational Firms

This paper analyses optimal taxation of foreign profits using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms that serve a foreign market through exports or foreign direct investment (FDI). If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise because of intra‐firm trade. It turns out that, in contrast to recent claims, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. However, the globally optimal tax system may require exemption of foreign income from tax.     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

Galloping,creeping, or receding internationalization

Using a simple two-period linear durability choice trade model, we examine strategic trade policy in terms of taxes or subsidies levied on duopolistic firms in sales markets. In contrast to earlier parametric durability studies we show that the optimal export policy is not necessarily a tax when product durability is endogenously determined. Our analysis indicates that with endogenous adjustment of durability either a tax, subsidy, or laissez-faire policy (zero subsidy) may be optimal. In addition, we find that any trade policy (tax or subsidy) has the unforeseen effect of changing the firms' product durability. For example, future expected subsidies tend to decrease the domestic firm's product durability while increasing the foreign firm's chosen durability.     

出口退税与就业增进——基于我国数据的协整研究

在一个出口决策模型的基础之上,建立了一个出口退税的就业影响模型。并采用我国1985-2009年的数据,研究了出口退税政策对我国就业水平的影响,结果显示:我国的出口退税政策显著促进了国内就业的增长。进一步把出口退税分解为增值税退还与关税退还两部分,研究了不同类别出口退税对国内就业的影响,结果仍然稳定。结果同时表明:国内投资、FDI以及汇率贬值显著促进了国内就业的增长,而技术水平的提升则抑制了国内就业的增长,这一结果说明,我国的技术发展选择的仍然是劳动节约型而非资本节约型技术进步。     

Firm Heterogeneity,Origin of Ownership and Export Participation

This paper investigates the relationship between firm heterogeneity and a firm’s decision to export, using the annual survey of Thai manufacturing firms from 2001 to 2004. A significant contribution of this paper is that we are, for the first time, able to break down FDI by country of origin to observe whether the behaviour of MNEs differs by region of origin. We find that sunk entry costs and firm characteristics are important factors in explaining a firm’s decision to export. Another important determinant is the ownership structure of the firm, with foreign‐owned firms having a higher probability of exporting than domestically owned firms, although this differs across country of ownership with potentially important policy implications. Export platform FDI is used to explain the behaviour of foreign firms that invest in Thailand. Using three measures of total factor productivity, we also find that highly productive firms self‐select into the export market. The implication for governments of developing countries is the need to think carefully about how and to whom they target their inward FDI policies as a means of growth. The heterogeneous behaviour of multinationals from different nations means that policies targeting specific regions or countries may be preferable to general tax concessions or the implementation of special economic zones that are open to all.     

Optimal trade policy with quality-differentiated goods

In this article we apply the model of vertically differentiated products to international trade. A foreign firm competes with a domestic firm in the latter's market, producing products of varying quality. We examine the nature of the equilibrium in this case, assuming the firms compete in prices. Contrary to the popular belief, we show that a protectionist policy of imposing a tariff on the foreign firm raises overall welfare in the domestic economy, as well as induces the domestic firm to upgrade the quality of its product, if it produces the lower quality product. Furthermore, if minimum quality standards are imposed on the foreign firm, the domestic firm upgrades quality, and overall welfare in the domestic economy is higher.     

Home Firm Performance After Foreign Investments and Divestitures

An almost undisputed aim for firms in today's globalised world is to operate internationally. Several papers find a positive relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and the domestic performance of firms. In this paper, we address the ‘FDI – export’ relationship to better understand this trend. Furthermore, by presenting results on firm's post‐divestiture employment growth at home, we are able to provide a more comprehensive view on firm performance after stepping in and out of foreign markets. We apply a propensity score matching technique in combination with a difference‐in‐difference estimator to analyse the performance dynamics of French firms that either invested abroad or carried out foreign divestitures during the period 2000–2007. FDI has, on average, a positive effect in terms of export share, operating turnover and employment in firm's domestic market. Industry differences reveal that firms in high‐tech industries experience a strong increase in their domestic performance, whereas firm performance in low‐tech industries increases only moderately in post‐investment periods. In contrast, the divestiture impact on the post‐divestiture performance is rather negligible.     

Trade policy in a “super size me” world

When a foreign monopolist sets a single market clearing price for its product, the sign of the optimal tariff is determined by the extent of pass through (also known as the terms of trade effect). However, when a foreign monopolist employs a second degree price discrimination mechanism in the domestic market the calculus of welfare maximization is very different. While there are still terms of trade effects from the imposition of a tariff, the existence of such effects are neither necessary nor sufficient to determine the sign of the optimal tariff. Instead the distribution of valuations within the population is the key determinant of the nature of policy intervention. This result differs significantly from the uniform price case and is driven by the incentive compatibility constraint which places the distribution of types at the center of the analysis. If there is a relatively large fraction of high valuation types in the population, then domestic information rents may be increased by subsidizing imports thereby increasing the consumption of the low valuation types and moving the incentive constraint in favor of the high valuation types. However, if the share of high types in the population is relatively small then the increase in information rents will also be small but the fiscal implications of a subsidy will be large. Consequently, the optimal policy will be to impose a trade tax.     

