How does ownership structure affect capital structure and firm value?Recent evidence from East Asia1

The present paper examines the effects of ownership structures on capital structure and firm valuation. It argues that the effects of separation of control from cash flow rights on capital structure and firm value also depend on the separation of control from management as well as on legal rules and enforcement defining investors’ protection. We obtain firm‐level panel data (three stage least squares, 3SLS) estimates from four of the East Asian countries worst affected by the last crisis. There is evidence that the general wisdom that higher control than cash flow rights may lower firm value may be reversed among owner‐managed family firms in the sample countries.     

家族企业目标的多重性及其冲突分析

家族企业与一般的非家族企业相比,除了存在企业目标和股东目标之外,还存在家族目标,家族企业承担目标的多重性常常使家族企业处于矛盾冲突当中,因为企业、股东和家族在目标、成功标准和权利平等性等方面各不相同,家族企业因为混淆了这些方面的不同规则,因而导致冲突的出现。家族企业的矛盾冲突包括家族成员经济利益冲突、权力地位冲突、经营思路冲突、角色冲突、家族企业主与职业经理人之间的冲突等等,每一种冲突都是对家族企业的严峻考验,家族企业必须及时识别和化解这些冲突。     

论国有制的可能

在国有企业改制过程以及相关的争论中,是否在国有制下不触及产权改革,而依靠引入像相对业绩比较这些技术手段实现国有制的效率,以往的产权理论尚未回答这类问题。本文论证了在纯国有制或者说集中所有权下,国家调控政策的巨大影响以及国家所有者和政策调控者身份的重合,加上国家无法准确把握政策的影响度,会造成这种判断信息的失真。这也说明,相对业绩比较无法取代产权改革,只能在国有经济比重不高的情况下才能起作用。     

论私有产权的限制

私有产权的限制可从两个层次看:一是立宪层次上的限制,它是私有财产所有者被动接受的限制,包括禁止侵害他物权的限制和保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制;二是法律上的私有产权界定后,私有产权所有者主动选择的限制,包括行使权利成本的限制和设立他物权的限制.保护公共利益与实现政治需求的限制抑制了私有产权、市场交换作为调节资源稀缺性与人类欲望无限性矛盾手段的力量;其他限制则是发挥市场机制配置资源,实现产值最大化的要求,为不是限制的限制.     

Bringing economic opportunity into line with environmental influence: A discussion on the Coase theorem and the Porter and van der Linde hypothesis

Environmental concerns and tightened environmental policy parameters have been associated with the notion of additional costs of compliance rather than with innovation and sustainability. The contrary, has also been suggested, claiming that strict environmental legislation merely serves as a catalyst for firms to retain obvious economic and environmental mutual gains–so called win–wins–laying around waiting to be collected. Such implications can be seen from the Porter and van der Linde writings, heavily criticised by Palmer et al. as being built on faulty examples. This paper supports that conclusion and uses property rights and transactions costs theories to find private incentives to explore the win–wins for those actors who have the largest potentials to diminish the pressure on our environment. By applying the Coase theorem, emphasising transaction costs and property rights, this paper argues that strong public support is needed to create private incentives for exploring economic and environmental win–win innovations. The public support suggested is to (A) extend producer responsibilities–where the same costs which may be neglected by the end consumers will, if transferred to the design owner, be viewed as a production cost–and to (B) enforce environmental public procurement. Both may be combined with a support to (C) actors (such as non-governmental organisations and consumer agencies) positioning themselves as information bridges by informing the consumers. The negative effects of asymmetric information among actors can, thereby, be diminished as well as the low interest to primarily care for the environment among common consumers.     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.     

Tradable emission rights and strategic interaction

The use of tradable emission rights as environmental policy instruments may affect the conditions for strategic interaction between regulated firms and thus have implications for competition policy. This paper presents an analysis of how, and under what conditions, emission rights can be used strategically by oligopolistic firms for predatory and exclusionary purposes.     

WAGE BARGAINING AND MERGER INCENTIVES WITH ASYMMETRIC COSTS

This paper examines how wage bargaining within each firm influences the relationship between an equilibrium ownership structure and the most preferred ownership structure from the viewpoint of social welfare, in a unionized oligopoly of asymmetric firms with respect to productivity of capital. We consider the merger incentive of each firm’s owner when the wage level is determined through bargaining between the firm’s owner and union. We derive a condition for both the degree of cost asymmetry among existing firms and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner to her/his union such that each ownership structure can be observed in equilibrium. We also show that although the two types of ownership structures with the merger involving the least efficient firm can be equilibria and socially optimal, these structures are observed only when both the degree of cost asymmetry and the relative bargaining power of each firm’s owner are moderate. Finally, we analyse the relationship among the cooperative game approach employed in this paper and two non‐cooperative merger formation approaches, and examine the robustness of the results obtained in this paper against the change in the assumption regarding each firm’s cost function.     

Playing monopoly in the creek: Imperfect competition, development, and in-stream flows

Land ownership and control of development in new and frontier cities is often concentrated. Local public goods, such as wetlands and riparian habitats, can be adversely affected by development. Regulatory pressure to protect these local public goods may not emerge until after some development has occurred. When development rights are insecure, an incentive exists to accelerate early development, an incentive that increases with the number of firms. Further, multiple equilibria may exist, which can result in large increases in development for small increases in the number of firms. When firms are uncertain about how the regulator values the local public good, development may be further accelerated and there may be even more equilibria.     

Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms

The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial firms. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown that (i) delegation drastically modifies the owners' preferences concerning the distribution of roles, as compared with the setting where firms act as pure profit-maximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving first in the market game entails that, at least observationally, the owner of the leading firm prefers not to delegate. I show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13.     

