Schumpeterian Growth with Productive Public Spending and Distortionary Taxation

Schumpeterian growth theory eliminates the scale effect by positing a process of development of new product lines that fragments the aggregate market in submarkets whose size does not increase with population or the size of the workforce. This entails the sterilization of the growth effects of selected fiscal variables. This insight is applied to shed new light on the role of distortionary taxes on consumption, household labor and assets income, corporate income, and of productive public spending. The framework allows the identification of which of these fiscal variables have permanent (steady‐state) growth effects, and which ones have only transitory effects. It also allows the transitional dynamics to be solved analytically and thus the analysis of the welfare effects of revenue‐neutral changes in tax structure. It is found that replacing taxes that distort labor supply with taxes that distort saving/investment choices raises welfare, and the intuition behind this surprising result is discussed.     

Redistribution and entrepreneurship with Schumpeterian growth

We examine the effects of redistributive taxation on growth and inequality in a Schumpeterian model with risk-averse agents. There are skilled and unskilled workers, and the growth rate is determined by the occupational choice of skilled agents between entrepreneurship and employment. We show that redistribution provides insurance to entrepreneurs and increases the growth rate. The effects on inequality are such that low tax rates increase inequality relative to laissez-faire due to changes in wages, but higher tax rates can simultaneously raise growth and reduce inequality. We contrast the optimal linear income tax with alternative policies for promoting R&D and find that it is preferable on both equity and efficiency grounds.      

Taxation and Capital Structure Choice: The Role of Ownership

Applying firm fixed‐effects estimations to European firm‐level data, I analyze how ownership structure affects the relationship between taxation and capital structure. I find that an increase in the corporate tax rate affects the debt‐to‐assets ratio positively, and that this effect is stronger for firms with concentrated ownership. These results hold independently of whether firms are standalone or subsidiaries, and are also valid if subsidiaries are divided into those that are foreign‐owned and those domestically owned. Lastly, ownership plays a role even when controlling for other potentially important determinants of the relation between corporate taxation and capital structure.     

Shift from gross profit taxation to distributed profit taxation: Are there effects on firms?

This paper investigates the consequences of the corporate tax reform in Estonia in 2000. This unique reform nullified the taxation of retained earnings and maintained corporate income tax only on distributed profits. We investigate the outcome of the reform by comparing the performance of the affected firms in Estonia with that of firms from Latvia and Lithuania, the two other Baltic countries. We use firm-level financial data and the difference in differences approach for our analysis. The results are consistent with an increase in holdings of liquid assets and lower use of debt financing after the reform. A positive relationship of the reform with post-reform investment and productivity has also been found. The results point to a stronger effect on smaller firms.     

西部大开发税收优惠政策实施效果评估

本文通过对西部开发税收优惠政策与地区经济增长、企业生产经营行为以及地方财政收入关系的评估分析,认为西部开发税收优惠政策对经济增长具有明显促进作用,对企业资产利润率提高也具有显著正效应.但从2002年到2004年西部开发税收政策对西部经济增长促进效应不断降低.最主要的原因是政策涉及的垄断企业多,市场化企业少;能源开发、环境污染严重企业享受多,实现地方可持续发展企业享受少;优惠税额主要促进了中央大型能源开采垄断企业,大多数有利于西部地区经济可持续发展的支柱产业得不到有效支持.所以提出:西部开发税收优惠政策在覆盖面上应做有增有减,并做出延长政策时效等调整.     

Corporate tax policy and heterogeneous firm innovation: Evidence from a developing country

This paper adds to the literature by identifying the causality of corporate tax policy on firm innovation in a developing country. We exploit the China’s 2006 corporate income tax base reform to integrate the tax system between foreign-invested and state/collective-controlled firms as a natural experiment. The difference-in-differences strategy documents a positive effect of corporate tax deduction on firm patenting. The effect is particularly significant if a firm is of larger size or locates in eastern provinces. We also examine possible channels behind the findings, including changes in R&D and capital investment, intangible assets, financial constraints, and new product sales.     

On indeterminacy and growth under progressive taxation and productive government spending

We examine the theoretical interrelations between equilibrium (in)determinacy and economic growth in a one‐sector representative‐agent model of endogenous growth with progressive taxation of income and productive flow of public spending. We analytically show that, if the demand‐side effect of government purchases is weaker, the economy exhibits an indeterminate balanced‐growth equilibrium and belief‐driven growth fluctuations when the tax schedule is sufficiently progressive or regressive. If the supply‐side effect of public expenditures is weaker, indeterminacy and sunspots arise under progressive income taxation. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian‐type stabilization policies, our analysis finds that raising the tax progressivity may destabilize an endogenously growing economy with fluctuations driven by agents’ self‐fulfilling expectations.     

