Funding liquidity and bank risk taking

This study examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk taking. Using quarterly data for U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2014, we find evidence that banks having lower funding liquidity risk as proxied by higher deposit ratios, take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk as evidenced by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower Z-scores. However, our results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the Global Financial Crisis banks with lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

The role of governance on bank liquidity creation

This paper examines the impact of internal bank governance on bank liquidity creation in the U.S. before, during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Using bank holding company level data, we analyze whether better-governed banks create higher levels of liquidity. We find that this effect is positive and significant but only for large bank holding companies. Further analysis reveals that specific internal governance categories: CEO education, compensation structure, progressive practices, and ownership have a significant effect on bank liquidity. However, this positive effect occurs mostly during the crisis period, and for large banks that are also high liquidity creators. Finally, we find that the effect of governance on liquidity creation increases during the crisis period. These findings are robust even while controlling for liquidity measures, bank size, and endogeneity problems between governance and liquidity creation.     

ESG投资能够促进银行创造流动性吗?——兼论经济政策不确定性的调节效应

当前在我国致力于实现“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的大背景下,银行能否通过ESG投资促进流动性创造,进而推动高质量发展具有重大战略意义。本文利用2009年第一季度至2020年第二季度中国36家上市银行的面板数据,实证分析ESG投资对银行流动性创造的影响,并将其置于经济政策不确定性条件下予以讨论。研究发现:第一,ESG投资整体上促进流动性创造,表现为对资产端和负债端流动性创造的促进作用,以及对表外流动性创造的抑制作用。从ESG投资结构看,环境保护投资和社会责任投资均抑制流动性创造,而公司治理投资则促进流动性创造。异质性分析表明,地方性银行和资本短缺银行的ESG投资对流动性创造具有更强的促进作用。第二,中介机制分析发现,ESG投资主要通过“盈利”和“风险”渠道促进流动性创造。第三,在经济政策不确定性上升时期,ESG投资对流动性创造的促进作用更加显著。从ESG投资分项看,经济政策不确定性会增强环境保护投资和社会责任投资对流动性创造的抑制作用,以及公司治理投资对流动性创造的促进作用。本文结论为充分发挥ESG投资作用并以此推动高质量发展提供了政策启示。     

The impact of bank FinTech on liquidity creation: Evidence from China

This paper examines whether and how bank FinTech affects liquidity creation. Using panel data from Chinese commercial banks over the period 2008–2019 and bank-level FinTech indices constructed by a textual analysis method, we find robust evidence that banks with greater FinTech development create more liquidity for the public. This effect operates through deposit inflow, risk management, and cost efficiency channels. Furthermore, we find that the positive effect of bank FinTech on liquidity creation is more pronounced for banks with non-state ownership, unlisted status, and less liquidity creation.     

Bank liquidity creation,monetary policy,and financial crises

This paper examines the interplay among bank liquidity creation (which incorporates all bank on- and off-balance sheet activities), monetary policy, and financial crises. We find that: (1) high liquidity creation (relative to trend) – particularly off-balance sheet liquidity creation – helps predict crises, controlling for other factors; (2) monetary policy has statistically significant, but economically minor effects on liquidity creation by small banks during normal times, and these effects are even weaker during financial crises; (3) monetary policy has very little effects on medium and large bank liquidity creation during both normal times and crises. These findings suggest that authorities may wish to monitor bank liquidity creation closely in order to predict and perhaps lessen the likelihood of financial crises. They might also consider other tools to control bank liquidity creation, such as capital and liquidity requirements.     

Do foreign ownership and home-host country distance matter? Evidence on the impact of bank market power on liquidity creation in a selected Southeast Asian country

This paper examines the roles of foreign ownership and home-host country distance in the impact of bank market power on bank liquidity creation in a selected Southeast Asian country (Malaysia) over the period 2001−2017. A key finding is that the impact of market power on liquidity creation is either significantly negative or insignificant for domestic banks, but is significantly positive for foreign banks, irrespective of the liquidity creation measures used. This finding points to evidence of “home-field advantage” of domestic banks as the banks possess greater ability to withstand interest margin compression, while competing with foreign banks in liquidity creation market. Moreover, this paper finds that foreign banks originated from countries with cultural, economic and institutional distance to the host country require greater market power to boost their liquidity creation performance, as compared to their domestic counterparts. Further analysis also indicates that the influence of host-home country distance is more evident among small foreign banks which have lower franchise value. Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that although bank competition policies may promote customer welfare, foreign banks should be granted with some degree of market power in the host country to help alleviating the banks’ operational challenges arising from home-host country distance.     

