The Monetary Policies of the European Central Bank and the Euro's (Mal-)Performance: A stability-oriented assessment

The stability-oriented macroeconomic framework established in the Treaties on European Union, especially the unparalleled status of independence and peculiar mandate of the European Central Bank (ECB), were promised virtually to guarantee price stability and a strong euro. Shattering these hopes and promises in a rather drastic way, the euro's external value has declined markedly while consumer price inflation has quadrupled since the new currency's inception. This paper assesses the ECB's role in relation to the euro's (mal-)performance. It challenges the truly odd conventional wisdom that, despite these dismal monetary developments, neither the Maastricht regime nor the ECB might possibly be at fault. Reviewing the ECB's interest rate policies and scrutinising its rationale, a conspicuous anti-growth bias is diagnosed that has produced rather perverse consequences.This stability-oriented assessment concludes that the ECB has been key to the 'euro puzzle', propagating euro weakness and pushing up inflation. Euroland's democratically elected representatives are therefore urged to reform Europe's key structural problem, namely, the ECB, an independent monetary policymaker whose unbounded discretion allows it to pursue ill-guided and thoroughly idiosyncratic policies without being held to account for the consequences.     

Germany in crisis: the unification challenge,macroeconomic policy shocks and traditions,and EMU

Conventional wisdom blames Germany's ongoing economic and fiscal crisis on the unification shock of the early 1990s and structural problems in labour markets. Challenging this view, this paper offers a fresh assessment that focuses on macroeconomic demand management. It is shown that Germany's fiscal crisis cannot be attributed to unification per se; it arose as a consequence of ill‐guided macroeconomic policies pursued in response to that event. Many structural problems that popped up along the way were mere symptoms of persistent macroeconomic mismanagement and protracted domestic demand stagnation. Arguably, systematically ill‐guided macroeconomic policies of this type are potent enough to wreck any real world economy, no matter how flexible it may be. Because Germany provided the blueprint for Europe's stability‐oriented macroeconomic policy regime, it comes as no surprise that a peculiar repeat of certain symptoms that started to arise in Germany a decade ago may now be observed across the euro area—protracted domestic demand weakness and inflation stickiness because of ‘tax‐push inflation’ in particular.     

Capital inflows, fiscal discretion, and exchange rate policy

Many writers have argued for the benefits of a credible fixed exchange rate (a hard peg) as a commitment device in an open economy. But historically, fixed exchange rates have often been associated with large current account deficits and episodes of ‘over-borrowing’. This paper develops a model of capital inflows that are linked to the exchange rate regime because of endogenous fiscal policy. The key message of the paper is that a hard peg is undesirable in the absence of commitment in fiscal policy. In face of a credible fixed exchange rate, the fiscal authority subsidizes capital inflows. The economy will engage in inefficiently high international borrowing, and in welfare terms may end up worse off than under capital market autarky. To eliminate the incentive to subsidize borrowing, the monetary authority must follow a flexible exchange rate rule in which capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation. If fiscal policy must be financed by money creation rather than direct taxation, then a fixed exchange rate rule may cause both over-borrowing and a subsequent exchange rate crisis.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a post Keynesian open-economy model

Using a post Keynesian model, this study aims to analyze the stabilizing role of fiscal and monetary policies in an open economy with a managed exchange rate regime. The real exchange rate is modeled as an endogenous variable and inflation explained using the conflicting claims approach. The dynamic properties of macroeconomic equilibrium are evaluated in different regimes of fiscal and monetary policies. The main result of this study suggests that the preferred policy regime is the one in which economic authorities are complementary and fiscal policy plays an explicitly active role. In this regime, the fiscal policy must commit to the target for the rate of capacity utilization and the monetary authority must commit to the inflation target.     