Does Taxation Stifle Corporate Investment? Firm‐Level Evidence from ASEAN Countries

This article conducts a firm‐level analysis of the effect of taxation on corporate investment, using large‐scale panel data on non‐financial firms over the period 1990–2014, and controlling for macrostructural differences among ASEAN countries. We find a significant degree of persistence in fixed investment over time, which varies with firm characteristics, such as size, growth prospects, profitability and leverage. The non‐linear estimations indicate that taxation facilitates business investment (possibly by enabling public investment in infrastructure and human capital, and the proper functioning of government institutions), but this effect turns negative and stifles private investment growth as the tax burden increases.     

Cross-border tax effects on affiliate investment—Evidence from European multinationals

Recent studies suggest that multinational firm activities at home and abroad are positively correlated which may be due to the use of common inputs (like marketing, patents, etc.). Then, a cost shock at one location may lead to reduced activity in all other locations within the firm. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically analyze national corporate tax policy in such a setting. Our main hypothesis is that corporate taxation at the parent location not only reduces the parent's capital stock but also lowers capital stocks at affiliates abroad. Using micro data on European multinational firms, we confirm the hypothesis showing that a 10 percentage point increase in corporate tax rates is associated with a 5.6% decrease in the affiliate's capital stock. From a welfare point of view, this cross-border tax effect on the capital stock gives rise to a negative fiscal externality of corporate taxation which is empirically shown to compensate a substantial fraction of the well-known positive externality due to profit shifting.     

Progressive taxation,tax exemption,and corporate liquidation policy

This paper develops a real options model of a firm that operates in continuous time with an infinite horizon. The firm receives stochastic profit flows that are subject to progressive taxation. Tax progression arises from an exogenously given tax exemption threshold that makes the average tax rate increase with the tax base. The firm possesses an option to liquidate its operation, which is optimally exercised when the firm's profit flow reaches an endogenously determined threshold level (the liquidation trigger) from above. We show that the firm's liquidation trigger under progressive taxation increases with either a reduction in the tax exemption threshold or an increase in the corporate income tax rate. Corporate income taxes are thus not neutral when tax schedules are progressive.     

Capital Taxation, Tobin's q and Overlapping Generations

This study examines the effect of capital taxation on the long-term equilibrium in an intertemporal model, incorporating overlapping generations of the Blanchard–Weil type and value-maximizing firms with adjustment costs in investment. I demonstrate that an increase in capital taxation raises the steady-state expected lifetime utility of an agent born after the tax increase, provided the intergenerational redistribution effect achieved through lowering the rate of return is greater than that achieved through the tax revenue effect owing to the reduced capital–labour ratio, and that an increased ITC rate would not necessarily raise the steady-state lifetime utility of all agents.
JEL Classification Numbers: D91, D92, E62, H24, H25.     

The repatriation incentive of the foreign dividend exemption system

Due to the high taxation of domestic corporate income, Japanese multinational enterprises have avoided to repatriate foreign profits to Japan for quite some time. As a consequence, the Japanese government introduced a new taxation system in 2009 – the so called dividend exemption system – which was aimed at reducing the effective tax burden of foreign dividends of Japanese multinational companies in order to increase tax revenue and stimulate economic growth. Applying a theoretical framework which allows comparing the repatriation incentive of the old and new Japanese tax systems, we find that in the long-run the tax regime change fails to incentivize foreign subsidiaries to repatriate foreign profits. Especially subsidiaries with high leverage located in countries with low corporate taxes and low dividend taxes might reinvest rather than distribute their earnings in the dividend exemption method.     

Informality,innovation, and aggregate productivity growth

This paper investigates how the costs of innovation in the formal sector temper or magnify the impacts of traditional policy levers such as taxation on sectoral choice. I embed a decision whether to operate formally or informally into a richer, general equilibrium model. Formal firms are subject to taxation, but they can improve their productivity through process innovation. Informal firms can potentially avoid taxation, and their productivity is determined by productivity growth in the formal sector. I find that changing tax rates from 50% to 60% decreases formal‐sector participation by 20.9%; however, this percentage falls by 10% when the cost of innovation is lower in the formal sector. The model also illustrates how changes in tax policy affect total factor productivity growth by limiting both the number of formal‐sector firms and the intensity of innovation. These results indicate a potential mechanism to induce firms to operate formally or mitigate harmful impacts of necessary tax changes.     

Foreign direct investment under oligopoly: Profit shifting or profit capturing?

