专利技术垄断、仿冒进入与政府管制政策

文章通过构建政府、正版厂商与仿冒厂商三者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并考虑仿冒品厂商的市场结构特征和性质,探讨了仿冒厂商进入条件下正版厂商的竞争行为、策略以及社会福利水平的变化.经研究发现:(1)市场中有仿冒厂商进入且政府稽查力度较弱的情况下,正版厂商总会选择大于独占均衡时的产出数量作为竞争的最优策略,并且,正版品的市场均衡价格要低于正版品独占时的市场均衡价格;(2)仿冒品和正版品之间具有相互替代性,但替代程度不同,仿冒品对正版品仅能部分替代,正版品对仿冒品产生完全替代作用;(3)仿冒品的存在有可能对正版厂商的利益产生正面的影响和作用;(4)在没有考虑政府管制成本的情况下,政府采取对仿冒品不予追究,或者采取严格的查处力度都会提高社会的福利水平.     

法律约束、政府管制与审计市场效率——基于操纵性应计利润和会计稳健性的视角

本文实证研究我国特殊制度背景下审计行业的外部风险约束因素,包括法律约束和政府管制,对提高审计市场效率的有效性及差异性。首先结合我国特殊制度环境的分析,构建决定审计师最优努力和审慎程度的审计成本模型,然后选取2007-2012年被提起法律诉讼或受到政府管制主体处罚的审计师作为研究样本,从可操纵性应计利润和会计稳健性的视角检验法律约束程度和政府管制力度的提高是否显著改善审计师执业质量。分析和检验结果表明,我国审计市场外部风险约束主要由政府管制主导,法律约束机制并未发挥有效作用。进一步研究发现,财政部和中注协责令整改要求、行业内通报批评的管制措施并未显著加强审计师执业质量,但"多头监管"显著加强了证监会行政处罚对问题审计师的管制效果。本文研究结论对于进一步改善我国审计市场外部风险约束环境,从而提高审计市场效率具有借鉴和参考意义。     

农村地下金融转化的焦点与关键:夯实政府管制

农村金融组织建设和缓解农村市场的融资问题已成为促进农业稳定发展、农民持续增收的关键所在。在市场不完美、信息不对称条件下,政府干预无疑是促进农村经济发展不可或缺的重要手段,但是从当前农村金融市场发展中所面临的借贷难、地下金融泛滥的现实看,提高政府干预或管制的水平至关重要。因此,发展农村金融市场必须加强政府管制水平和力度,充分发挥政府在不完全竞争市场中的力量,促进"地下金融"转化成"地上金融",实现农村金融市场又好又快地发展。     

厂商的密集性进入与产业链纵向关系治理——基于中国汽车产业的分析

随着产业进入管制的逐步放松,厂商的密集性进入不仅改变了产业链的横向市场结构,也为产业链纵向关系治理模式的重新选择创造条件.面对中国汽车产业发展的这一现状,本文在文献回顾的基础上,通过对一个连续古诺模型的分析,认为下游整车厂商的密集性进入将导致产业链的部分或完全分拆,其具体形式取决于初始状态和上游厂商的数量.最后,结合国际经验以及国内新近产业政策设计和汽车企业的策略实践辅以论证说明.     

改善劳动力市场管制的几个问题探讨

对劳动力市场的管制是政府监管市场的一个重要方面。本文通过对目前我国劳动力市场建设及运行、管制中存在的主要问题的分析,探讨了放松对劳动力市场的管制及管制的着力点。笔者认为,政府放松对劳动力市场管制是劳动力市场运行规律及WTO规则的要求,而管制的着力点应主要放在强化制度供给、弥补市场失灵、保护劳动者的合法权益等方面。     

我国银行业进入壁垒浅析

不同的产业组织理论学派对进入壁垒的理解不同,理论分歧较大。从定义来看,结构主义学派的基本立足点是相对于行业中的在位厂商来说的,进入者处于劣势的程度,而反应这种程度的则正是进入壁垒的高度或进入壁垒本身。而效率学派与可竞争市场理论的定义主要是以在位厂商与进入厂商问存在需求、成本不对称性为立足点,进入壁垒是指进入厂商必须承担而在位厂商不必承担的成本。     

