战略性研发补贴政策稳健吗?-基于中间品贸易的视角

在Stackelberg竞争框架下,本文沿用Spencer and Brander(1983)第三国市场模型,考虑存在中间品贸易情形时,一国的战略性研发政策。研究结果表明,在只有单个国家可以实施研发政策的情况下,若最终产品间的差异程度较大(小),那么该国的最优研发政策为征税(补贴);而当两国政府均可以干预各自国内企业研发时,一国最优的研发政策将随最终产品间的差异程度不同而选择征税、补贴或不干预,并且当最终产品间的差异程度位于一定范围之内时,一国的研发补贴政策并不会招致另一国的报复,因此,战略性研发补贴政策并不如LeahyandNeary(2001)分析的稳健。     

软件信息业研发投入、研发费用加计扣除与企业绩效实证研发

选取上海、深圳证券市场软件信息业171家高新技术企业2012-2015年的相关数据,针对研发投入、研发费用加计扣除与企业绩效三者间的关系进行研究。结果表明,研发费用加计扣除与研发投入和企业绩效显著正相关,加计扣除政策实施效果较好,政府应给予企业更多的加计扣除优惠;根据面板数据模型估计结果,研发投入与企业绩效存在非线性关系,研发投入对当期绩效的抑制作用不明显,对滞后一期绩效有显著抑制作用,对滞后两期绩效正向作用不明显。研发投入经济效益回收存在一定的滞后性,根据分位数回归结果,处于50%分位点的企业研发投入对企业绩效的正向作用最大;分组回归结果显示,研发费用加计扣除优惠对研发投入与企业绩效的关系具有正向调节作用。     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.     

Comparing Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D

We compare the Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in an asymmetric duopoly with product R&D competition. If a firm’s marginal cost is lower than that of its rival, then this firm (its rival) is referred to as the more (less) efficient firm. Under each mode of competition, there are three types of equilibria: blockaded-entry, deterred-entry, and accommodated-entry. Moreover, the presence of R&D investment makes it harder for the less efficient firm to survive. Cournot competition entails a unique equilibrium, whereas Bertrand competition may yield two equilibria. It is harder for the less efficient firm to survive under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition. Versus Cournot competition, Bertrand competition yields higher industry output, and it shifts production from the less efficient firm to the more efficient firm. This result, together with the known size effect, explains the following three findings. First, the more efficient firm has a normal output ranking, whereas the less efficient firm may demonstrate an output reversal. Second, the more efficient firm may demonstrate a R&D reversal, whereas the less efficient firm has a normal R&D ranking (its Cournot R&D effort exceeds its Bertrand R&D effort). Third, Bertrand competition is more welfare-efficient than Cournot competition.     

Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate R&D. Using a unique 2003 World Bank survey of over 2400 firms in 18 Chinese cities, we obtain the following findings: (1) property rights protection is positively and significantly related to corporate R&D activity (for both process and product R&D); (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate R&D, while informal payments to government officials are not; and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.     

Does market competition promote innovation efficiency in China’s high-tech industries?

ABSTRACT

Despite extensive discussion about the relationship between market competition and innovation performance, the impact of market competition on the innovation efficiency of high-technology industries in a transitional economy is still unclear. The article is based on panel data of 17 subsectors of China’s high-tech industry spanning the 2001–2016 period. Using stochastic the frontier analysis model, we empirically test the impact of market competition on two-stage innovation efficiency from the perspective of the industry. The results indicate that market competition and firm scale have positive and significant effects on the efficiency of two-stage innovation, the effects of industry export intensity and government intervention on R&D efficiency are negative, but the effects are different for the efficiency of the commercialisation of technology. Based on the results of the empirical analysis, this paper compares the trends and the differences between R&D efficiency and commercialisation efficiency, and then uses cluster analysis to reclassify China’s high-tech industries into three categories, thus revealing the disconnect and imbalance within China’s high-tech industries. At the end of the article, we present some possible policy recommendations.     

Oligopolistic Competition, Technology Innovation, and Multiproduct Firms

Firms' proliferation behavior in a differentiated product market is studied using an oligopolistic competition model with multiproduct firms. The model has the following characteristics: (1) the elasticity of substitution across firm's own products and the elasticity of substitution across different firms are allowed to differ; (2) the product managers of the same firm behave cooperatively rather than independently; (3) the number of firms is determined by a free-entry condition and so is endogenous. If the elasticity of substitution across the firm's own products increases, it is shown that the firm proliferates less and the number of firms in the market increases. If the elasticity of substitution across different firms increases, firms proliferate more and the number of firms in the market decreases.     

