中国创业投资退出方式研究

创业投资的成功实现必须建立在良好的退出机制之上，创业投资理论的发展使得创业投资退出机制的创新成为必然趋势。通过对创业投资退出形式的分析和效率评价，研究创业投资退出机制的合理方式，并进而探索中国创业投资退出机制的建立。     

浅论我国创业投资退出机制

退出机制是创业投资的重要环节，没有合适的退出渠道，一个创业投资项目就称不上成功。本文首先简单介绍创业投资退出机制的相关情况，然后主要从我国目前的创业投资退出的现状着手，通过对数据资料的分析，透过现象提出了我国创业投资退出机制中普遍存在的问题，并提出相应的解决方法。     

创业投资IPO退出时机和偏低定价研究:回顾与展望

在整个创业投资循环发展的过程中,创业资本通过IPO成功的退出对于确保投资者获得具有吸引力的回报进而筹集新资本至关重要。国外研究表明,市场条件和创业投资者的声誉影响着创业投资IPO的时机选择;代理问题、信息不对称、是否创业投资、创业投资家的经验、退出时期都影响着创业投资IPO时的定价。     

创业投资公司退出调查

从创业投资家的角度看,创业投资是很多年内流动性较差的长期投资,因为很多创业企业最初是不盈利的,因此从这些企业中退出是创业投资家实现投资回报的基本方式。退出有两个重要的功能:(1)它使创业投资家将对成功企业的增值服务转移给处于早期阶段的创业企业;(2)它使创业投资基金的投资者能够评价创业投资家的质量,并且能够将创业资本从不成功的创业投资家重新分配给成功的创业投资家。因此,退出对创业资本的运作至关重要。     

创业投资退出方式的选择及影响因素研究综述

创业投资的成功退出有利于实现创业资本的循环发展。对与国外创业投资退出方式的选择相关的研究进行了回顾,内容涉及各种退出方式的比较与选择、不同国家退出方式选择受制度体系的影响以及同一国家退出方式选择受契约安排的影响。最后结合目前国内对创业资本退出的研究现状,对今后的研究方向进行了展望。     

我国创业投资的回报率及其影响因素

基于1999年到2003年间我国56个本土创业投资退出项目的数据,本文对我国创业投资退出项目的投资回报率及其影响因素进行了实证研究。结果表明:(1)国有创业投资机构退出项目的平均投资回报率显著低于非国有创业投资机构;(2)创业投资机构的资本规模与回报率呈显著负相关关系;(3)上海、深圳两地创业投资机构退出项目的回报率显著高于其他地区;(4)本土创业投资机构的从业时间、投资规模、投资周期、退出方式均与回报率没有显著相关关系。本文在此基础上提出了相关的政策建议。     

创业投资退出机制的经验借鉴及启示

创业投资业的发展有利于高新技术产业的成长,有利于缓解中小企业融资难困境,有利于国民经济的持续发展,完善的创业投资退出机制是创业投资成长的关键,是保持创业投资活力的重要环节。美国和台湾地区创业投资退出机制成功经验表明:构建多层次的资本市场,完善退出渠道;完善相关法律法规,提供法律保障;培养优秀的创业投资人才队伍,是当前完善中国创业投资退出机制,保持创业投资业健康发展的实际需要。     

国际创投买什么?

<正>高风险、高回报、高增长是创业投资基金运作的最基本特征。由于其介入初创期企业、具有高风险的特性,创业投资基金的投资组合中往往有大量的项目并不能最终完成获利退出,因此,他们往往要求所选择的目标企业能预见到的增长和收益要不低于十倍,成功的投资项目的退出     

我国创业投资退出机制现状分析及问题研究

完善的退出机制是创业投资健康发展的关键,是创业投资不断循环的根本保证.本文分析了我国创业投资退出机制的现状,以及各种退出方式的具体情况,同时指出前中国创业投资退出机制存在的问题,并提出解决这些问题的建议.     

创业投资的退出方式分析

创业资本的退出是由创业投资的性质和运作规律所决定的，是创业投资自身运作和发展的必然选择，创业投资的退出有首次公开发行股票、创业企业并购、股权回购、清算等四种方式，退出方式与创业资本的收益率是密切相关的。     

马克思对沉淀成本概念的分析及其意义

虽然马克思没有使用沉淀成本这一概念,但已认识到沉淀成本的本质特征——成本补偿或价值实现问题。因此,从马克思价值实现角度扩展西方学者对沉淀成本概念的理解,不仅突破了西方学者沉淀成本概念仅仅与资产特征和市场交易成本相关的局限性,而且将沉淀成本和生产过程与产品价值实现联系起来,从而纳入社会再生产运动过程中。从马克思价值实现角度出发,再次回到投资生产上来,充分理解影响沉淀成本的诸多因素,为政府制定政策或制度安排提供一种新的分析视角,在于避免出现沉淀成本,形成良好的再生产过程。     

Bankruptcy costs,economic policy uncertainty,and FDI entry and exit

In this paper, we examine how the effect of economic policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment (FDI) entry and exit varies with the cost of bankruptcy resolution. Using a sample of bilateral FDI entry and exit for 23 countries and areas from 2004 to 2012, we find that an increase in bankruptcy costs in a country exacerbates the dampening effect of economic policy uncertainty on both FDI entry and exit. Subsample analysis reveals that the bankruptcy resolution channel only exists in high political risk countries. We also find that the bankruptcy resolution channel does not exist for foreign portfolio investment, which is consistent with real option theory. Broadly put, our contribution is at the nexus of institutional theory and FDI, as we identify the bankruptcy resolution channel through which economic policy uncertainty affects FDI entry and exit.     