INTERNAL REGULATION BY MIXED ENTERPRISES: THE CASE OF THE ITALIAN WATER SECTOR

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises in local utilities. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following it, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of 'internal' regulation. With more information, the public authority can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations. Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of these enterprises can be the suitable place where public and private representatives can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts.     

我国国有建设工程监理服务的独立性分析

在现阶段,国有建设工程业主代表与建设监理人的地位并不是平等的.社会责任与契约责任的偏离客观上造成监理人权利与责任的失衡,建设监理人存在丧失独立工作的可能.而监理人声誉机制与申述机制的缺乏会将建设监理人独立判断与决策受到国有建设业主代表的不规范行为干预的可能变为现实.平衡建设监理人权利与责任,促进监理行业协会的建设,强化建设监理人自身素质提高监理人独立性的有效途径.因此,从制度层面理顺监理人权利与责任的关系,保证监理人正当行驶权利,对于促进建设监理人的权利与义务的平衡,对于遏制国有建设业主代表的机会主义行为,摆脱国有建设业主代表对工程建设的非法干预,乃至提高国有建设工程效果具有重要的意义.     

A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE

We investigate the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that: (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.     

终极控制权、外资持股与隧道输送

上市公司的大股东隧道输送行为一直都是监管的难点和研究的热点。基于终极控制权的分析框架,并借以上市公司的关联交易和关联债权债务,本文实证检验了中国上市公司的隧道输送行为和外资持股对其的治理效应。研究表明,绝大部分中国上市公司都被政府所终极控制;对于家族所控制的上市公司,终极控制权与现金流权的分离确实可以影响到大股东的隧道输送行为,但对于政府终极控制的上市公司此效应并不明显;外资股东的存在能有效地约束家族终极控制者的隧道输送行为。     

公务员人力资本产权激励理论渊源探析

人力资本产权激励功能源于产权所带来的收益,而产权收益的实现是产权主体拥有产权权利的根本目的.从理论渊源来看,关于公务员人力资本产权激励的研究大体可分为两种视角:即制度主义研究视角与管理主义研究视角.制度主义研究视角强调制度建设对于产权主体的重要意义,主张通过制度设计来确保公务员人力资本所有者获取到合理的产权收益.而管理主义视角则认为,公务员人力资本产权收益的实现是以人力资本所有者的需求满足为基础,不同的产权收益方式和内容带给公务员个体的满足程度不一,从而可以形成不同的产权激励效果,因而,其所关注的重点不再是产权制度的设计,而是产权收益的表现形式.两种视角共同构成了公务员人力资本产权激励的实现途径.     

Drivers of price reaction to rights issue announcements in the Kuwait Stock Exchange

This study examines the drivers behind stock price reactions to announcements of rights issues by firms listed on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange for the period 2003–2013. We find higher cumulative abnormal returns for firms that undertake larger issues, with the issue size reflecting the availability of favourable investment opportunities and their potential positive impact on firms’ earnings. We also document a positive price reaction in firms that are affiliated with a family group. We interpret this as evidence that the proceeds of the rights offering would be employed effectively when the firm is controlled by a family firm. No evidence was found for the price pressure and pricing effects.     

Innovation or imitation? The effect of spillovers and competitive pressure on firms’ R&D strategy choice

In this paper a firm’s R&D strategy is assumed to be endogenous and allowed to depend on both internal firm characteristics and external factors. Firms choose between two strategies, either they engage in R&D or abstain from own R&D and imitate the outcomes of innovators. This yields three types of equilibria, in which either all firms innovate, some firms innovate and others imitate, or no firm innovates. Firms’ equilibrium strategies crucially depend on external factors. We find that the efficiency of intellectual property rights protection positively affects firms’ incentives to engage in R&D, while excessive competitive pressure has a negative effect. In addition, smaller firms are found to be more likely to become imitators when the product is homogeneous and the level of spillovers is high. Regarding social welfare our results indicate that strengthening intellectual property protection can have an ambiguous effect. In markets characterized by a high rate of innovation a reduction of intellectual property rights protection can discourage innovative performance substantially. However, a reduction of patent protection can also increase social welfare because it may induce imitation. This indicates that policy issues such as the optimal length and breadth of patent protection cannot be resolved without taking into account specific market and firm characteristics.     

中国国有企业民营化绩效研究

本文研究中国国有企业民营化是否有效的问题。我们通过对国企民营化进程的考察来对此问题作出经验解答。根据世界银行一份对中国五个城市、覆盖六个行业的近300家国有企业(SOEs)1996—2001年间的调查数据,我们发现:(1)绩效较好的国有企业优先被民营化;(2)总体上来说,中国的民营化是富有成效的,尤其是提高了销售收入,降低了企业的成本,并最终导致企业盈利能力和生产率的大幅提高;而且在获得这些收益的同时并没有带来大规模的失业问题;(3)由民营机构控股、彻底民营化的企业比那些仍然是国有控股、部分民营化的企业绩效表现更好。     

Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights

The consumption of an indivisible good causes identity-dependent externalities to non-consumers. We analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure, but cannot commit to future actions. We ask the following questions: (1) Does the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer? (2) Is the outcome always efficient? The major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency. This result complements the Coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency.     

Spillovers from Foreign Firms through Worker Mobility: An Empirical Investigation*

While there is a large empirical literature on productivity spillovers from multinationals, this literature treats the channels through which these spillover effects work as a black box. The new approach in this paper is to investigate whether spillovers occur via worker mobility. We use data on whether or not the owner of a domestic firm has previous experience in a multinational, and relate this information to firm‐level productivity. Our results suggest that firms which are run by owners who worked for multinationals in the same industry immediately prior to opening up their own firm are more productive than other domestic firms.