In this paper a model of taxation of foreign source corporate income is developed when the output market is not perfectly competitive. Profit shifting policies, similar to those in the new trade literature, are also present in the case of foreign direct investment (FDI). There are, however, important differences to the new trade theory since in case of FDI, (i) corporate taxation and double taxation relief are the policy instruments rather than output or revenue taxes, (ii) countries are not symmetric in the sense that the host country has the first right to tax the multinational's profit and the home country reacts by providing double taxation relief, and (iii) output but not corporate taxation is specific to imperfectly competitive industries. It is argued that (a) variants of a tax credit are analogous to export subsidies, (b) when the home country operates a tax credit system the host country's incentive to capture the multinational's profit is bounded under imperfect competition, (c) when the host country offers a tax holiday the home country should imitate this policy, and (d) in the presence of perfect competitive industries, double taxation relief is a good instrument to target imperfectly competitive industries.     

The role of infrastructure investment and factor productivity in international tax competition

In this paper we use data from 30 developed economies from 1999 to 2014 to analyse the importance of infrastructure investments and factor productivity for explaining international capital tax competition. Our results indicate the existence of intensive tax competition in effective average corporate taxation during this period. It is also suggested that non-tax variables of third countries affect a country's corporate tax policy. Countries whose direct competitors have better infrastructures or are more productive compensate with lower capital taxation. In this way, their infrastructure investment and productivity-enhancing policies are used as strategic substitutes for capital taxation. With regard to the characteristics of closest competitors, we find that corporate tax competition is fiercer among countries that are characterized by similar infrastructure investments and geographical proximity.     

VAT and the taxation of rents

Cash-flow corporate taxes can tax corporate-source rents and avoid some of the distortions on investment and financing caused by conventional corporate taxes. However, cash-flow taxes applied on an origin basis are prone to international profit-shifting, which can lead to a competitive reduction in tax rates. While this can be avoided by a destination-based cash-flow tax, most countries have opted for origin-based taxation, asserting the right to tax rents generated within their jurisdictions. Since a value-added tax (VAT) implicitly includes rents in its base, it can complement origin-based corporate taxation. We compare and contrast the use of destination and origin VATs as complements to an origin-based cash-flow corporate tax.     

Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?

The statutory rate and effective tax rate imposed on corporation income—as well as the dispersion of these rates—began to decline in the 1980s. Is this due to changes in the domestic determinants of corporate taxation or increases in international pressures for tax competition?This paper finds clear evidence that the corporate tax rate is insulated from a country's revenue needs: across countries, there is no association of the expenditure-GDP ratio with the corporate statutory rate and only weak evidence of a positive association with the average rate. There is suggestive, but not definitive, evidence that the domestic role of the corporate tax as a backstop to the individual income tax is important: across countries, there is indeed a strong association between the top individual rate and the top statutory corporate rate.There is intriguing evidence about the role of international competitive pressures on corporate taxation. Measures of openness are negatively associated with statutory corporate rates, although not with revenues collected as a fraction of GDP. Strikingly, larger, more trade-intensive countries do collect more corporate tax, but this may be because these countries are more attractive venues for investment.     

Dividend taxes,corporate investment,and ‘Q’

Taxes on corporate distributions have traditionally been regarded as a ‘double tax’ on corporate income. This view implies that while the total effective tax rate on corporate source income affects real economic decisions, the distribution of this tax burden between the shareholders and the corporation is irrelevant. Recent research has suggested an alternative to this traditional view. One explanation of why firms in the United States pay dividends in spite of the heavy tax liabilities associated with this form of distribution is that the stock market capitalizes the tax payments associated with corporate distributions. This capitalization leaves investors indifferent at the margin between a corporation's decision to pay out dividends or to retain earnings. This alternative view holds that while changes in the dividend tax rate will affect shareholder wealth, they will have no impact on corporate investment decisions.This paper develops econometric tests which distinguish between these two views of dividend taxation. By extending Tobin's ‘q’ theory of investment to incorporate taxes at both the corporate and personal levels, the implications of each view for corporate investment decisions can be derived. The competing views may be tested by comparing the performance of investment equations estimated under each theory's predictions. British time series data are particularly appropriate for testing hypotheses about dividend taxes because of the substantial postwar variation in effective tax rates on corporate distributions. The econometric results suggest that dividend taxes have important effects on investment decisions.     

Taxation,corruption, and growth

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.     

Foreign (in)direct investment and corporate taxation

Abstract Foreign investments of multinational firms are often complex in that they involve conduit entities. In particular, a multinational can pursue either a direct or an indirect investment strategy, where the latter involves an intermediate corporate entity and is associated with enhanced opportunities for international tax planning. As a consequence, in the case of indirect investments, the role of corporate taxation in destination countries may change. This paper investigates the effects of corporate taxation on foreign investment decisions of German multinationals, taking explicitly into account that firms choose in a first stage the investment regime (direct vs. indirect). The empirical findings, consistent with theoretical predictions, suggest that tax effects differ according to whether the investment is direct or indirect.