The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis

This study examines the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) on liquidity, information asymmetry, and institutional and retail investors trading behavior. Our main findings suggest three conclusions. First, Regulation FD has been effective in improving liquidity and in decreasing the level of information asymmetry. Second, retail trading activity increases dramatically after earnings announcements but there is a significant decline in institutional trading surrounding earnings announcements, particularly in the pre‐announcement period. Last, the decline in information asymmetry around earnings announcements is closely associated with a lower participation rate in the pre‐announcement period and more active trading of retail investors after earnings releases.     

Informed Trading in Corporate Bonds Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper examines the information content of corporate bond trading prior to earnings announcements using data from both NAIC and TRACE. We find that the direction of pre‐announcement bond trading is closely related to earnings surprises. This link is most evident prior to negative news and in high‐yield bonds. Further, abnormal bond trading during the pre‐announcement period can help predict both earnings surprises and post‐announcement bond returns. Such predictive ability of bond trading largely originates from institutional‐sized trades and is concentrated in the issuer's most actively traded bond. Finally, even after accounting for transactions costs, informed bond trading can generate significant net profits, especially prior to the release of bad news.     

Short-Selling Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper examines short‐sales transactions in the five days prior to earnings announcements of 913 Nasdaq‐listed firms. The tests provide evidence of informed trading in pre‐announcement short‐selling because they reveal that abnormal short‐selling is significantly linked to post‐announcement stock returns. Also, the tests indicate that short‐sellers typically are more active in stocks with low book‐to‐market valuations or low SUEs. The levels of pre‐announcement short‐selling, however, mostly appear to reflect firm‐specific information rather than these fundamental financial characteristics. We believe that these results should encourage financial market regulators to consider providing more extensive and timely disclosures of short‐selling to investors.     

Asymmetric Trading Costs Prior to Earnings Announcements: Implications for Price Discovery and Returns

We show that the cost of trading on negative news, relative to positive news, increases before earnings announcements. Our evidence suggests that this asymmetry is due to financial intermediaries reducing their exposure to announcement risks by providing liquidity asymmetrically. This asymmetry creates a predictable upward bias in prices that increases preannouncement, and subsequently reverses, confounding short‐window announcement returns as measures of earnings news and risk premia. These findings provide an alternative explanation for asymmetric return reactions to firms' earnings news, and help explain puzzling prior evidence that announcement risk premia precede the actual announcements. Our study informs methods for research centering on earnings announcements and offers a possible explanation for patterns in returns around anticipated periods of heightened inventory risks, including alternative firm‐level, industry‐level, and macroeconomic information events.     

Firm strategy and market reaction to earnings

We examine whether a firm's strategy affects the information content of the firm's earnings announcement. A cost leadership strategy is characterized by low sales margins coupled with large sales volumes, economies of scale and major investments in plant and physical assets, whereas a differentiation strategy involves high sales margins achieved through product quality and branding realized by investments in intangibles such as R&D and advertising. These characteristics of the strategies result in differential impact on investor reactions to new information that is revealed about firms. Our results show that firms pursuing a cost leadership strategy have earnings announcements that are more commonly interpreted and result in a greater change in the average belief about stock price. On the other hand, earnings announcements of firms pursuing a differentiation strategy result in more heterogeneous interpretation accompanied by a smaller change in the average belief about stock price. This paper advances our understanding of the cross-sectional variation in the market's reaction to earnings announcements. In addition, the paper demonstrates a predictable instance of divergence in the price reaction and trading volume reaction to an earnings announcement.     

Are active fund managers collectors of private information or fast interpreters of public information?

Recent studies of fund manager performance find evidence of outperformance. However limited research exists as to whether such outperformance is because of privately collected information, or merely expedient interpretation of publicly released information. In this study, we examine the trade sequences of active Australian equity fund managers around earnings announcements to provide insights into the source of fund managers’ superior information. We document an increased occurrence of buy‐sell trade sequences around good‐news earnings announcements. The evidence is consistent with fund managers having both private information about forthcoming good‐news earnings announcements and being ‘short‐term profiteers’. We find no evidence that fund managers have private information about forthcoming bad‐news earnings announcements. However, we do find an increase in the frequency of fund managers not trading before bad‐news earnings announcements only to subsequently sell during announcements.     