Product differentiation, process R&D, and the nature of market competition

We investigate the relationship between process and product R&D and compare the incentives for both types of R&D under different modes of market competition (Bertrand versus Cournot). It is shown that: (i) process R&D investments increase with the degree of product differentiation and firms invest more in product R&D when they can do process R&D than when they cannot; (ii) Bertrand firms have a stronger incentive for product R&D whereas Cournot firms invest more in process R&D; and (iii) cooperation in product R&D promotes both types of R&D relative to competition whereas cooperation in both types of R&D discourages R&D relative to cooperation in just product R&D.     

国际多市场寡头条件下的贸易政策和产业政策

国际多市场寡头是Bulow( 1 985)提出的多市场寡头概念在国际贸易领域的自然延伸。在本文中 ,市场之间联系的纽带是本国企业具有规模收益递减的生产技术。本文的主要结论是 ,第一 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行价格竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预组合包括国内生产补贴与出口税 ,它们对本国福利的作用是一致的。第二 ,如果本国企业与外国企业在外国市场进行数量竞争 ,那么 ,最优干预政策组合包括国内生产补贴与出口补贴 ,它们作用于本国福利的方向是不一致的 ,这时 ,本国政府用国内生产补贴执行反托拉斯职能 ,用出口补贴执行利润转移职能。第三 ,作为模型的一个应用 ,本文论证了出口退税政策会加剧国内市场的扭曲 ;而且它不一定能够提高本国福利。     

战略性经营者激励选择与国际市场份额竞争

本文首先用具有线性需求和规模收益不变生产技术的Cournot双头模型来刻画国际市场份额竞争。指出 ,如果参与国际竞争的本国企业是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,那么 ,无论竞争对手是否是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,本国企业所有者总是有积极性操纵经营者的激励 ,特别的 ,在只有本国企业作出单边激励选择的情况下 ,这种操纵可以使本国企业生产Stackelberg领先者产量成为可以置信的承诺。它在这里所起到的作用是与出口补贴在战略性贸易政策分析中所起到的作用相一致的。如果考虑到从过去的GATT到现在的WTO都规定政府不得以任何形式参与国际竞争 ,这个结论就更有趣了。因为无须政府帮助 ,本国企业所有者凭借自身的力量就能实现有利于本国企业的竞争结果。这种民间对政府的替代是有意义的。在双边激励选择的情况下 ,两国企业陷入了“囚徒困境”。本国企业只有诉诸于本国政府对国际市场的干预 ,才能重新获得Stackelberg领先者的地位 ;但与对它的传统理解相比 ,这种地位已然弱化。最后 ,我们还证明 ,根据相当一般的条件 ,所有者决定的最优经营者激励只与竞争类型 (数量竞争还是价格竞争 )有关 ,而与企业的产品类型 (替代品还是互补品 )无关。     

Strategic environmental policy and the accumulation of knowledge

In dealing with a transnational pollutant-emitting duopoly welfare-maximising policy makers face two negative externalities: imperfect competition and unpriced emissions. Strategic environmental policy models show that these externalities involve a trade-off between reducing pollution and allowing for rent-seeking of the respective firm. This dilemma usually results in a suboptimal internalisation of the negative externality emerging from emissions. Indeed, the conventional model setup includes an R&D stage that enables the firms to mitigate regulation costs. But the typical one period configuration ignores that R&D expenditures create knowledge capital which is, due to its inherent cumulativeness, also effective in following periods. Our model analyses the established trade-off in a two period setting and therefore allows for an investigation of intertemporal knowledge accumulation. We find that the intertemporal effects provide an incentive for a policy maker to set a higher tax rate compared to a one-period setup which lessens the magnitude of the suboptimal internalisation of emissions. Under certain conditions even a tax rate above the Pigouvian level is possible in period 1.     