A Model of Balance‐of‐Payments Crises due to External Shocks: Monetary vs. Fiscal Approaches

This paper develops a model for balance‐of‐payments (BOP) crises triggered by an external shock. Whether an external shock induces a BOP crisis depends crucially on the sequence of policy actions taken by the government's monetary and fiscal authorities. If the fiscal authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the monetary authority, an external shock can lead to a BOP crisis. However, if the monetary authority moves first and imposes an exogenous constraint on the fiscal authority, the same shock does not cause a BOP crisis.     

Foreign Exchange Accumulation and the Entrapment of Chinese Monetary Power: Towards a Balanced Growth Regime?

This article criticises the notion that China's foreign exchange reserves have strengthened its monetary power. While some scholars have argued that China's international monetary influence has been ‘entrapped’ by the domestic interests of its export sector, a one-sided focus on the export sector fails to identify the significant constraints on its macroeconomic autonomy. This article proposes an extension of the concept of entrapment that draws attention to the key role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their domestic fixed-asset investment in its growth regime: China's external monetary dependency – which is understood as both export dependency and the need to maintain foreign exchange accumulation – has been caused by a disparity between fixed-asset investment and private consumption that reflects a redistribution of income from the household sector to the SOE sector. In particular, I expose the SOE sector's rising interests in foreign exchange accumulation by uncovering a mutually reinforcing dynamic between China's external monetary dependence and the financial repression of its banking system. By entrenching an investment-led growth regime that provides key benefits the SOE sector, this dynamic is found to have seriously constrained the macroeconomic policy autonomy of Chinese authorities to rebalance growth away from investments and exports towards private consumption.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.     

Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Systems

A new 'fiscal' theory of price determination has implications for exchange rate systems and common currency areas. We show that deeper monetary integration requires the discipline of a Ricardian regime ; that is, the government must guarantee fiscal solvency for any sequence of prices or exchange rates. Particularly striking results are that a currency peg is not credible without the discipline of a Ricardian regime, and a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two (or more) of the countries in the union is Non-Ricardian. Interestingly, constraints written into the Maastricht Treaty are sufficient for a Ricardian regime.     

Time inconsistency problems and commitments of monetary and fiscal policies

Within a policy game, where monetary and fiscal authorities are subject to a time inconsistency problem vis-à-vis a monopoly-union, we provide additional support for commitments of either authority: monetary commitment moderates fiscal time inconsistency problems, and fiscal commitment moderates monetary time inconsistency problems. In contrast with the benefits of commitments, a regime of coordinated monetary and fiscal policy may turn out to be counterproductive.Comments and suggestions from Torben M. Andersen and one anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Errors and omissions are, of course, my own responsibility.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Interactions in the Euro Area

The problem of monetary and fiscal policy interactions is an important issue for the euro area, since the individual member states of the EMU are responsible for their fiscal policies but monetary policy is pursued by a single monetary authority, the ECB. This paper is concerned with empirical evidence on monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the euro area. We first explore fiscal regimes with a VAR model and find empirical evidence that a non-Ricardian fiscal policy has been pursued in both France and Germany. As an example, we then study how one member state of the EMU, namely, Italy, is responding to the common monetary policy with its fiscal policy and find that Italian fiscal policy seemed to be counteractive to the common monetary policy between 1979 and 1998. In order to study monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a more general way, we explore time-varying interactions by estimating a State-Space model with Markov-switching for some Euro-area countries. There appear to be some regime changes in monetary and fiscal policy interactions in France and Germany, but the interactions between the two policies are not strong. Moreover, the two policies have not been accommodative but counteractive to each other. Finally we explore forward-looking behavior in policy interactions and find that expectations do not seem to have played an important role in the policy designs.     

