知识产权保护的经济分析──以音像作品版权为例

知识产权制度是保护科学、技术、文化成果的基本法制,反不正当竞争法的颁布,标志着我国知识产权立法的基本完成。著作权保护是知识产权保护中最复杂最困难的一个领域,也是目前使权行为发生较严重的领域。其中,对音像作品版权的慢犯(即盗版)已达到猖撅的地步。本丈拟以音像作品盗版为例对知识产权保护进行经济分析。第一部分分析了音像产品的厂商均衡;第二部分分析了版权不受保护时的音像产品市场;第三部分分析了版权受保护时制止音像盗版行为的条件;最后探讨了制止音像盗版行为及知识产权保护的社会政策选择问题。     

我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为分析

文章以知识产权得到有效保护时计算机软件的价格和产量为比较标准,分析了我国知识产权保护中的企业与政府行为及其后果。文章得出结论认为:与知识产权完全实施时相比较,侵犯知识产权的行为不仅降低了国内类型软件产量,提高国内软件的价格,而且也降低了国外软件开发商在中国市场的利润,而这正是发达国家与我国在与贸易相关的知识产权问题上存在摩擦的主要原因。从短期静态利益考虑,地方政府在追求社会福利最大化时,零查处概率是最佳选择。政府查处盗版的最优概率是查处侵犯知识产权的边际收益等于边际成本时的概率,盗版现象虽不可能被完全杜绝,但却可以被控制在一定的范围和程度内。     

交易成本：软件盗版的一个经济学注释

盗版软件影响软件市场的发展,长期以来却屡禁不绝。从产权经济学上分析,软件是具有公共性的商品。矫正软件公共性所导致的交易成本过高,被认为是盗版问题的主要经济学根源,造成了在打击盗版方面执法效果不佳。只有关注交易成本的影响,才能更加合理有效的对软件产权进行保护。     

我国民族工业的适度保护

我国民族工业的适度保护李平，刘月中国的复关谈判虽然在１９９４年１２月中止，但中国需要世界贸易组织，世界贸易组织也需要中国，这使得中国加入世界贸易组织成为早晚之事。因此，中国民族工业如何来迎接挑战是非常值得研究的问题。世界各国对民族工业的保护幼稚工业的...     

初探李斯特幼稚产业保护论对我国的借鉴意义

经过三十年的改革开放,我国经济得到了极大的发展,综合国力得到了明显的提高.随着世界经济一体化和区域集团化的趋势不断加强,我国要从自身的国家利益出发,制定恰当的贸易政策具有极其重要的意义.研究李斯特保护幼稚产业理论对我国适度保护幼稚工业具有可借鉴的作用.     

宪法平等权与反歧视

本文首先分析了歧视和平等的关系,简单论述了平等在反歧视中的体现,进而分析了反歧视的正当性,指出了出干对平等的保护和维护社会的发展,反歧视是必要的和正当的,然后又详细说明了平等作为形武平等和实质平等在反歧视中所起的不同作用,在具体制度上,介绍了美国和欧盟在反歧视方面的规定和具体做法,指出了我国法律存在的不足之处,最后简单指出了我国在反歧视方面可供完善的地方.     

中小企业网络财务软件升级问题初探

本文简要介绍了网络财务的概念，及其软件分类和发展过程，阐述了中小企业网络财务软件升级存在的主要问题是：仅能满足日常核算需要，使用时需花费大量资金，投入较多的人力，盗版现象严重，使用功能单一；提出了解决思路：企业领导层重视是关键，电子商务的使用是前提，软件技术标准化是核心，保护知识产权，打击盗版是保障。     

浅谈经济法视野下的图书盗版及其防治

本文从我国图书盗版问题的现状和危害性入题,简单分析了图书盗版问题的法规原因,进而对图书盗版问题的经济法防治策略进行了简要分析.     

宪法平等权与反歧视

本文首先分析了歧视和平等的关系,简单论述了平等在反歧视中的体现,进而分析了反歧视的正当性,指出了出于对平等的保护和维护社会的发展,反歧视是必要的和正当的,然后又详细说明了平等作为形式平等和实质平等在反歧视中所起的不同作用,在具体制度上,介绍了美国和欧盟在反歧视方面的规定和具体做法,指出了我国法律存在的不足之处,最后简单指出了我国在反歧视方面可供完善的地方。     

盗版的经济学分析

盗版现象由来已久,屡禁不止,这是源于它坚实的市场基础.那么,盗版品究竟会增加福利还是减少福利,取决于时期的长短、竞争的最后趋势以及政府反盗版的严厉程度.在我国加大知识产权保护的大背景下,政府应该以在权衡盗版成本和反盗版成本的基础上,实行适时适度的反盗版策略,以运用竞争机制为导向,以达到版权保护和反盗版的目的.     

