完善我国国家助学贷款机制

2004年，针对国家助学贷款原有机制存在的问题，国家又出台了助学贷款新机制，一定程度上促进了各地助学贷款业务的发展。但是，原有设计存在的制度性缺陷没有得到根本解决，软肋依然存在，助学贷款覆盖率低，违约率高，银行缺乏积极性。主要有以下三方面的原因。     

试析我国加强国家助学贷款管理的方法与途径

继2002年2月中国人民银行会同教育部、财政部下发<关于切实推进国家助学贷款工作有关问题的通知>(简称"四定三考核":定学校、定范围、定额度、定银行,申请考核、审批考核以及实际发放阶段的考核)后,9月份中国人民银行又联合教育部下发<关于下达2002年度国家助学贷款指导性计划的通知>,对推动国家助学贷款的发放起到了重要作用.     

关注助学贷款的实践难题——生源地信用助学贷款缘何难以助学：问题及建议

从1999年我国开始实施国家助学贷款政策，到目前包括生源地助学贷款、商业性助学贷款在内的助学贷款体系的不断探索和完善．助学贷款一直备受政府部门的高度重视和大力推动。但随着助学贷款业务的开展，其面临的矛盾和问题也不断显现：助学贷款手续繁杂、补偿资金不到位、贷款违约率攀高，等等。在一些欠发达地区，一边是人数占到新入学大学生半数以上的贫困生，一边是金融机构助学贷款的少人问津，甚至逐年缩水。助学贷款的可持续发展面临考验。[编者按]     

国家助学贷款市场化研究

国家助学贷款是高校资助体系的重要组成部分,对国家实现教育公平化,帮助贫困生完成学业起着极其重要的作用。在2009年国家发布生源地助学贷款的新政策之后,助学贷款的资助范围和力度进一步扩大。国家助学贷款走向市场化,尤其是国家助学贷款二级市场的建立和商业保险制度的引入,有助于国家助学贷款的可持续发展,是运用金融创新工具改进助学贷款制度的重要举措。本文探讨了我国助学贷款二级市场和保险制度的具体运作方式,并对国家助学贷款市场化的发展提出了自己的建议。     

国家助学贷款新机制：财政与金融协调联动

财政是国家助学贷款资金的主要来源,而金融的介入不仅解决了资金不足的问题,而且推动了制度和机制建设,实现国家助学贷款的商业可持续发展,财政与金融协调联动创建了多方参与、利益共享、风险共担的国家助学贷款"河南模式",从体制和机制上解决了"国家助学贷款难"这一课题.本文通过基于开发性金融原理的财政与金融的互动分析,介绍了国家助学贷款"河南模式",并对该模式的主要特点和初步实践进行了阐述,同时提出了一些旨在进一步完善财政与金融互动的思路和方法.     

“贷款+保险”:国家助学贷款市场化机制研究

国家助学贷款是促进教育公平、解决贫困学生就学问题的主要资助手段。目前,国家助学贷款主要以政策性金融为主、商业性金融为辅的格局,存在生源地贷款和校园地贷款两种选择,并形成了国开行模式与商业银行模式。国家助学贷款存在空白点、效率低、贷后管理压力大以及市场化水平低等问题,在助学贷款商业银行模式中引入保险机制,以市场化的方式探索了银行、保险和教育三方紧密联结、优势互补、分工明确、高效快捷的新型助学贷款业务模式。中国社会科学院金融所课题组对此进行了调研与分析,走访了银行、高校和保险机构等,采用国际比较的方法,对国家助学贷款发展状况、运作模式、运行效果和风险情况进行梳理,认为"贷款+保险"模式成为国家助学贷款可持续发展的市场化机制的一种有益探索,同时该模式面临诸多体制机制及操作困难,深化试点和改革是必由之路。     

国家助学贷款风险的博弈分析与规避

当前，国家助学贷款的高风险已影响到国家助学贷款的全面推行。本文中，笔者就当前我国国家助学贷款中存在的主要问题，运用博弈论中的分析方法，揭示造成其风险的制度原因，并在此基础上提出控制、防范我国国家助学借款风险的制度安排和政策性建议。     

