中国机动车辆保险承保周期存在性分析

承保周期反映了承保利润的周期性变动情况，同时这种变动伴随着保费、保险产品供给的周期性波动。在欧美等产险业发达的国家，承保周期现象得到了广泛的研究，但是在中国由于经营机制和数据库建立不完善等问题，至今对承保周期的研究几乎一片空白。本文利用国外学者 Venezaian 提出的二阶自回归模型来检验中国机动车辆保险的周期存在性，经过检验认为机动车辆保险存在承保周期，因而，保险公司、保险监管机关、投资者可以利用承保周期规律来制定更加科学合理的决策。     

环境污染责任保险与企业创新:促进还是抑制

在绿色发展背景下,基于环保部公布的投保环境污染责任保险企业名录,实证检验环责险对企业创新的影响及其作用机制。结果显示：投保环责险能促进企业创新能力提升,其在企业创新治理方面发挥着积极作用;环责险通过缓解融资约束提高企业创新能力;环责险对非国有企业创新水平促进效果更显著;环责险与环境规制不能发挥协同作用。结论丰富了企业创新影响因素以及环责险经济后果的理论研究,对深化绿色保险改革、实现创新驱动发展具有重要现实意义。     

Do insurance activities enhance the performance of financial services holding companies?

Stiroh and Rumble (2006) and Yeager et al. (2007) have argued that extension of banks into nonbanking activities produces no diversification benefits for financial services holding companies (FSHCs) eligible to consolidate banking and insurance products. We investigate the effect of aggregate nonbank activities, as well as two main areas of insurance business, namely agency and underwriting enterprise, on the risk-adjusted performance of FSHCs. Our sample includes a quarterly panel data of FSHCs over the period 2003–2011. We find that the effect of FSHCs’ entry into agency insurance activities on their risk-adjusted returns is dependent on their size; it is positive for FSHCs in the top quartile of our sample (assets greater than $4.495 billions), but negative for smaller and mid-size FSHCs. The effect of underwriting insurance activities on risk-adjusted returns is generally negative or statistically insignificant, except for some of the largest-size firms.     

Capital asset pricing models with default risk: Theory and application in insurance

The Capital Asset Pricing Model has been used frequently to derive a fair price of insurance. But the use of this model overestimates insurance premiums because it does not account for the insolvency risk of insurers. This paper examines how the insurance price should be fairly adjusted when insurers' default risk is considered. It develops a model which shows that fair insurance premiums are lower when insurance firms have a positive probability of being insolvent. Using data of property liability insurers during the period from 1943–99, the paper further estimates the effects of the insolvency risk on insurers' underwriting profit rate. It shows that the incorporation of the default risk of insurers in the model, by significantly reducing the required price for insurance, would lead to lower profit potentials. Some writers argue that including the insolvency risk when calculating insurance premiums is not so necessary because of the existence of states' guaranty insurance funds which protect consumers. However, as shown in the paper, these funds have provided inadequate protection to consumers. Therefore, because of the increase in the number of insolvencies in recent years, and because of the limited coverage provided by states' guaranty funds, it seems that considering the insolvency risk in insurance pricing has become very necessary.     

RISK, INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRY AND PRODUCT LIABILITY: An Enquiry Into Conflicting Objectives

Abstract.  Risky products inflict two costs on society; the accident and the insurance costs. The expansion in the scope of product liability since the late 1970s has increased the cost of third-party liability insurance. However, the economic analysis has, traditionally, focused on only the accident costs. Some recent works suggests a strict trade-off between minimization of the accident costs and the insurance costs. In this paper, we extend the analysis by considering both types of costs. An efficiency characterization of product liability rules is provided by assuming informational asymmetry about the risk. We show that it is possible to achieve efficiency with respect to the insurance costs as well as the care levels.     

Private Information in Life Insurance,Annuity, and Health Insurance Markets

Economic theory predicts that private information on risks in insurance markets leads to adverse selection. To counterbalance private information, insurers collect and use information on applicants to assess their risk and to calculate premiums in an underwriting process. Using data from the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA), this paper documents that differences in the information used in underwriting across life insurance, annuity, and health insurance markets attenuate private information to different extents. The results are in line with – and might help to reconcile – the mixed empirical evidence on adverse selection across these markets.     