Strategic dropouts

Following Spence, this note provides an education signaling model to explain the phenomenon of gifted entrepreneurs who acquire less education than ordinary individuals. Two types of individuals, ordinary and gifted, are considered. Each one of them can either convince an investor to fund his enterprise or approach a competitive job market. The probability that an ordinary individual succeeds to establish a successful enterprise is smaller than that of a gifted individual irrespective of his education level. The probability of an ordinary individual succeeding increases with the level of education. In a separating equilibrium gifted individuals curtail their eduction to a level below that of the ordinary ones. This happens if the value of a successful enterprise per dollar investment is sufficiently large, on the one hand, but not too large to guarantee that the expected value of an enterprise run by an educated ordinary entrepreneur falls below the investment cost, on the other.     

PRODUCTIVITY OR UNEXPECTED DEMAND SHOCKS: WHAT DETERMINES FIRMS' INVESTMENT AND EXIT DECISIONS?

We investigate the roles played by unexpected demand shocks, besides productivity, on firms' capital investment and exit decisions. We propose a practical approach to recover unexpected firm‐level demand shocks using inventory data. The recognition of demand shocks and inventory also improves the productivity estimation. The empirical results indicate that although productivity and demand shocks are both significant factors determining firm behavior, the former is more dominant for investment decision and the latter is more salient for firm exit. These findings confirm that unexpected demand shocks, besides persistent productivity, are important factors when analyzing capital investment and firm exit decisions.     

Rate of return on venture capital investment in China

The rate of return on venture capital investment of venture capital (VC) firms in China has been attracting increasing attention. We use robust multinomial regression models to analyze 56 exit projects of venture capital investment from 1999 to 2003 in China. The results show that the returns of state-owned VC firms are lower than those of non state-owned VC firms. Furthermore, the returns of the VC firms located in Shanghai and Shenzhen are higher than those in other regions. The capital scale of VC firms is negatively correlated with the rate of return. In addition, some variables, such as business duration, investment scale, investment duration and exit vehicle, are probably unrelated to rate of return on venture capital investment in China.     

创业企业控制权配置对创业投资机构退出方式影响研究

创业企业控制权配置是创业投资机构有效退出的重要保证,对投资机构退出方式具有重要影响。从IPO和并购这两种退出方式视角,选取CVSource数据库2000—2014年大样本数据,使用多变量回归模型,研究创业企业控制权不同配置对创业投资机构退出方式的影响。研究发现,创业企业家拥有的控制权比例与IPO退出方式显著正相关,企业家拥有的控制权越多,对其产生的期权激励作用越大,越会促使创业投资机构通过IPO方式退出;而创业投资机构拥有的控制权比例与并购退出方式存在显著正相关关系,创业投资机构拥有的控制权越多,为了尽早收回投资,保护自身利益,实现较高投资收益,其越会选择通过并购方式退出。     

Entry and exit echoes

While aggregate data do not show the investment echoes predicted by vintage-capital models, echoes arise in rates of entry and exit of firms at the industry level. Moreover, industries where prices decline rapidly experience early ‘shakeouts’. The relation emerges naturally in a vintage-capital model in which exit of firms sometimes accompanies the replacement of their capital, and in which a shakeout is the first replacement ‘echo’ of the capital created when the industry is born.     

A METHOD FOR IMPROVED CAPITAL MEASUREMENT BY COMBINING ACCOUNTS AND FIRM INVESTMENT DATA

We propose a new method for estimating capital stocks at the firm level by combining business accounts information and investment data. The method also produces capital estimates at the sector or industry level by summing individual firms' capital stocks and appropriately inflating this sum to account for firms not included in the data set. Our approach has two major advantages compared with the much used Perpetual Inventory Method (PIM). First, long investment series are not necessary. Second, sector capital estimates are automatically adjusted for changes in the capital stock because of entry and exit of firms. While capital growth rates in Norwegian manufacturing were only 1 percent on average during 1993–2004 according to national accounts figures, our method yields much higher growth rates of 5.5 percent on average.     

Irreversible exit decisions under mean-reverting uncertainty

Although many economic variables of interest exhibit a tendency to revert to long-run levels, mean reverting processes are rarely used in investment and disinvestment models in the literature. Previous work by Sarkar (J Econ Dyn Control 28(2):377–396, 2003), that focuses on irreversible entry decisions, showed that mean reversion has three effects on investment: (a) the “variance effect” (mean reversion reduces the long-run uncertainty and thus brings closer the critical investment level), (b) the “realized price effect” (the lower variance resulting from mean reversion makes it less likely to reach extreme high or low price levels, thereby reducing the likelihood of reaching the investment trigger) and (c) the “risk discounting effect” (mean reversion lowers the required rate of return, which affects both the project value and the value of the real option to invest). Metcalf and Hassett (J Econ Dyn Control 19(8):1471–1488, 1995) and Sarkar (J Econ Dyn Control 28(2):377–396, 2003) showed that (a) and (b) work in opposite directions, essentially canceling each other out, however the effect of (c) depends on parameter values, making the overall effect (a–c) of mean reversion on entry decisions ambiguous and parameter-dependent. In this paper, we show that as far as irreversible exit decisions are concerned, the effect of mean reversion is negative: Mean reversion unambiguously lowers the rate of irreversible disinvestment/exit for reasonable parameter values, since the mean reversion in this case only affects the value of the real option to exit and not the value resulting from (real) option exercise.