海南省助学贷款的现状及对策建议

开展国家助学贷款工作，是党中央、国务院实施科教兴国战略的一项重要决策，海南省国家助学贷款远不能满足贫困学生助学贷款需求，给教育事业的发展带来影响，本中笔对海南省国家助学贷款进行了分析，并提出对策建议。     

市场细分与国有商业银行助学贷款业务的发展

国家助学贷款具有明显的外部收益。目前政府和央行要求各主办银行加大助学贷款的力度，但是国家助学贷款是信用贷款，业务风险又比较高，各主办银行在办理该业务时面临两难选择。本指出，各主办银行按毕业生就业率对高校申贷学生进行市场细分，并确定营销的目标市场则有助于解决该问题，促进国家助学贷款业务的开展以及高等教育产业化的发展。     

对助学贷款政策阻滞现象的分析与思考

助学贷款作为一项造福广大贫困大学生的信贷政策,自开办以来,深受广大贫困大学生、学生家长和高校的欢迎.党和政府也高度重视助学贷款工作,国务院办公厅先后三次为此发文,李岚清副总理还专门对国家助学贷款工作作出重要批示,今年2月9日,中国人民银行、财政部、教育部又联合召开了全国国家助学贷款工作电视电话会议,对进一步推进助学贷款工作作出了部署.     

Inter-corporate loans: the Indian experience

We examine transactions of inter-corporate loans among Indian non-financial firms during 1999–2014. We find that the consolidated amount of these loans is not small and comparable to total short-term bank loans transacted in a year. Over the years, a number of such loan providers/receivers has increased. Both group and stand-alone firms across different industries receive and provide inter-corporate loans and these transactions are not one-off events. Larger and older firms grant these loans to smaller and younger firms. Loan receivers report higher leverage, accounts payable and lower cash balance than non-receivers and about thirty percent of loan receivers are financially distressed.     

Negotiating for survival: Balancing mission and money

The impetus for prioritising money over mission in charities is increasingly pertinent as public sector austerity progresses in the UK. Mid size charities – who are heavily reliant on grant funding - have experienced proportionately greater challenges to austerity than larger entities. A substantial part of accountability efforts in mid size charities are directed towards funders, where funder imposed frameworks and measures may direct charity attention away from social mission towards funder needs, causing mission drift. Four charity case studies and grant funder interviews were conducted to investigate how charities can pursue social mission in a challenging funding environment. This paper shows that charities can protect social mission despite high dependence on grant funding, but also provides evidence of susceptibility to mission drift in cases where the balance between money and mission changes. Charity accounting systems display notable funder influence. A resource dependence perspective is utilised to highlight the complexity in assessing dependence of charities in a challenging environment and demonstrates the extent of funder influence in accounting and performance systems in these charities. However, charities employ strategies to cope with external requirements, enabling them to retain mission focus.     

Credit risk transfer and bank competition

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is private information, banks have an incentive to grant unprofitable loans that are then transferred to other parties, leading to an increase in aggregate risk. Higher competition increases welfare in the presence of CRT with public information. In contrast, welfare eventually decreases for high levels of competition in the presence CRT with private information due to the expansion of unprofitable loans. This finding coincides with the decrease in credit quality observed during the late years of the credit boom preceding the subprime crisis.     

Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting

Loan rates for seemingly identical borrowers often exhibit substantial dispersion. This paper investigates the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted by banks to small and medium sized enterprises. We associate this dispersion with the loan officers’ use of “discretion” in the loan rate setting process. We find that “discretion” is most important if: (i) loans are small and unsecured; (ii) firms are small and opaque; (iii) the firm operates in a large and highly concentrated banking market; and (iv) the firm is distantly located from the lender. Consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry, we find a decreasing role for “discretion” over time in the provision of small credits to opaque firms. While widely used in the pricing of loans, “discretion” plays only a minor role in the decisions to grant loans.     

What Do Banks Evaluate When They Screen Borrowers? Soft Information, Hard Information and Collateral

By applying factor analysis to unique data on loan screening for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan, we investigate the factors that banks actually evaluate when underwriting commercial loans. We find that banks emphasize three factors when they decide whether to grant loans: the relationship factor, the financial statement factor, and the collateral/guarantee factor. We also find that smaller banks place greater emphasis on the relationship and the collateral/guarantee factors, and that banks under competitive pressure emphasize the relationship factor to a greater extent. We interpret these findings based on the theory of relationship lending and lending technologies.     

