基于VMI和价格波动的供应链协调问题研究

VMI模式下当突发事件导致商品的市场销售价格发生波动时,供应商与零售商之间的合作契约面临新的挑战。本文通过建立基于协作关系的库存和销售努力水平的决策关系模型,分析了成本共担机制对供应链的协调作用。在此基础上,研究了当突发事件导致销售价格发生变化时,原有的成本共担契约不能保证供应链的协调,进而对成本共担契约进行了调整。最后利用数值分析验证了新的成本共担契约的有效性。     

药品供应链中收益共享契约与努力成本共担的模型研究

探讨和研究由药品零售商和政府部门组成的二级供应链模式,其中药品的市场需求与政府部门对药品零售商的努力水平相关。由于政府对于健康药品的销售促进需要有相关的成本,建立传统收益共享模型无法实现药品供应链的协调。因此,在收益共享模型的基础上采用努力成本共担的策略,从而保证药品零售商和政府部门之间的供应链协调。     

银行与电商平台共享客户信誉信息的供应链协调契约

针对银行与电商平台之间的客户信誉信息共享与合作问题,在电商平台宣传努力水平影响信贷消费市场需求的背景下,银行以供应链协调的契约参数作为决策变量,同时电商平台以自身的努力水平作为决策变量,分别建立了集中决策模型和分散决策模型。通过运用博弈伦和最优化理论对模型进行求解,得出了以下研究结论:银行与电商平台组成的供应链无法被批发价契约、收益共享契约实现协调,但可被收益共享和努力成本共担组合式契约实现完美地协调;在帕累托意义上,批发价契约次于收益共享契约,收益共享契约次于收益共享和努力成本共担契约。最后运用数值分析验证上述契约的可靠性和真实性。     

考虑保鲜努力的生鲜混合双渠道供应链决策研究

本文以生鲜供应商和零售商均开通双渠道所形成的生鲜混合双渠道供应链为背景,构建受到价格和供应商保鲜努力水平共同影响的市场需求函数,通过Stackelberg博弈求解不同决策模式下的最优保鲜努力水平、定价和利润,为实现供应链总利润最大化,提出"保鲜成本共担+收益共享契约"对生鲜混合双渠道供应链进行协调.通过算例分析得到,供...     

基于零售商努力水平的闭环供应链协调模型

针对市场需求量和旧产品回收量均受零售商努力水平影响的二级闭环供应链,建立了基于零售商销售努力水平和回收努力水平的决策模型;通过设计一个努力成本分摊契约,得到了努力水平的最优投入值;对于努力成本分摊的比例,给出了一个双方都偏好的区域;论证了该契约能将制造商和零售商紧密联系在一起,通过双方的协作达到双赢;通过算例分析验证了结论的有效性。     

专有品牌经营中不确定性需求的供应链价格协调机制分析

在专有品牌供应链中,供应商为供应链的领导者,制订销售终端的零售价格以一个供应商和一个零售商为供应链模式,在零售商销售成本是私隐信息的情况下,探讨如何设计激励契约,尽可能实现双方信息共享,假定市场需求具有与零售价格相关的不确定性,结合收益共享,建立双方各自的利润模型,并以此为基础分析供应链协调的实现。     

供应链上游段分散协调型VMI&TPL模式利益分配机制研究

本文以"收益共享-批发价格契约"为基础,研究如何对供应链上游段集中控制型VMITPL模式进行协调。由于"收益共享-批发价格契约"对协调供应链失效,风险共担型"收益共享-批发价格契约"不能保证企业成员的期望收益实现Pareto最优,本文提出"基于不对称的NASH谈判的风险共担型‘收益共享-批发价格’契约",该契约能够同时保证VMITPL供应链整体的期望收益和各成员企业的期望收益实现Pareto最优。     

非对称信息下三级供应链协调契约模型的构建

本文研究了非对称信息条件下由一个制造商、一个分销商和一个零售商组成的三级供应链的协调问题,建立了非对称成本信息下基于收益共享的供应链契约协调模型.给出了三级供应链协调的条件,最后通过算例分析说明模型设计的有效性.     