Unconventional monetary policy,liquidity trap,and asset prices

This article offers a fundamental critique of monetary policy implemented in the United States following the 2007–8 global financial crisis. It aims to show that the misunderstanding of the mainstream theoretical thinking underlying monetary policy actions led to the ineffectiveness of the policy response to the 2007–8 global financial crisis. The conventional view that monetary policy is the stabilization tool has serious flaws and is ineffective for bringing about economic recovery. The Federal Reserve’s experiment with the so-called unconventional monetary policy exposed the weakness of the conventional belief in understanding how banks operate, how the monetary authority can influence the yield curve, and how the monetary transmission mechanism works, resulting in prescribing an ineffective treatment to boost economic activity. In this regard, it is argued that the Federal Reserve’s decision to let long-term interest rates be market determined represents a significant self-imposed constraint, which limits policy options regarding monetary policy actions and the effective control of long-term interest rates. By limiting the setting of policy rates only to the overnight interest rate, the ability of the monetary authority to influence long-term interest rates is both weak and indirect.     

The Macroeconomic Management of Increased Aid: Policy Lessons from Recent Experience

The authors investigate the macroeconomic challenges created by a surge in aid inflows. They develop an analytical framework for examining possible policy responses to increased aid, in terms of absorption and spending of aid—where the central bank controls absorption, through monetary policy and the sale of foreign exchange, and where the fiscal authority controls spending. Different combinations of absorption and spending lead to different macroeconomic consequences. Evidence from five countries that recently experienced an aid surge (Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Uganda) shows no support for aid-related real exchange rate appreciation in these countries, but it does indicate that the fear of Dutch disease played an important part in the policy reaction to aid surges. Fiscal and monetary authorities should coordinate their responses to an aid surge, because an uncoordinated response—typically when the fiscal authority wants to spend aid while the central bank wants to avoid exchange rate appreciation—can have serious negative macroeconomic consequences.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the post-war U.S.

A New Keynesian model allowing for an active monetary and passive fiscal policy (AMPF) regime and a passive monetary and active fiscal policy (PMAF) regime is estimated to fit various U.S. samples from 1955 to 2007. The results show that data in the pre-Volcker periods strongly prefer an AMPF regime, even with a prior centered in the PMAF region. The estimation, however, is not very informative about whether the Federal Reserve's reaction to inflation is greater than one in the pre-Volcker period, because much lower values can still preserve determinacy under passive fiscal policy. In addition, whether a PMAF regime can generate consumption growth following a government spending increase depends on the degree of price stickiness. An income tax cut can yield an unusual negative labor response if monetary policy aggressively stabilizes output growth.     

Why was the euro weak? Markets and policies

Against all odds, the euro turned out to be a weak currency. We argue that this outcome can readily be explained by the policy-mix that was chosen at the onset of the period: tight fiscal policies following the convergence mechanism that was imposed by the Maastricht treaty and loose monetary policy that resulted from the convergence of interest rates to the lower point of the spectrum. We investigate this outcome empirically and show that the euro's weakness can be understood as the result of an excess supply in the zone, which is channelled abroad in the usual beggar my neighbor way.     

Time-varying effects of fiscal policy in Spain: a Markov-switching approach

How have the effects of Spanish fiscal policy varied over time? Given this starting point, in this article we analyse the regime dependence of fiscal policy in Spain by estimating a vector autoregressive model within a Markov-switching framework. Our results indicate that Spain’s membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the most likely source of time variation in the fiscal outcomes. Accordingly, increases in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio do not succeed in stimulating economic activity in the first regime; rather, unexpected upsurges in the primary deficit harm economic activity (non-Keynesian effect) in the second regime, which prevails since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.     

The government's time discount rate: Choices and consequences in a dynamic framework

This paper considers a closed macroeconomy where the monetary authority pursues an inflation target and policy outcomes are the consequence of a Nash game between fiscal and monetary authorities. The specification of the macroeconomic framework is characterized by nonlinearities which lead to multiple equilibria with differing stability properties. Employing a calibrated model and simulations derived using the Mathematica package, the stability properties of the economy and the likely choice of equilibrium are examined. Within this framework, the dynamic consequences of different time discount rates for the fiscal authority are investigated, both in a world of certainty and also in a world of uncertainty. It is shown that, in a world of certainty, it will be optimal to choose the fiscal authority's time discount rate equal to the market rate of interest. However, depending on the degree of uncertainty in evaluating the time discount rates of consumers and of the fiscal authority, it may be appropriate to bias the fiscal authority's discount rate above or below the expected interest rate.     