董事高管责任保险与企业绿色创新：激励工具还是自利手段

以2011—2019年我国A股上市公司为研究对象，通过手动收集企业董事高管责任保险及绿色专利数据，实证考察董事高管责任保险对绿色创新的影响，结果发现：①董事高管责任保险能够显著促进企业绿色创新，即董事高管责任保险是企业绿色创新的激励工具，而非管理层阻碍绿色创新的自利手段；②通过Heckman两阶段模型、倾向得分匹配缓解可能存在的内生性问题，并经过一系列其它稳健性检验后，基本结论仍保持不变；③董事高管责任保险对绿色创新的促进作用在不同规模、不同股权集中度的企业间存在差异，主要表现为对中小型企业的影响大于大型企业，对股权较为集中企业的影响大于股权分散企业。从董事高管责任保险这一全新视角对企业绿色创新进行解读，可为加速我国上市企业董事高管责任保险知识普及，驱动企业绿色创新跨越式发展提供理论支撑。     

Does asymmetric information matter in the early insurance market? Evidence from the auto insurance market

In the late 1960s, the performance of automobile insurance declined dramatically in Japan in spite of rapid growth in the diffusion rate, and the premiums were sharply raised several times in order to improve the situation. This observation indicates the possible presence of adverse selection (death spiral), and provides an ideal situation for assessing informational asymmetry. Using bodily injury liability (BIL) insurance data from 46 Japanese prefectures over the period 1966 to 1975, this article tests two hypotheses of adverse selection: (i) high-risk drivers were more likely to join the BIL insurance market and (ii) sharp premium increases drove low-risk policyholders away. Various empirical analyses show that there is little evidence for either type of adverse selection. We also test whether a risk-misperception hypothesis can explain our results, and find some evidence that the population density have a significantly positive impact on the demand for BIL insurance.     

环境污染赔偿责任保险制度可行性基础研究

作为环境污染责任保险之一的环境污染赔偿责任保险在美国、德国等西方发达国家以及巴西、印度等发达国家已趋于完善,并对环境的保护和纠纷的解决发挥了重要作用。然而,由于种种原因,该制度目前在我国只处于政策层面,尚没有上升为法律,在政策的指导之下,地方各自为战开展环境污染责任保险制度,虽然取得了一些成绩,但也存在诸多问题,迫切需要国家立法机关对制度制定统一的法律、法规,因此对其理论基础、实践基础等方面展开深入研究,对于环境污染赔偿责任保险制度的构建具有重要意义。     

产险业资本结构与承保风险对获利能力的影响——基于结构方程模型的实证分析

文章以资本结构理论为基础,利用国内产险公司2001～2004年的财务数据,运用结构方程模型探讨产险公司资本结构与承保风险对获利能力的影响。实证结果发现,资本结构的变化对我国产险公司的获利能力有正负两方面的影响,而资本结构与风险之间是相互影响的。当不考虑风险的影响时,资产负债率的提高会增强公司的获利能力,而随着资产负债率的提高,公司承保风险加大,对公司的获利能力有显著的负向影响。因此,产险公司不应一味地通过提高资产负债率来取得短期获利,还应注意控制风险,增强长期获利能力。     

董事高管责任保险促进还是抑制企业创新

作为企业重要的治理机制,董事高管责任保险通过管理层风险偏好、管理水平及激励机制等因素进而影响企业创新,此影响过程究竟是促进还是抑制,尚存争论.基于沪深A股2007—2018年上市公司微观数据,实证研究了董事高管责任保险对企业创新的影响.研究发现:董事高管责任保险对企业创新存在显著的"创新激励"效应,特别是对创新产出和创新效率的提升作用明显,并在考虑控制内生性问题后,上述结论仍成立;企业高层的风险承受力与管理水平是董事高管责任保险对企业创新影响的重要机制和渠道,董事高管责任保险明显提高了管理层的风险承受力和管理能力,从而促进了企业创新;不同行业对"创新激励"效应存在显著的异质性,较高科技水平和竞争水平的行业"创新激励"效应更为明显.研究为完善上市公司治理结构,加快董事高管责任保险发展以促进企业创新具有重要的理论价值和政策意义.     

中国居民医疗保险购买行为研究-基于商业健康保险的角度

本文通过健康保险市场供需双方行为分析,构建居民医疗保险购买行为模型,利用中国健康与营养调查数据(2000—2006),运用部分观测的二元Probit估计方法(Bivariate Probit with partial observability),从实证的角度分析商业健康保险市场中供需双方各自的风险选择行为,以及城乡地区居民对商业健康保险的潜在需求行为及其宏微观影响因素。本文发现:(1)城乡居民都存在显著的逆向选择行为;(2)城乡社会医疗保障对居民商业健康保险需求行为有显著的促进作用;(3)影响居民商业健康保险行为的其他因素还包括,个人的风险偏好和经济购买力。     