政府管制、法治、银行发展与中小企业发展

本文实证检验了政府管制措施、法治和银行业的发展程度对世界各国中小企业发展程度的影响。我们发现,以案件审理司法程序的正式性衡量的法治水平对中小企业的发展有着积极稳定的作用,而初始的经济发展水平、包括准入管制、劳动用工管制、征信管制以及退出管制在内的政府管制措施以及银行业的发展水平和结构对中小企业的发展有着不稳定或不显著的影响。研究结果支持了中小企业发展的"法治论",而否定了"政府管制论"和"银行发展论"。     

对银行行为与效率的分析

基于对银行管制理论的分析以及对市场进入管制下银行行为的描述,讨论了政府管制对银行福利的效应及可能引起的社会成本;针对政府管制产生的低效率状况,探讨了银行业管制改革的对策及效率目标。     

市场进入壁垒、进入管制与中国产业的行政垄断

本文在对中国产业行政垄断研究的基础上,从产业组织理论的角度对该问题给予了较全面的论述.其基本逻辑过程是:如果不存在市场的进入壁垒,那么,没有外力干预的市场竞争机制将导致最优的社会福利结果.如果存在市场进入壁垒,则可能是技术进入壁垒、企业战略性进入壁垒和政府进入管制,如果这些进入壁垒的效应有利于市场竞争机制的有效发挥及社会福利,那么政府对此就无需进行干预;反之,就应存在着政府干预,而且这种干预的程序和方法都应该具有有效性和公平性.如果我们将这种干预称作政府管制的话,就不应该存在所谓政府对产业的行政垄断.本文从上述分析逻辑给出行政垄断的定义,并对在我国建立完善有效的产业政府管制以及消除产业的行政垄断提出建议.     

政府管制、法治、银行发展与中小企业发展

本文实证检验了政府管制措施、法治和银行业的发展程度对世界各国中小企业发展程度的影响。我们发现，以案件审理司法程序的正式性衡量的法治水平对中小企业的发展有着积极稳定的作用，而初始的经济发展水平、包括准入管制、劳动用工管制、征信管制以及退出管制在内的政府管制措施以及银行业的发展水平和结构对中小企业的发展有着不稳定或不显著的影响。研究结果支持了中小企业发展的“法治论”，而否定了“政府管制论”和“银行发展论”。     

Avoiding commercial piracy

In this paper we analyse the roles of the government and an incumbent in preventing the entry of a pirate, who tries to avoid being caught. The framework of analysis used is a sequential duopoly model of vertical product differentiation with price competition. We find that both the government and the incumbent have key roles in preventing the entry of pirates. We show that the government will not help the incumbent to become a pure monopolist, even if it installs an antipiracy system. It will let the pirate enter either as a follower or a leader, or encourage the incumbent to set a low enough price to successfully deter the pirate from entering the market, depending on its technology for monitoring commercial piracy. Finally, we find that the pirate decides to become a leader to avoid being caught by the incumbent and the government.     

Entry and Competition in the Postal Market: Foundations for the Construction of Entry Scenarios*

This paper presents a model of entry and imperfect competition, which is inspired by the product differentiation literature and incorporates facts pertaining to the postal sector. There are two operators: incumbent and potential entrant. The entrant offers only one of the products (commercial mail) with a specific technology and delivers only to part of the addressees (located in low cost areas). Its degree of coverage is viewed as a quality attribute; it affects demand and hence market share. The incumbent faces a USO while the entrant is an unregulated profit maximizing firm. To illustrate the potential applications of our approach, we provide some numerical simulations of entry scenarios.     

Host country's strategic policies and multinational firm's choice of entry mode

This paper examines the effects of contract enforceability and market structure on a firm's choice between licensing and foreign direct investment. Clearly, the firm's choice impacts upon social welfare in the host country. Therefore, the government of the host country is likely to set contract enforceability for inducing the multinational firm (MNF) to choose a desirable mode of entry. The paper takes into account two different cases. In the first case, the host country does not have an incumbent that can compete with the MNF, and in the second case, it has one incumbent that can compete. The paper shows that the government's choice of contract enforceability is crucially dependent upon the domestic market structure and the domestic capacity to absorb the advanced technology of the MNF.     