The effects of fiscal spending shocks on the performance of simple monetary policy rules

We examine the effects of fiscal shocks on the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in a small dynamic general equilibrium framework. We explicitly consider the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy rules which may be present in the real world. We use a simple specification for the fiscal policy rule and various specifications for the (simple) monetary policy rule. Our analysis suggests that some form of flexible inflation targeting regime would perform well in response to fiscal shocks compared to other forms of policy regimes.     

The role of fiscal policy in the St. Louis model: Nonparametric estimates for a small open economy

This paper reevaluates the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies and bidirectional causality between income and each of the policy instruments used in the St. Louis model for aggregate demand using nonparametric (or infinite parametric) spectral methods. We proceed by estimating the strength of the correlations (or partial coherences) between income and each of the policy instruments over various frequencies. Then we obtain the corresponding band regression and Hannan's efficient estimates of both the lead and lag coefficients in the St. Louis model. The analysis is carried out with seasonally adjusted quarterly data and is divided into the flexible, fixed, and managed flexible exchange rate regimes. We find that while estimates from parametric regressions yield the standard conclusions for the St. Louis model, results from the nonparametric analysis are quite different. Specifically, the results of our analysis reveal that (i) both monetary and fiscal instruments are strongly correlated with income over cycles of 10 quarters or longer for the most recent period of the managed flexible exchange rate regime, and (ii) bidirectional causality exists between income and the fiscal policy instrument. These results suggest that both monetary and fiscal policy have a long-lasting effect on aggregate demand and that bidirectional causality exists between income and policy instruments. An explanation for the existence of bidirectional causality might be that the Canadian government generally pursued a purposeful discretionary fiscal policy during the post-World War II period. Furthermore, it appears that discretionary policy action may have been anticipated by rational, farsighted, and forward-looking economic agents. Finally, our results for the flexible exchange rate and fixed rate regimes are in agreement with the Mundell-Fleming view of the role of monetary fiscal policy in an open economy.     

我国财政货币政策作用关系实证研究--基于VAR模型的检验分析

文章通过构建一个真实GDP增长率、财政赤字占GDP比重、货币供给M2增长率、零售物价指数变化率等4个变量的VAR模型,对我国财政政策与货币政策相互作用的关系及其动态性进行了实证分析,通过模型设定、格兰杰因果关系检验、脉冲响应函数分析和预测方差分解,发现在我国不存在简单的财政货币政策的互补或替代关系,而是存在一种非对称性的关系,即扩张的货币政策伴随着收缩或稳健的财政政策,而扩张的财政政策导致被动扩张的货币政策,表现形式取决于具体宏观经济环境和经济冲击形式。同时,文章也得到其他一些结论,并认为,要增强政策的效率,必须强化央行的独立性,在现阶段需要严格控制赤字财政政策,以减少其对经济增长和经济波动的影响。     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions: Evidence from emerging European economies

This paper examines the interactions between fiscal and monetary policy for some former transition, emerging European economies over the 1995Q1–2010Q4 period by using a Markov regime-switching model. We consider the monetary policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993) and the fiscal policy rule suggested by Davig and Leeper (2007) in accounting for monetary and fiscal policy interactions. Empirical results suggest that monetary and fiscal policy rules exhibit switching properties between active and passive regimes and all countries followed both active and passive monetary policies. As for fiscal policy, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia seem to have alternated between active and passive fiscal regimes while fiscal policies of Poland and the Slovak Republic can be characterized by a single fiscal regime. Although the policy mix and the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy point a diverse picture in our sample countries, the monetary policy seems to be passive in all countries after 2000. This finding is consistent with the constraints imposed by European Union enlargement on monetary policy.