Price Versus Quantity in a Duopoly with a Unilateral Effect and with Bargaining over Managerial Contracts

This study examines the endogenous choice of each firm’s strategic contract, that is, a price contract or a quantity contract, in a duopoly in which their demand functions are asymmetric when the content of their managerial contracts is determined through bargaining between the owner and the manager. The degree of asymmetry between their demand functions corresponds to the relation between the goods they produce. In contrast to the case wherein each firm’s delegation parameter is determined through profit maximization, we show that the quantity competition cannot become the equilibrium market structure when the bargaining power of the manager relative to that of the owner is sufficiently low. In particular, when the relation between the two goods is complementary, two asymmetric market structures can be observed in equilibrium. Furthermore, we consider the situation in which the relative bargaining power of the manager to that of the owner within each firm is different between the two firms.     

外资零售企业进入、混合竞争与中国培育大型流通企业政策——基于混合寡占博弈模型的流通政策分析

组建与培育具有国际竞争力的大型国有控股流通企业集团是转型经济时期我国政府的一种积极的市场治理方式。通过构建三类混合寡占零售博弈模型和均衡分析表明,在多种所有制零售企业共同参与竞争时,国内社会总体福利的大小与外资零售企业的信息技术管理水平并不成简单正相关关系;当国有零售企业完全以社会总剩余最大化为目标时,即使其效率低于外资企业、市场的价格小于国有企业的边际成本,它的存在也将提升社会福利;国有零售企业具有规定市场规模、维护市场稳定的重要功能;明确国有流通企业在不同状态下目标函数预期,合理构建零售市场的组织结构与所有制结构,可以有效增强我国零售市场的供给保障和调控能力。     

Bank support and export: evidence from small Italian firms

The ability of a country and its businesses to grow is tightly related to the possibility of exporting and penetrating into foreign markets. The aim of this article is to study whether bank support can help small businesses (SBs) exporting at the extensive as well as the intensive margin. We address this issue by using a large database on small Italian firms. We provide an empirical analysis of the role of bank support in affecting the firms’ export decisions. Our results show that among the exporting SBs those using bank services to support their exports have a higher probability of being better placed in both the intensive and the extensive margin. Moreover, these positive impacts on export are statistically significant only when the main bank of the firm is an internationalized bank. These results have relevant policy implications as well as consequences for the business models of internationalized banks.     

对我国出口退税政策效果的实证分析及反思

本文以我国出口退税政策的实际效果为研究对象,对出口退税政策的经济效应进行理论分析,并运用Spearman秩相关分析方法对我国出口退税政策的实际效果进行实证分析。实证研究表明：出口退税对我国出口额的促进作用并不显著,国外需求才是影响我国出口额的主要因素,而且出口退税会恶化我国价格贸易条件,加大通货膨胀压力。基于理论和实证的研究结果,本文提出了相应的政策建议。     

Are Exporters More Likely to Introduce Product Innovations?

A firm’s export status may improve its ability to introduce product innovations (learning by exporting). We explore this idea using very rich firm‐level data on Italian manufacturing, which enables us to control for many confounding factors in the exporting–product innovation link (i.e. selection on observable variables). We also make an attempt to address the potential self‐selection of firms into exporting according to unobservable characteristics using an industry–province specific measure of firm distances from their most likely export markets, and of these export markets’ potentials as sources of presumably exogenous variations in export status using an instrumental variables strategy. We find that export status significantly increases the likelihood of introducing product innovations and that this effect is not fully captured by the channels commonly stressed by the theoretical literature, such as larger markets (and accordingly firm size) or higher investments in R&D. We argue that heterogeneity in foreign customers’ tastes and needs may explain our findings.     

The optimal tax on antebellum US cotton exports

The US produced about 80% of the world’s cotton in the decades prior to the Civil War. How much monopoly power did the US possess in the world cotton market and what would have been the effect of an optimal export tax? This paper estimates the elasticity of foreign demand for US cotton exports and uses the elasticity in a simple partial equilibrium model to calculate the optimal export tax and its effect on prices, trade, and welfare. The results indicate that the export demand elasticity for US cotton was about −1.7 and that the optimal export tax of about 50% would have raised US welfare by about $10 million, about 0.3% of US GDP or about 1% of the South’s GDP.