The Effect of Down Payment Assistance on Mortgage Choice

Lack of wealth for a down payment is one of the most recognized barriers to home ownership. In response to this barrier, state and federal government have implemented many programs that provide down payment assistance to potential home buyers. Numerous studies have shown that this assistance can increase homeownership rates, but few have measured how receiving assistance may alter borrowing behavior. Using data from a down payment assistance grant in the Midwest, this study compares the loan type and size of grant recipients to other borrowers that report similar income and buy homes in the same census tract. Results indicate grant recipients are more likely to use conventional loans, which are less expensive than other loan types that require a smaller down payment. Estimates also suggest that the grant may reduce loan size for borrowers who are on the margin of using a conventional loan.     

Is there an optimal microcredit size to maximize the social and financial efficiencies of microfinance institutions?

Financial intermediation theory posits that a smaller loan size triggers a higher cost per dollar lent. This leads to question whether microfinance can become a self-sustainable industry. Hence, in microfinance innovations like loans without collateral, progressive loans, solidarity groups and relational lending are employed to reduce asymmetric information costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard while serving the poorest people. Crucially, we find a non-linear U-shaped effect of loan size on financial and social efficiencies. This reconciles the two opposite strands of the literature, aligning microfinance and banking central principles. The major implication of this study is that, unlike banking, microfinance institutions can grant small size loans while simultaneously obtaining high levels of financial and social efficiency. Indeed, our findings do not support the widely debated mission drift assumption since loan size does not generate a trade-off between financial and social outcomes. Therefore, loan size is a core management variable.     

The role of venture capital in SME loans in China

We examine the role of venture capital (VC) in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) loans through samples on the National Equities Exchange and Quotations (NEEQ) in China. We find that VC backup can effectively improve SMEs’ access to bank loans, especially short-term loans, at lower costs, and loans without collateral. VC backed loans are also less likely to default and positively related to SMEs’ performance. Our findings further suggest that VC backup reduces the information asymmetry between banks and SMEs through both “hard” information of better-quality financial statement and “soft” information of SMEs’ creditability. Evidenced by enhanced SME financing conditions and bank efficiency in loan allocation, the combined debt-equity financing scheme can be a meaningful new ingredient in the financial infrastructure of the largest emerging market.     

Asymmetric information,adverse selection,and the pricing of CMBS

We demonstrate that asymmetric information between sellers (loan originators) and purchasers (investors and securities issuers) of commercial mortgages gives rise to a standard lemons problem, whereby portfolio lenders use private information to liquidate lower quality loans in commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) markets. Conduit lenders, who originate loans for direct sale into securitization markets, mitigate problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection in loan sales. Our theory provides an explanation for the pricing puzzle observed in CMBS markets, whereby conduit CMBS loans are priced higher than portfolio loans, despite widespread belief that conduit loans are originated at lower quality. Consistent with theoretical predictions of a lemons discount, our empirical analysis of 141 CMBS deals and 16,760 CMBS loans shows that, after controlling for observable determinants of loan pricing, conduit loans enjoyed a 34 basis points pricing advantage over portfolio loans in the CMBS market.     

Deflation,bank credit growth,and non-performing loans: Evidence from Japan

In this paper, I examine the link between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in an economy with deflationary pressures. Using panel OLS regressions and two-step GMM regressions, I find evidence for the time-varying relationship between bank credit growth and non-performing loans in a sample of 82 publicly listed commercial banks in Japan during the period 1993–2013. I show that bank credit growth positively correlates with non-performing loans prior to the onset of the global financial crisis of 2007 but negatively correlates with non-performing loans afterwards. I find evidence to support the notion that large banks drive the observed effects of credit growth on non-performing loans. In addition, credit growth and non-performing loans have no effect on profitability. Overall, the findings suggest that while the increase in the supply of bank loans increases the level of non-performing loans, it does not lead to higher profitability.