The price of liquidity: The effects of market conditions and bank characteristics

We study the prices that individual banks pay for liquidity (captured by borrowing rates in repos with the central bank and benchmarked by the overnight index swap) as a function of market conditions and bank characteristics. These prices depend in particular on the distribution of liquidity across banks, which is calculated over time using individual bank-level data on reserve requirements and actual holdings. Banks pay more for liquidity when positions are more imbalanced across banks, consistent with the existence of short squeezing. We also show that small banks pay more for liquidity and are more vulnerable to squeezes. Healthier banks pay less but, contrary to what one might expect, banks in formal liquidity networks do not. State guarantees reduce the price of liquidity but do not protect against squeezes.     

Do stress tests affect bank liquidity creation?

We examine the impact of Federal Reserve stress tests from 2009 to 2016 on U.S. bank liquidity creation. Empirical results show that regulatory stress tests have a negative effect on both on-and off-balance sheet bank liquidity creation and asset-side liquidity creation. As banks enter the stress tests, they reduce their liquidity creation to avoid failing the stress tests. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks manage their risk exposures to meet higher capital requirements. The negative effect of stress testing on liquidity creation continues to persist in the quarters after the stress tests. Finally, stress test banks appear to increase liability-side liquidity creation. These findings highlight that the enhanced financial stability from greater regulatory scrutiny may be achieved at the expense of financial intermediation.     

Climate risk and bank liquidity creation: International evidence

This study examines the impact of climate risk on bank liquidity creation in 56 countries over the period 1995–2012. Specifically, it investigates whether the relationship between climate risk and bank liquidity creation varies by bank and country characteristics. The results reveal that climate sensitivity and exposure have negative impacts on overall liquidity creation, whereas climate adaptation has positive effects. These effects are more pronounced for larger banks with lower capital, banks located in lower-GDP and developing countries, and those in Asia. The results suggest that policymakers should exercise caution when formulating and implementing climate-related strategies, as these can influence liquidity creation, which in turn can affect macroeconomic stability.     

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis

We use country level data and bank level data from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. The results indicate that less cost efficient banks, with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their income, and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings. Larger and more profitable banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher ratings only when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official disciplinary power, explicit deposit insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines, entry requirements, fraction of entries denied, and economic freedom have a significant impact on ratings in all of our specifications. Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for the regulatory environment and the market structure, while auditing requirements have a significant impact only when we control for the regulatory environment alone. Finally, banks in developed countries are assigned higher ratings. However, this impact disappears when we include the regulatory and supervision variables in the models.     

Do non-traditional banking activities reduce bank liquidity creation? Evidence from Vietnam

The study analyzes the impact of engaging in non-traditional banking activities on bank liquidity creation. This strand of research has almost gone unnoticed by academics so far. Based on a dataset of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2007 to 2018, we document that the liquidity creation function of banks decreases with the income from non-traditional banking segments. This impact is observed in both on- and off-balance sheets across multiple robustness tests of the static and dynamic panels regressed by the ordinary least squares method and the generalized method of moments. Further decomposing the non-interest income sources, we find that banks that engage more in non-traditional activities for fees and commissions tend to reduce the liquidity creation more compared to other counterparts. The findings offer insightful implications for regulatory agencies and bank managers in the determination of liquidity creation behavior in emerging markets.     

Liquidity Coinsurance and Bank Capital

Banks can deal with their liquidity risk by holding liquid assets (self‐insurance), by participating in interbank markets (coinsurance), or by using flexible financing instruments, such as bank capital (risk sharing). We use a simple model to show that undiversifiable liquidity risk, that is, the liquidity risk that banks are unable to coinsure on interbank markets, represents an important risk factor affecting their capital structures. Banks facing higher undiversifiable liquidity risk hold more capital. We posit that, empirically, banks that are more exposed to undiversifiable liquidity risk are less active on interbank markets. Therefore, we test for the existence of a negative relationship between bank capital and interbank market activity and find support in a large sample of U.S. commercial banks.     

互联网金融影响了商业银行流动性创造吗?

选取2010-2019年中国98家商业银行年度数据就互联网金融对银行流动性创造的影响及其作用机制进行实证分析.研究发现:互联网金融通过分流银行存款及理财资金对银行盈利形成冲击,由此引发的"鲶鱼效应"会倒逼银行加大存贷期限错配来缓解盈利下降压力,从而促进银行流动性创造.相对于国有银行与城农商行,互联网金融对股份制银行流动性创造的促进力度更大.金融脱媒仅在P2P网络借贷对银行流动性创造的影响中承担着中介作用,但"第三方支付-金融脱媒-银行流动性创造"的传导渠道无效.银行业景气度提高会加剧互联网金融对流动性创造的促进作用,银行流动性创造存在顺周期倾向.     