发展环境责任保险,建构双层环境污染监督体制

环境责任保险是以被保险人因污染环境而应承担的以损失赔偿和治理责任为标的的责任保险形式。在我国,建立和推广环境责任保险,不仅满足了保险市场的供给与需求,更重要的是可以建构国家(环保部)——保险公司——污染企业双层环境污染监督体制,有利于我国环境保护事业的发展。     

Exclusive vs. independent agents: a separating equilibrium approach

We provide a separating equilibrium explanation for the existence of the independent insurance agent system despite the potentially higher costs of this system compared to those of the exclusive agents system (or direct underwriting). A model is developed assuming asymmetric information between insurers and insureds; the former do not know the riskiness of the latter. We also assume that the claims service provided by the independent agent system to its clients is superior to that offered by direct underwriting system, that is, insureds using the independent agent system are more likely to receive reimbursement of their claims. Competition compels the insurers to provide within their own system the best contract to the insured. It is shown that in equilibrium the safer insureds choose direct underwriting, whereas the riskier ones choose independent agents. The predictions of the model agree with previous research demonstrating that the independent agent system is costlier than direct underwriting. The present model suggests that this does not result from inefficiency but rather from self-selection. The empirical implication of this analysis is that, ceteris paribus, the incidence of claims made by clients of the independent agents system is higher than that of clients of direct underwriting. Implications for the coexistence of different distribution systems due to unbundling of services in other industries such as brokerage houses and the health care industry are discussed.     

推进环境污染责任保险的难点与对策

我国环境污染责任保险的试点探索离预期的要求有相当的差距,因此,有必要对推进环境污染责任保险的难点和对策选择基点加强研究,以有利于该项工作的顺利推进。     

Liability Insurance and Choice of Cars: A Large Game Approach

If a car, already on the road, is replaced by another one, more expensive to collide with, a negative externality spills over to other drivers. This paper studies such externalities, relating them to insurance and incentives. It formalizes links from liability rules to choice of car. By assumption, insurance is cooperative but car acquisition is noncooperative. Construing drivers' interaction as a large game, the paper considers how a Nash equilibrium—and its efficiency or fairness—is shaped by the underlying liability regime.     

责任保险在大规模侵权中的运用

随着大规模侵权事件的不断出现,传统侵权法仅由"加害人承担损失"的观念正逐渐改变,责任保险成为侵权领域中一种新的救济方式.本文在对大规模侵权的可保性进行深入分析的基础上,提出责任保险与其他救济方式相比存在独特的优势,并从法律和保险实务两个角度明确了其保障范围、保障程度及发生责任竞合时的处理方式.     

我国责任保险市场供求环境分析

责任保险的发展水平是衡量一国保险业发达程度的重要尺度，我国的责任保险尚落后于发达国家，本文试从责任保险市场的供求环境分析我国责任保险现状的主要成因。     

Courts,scheduled damages,and medical malpractice insurance

We study how the functioning of the judicial system affects the availability and affordability of medical liability insurance, as proxied by the number of insurers and the premiums paid. We use two unique datasets collected in Italy from 2000 to 2010. Using the first dataset—insurance contracts for hospitals—we estimate the average treatment effect of schedules on insurers and premiums paid, conditional on judicial efficiency and proxied by different measures. Our identification rests on the partial overlap between healthcare districts and judicial districts, meaning that the caseload of a court and malpractice events at the healthcare provider level are not perfectly correlated. On average, the adoption of schedules does not produce any significant effect on insurers or on premiums paid. However, adopting schedules has a robust and significant effect on the number of insurers, but only in inefficient courts. We further investigate these findings using a second dataset comprising 17,578 malpractice insurance claims. We find evidence of a composition effect among claims that is triggered by higher levels of judicial inefficiency: As a court’s inefficiency increases, the likelihood for a case to not be decided on the merits decreases and the levels of reserve and recovery per claim decrease.     

Group insurance and lending with endogenous social collateral

We construct a dynamic model of self-enforcing insurance provision and lending to a community of borrowers who are connected by risk-sharing arrangements that are themselves subject to enforcement problems, as in Kocherlakota (1996). We show that an outside lender offering constant-consumption contracts can earn a higher profit if he conditions his repeated interactions with each borrower on the history of his interactions with all the group members (a joint liability contract), rather than on his history with that borrower only (individual liability contracts). This result holds even in the absence of informational asymmetries. The observation driving it is that with individual liability contracts, a joint welfare-maximizing group may prefer to have one or more group members default on their contracts, so that the group can consume a mix of outside funds and the defaulters' stochastic income. One contribution of our work is to give precise economic content to the concept of “social collateral” as the per-agent surplus from group risk-sharing over autarky. The group can deter its members from defaulting on their contracts with the principal by threatening to reduce that surplus.