基于产品质量策略性行为的进入壁垒研究

本文从产品纵向差异的角度出发,研究了垄断厂商为构建进入壁垒在选择产品质量方面所采取的策略性行为。通过采用一个扩展式博弈,分析了在位者和潜在进入者的质量选择行为所形成的各种产品质量组合及其支付。研究发现,在位者可以通过一部分研发投资,抢先承诺提供多档次质量的产品,填补消费者的需求空间,减少潜在进入者的期望收益,使其做出不进入的决定。所以,在位者在产品质量方面的策略性行为就构成了进入壁垒。     

Capacity-based versus time-based access charges in telecommunications

The Spanish telecommunications regulator recently introduced a capacity-based access system. Under this regulation, entrants pay a flat charge for the interconnection circuits leased to the incumbent operator and are able to freely use these circuits to provide telecommunications services. This paper determines the optimal capacity-based access charge in the presence of time varying demand and capacity constraints and compares this regulation with the traditional time of use access system. The analysis shows that either type of regulation allows the incumbent to recover its fixed costs and can promote the same pattern of entry. Finally, the optimal capacity-based access charge when the entrant has market power is derived.      

Preemptive Spacing With Vertical Differentiation When Input Quality is of Inelastic Supply

This paper examines a model of vertical differentiation in which an incumbent engages in preemptive spacing to prevent entry. Input quality is of fixed supply, and the incumbent prevents high-end entry by producing a product with all the quality available. It also commits to the production of a minimum-quality product to deter low-end entry. There is no entry in equilibrium, and the incumbent monopolist chooses to sell only its high-quality product. Commitment to the production of the minimum-quality product is used merely as a credible threat to vigorously compete should an entrant also produce a minimum-quality product.     

The Entry‐Deterring Effects of Inflexible Regulation

This paper investigates the signalling role of tax policy in promoting, or hindering, the ability of a monopolist to practise entry deterrence. We show that environmental policy can facilitate the incumbent firm's concealment of information from potential entrants, thus deterring entry, and yet entail welfare improvements. Furthermore, we demonstrate that entry deterrence is more likely to arise when environmental regulation cannot be rapidly revised across time if market conditions change (inflexible regimes) than when regulatory agencies can adjust environmental policy over time.     

Price-Matching Guarantees and Entry Deterrence under Incomplete Information

This paper studies price-matching guarantees in a market where entrant does not have perfect information about incumbent’s cost. The low-cost incumbent can adopt price-matching guarantees as a signal to distinguish itself from the high-cost type and thus effectively deter entry. On the other hand, the high-cost incumbent can successfully fool the potential entrant under certain conditions. Compared with the equilibriums in situations where the option of offering a price guarantee is not available, the use of this instrument either makes it easier for the low-cost incumbent to signal its cost, or expands the range of parameters over which the high-cost incumbent is able to deter entry successfully.     

Environmental taxes and industry monopolization

This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Production by both firms causes polluting emissions. The government selects a tax per unit of emission to maximize social welfare. The size of the tax rate affects whether or not the potential entrant enters the market. We identify the conditions that create a market structure where the preferences of the government and the incumbent firm coincide. Interestingly, there are cases where both the government and incumbent firm prefer a monopoly. Hence, the government might induce profitable monopolization by using a socially optimal tax policy instrument.      

Entry and espionage with noisy signals

We analyze the effect of industrial espionage on entry deterrence. We consider a monopoly incumbent who may expand capacity to deter entry, and a potential entrant who owns an Intelligence System. The Intelligence System (IS) generates a noisy signal based on the incumbentʼs actions. The potential entrant uses this signal to decide whether or not to enter the market. The incumbent may signal-jam to manipulate the likelihood of the noisy signals and hence affect the entrantʼs decisions. If the precision of the IS is commonly known, the incumbent benefits from his rivalʼs espionage. Actually, he benefits more the higher is the precision of the IS while the spying entrant is worse off with an IS of relatively high quality. When the IS quality is private information of the entrant, the incumbent is better off with an IS of high expected precision while the entrant benefits from one of high quality. In this case espionage makes the market more competitive.