IDIOSYNCRATIC AND AGGREGATE RISKS,INEQUALITY AND GROWTH

The paper disaggregates productivity shocks at a firm level into idiosyncratic and aggregate risks, and studies their impacts on inequality, growth and welfare. It develops a growth model with human capital and incomplete insurance and credit markets that provides a closed‐form solution for income inequality dynamics. We find that uninsured idiosyncratic risks are the most important determinants of inequality, growth and welfare. They are the source of nondegenerate wealth distribution. A lower weight of these shocks leads to lower steady‐state inequality, higher growth and welfare. A redistribution of income that serves as social insurance against such risks increases welfare and decreases inequality. But, it also decreases growth by distorting individual consumption and saving decisions.     

Inequality,Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve?

The aim of this paper is to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on recent theories that link democracy and income inequality for the period 1960–1997. In simple cross-country regressions I find a non-monotonic link between democracy and inequality when using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and Eusufzai tests. I also employ dynamic panel data techniques, which control for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. I also find support for the existence of apolitical Kuznets curve. Moreover, it appears that income inequality is unconditionally persistent. Results are robust to different democracy proxies when sensitivity analysis is applied.     

Political capitalism: The interaction between income inequality,economic freedom and democracy

We study the relationship between income inequality and economic freedom for a panel of 100 countries for the 1971–2010 period. Using a panel Granger non-causality approach, we reject the null hypothesis of Granger non-causality running from income inequality to economic freedom, but not vice versa. From a series of dynamic panel estimations we show that the effect of income inequality on economic freedom is negative and robust to the inclusion of additional controls. In particular, inequality is negatively associated with those components of economic freedom related to international trade, domestic market regulation as well as the rule of law and property rights protection. We argue that the negative effect of inequality on economic freedom is due to the economic elite converting its economic power into de facto political power to defend its economic interests; these interests run counter to economic freedom, discouraging innovation and competition as well as protecting the elite's rents. Finally, we show that economic freedom decreases with income inequality even in democratic countries, suggesting that democratic institutions do not prevent economic freedom from eroding. We argue that the latter finding corresponds to a system of political capitalism or captured democracy, where a powerful economic elite can nevertheless exercise de facto political power by cooperating with politicians and other decision-makers for their mutual benefit.     

Trade uncertainty,income, and democracy

Existing studies establish a strong correlation between income and democracy. Little, however, is known about whether income shocks driven by non-economic fundamentals matter for political transitions. This study employs trade uncertainty as a non-economic fundamental and examines the effect that trade uncertainty driven income variations have on democratic transitions over the period 1960–2013. We find that higher income fosters democratic transitions, but this effect works mainly for developing than developed countries. Specifically, using trade uncertainty as an instrument, we find that the Polity2 score, a measure of democracy, increases by at least 2.3 points following a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth. This positive association is robust to exploiting conditional heteroskedasticity for identification, using different time periods, including lagged Polity2 as a regressor, and using alternative measures of GDP and democracy.     

Income inequality and economic growth

Despite the extensive existing literature on income inequality and economic growth, there remains considerable disagreement on the effect of inequality on economic growth. Existing literatures find either a positive or a negative relationship. In this paper, we attempt to theoretically examine that relationship with a stochastic optimal growth model. We make the disagreement clear within a single model. We conclude (i) that both are possible – that is, higher inequality can retard growth in the early stage of economic development, and can encourage growth in a near steady state, (ii) that income redistribution by high income tax does not always reduce income inequality. Income inequality can be reduced by higher income tax in a near steady state, but it cannot be reduced in the early stage of economic development, and (iii) that two government polices – rapid economic growth and low income inequality – can be achieved by low income tax in the early stage of economic development, but both cannot be achieved simultaneously in a near steady state.     

LIFE SATISFACTION AND INCOME INEQUALITY

Do people care about income inequality and does income inequality affect subjective well‐being? Welfare theories can predict either a positive or a negative impact of income inequality on subjective well‐being and empirical research has found evidence of a positive, negative, or non‐significant relation. This paper attempts to determine some of the possible causes of such empirical heterogeneity. Using a very large sample of world citizens we test the consistency of the effect of income inequality in predicting life satisfaction. We find that income inequality has a negative and significant effect on life satisfaction. This result is robust to changes of regressors and estimation choices and also persists across different income groups and across different types of countries. However, this relation is easily obscured or reversed by multicollinearity generated by the use of country and year fixed effects. This is particularly true if the number of data points for inequality is small, which is a common feature of cross‐country or longitudinal studies.     