Individual Investor Trading and Return Patterns around Earnings Announcements

This paper provides evidence of informed trading by individual investors around earnings announcements using a unique data set of NYSE stocks. We show that intense aggregate individual investor buying (selling) predicts large positive (negative) abnormal returns on and after earnings announcement dates. We decompose abnormal returns following the event into information and liquidity provision components, and show that about half of the returns can be attributed to private information. We also find that individuals trade in both return‐contrarian and news‐contrarian manners after earnings announcements. The latter behavior has the potential to slow the adjustment of prices to earnings news.     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

Information Asymmetry and the Dealer's Bid-Ask Spread: A Case Study of Earnings and Dividend Announcements

Recent theoretical work on the bid-ask spread asserts that the dealer should widen the bid-ask spread when he or she suspects that the information advantage possessed by informed traders has increased. Thus, the dealer's spread can be employed to test for an increase in information asymmetry prior to an anticipated information event. In this paper, the method is applied to earnings and dividend announcements, which have been documented to be information events. The authors study three groups of announcements: (a) joint announcements—i.e., earnings and dividend announcements that are made on the same day, (b) initial (first) announcements—earnings or dividend announcements that were not preceded by another announcement in the prior thirty days, and (c) following (second) announcements—those announcements that follow the first announcement by at least ten days but by no more than thirty days. The authors find a strong increase in information asymmetry only before the second announcements and virtually no increase before the joint and first announcements. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is, on average, normal information asymmetry before announcements, but that the dealer will suspect a nonroutine announcement (with an attendant increase in information asymmetry) when the second announcement is separated from the first by more than ten days. Other possible explanations for the results are discussed, and suggestions for future research are outlined.     

The informativeness of pro forma and street earnings: an examination of information asymmetry around earnings announcements

Using adverse-selection cost as a proxy for information asymmetry, we find evidence that non-GAAP earnings numbers issued by management (pro forma earnings) and analysts (street earnings) improve price discovery. First, information asymmetry before an earnings announcement is positively associated with the probability of a non-GAAP earnings number at the forthcoming earnings announcement. Second, the post-announcement reduction in information asymmetry is greater when managers or analysts issue non-GAAP earnings at the earnings announcement and when the magnitude of the non-GAAP earnings adjustment is larger. Our results suggest that earnings adjustments by analysts and managers increase the amount and precision of earnings information and help to narrow information asymmetry between informed and uninformed traders following earnings announcements. Alternatively, the findings may be attributable to characteristics of non-GAAP firms and overall better reporting quality for those firms rather than non-GAAP earnings disclosure per se.     

Investor and (Value Line) Analyst Underreaction to Information about Future Earnings: The Corrective Role of Non-Earnings-Surprise Information

Prior research suggests that financial analysts' earnings forecasts and stock prices underreact to earnings news. This paper provides evidence that analysts and investors correct this underreaction in response to the next earnings announcement and to other (non-earnings-surprise) information available between earnings announcements. Our evidence also suggests that analysts and investors underreact to information reflected in analysts' earnings forecast revisions and that non-earnings-surprise information helps correct this underreaction as well. Controlling for corrective non-earnings-surprise information significantly increases estimates of the degree to which analysts' forecasting behavior can explain drifts in returns following both earnings announcements and analysts' earnings forecast revisions.     

Individuals’ Trading Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper investigates the relationship between individuals’ net trading and stock price movements before and after annual earnings announcements for the Taiwan Stock Exchange. We conduct an event study on the effects of pre‐event individual trade imbalances on pre‐ and post‐announcement abnormal returns. With a unique and comprehensive dataset, we accurately classify executed orders by aggressiveness of order price. The evidence indicates that while individuals, as a group, are not informed about impending earnings announcements, individuals who place aggressive orders are informed as their net trading coincides with contemporaneous and future stock returns. Aggressive individuals lose their edge during the financial crisis. More importantly, the advantage (disadvantage) for individuals who adopt aggressive (passive) orders weakens when foreign institutions own concentrated equity in firms. We also find that net individual trading contains information about abnormal returns that either past returns or volume does not subsume. Controlling for past returns, trading volume and volatility, or using an alternative measure of net individual trading does not change our conclusions.     

Information interpretation or information discovery: which role of analysts do investors value more?

This study provides evidence that a significant percentage of analyst forecast revisions are issued promptly after a broad set of corporate public disclosures and that investors perceive these prompt revisions as more valuable than nonprompt revisions. These results hold for all revisions, revisions outside of the earnings announcement window, or revisions in weeks preceding the earnings announcements and are also robust to various sensitivity tests. Investors particularly value analysts?? prompt interpretation of earnings announcements, Form 8-K filings, or certain qualitative news. To the extent that prompt revisions are more likely to reflect analysts?? information interpretation role, our results suggest that investors value more highly analysts?? ability to interpret public disclosures, especially less structured or non-financial disclosures, than their ability for information discovery.     