Bank Mergers, Competition, and Liquidity

We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank.     

Bank liquidity creation and real economic output

We find that bank liquidity creation (LC) is statistically and economically significantly positively related to real economic output (GDP). This is robust to using instrumental variables and many robustness checks. LC also beats bank assets in “horse races.” On-balance sheet LC matters more for small banks and off-balance sheet LC matters more for large banks. Small bank LC generates more GDP per dollar than large bank LC, but large bank LC matters more overall because large banks provide much more LC than small banks. The LC-output relation is strongest in bank-dependent industries, consistent with the hypothesized transmission mechanism.     

Bank panics and the endogeneity of central banking

Central banking is intimately related to liquidity provision to banks during times of crisis, the lender-of-last-resort function. This activity arose endogenously in certain banking systems. Depositors lack full information about the value of bank assets, so that during macroeconomic downturns they monitor their banks by withdrawing in a banking panic. The likelihood of panics depends on the industrial organization of the banking system. Banking systems with well-diversified big banks are less prone to inefficient bank runs because diversification alleviates the information asymmetry. In addition, big banks can self-monitor through publicly observable branch closure. Systems of many small banks form incentive-compatible bank coalitions to emulate the big banks during times of crisis. Such coalitions improve efficiency by monitoring member banks and issuing money that is a kind of deposit insurance—a precursor of central banking.     

Bank regulatory capital and liquidity: Evidence from US and European publicly traded banks

The theory of financial intermediation highlights various channels through which capital and liquidity are interrelated. Using a simultaneous equations framework, we investigate the relationship between bank regulatory capital and bank liquidity measured from on-balance sheet positions for European and US publicly traded commercial banks. Previous research studying the determinants of bank capital buffer has neglected the role of liquidity. On the whole, we find that banks decrease their regulatory capital ratios when they face higher illiquidity as defined in the Basel III accords or when they create more liquidity as measured by Berger and Bouwman (2009). However, considering other measures of illiquidity that focus more closely on core deposits in the United States, our results show that small banks strengthen their solvency standards when they are exposed to higher illiquidity. Our empirical investigation supports the need to implement minimum liquidity ratios concomitant to capital ratios, as stressed by the Basel Committee; however, our findings also shed light on the need to further clarify how to define and measure illiquidity and also on how to regulate large banking institutions, which behave differently than smaller ones.     

结售汇如何影响银行风险承担水平?——基于银行资产负债表的视角

本文构建了一个基于银行资产负债表的理论模型,研究了结售汇对银行风险承担水平的影响机制,并采用结售汇报表数据进行实证检验。结果表明,为实现利润最大化,银行会将外汇流入创造的流动性用于投放较高风险的贷款,导致净结汇对银行风险承担水平有正向影响,异质性分析结果显示大型银行受影响程度高于中小银行。本文结论意味着,当考虑结售汇波动可能进一步加剧时,有必要出台更多结构性政策,补足外汇流入减少带来的货币缺口,优化存款市场结构,稳定金融机构流动性预期,以缓冲外需冲击可能带来的影响,并激励银行服务重心进一步下沉,为小微企业提供更多信贷支持,完成好金融服务实体经济的重要使命。     

Cyclicality of liquidity creation: Nonlinear evidence from US bank holding companies

Using a panel smooth transition regression framework on a new proxy of the business cycle (BC) index and quarterly data of US bank holding companies from 1993Q1 to 2020Q1, our results provide empirical support for the theory that the BC has a nonlinear effect on liquidity creation. We find a positive and highly significant nonlinear effect of the BC on liquidity creation, which not only supports the pro-cyclicality of liquidity creation but also improves the liquidity creation estimation compared to previous studies. The results are robust to different proxies of the BC and model specifications. We also document that US bank holding companies create liquidity more during the expansion phase (normal times) than during the recession phase (crisis times) of the BC, suggesting an asymmetrical effect of BC changes on liquidity creation. Our findings have important implications for financial market participants by suggesting that banks should keep alternative sources of funding on hand during the BC recession phase. Insights from our study also provide policy implications for central banks and prudent supervisors to consider when incentivizing banks, for instance, by lowering regulatory requirements, adjusting the policy rate, or implementing any other quantitative easing policy during the BC recession phase to keep the financial system efficient.