中国农村的收入差距与健康

随着收入差距的扩大,收入分配对健康和健康不平等的影响日益受到关注。本文利用中国健康营养调查(CHNS)1997年和2000年农村的面板数据回答两个问题:收入差距对健康的影响以及影响健康的方式;收入差距的扩大是否会导致健康不平等的加剧,尤其是低收入人群的健康是否受到更为不利的影响。研究发现,首先收入差距对健康的影响存在滞后效应;其次,收入差距对健康的影响呈现“倒U”型,在收入差距较高时,收入差距对健康的影响主要为负向的,一个可能的原因是收入差距影响到公共卫生设施的供给。再次,收入差距的扩大会加强收入效应,其含义是如果低收入人群的收入更容易受到负向冲击,那么收入差距对低收入人群的健康更为不利。     

An empirical investigation of long-run growth in the UK

In this paper the long-run growth of the UK economy is analysed over the period 1855–1997, using a Markov-switching cointegration approach. We find that long-run economic growth can be explained by two permanent shocks, namely a technological shock and a labour supply shock. While technological progress seems to have a positive impact on the wage share and on income equality, the labour supply shock has the opposite effect, contributing to income inequality. Both shocks have a positive impact on aggregate output, but the bulk of long-run output growth variability is explained by the labour supply shock, suggesting that inequality is not harmful to growth.     

PRICE SEARCH,CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY AND EXPENDITURE INEQUALITY OVER THE LIFE ‐CYCLE

We differentiate consumption from expenditure by incorporating price search decision into an otherwise standard life‐cycle model. We first analytically show that, under very general conditions, poorer households search more and pay lower prices compared to wealthier ones. As a result, consumption inequality is smaller than expenditure inequality, and the gap between them increases over the life‐cycle. Next, using a plausibly calibrated model, we find that life‐cycle increase in consumption inequality is about 30% lower than the increase in expenditure inequality. Price search provides an insurance mechanism against income shocks and increases the welfare of a newborn by 3.9%.     

A farewell to critical junctures: Sorting out long-run causality of income and democracy

We consider the empirical relevance of two opposing hypotheses on the causality between income and democracy: The Democratic Transition hypothesis claims that rising incomes cause a transition to democracy, whereas the Critical Junctures hypothesis denies this causal relation. Our empirical strategy is motivated by Unified Growth Theory, which hypothesizes that the present international income differences have roots in the prehistoric past. Thus, we use prehistoric measures of biogeography as instruments for modern income levels, and find a large long-run causal effect of income on the degree of democracy. This result rejects the Critical Junctures hypothesis, which is an important part of the Primacy of Institutions view.     

Income,inequality, and the stability of democracy — Another look at the Lipset hypothesis

This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes, in particular democracy, oligarchy and mass dictatorship, in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The political regime is shown to depend not only on income levels, but also, in particular, on resource inequality. The main results imply that under any economic environment a distribution of resources exists such that democracy is the political outcome. This distribution is independent of the particular income level if the income share generated by the poor is sufficiently large. On the other hand, there are distributions of resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium regardless of the level of economic development. The model also delivers results on the stability of democracy. Variations in inequality across several dimensions due to unbalanced technological change, immigration or changes in the demographic structure affect the scope for democracy or may even lead to its breakdown. Among other historical examples, the results are consistent with the different political regimes that emerged in Germany after its unification in 1871.     

Effects of monetary and government spending policy on economic inequality

Using detailed micro-level income and expenditure data, we study the effects of monetary and government spending policy shocks on income and expenditure inequality in the US from 1990 to 2018. We find that expansionary monetary and government spending policy shocks systematically decrease income, disposable income and expenditure inequality. There is evidence of time variation on the effects and monetary policy and transfer payment shocks. Various impulse responses suggest that the impacts of the policy shocks increase during and after the Great Recession. The responses of income and expenditures of households at different percentiles suggest that expansionary monetary and government spending policy have a larger positive impact on households with low income and expenditures relative to those at the top of the distribution. We do not find evidence of the significant impact of Quantitative Easing policies on income inequality, however, expenditure inequality appear to increase due to the policies.     

An experimental study of democracy breakdown,income and inequality

Many empirical studies investigate the relationships between economic development, inequality, and democracy survival; however, establishing causal links with naturally occurring cross-country data is problematic. We address this question in a laboratory experiment, where in democracy citizens can invest in profitable projects and vote on income taxation. In the alternative regime—autocracy—efficient investment levels and equitable redistribution are implemented exogenously, but there is a risk of resources being partially expropriated. Citizens can voluntarily switch from democracy to autocracy by a majority vote, which mimics recent historical examples, where voters voluntarily delegate political powers to an autocrat in exchange for a promise of high taxation and redistribution. We find that the likelihood of democracy breakdown increases with the degree of inequality but does not vary with productivity. The link between productivity and democracy survival depends critically on the degree of sophistication of the median voter.     