供应链突发事件应急管理研究

本文研究包含一个风险中性供应商和一个风险中性零售商的供应链应对突发事件的问题。在突发事件造成供应链随机需求分布变化的情况下,给出了集中供应链的最优应对策略;对分散供应链情形,提出基于风险共担的回购契约使供应链在突发事件下达到协调,最后给出了数值算例与管理启示。     

基于零售商努力和风险偏好的闭环供应链协调研究

本文研究零售商努力和决策者风险偏好共同作用下闭环供应链的企业最优策略。首先得到集中化决策下的最优努力水平,然后构建了批发价格模型,得到零售商和制造商的最优策略,发现制造商和零售商的最优策略没有受到零售商损失厌恶度的影响,而受到制造商损失厌恶度的影响,证明了零售商努力水平组合低于集中化决策下的努力水平组合。最后构建努力成本分摊模型来协调整个供应链,并得出契约设计参数。     

基于促销投资的非对称信息供应链契约研究

利用了委托代理理论和最优控制理论,分析对称信息和不对称信息两种情况下制造商和零售商的供应链契约。零售商进行促销投资,在对称信息情况下,制造商以批发价作为线性契约来协调供应链系统,批发价是促销投资的减函数;在非对称信息情况下,制造商以批发价和补贴作为非线性契约的协调机制,而批发价和补贴都是促销投资的增函数。     

基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制

基于制造商共享契约前后的收益分配模型,根据Stackelberg动态博弈思想,从整个供应链收益最大化视角,分析制造商与零售商的共享收益合作区间,提出了基于共享契约的供应链合作伙伴收益分配协调机制。研究结果表明,制造商采用共享收益分配机制可使整个供应链系统得到协调,并在实践中具有可操作性。     

Reconciling conflict of interests in a green retailing channel with green sales effort

In this paper, we address conflicting objectives in a two-echelon retailer-manufacturer green retailing channel (GRC) with two types of substitutable green and non-green products. In the investigated model, the government pays (charges) the manufacturer a certain amount of subsidies (penalties) for producing green (non-green) products. The retailer can implement a green sales effort program to encourage customers to purchase green items instead of non-green products. In so doing, the retailer can transfer an uncertain amount of non-green demand to the green demand, while the total demand over both products remains constant. However, while producing green products is advantageous for the manufacturer due to governmental interventions, this is not the case for the retailer. To mitigate this conflict, we develop a game-theoretical model and a coordination mechanism that reconciles both members' interests. By applying the novel revenue-cost sharing along with a buyback (RCS&B) contract as an incentive mechanism, we mitigate conflicts and coordinate ordering and sales effort decisions throughout the channel. Our results show that the RCS&B contract may be quite effective in managing conflicting objectives toward aligning both GRC members’ interests. The proposed contract creates an economically viable, ambidextrous GRC by devising Pareto-improving solutions.     

两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量激励机制研究

两级物流服务商参与的供应链存在围绕产品质量以及物流服务质量控制的挑战。基于两级物流服务商参与的供应链质量特殊性设计了零售商主导下静态激励与动态激励相结合、个体单独激励与团队激励相结合的质量激励机制。研究表明：零售商对LSI的物流服务质量激励强度将影响LSI对FLSP的物流服务质量激励强度；制造商、LSI以及FLSP的质量努力水平与委托方对其质量激励强度系数以及其本身的质量努力效果系数成正比，与其各自的质量努力成本系数成反比；由于零售商对制造商以及LSI的团队激励并没有使得制造商与LSI提高产品质量及物流服务质量努力水平，因此，零售商缺乏提供团队激励的积极性；相比静态激励而言，当激励强度调节系数满足一定条件时，动态激励可以提高制造商的质量努力水平和零售商的期望收益；同时，零售商可通过改变激励强度调节系数来平衡自身期望收益最大化与质量努力水平最大化的目标，也即相比静态激励而言，动态激励机制更具优势。     

具有服务策略的双渠道供应链定价问题研究

本文研究了零售商提供服务的双渠道供应链,分析了零售商在不同的服务成本下提供服务对于供应商和零售商定价策略的影响。研究发现提供服务对于零售商不仅可以扩大利润,还可以把提供服务当作一种有效策略,应对来自电子商务渠道的利润吞噬,通过利润分享从而延缓渠道之间的冲突;只有服务系数小于一个临界值时,提供服务才能使零售商和供应商同时得到帕累托改进。因此,零售商应不断提高服务效率,为消费者提供更高效的服务。     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.     

论零售商主导型供应链联盟

现代商业中的竞争已经从企业之间的竞争转变为供应链联盟之间的竞争.零售商主导下的供应链联盟是分工深化和信患化条件下以大型零售商为主导的流通渠道成员通过信息共享并按契约分享利益的一种中间性组织.创新流通渠道组织、建立零售商主导下的供应链联盟本质上反映了客观经济规律的要求,同时能够有效地协调工商关系.本文基于合作竞争视角深入讨论了其组织性质、形成原因和竞争优势,并结合现阶段市场竞争国际化的背景探讨了我国零售企业的发展对策.     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

零售业顾客缺货反应研究评述

零售业主要是销售消费用品,直接面向终端顾客。关于缺货反应的研究,对后期的零售业具有重大的借鉴意义。缺货问题涉及供应链管理、顾客关系管理等诸多方面,它的研究对制造商、经销商、零售商都有很大的指导作用。否则,商品缺货可能导致零售门店损失销售额,也会削弱消费者对零售商和缺货商品品牌的信赖。