Piracy and limited liability

This paper analyzes the effects of end-user piracy on a monopolized software industry with network effects in which consumers have heterogeneous income and limited liability. Limited liability produces a piracy cost which increases with income. The monopolist thus may be able to exploit the network effect brought about by the piracy of low-income consumers to charge a higher price to high-income consumers thereby earn a higher profit, especially when the monopolist can prevent the network effect from spilling over to the high-income consumers. If intellectual property rights policies are severe enough, then the monopolist can avoid the spillover. Otherwise it may become a case where each high-income buyer benefits from the piracy but the monopolist is hurt. However, a severe policy may bring about a high piracy rate since it invites the monopolist to raise the price.      

The impact of software piracy on inclusive human development: evidence from Africa

The study examines the effect of software piracy on inclusive human development in 11 African countries for which software piracy data is available for the period 2000–2010. The empirical evidence is based on instrumental variable panel Fixed Effects (FE) and Tobit models in order to control for the unobserved heterogeneity and limited range in the dependent variable. The modeling exercise is based on the inequality adjusted human development (IHDI) and its constituents. The following main findings are established. First, from the FE regressions, software piracy consistently improves the IHDI and its constituents. Within this framework, the positive relationship between inclusive human development and software piracy is driven by all its constituents. Second, for Tobit regressions, the positive relationship between software piracy and inclusive human development is confirmed exclusively in IHDI and literacy specifications. Within the latter framework, the positive relationship between software piracy and inclusive human is driven fundamentally by the literacy rate. Policy implications are discussed.     

Socio-economic development and software piracy. An empirical assessment

The high rate of software piracy is a growing concern for software developers as well as businesses and governments. It is argued here that the piracy rate is influenced by expected benefits and costs to the pirates. A model is developed using a set of variables that may affect such benefits and costs and hence piracy rate in a country, and tested for a large sample of 53 countries. The results of this paper suggest that the existing socio-economic conditions and the lack of proper institutions in developing and emerging economies may be responsible for high software piracy rates. One may, therefore, infer that the current trends of globalization and socio-economic development may help software piracy in developing countries.     

Influences on software piracy: Evidence from the various United States

Examining socio-economic influences on software piracy in the United States, we find a negative relationship between software piracy and income, tax burdens, and economic freedom. A 1% increase in per-capita income correlates with a 0.25% reduction in piracy.     

Piracy in a two-sided software market

This paper studies the impact of software piracy in a two-sided-market setting. Software platforms attract developers and users to maximize their profits. The equilibrium price structure is affected by piracy: license fees to developers are higher with more software protection but the impact on user prices is ambiguous. A conflict between platforms and software developers over software protection may arise: whereas one side benefits from better protection, the other party loses out. Under platform compatibility, this conflict is no longer present.     

假冒生产对专利制度的伤害

本文是对中国年轻的专利制度的经济学分析。通过一个包含假冒生产行为的理论模型和相应的计量检验 ,我们研究了中国普遍存在的假冒生产活动对专利保护的影响 ,并得出结论 :中国 1 993年以延长专利保护时间为主的专利法修改未使地区专利申请和研究开发投入的倾向上升 ,反而有所下降 ,原因在于专利保护时间的延长刺激了更多的假冒企业进入那些具有较大假冒潜力的行业 ,从而专利开发企业的利益受到了损害 ,也就没有动力进行进一步的研究开发和专利申请。对一切行业实行相同的专利保护期T与相同的惩罚假冒力度K ,必定违反最优专利制度设计原则。应该针对不同行业的假冒生产特点 ,通过制定相应的法律政策使假冒潜力最大的行业假冒成本提高。另外 ,就当前关于计算机软件保护的争论 ,本文认为软件行业过去保护不足。     

Copyright piracy as prey–predator behavior

The economic analysis of the piracy of copyright products has used a variety of modeling assumptions, the majority of which use typical industrial organization settings. The results of such models are manyfold, but in general they are ambiguous as to the optimal protection strategy, and the effects of protection on the welfare of copyright holders, and on the existence of piracy. Concretely, little has been said about which types of protection mechanisms are most adequate for controlling piracy. In the present paper, we propose a new theoretical framework by drawing an analogy between copyright piracy and prey–predator behavior. This analogy gives us a new perspective to approach copyright issues and it provides the economic theory of copyright piracy with a new set of mathematical models. We consider a very simple model that can be used to show that publicly instigated and financed policies designed to deter piracy can have the effect of increasing the amount of piracy, while privately financed strategies (e.g. DRM) will always decrease piracy.     

On the sufficiency of regulatory enforcement in combating piracy

The literature on piracy has questioned the role of regulatory enforcement in the form of monitoring in deterring piracy. This article shows that for a wide range of penalty levels the equilibrium monitoring rate is such that it is optimal for the copyright holder to prevent piracy by expanding his output beyond the monopoly output level rather than producing the monopoly output level and investing in an anticopying technology. This result holds even when the monitoring cost is “sufficiently” high relative to the cost of investing in anti-copying technology.     

Pirates and traders: Some economics of pirate-infested seas

Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.