Income inequality, consumption, and social-status seeking

Using the Chinese Urban Household Survey data between 1997 and 2006, we find that income inequality has a negative (positive) effect on household consumption net of education expenditures (savings) even after we control for household income. We argue that people save to improve their social status when social status is associated with pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Rising income inequality can strengthen the incentives of status-seeking savings by increasing the benefit of improving status, and by enlarging the wealth level required for status upgrading. We also find that the negative effect of income inequality on consumption is stronger for poorer and younger people and that income inequality stimulates more education investment, which are consistent with the status-seeking hypothesis.     

Rule of law, democracy, openness, and income

We estimate the interrelationships among economic institutions, political institutions, openness, and income levels, using identification through heteroskedasticity (IH). We split our cross‐national dataset into two sub‐samples: (i) colonies versus non‐colonies; and (ii) continents aligned on an East–West versus those aligned on a North–South axis. We exploit the difference in the structural variances in these two sub‐samples to gain identification. We find that democracy and the rule of law are both good for economic performance, but the latter has a much stronger impact on incomes. Openness (trade/GDP) has a negative impact on income levels and democracy, but a positive effect on rule of law. Higher income produces greater openness and better institutions, but these effects are not very strong. Rule of law and democracy tend to be mutually reinforcing.     

Inequality and the business cycle: evidence from U.S. survey data

ABSTRACT

We study the effects of macroeconomic shocks on measures of economic inequality obtained from U.S. survey data. To identify aggregate supply, aggregate demand, and monetary policy shocks, we estimate vector autoregressions and impose sign and zero restrictions on impulse response functions. We find that the effects of the macroeconomic shocks on inequality depend on the type of shock as well as on the measure of inequality considered. Contractionary monetary policy shocks increase expenditure and consumption inequality, whereas income and earnings inequality are less affected. Adverse aggregate supply and demand shocks increase income and earnings inequality, but reduce expenditure and consumption inequality. Our results suggest that different channels dominate in the transmission of the shocks. The earnings heterogeneity channel is consistent with the inequality dynamics after monetary policy shocks, but it appears to be less crucial when the economy is hit by either aggregate supply or aggregate demand shocks. Using variance decompositions, we find that although the macroeconomic shocks account for large shares of the variation in the macroeconomic variables, their contributions to the dynamics of the inequality measures are limited.     

Distributional Consequences of Commodity Price Shocks: Australia Over A Century

This paper studies the distributional impact of commodity price shocks over the short and the very long run. Using a GARCH model, we find that Australia experienced more volatility than many commodity exporting developing countries over the periods 1865–1940 and 1960–2008. We conduct cointegration tests to assess the commodity price shock inequality nexus. A single equation error correction model suggests that commodity price shocks increase the income share of the top 1, 0.05, and 0.01 percent in the short run. The very top end of the income distribution benefits from commodity booms disproportionately more than the rest of the society. The short run effect is mainly driven by wool and mining and not agricultural commodities. A sustained increase in the price of renewables (wool) reduces inequality whereas the same for non‐renewable resources (minerals) increases inequality. We expect that the initial distribution of land and mineral resources explains the asymmetric result.     

Volunteering and life or financial shocks: does income and wealth matter?

Volunteering is a dominant social force that signals a healthy state. However, although the literature on volunteering is extensive, knowledge on how life’s discontinuities (life and financial shocks) affect volunteering is limited because most studies work with static (cross-sectional) data. To reduce this shortcoming, we use longitudinal data from Australia (HILDA) that track the same individuals over time to assess how individuals from different income and wealth groups respond to life and financial shocks with respect to volunteering. Although both income and wealth can act as buffers against life shocks by providing stability and reducing vulnerability – which decreases the need to actually change behaviour patterns – we observe more heterogeneity than expected and also stickiness at the lowest income levels. Response delays in post-shock volunteering also suggest that volunteering habits may be driven and influenced by strong commitment and motivation that are not shattered by life or financial shocks. In fact, the amount of time spent volunteering tends to increase after negative income shocks and decrease after positive income shocks.     

Inequality and volatility moderation in Russia: Evidence from micro-level panel data on consumption and income

We construct key household and individual economic variables using a panel micro data set from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) for 1994–2005. We analyze cross-sectional income and consumption inequality trends and find that inequality decreased during the 2000–2005 economic recovery. The decrease appears to be driven by falling volatility of transitory income shocks. The response of consumption to permanent and transitory income shocks becomes weaker later in the sample, consistent with greater self-insurance against permanent shocks and greater smoothing of transitory shocks. Finally, expenditure and income inequality in Russia are not far apart.