ON THE INFORMATIONAL EFFECT OF SHORT‐SALES CONSTRAINTS: EVIDENCE FROM THE TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE

Using a database of stock lending fees for Japanese centralized margin transactions, I show that short‐sales constraints reduce the adjustment speed of stock prices to negative information before the announcements of revised earnings forecasts disclosed by firms in the Tokyo Stock Exchange from July 1998 to December 2001. I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the stocks with high short‐sales costs are insensitive to negative information on pre‐announcement days, but the CARs of these stocks become significantly lower than the CARs of the stocks with low short‐sales costs when the announcements reveal negative information to the public.     

业绩快报的信息含量:经验证据与政策含义

业绩快报是上市公司2004年报披露中的一项制度创新。本文旨在研究业绩快报是否具有信息含量,以及业绩快报的披露是否会减少盈利公告的有用性。我们选取了2005年1月至4月间披露的70份2004年度业绩快报作为样本进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:业绩快报的披露提高了会计信息质量;业绩快报具有显著信息含量;业绩快报的披露并没有减少盈利公告的信息含量,是盈利公告的一种有益补充形式,值得提倡和推广。     

THE RELATION AMONG DIVIDEND POLICY,FIRM SIZE,AND THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS

In this paper we investigate the role of dividends in explaining the size effect. The previous literature concludes that before the firm's earnings announcement, small firm stock prices impound less information than large firm stock prices. This size effect is evidenced by the greater market reaction to small firm earnings announcements than to large firm earnings announcements. We find that if the dividend announcement precedes the earnings announcement, no size effect exists. The implication is that the information conveyed by dividend announcements includes the information conveyed to investors in large firms by other information sources. However, if the firm does not pay dividends or if the firm's earnings announcement precedes its dividend announcement, the size effect exists. The implication is that dividends do not completely explain the size effect. That is, there are information sources other than dividends that are exclusively available to investors in large firms, and the information provided by these sources is reflected in the stock price of large firms before the earnings announcement.     

DIVIDEND CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS AND EARNINGS VOLATILITY AND TIMING

Recent modeling using the asymmetric information framework suggests that the magnitude of a market response to dividend change announcements should be related to the timing of the dividend announcement vis-a-vis the earnings release and to the stability of those earnings. The announcement effects of regular quarterly dividend changes are tested and these effects are related to the percentage change in the dividend yield, to the stability of the firm's earnings, to the timing of dividend and earnings announcements, and to the level of earnings compared with prior quarters. Analysis indicates that significant relationships exist between the announcement effect and changes in the dividend yield, and whether the dividend change is positive or negative. Only weak evidence exists that dividend announcement effects are larger when current earnings are unknown.     

PROFITABILITY, EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT TIME LAGS, AND STOCK PRICES

This research addresses (1) whether firms with lower (hgher) than expected earnings fgures released those figures to the public later (earlier) than expected and (2) whether there is a reaction by the capital market to the timing of the earnings announcement. The results indicate that later than expected earnings announcements are likely to contain worse news than early announcements. Also the stock returns of late reporting firms appear to be lower than that of early reporting firms in the days surrounding the earnings announcement date.     

Too Good to be True? An Analysis of the Options Market's Reactions to Earnings Releases

Using option implied risk neutral return distributions before and after earnings announcements, we study the option market's reaction to extreme events over earnings announcements. While earnings announcements generally reduce short‐term uncertainty about the stock price, very good news does not reduce uncertainty and slightly bad news actually increases uncertainty. We also find that left tail probabilities decrease over earnings releases while right tail probabilities increase. We interpret these findings as evidence of maintained investor expectations that very good news is generally not released during earnings announcements, combined with skepticism in the form of lingering uncertainty at the release of such very good news.     

Investor Information Demand: Evidence from Google Searches Around Earnings Announcements

The objective of this study is to investigate factors that influence investor information demand around earnings announcements and to provide insights into how variation in information demand impacts the capital market response to earnings. The Internet is one channel through which public information is disseminated to investors and we propose that one way that investors express their demand for public information is via Google searches. We find that abnormal Google search increases about two weeks prior to the earnings announcement, spikes markedly at the announcement, and continues at high levels for a period after the announcement. This finding suggests that information diffusion is not instantaneous with the release of the earnings information, but rather is spread over a period surrounding the announcement. We also find that information demand is positively associated with media attention and news, and is negatively associated with investor distraction. When investors search for more information in the days just prior to the announcement, preannouncement price and volume changes reflect more of the upcoming earnings news and there is less of a price and volume response when the news is announced. This result suggests that, when investors demand more information about a firm, the information content of the earnings announcement is partially preempted.