Optimal Trade Policy with Horizontal Differentiation and Asymmetric Costs

This paper examines the optimal export policy under Bertrand competition when the products exhibit horizontal differentiation and production costs are asymmetric. The focus of this paper is on the product‐differentiation effect in the determination of the optimal export policy. We show that given that the equilibrium characteristic of a foreign firm's product R&D lies to the left‐hand side of its initial level , since the foreign firm has a unit cost advantage and the efficiency of its R&D technology is sufficiently low, a rise in the export subsidy of the domestic country increases a domestic firm's profits and then welfare by extending the degree of horizontal differentiation between the two products. Thus, the optimal export policy under Bertrand competition may turn out to be an export subsidy rather than an export tax. This result is in sharp contrast to that of Eaton and Grossman (1986 ).     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

市场竞争、经理人激励与上市公司舞弊行为——来自中国证监会处罚公告的经验证据

中国上市公司控制权市场、经理人市场和经理人激励对舞弊行为影响的检验结果表明,在控制权市场竞争中只有第二大股东的制衡力量对舞弊行为起到显著的抑制作用,经理人市场的竞争程度与公司舞弊行为显著负相关,不成熟的经理人市场使得经理人的声誉机制和报酬激励机制都难以发挥抑制舞弊行为的作用。治理上市公司舞弊行为的更好路径是优化经理人的选任机制和竞争机制,而不是仅仅强化其激励。     

Industrial Policy and Firm Heterogeneity

Our concern in this paper is with firm-specific industrial policy. When R&D subsidies or taxes are differentiated among firms, the question arises as to which firms in an industry should receive such support. We analyze a situation where firms differ in their R&D technologies in two distinct ways: in the costs of performing R&D activities and in the output obtained from such activities. We find that the optimal firm-specific industrial policy is affected differently by the two sources of firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, a change in a firm's R&D productivity has an ambiguous effect on the optimal policy towards the firm.
JEL classification: O 31; L 52; F 13     

R&D and productivity growth: Evidence from the UK

Although the econometric evaluation of R&D has attracted wide interest in many countries, it has not attracted much in the UK. The main objective of this paper is to fill this void, i.e., to estimate the impact of R&D on productivity growth of the UK manufacturing sector. However, there are some additional objectives. Firstly, we estimate the impact of R&D on productivity growth of large and small firms and we discuss a number of theoretical arguments regarding the role of firm size. Secondly, given that the technological infrastructure influences the innovative capacity of a firm, we compare the impact of R&D on productivity growth of high-tech firms with the corresponding impact on productivity growth of low-tech firms. Thirdly, we investigate whether the contribution of R&D to productivity growth has changed over time.

Based on firm-level data (78 firms, 1989–2002), we find that the contribution of R&D is approximately 0.04. Although the R&D-elasticity of large firms (0.044) is higher than the corresponding elasticity of small firms (0.035), the difference is small. In contrast, the R&D-elasticity is considerably high for high-tech sectors (0.11), but statistically insignificant for low-tech sectors. Finally, the investigation of the elasticity of R&D over time revealed an interesting discontinuity showing that although until 1995 the R&D-elasticity was approximately zero, after 1995 it increased dramatically to 0.09. We investigate the potential causes of such non-linearity and we suggest a number of possible explanations.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

Multistage R&D competition and patent policy

In this paper a model of multistage R&D patent policy is investigated. We study the impact of the duration of patent protection for intermediate products on R&D races when the discovery of the final product requires the accomplishment of an intermediate step. Using a multistage model where firms choose their levels of research investment at each stage, we find all subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. We also determine how competition affects a firm's level of research investment at different stages of the R&D competition.     

不同监督情境下政府创新支持对企业研发投入的影响——基于农业上市公司的实证研究

近年来,“三农”问题受到极大关注。为了应对外部资源、环境、科学技术等多重压力对农业升级与发展的影响,政府出台了诸多政策支持农业企业的技术研发与创新。本文从政府干预视角分析政府补助和税费返还两种形式的政府创新支持政策对农业企业研发投入的影响,重点分析机构投资者与大股东参与公司内部治理以及社会审计事务机构参与公司外部治理这两者所发挥的不同监督作用。研究发现：第一,不同形式的政府创新支持（政府补助和税费返还）对农业企业研发投入的影响并不一致。政府补助产生替代效应,税费返还则产生互补效应。第二,持股监督（机构投资者和大股东的持股比例上升）能增强政府补助对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也能增强税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。第三,审计监督（社会审计事务机构的审计意见）会减弱政府补助支持对农业企业研发投入的替代效应,也会减弱税费返还对农业企业研发投入的互补效应。本文的研究发现为政府制定适宜的创新支持政策,以及合理发挥持股监督与审计监督的内外部治理作用,提供一定的决策依据和理论支持。     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.